ABSTRACT

The aftermath of the recent Gaza War ceasefire has introduced a transformative narrative to the intricate geopolitics of the Middle East. This shifting landscape is not limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but extends its influence across key strategic and economic domains. Among the most striking developments is the announcement by the Houthis to cease attacks on maritime activities not linked to Israel, a declaration laden with implications for the fragile stability of the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The stakes are enormous, as these waters serve as vital arteries of international trade, facilitating the transit of substantial energy exports and global commerce. This moment of recalibration is deeply intertwined with broader regional trends and emerging challenges.

The Houthis’ shift comes at a time when regional actors, traditionally entrenched in confrontations, appear to lean cautiously toward de-escalation. However, this evolution is far from straightforward. The Houthis, operating as a non-state actor with profound ties to Iran, have long utilized their strategic positioning along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as leverage against adversaries. By targeting vessels and disrupting critical trade routes, they have consistently highlighted the vulnerabilities of global markets to asymmetric threats. The intersection of their actions with the larger geopolitical chessboard underscores the importance of their recent announcement. Yet, questions of trust, enforcement, and long-term adherence complicate the narrative.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a maritime chokepoint of immense strategic significance, connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and facilitates over 10% of the world’s seaborne trade. Its importance transcends the economic realm, embedding it within the fabric of international security. Historically, disruptions in this corridor have reverberated through global supply chains, amplifying economic uncertainty. The Houthis have weaponized these vulnerabilities, employing advanced technologies such as unmanned surface vehicles and precision-guided missiles. These tools have transformed the nature of maritime security, marking a significant evolution in the tactics of non-state actors. The damage inflicted by their actions extends beyond the immediate cost of lost trade, influencing insurance premiums, shipping routes, and the broader calculus of international commerce.

The recent ceasefire agreement, brokered amidst heightened tensions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has inadvertently created an environment ripe for secondary actors like the Houthis to reassess their strategies. Their pledge, articulated through the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center, signals an intent to align their operations with the broader diplomatic tone of the region. However, the conditional nature of their commitments raises critical questions about the durability of such promises. The upcoming phase of the ceasefire agreement, scheduled to unfold in the coming weeks, will serve as a litmus test for the Houthis’ intentions and the mechanisms designed to ensure compliance.

Enforcement remains a formidable challenge. The Houthis’ history of targeting vessels, often on ambiguous grounds, introduces layers of complexity to monitoring and verification efforts. The maritime industry, already grappling with heightened risks, faces the dual task of adapting to immediate threats while recalibrating its operational models for a volatile future. The resilience of global trade depends heavily on the ability of international coalitions to bridge gaps in security frameworks and mitigate ambiguities that could trigger renewed hostilities.

The Red Sea’s enduring role as a critical global trade corridor is further underscored by its historical and geopolitical resonance. This region, linking continents and civilizations, has been a nexus of power struggles for centuries. The contemporary narrative, shaped by technological advances and shifting alliances, reflects the evolving nature of these conflicts. The Houthis’ actions, emblematic of the asymmetric tactics employed by modern insurgent groups, challenge traditional paradigms of power projection and defense.

The technological sophistication of the Houthis has redefined their strategic posture. Deploying unmanned surface vehicles, drones, and precision missiles, they have elevated the threat profile of non-state actors to unprecedented levels. Incidents such as the targeting of commercial vessels with advanced drones or the deployment of explosive-laden boats illustrate the intersection of technological innovation and strategic intent. These actions, while disruptive, also expose the vulnerabilities inherent in maritime defense systems, prompting a reevaluation of global security priorities.

Economically, the repercussions of Houthi aggression ripple through multiple dimensions, from heightened shipping costs to broader trade disruptions. The reclassification of the Red Sea as a high-risk zone exemplifies the tangible impacts on global commerce. Insurance premiums, rerouted traffic, and operational delays collectively underscore the financial toll of insecurity in the region. For nations heavily reliant on these waters, such as Egypt, the implications extend to critical revenue streams like the Suez Canal, compounding the challenges of an already volatile economic environment.

The evolving narrative of the Red Sea and its surrounding regions is emblematic of the broader transformations reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics. The confluence of strategic, economic, and technological factors demands a nuanced approach to security and diplomacy. The Houthis’ announcement, while significant, is but one facet of a complex equation. Its implications for maritime security, global trade, and regional stability highlight the interconnectedness of contemporary challenges.

As the ceasefire framework unfolds, the interplay between local conflicts and global interests will shape the trajectory of the region. The Houthis’ recalibration, driven by a mix of strategic necessity and external pressures, underscores the fragile equilibrium that defines the current moment. The broader implications for maritime security, economic stability, and geopolitical alignments remain pivotal, framing a narrative that is as dynamic as it is uncertain. This evolving story serves as a microcosm of the complexities that define the modern Middle East, offering lessons in resilience, adaptation, and the enduring quest for stability amidst a landscape of uncertainty.

Summary Table: Detailed Analysis of Geopolitical, Economic, and Strategic Implications in the Red Sea Region

Category	Details
Geopolitical Context	The aftermath of the Gaza War ceasefire has led to transformative shifts in the Middle East, influencing both local and global power dynamics. The Houthis’ declaration to halt attacks on non-Israeli-linked maritime assets reflects strategic recalibration amid broader de-escalatory efforts by regional powers. This moment is marked by both opportunities and risks, with the fragility of commitments underscored by the complexity of enforcement and verification.
Strategic Importance of the Red Sea	The Bab el-Mandeb Strait serves as a critical chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, facilitating over 10% of global seaborne trade and a substantial share of energy exports to Europe and Asia. Disruptions in this corridor reverberate across global markets, raising stakes for maritime security. Historically, the Houthis have exploited this strategic position through attacks involving unmanned surface vehicles, missiles, and drones, causing trade disruptions, increased insurance premiums, and rerouted shipping. These actions have demonstrated the intersection of asymmetric warfare and global economic stability, elevating the region’s importance in international security frameworks.
Houthi Technological Capabilities	The Houthis have adopted advanced military technologies that have significantly raised the threat profile of non-state actors: – Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs): Remotely operated vessels equipped with explosive payloads capable of targeting moving military and commercial ships. They can evade advanced radar systems and pursue targets, exemplified by the December 2023 attack on a Liberian-flagged tanker. – Precision Missiles: Iranian-supplied Quds-1 and Quds-2 series missiles, capable of long-range strikes. Tactical use includes layered offensive strategies involving drones and missiles to overwhelm defenses. – Drones: Deployed for reconnaissance and strikes, adding a coordinated dimension to maritime aggression. In January 2024, these technologies were used to target a European commercial vessel, demonstrating the sophistication of coordinated Houthi attacks.
Economic Impacts of Houthi Aggression	The economic consequences of the Houthi maritime campaign are multifaceted: – Insurance Costs: War risk premiums for vessels transiting the Red Sea increased by over 300%, reflecting the heightened risk environment. – Trade Disruptions: Rerouted ships, including around the Cape of Good Hope, added $300,000–$400,000 per voyage in costs for large container ships. Monthly global losses totaled an estimated $7 billion. – Suez Canal Revenue Decline: Egypt’s Suez Canal Authority reported a 60.7% drop in annual revenue in 2024, falling to $4 billion from $10.2 billion in 2023, as vessel transits decreased by 51% due to shipping diversions. – Commodity Price Increases: European imports of East African agricultural produce declined by 12%, raising food prices by 6% in EU markets. – Energy Market Volatility: Disruptions led to an 18% reduction in Red Sea shipping volumes, contributing to a 9% increase in Brent Crude oil prices in late 2024.
Ceasefire Agreement	The January 19, 2025, ceasefire brokered between Hamas and Israel provides the backdrop for the Houthis’ announcement to halt attacks. The agreement’s phased implementation introduces uncertainties: – Conditionality: The HOCC emphasized that their commitment depends on the “full implementation of all phases of the agreement.” The fragility of trust mechanisms makes Phase 2 (scheduled for five weeks post-announcement) a pivotal juncture. – Monitoring Challenges: The Houthis’ history of targeting vessels with ambiguous ties to Israel complicates enforcement. Their threats to reinstate kinetic actions against perceived violations highlight the need for robust verification systems. – Maritime Industry Responses: Shipping companies remain cautious, recalibrating risk models and contingency planning. These adaptations influence global economic patterns and shape regional actors’ strategies.
Regional Geopolitical Shifts	The broader regional landscape reflects shifting alliances and priorities: – De-escalation Trends: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are advocating for stabilized trade routes while maintaining security investments. – Proxy Dynamics: Iran’s support for the Houthis, including advanced weaponry, underscores the strategic interplay of regional power struggles. – U.S. and Allied Naval Presence: U.S. and allied forces, deploying advanced assets like Standard Missile interceptors and FREMM frigates, have reduced the operational reach of Houthi attacks, intercepting 72% of strikes in 2024 compared to 51% in 2023. – Sustainability Initiatives: Investments in alternative energy infrastructure and “Green Suez Canal” initiatives reflect broader efforts to mitigate dependency on vulnerable chokepoints while aligning with environmental goals.
Future Imperatives	Achieving sustainable maritime security in the Red Sea demands a multi-pronged approach: – Technological Innovation: Investment in directed-energy weapons, advanced counter-USV systems, and real-time satellite monitoring is critical for neutralizing emerging threats. – Economic Incentives: Establishing a Red Sea security fund supported by international contributions could help mitigate the financial impact on affected nations like Yemen and Egypt. – Political Solutions: Addressing root causes of instability, including economic deprivation and governance deficits in Yemen, is essential for long-term regional peace. – Global Collaboration: Enhanced intelligence sharing, capacity building for regional navies, and coordinated international naval patrols are necessary for maintaining security and economic stability.

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In the aftermath of the recent Gaza War ceasefire, the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has witnessed seismic shifts, with ripple effects extending far beyond the epicenter of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Among these developments, the Houthis’ announcement to halt attacks on shipping not linked to Israel signals a potential turning point for maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. However, this declaration raises intricate questions about the sustainability of such commitments and their broader implications for international trade and security.

The Houthis, a key non-state actor with deep connections to Iran, have been a focal point in the broader proxy conflicts that define the region. Their recent pronouncement, issued through the Houthi-linked Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC), underscores their intention to leverage the ceasefire framework for strategic recalibration. This maneuver coincides with a broader de-escalatory tone among regional powers, albeit one fraught with uncertainties and potential pitfalls.

Geopolitical Significance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a crucial maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, serves as a linchpin for global trade routes. This 20-kilometer-wide passage facilitates the transit of over 10% of the world’s seaborne trade, including a substantial share of energy exports to Europe and Asia. Any disruption in this artery reverberates across global markets, amplifying the stakes for ensuring its security.

Historically, the Houthis have exploited this strategic vulnerability to project power and disrupt adversaries’ economic lifelines. Their attacks on vessels, whether through direct missile strikes or the deployment of unmanned maritime vehicles, have resulted in severe economic and humanitarian repercussions. The losses include hundreds of millions of dollars in trade disruptions, insurance premium hikes, and operational costs for rerouted ships. These actions underscore the intersection of asymmetric warfare and global economic stability, with the Houthis wielding maritime disruption as a strategic tool.

Contextualizing the Ceasefire in a Broader Framework

The ceasefire agreement of January 19, 2025, brokered amidst escalating tensions between Hamas and Israel, represents a diplomatic milestone with far-reaching consequences. The prisoner swap that catalyzed the truce also set the stage for secondary actors, like the Houthis, to recalibrate their positions. The timing of the HOCC’s pledge aligns with a regional shift towards negotiated de-escalation, driven by an emerging consensus among Gulf states and international powers to stabilize key trade routes.

However, the conditions attached to the Houthis’ commitment introduce layers of complexity. The HOCC’s stipulation that attacks will cease only upon the “full implementation of all phases of the agreement” highlights a conditional approach that is fraught with ambiguity. Phase 2 of the ceasefire, scheduled for implementation in five weeks, becomes a critical juncture in assessing the Houthis’ adherence to their promises. This timeline underscores the fragility of the truce and the interplay of trust and verification mechanisms in conflict resolution.

Challenges in Monitoring and Enforcement

A key challenge lies in operationalizing the Houthis’ pledge, particularly in light of their history of targeting vessels with indirect or perceived ties to Israel. The ambiguity surrounding such linkages creates a fertile ground for misinterpretation, raising the specter of renewed hostilities. The HOCC’s veiled threats to reinstate sanctions and kinetic actions against perceived aggressors further complicate the enforcement of this truce. These dynamics necessitate a robust framework for monitoring and verification, potentially involving international maritime coalitions and enhanced surveillance capabilities.

Furthermore, the maritime industry’s response to this precarious environment will shape the broader narrative of security and risk management in the Red Sea. Shipping companies may adopt a cautious approach, incorporating contingency plans and recalibrating insurance models to account for residual risks. This adaptation, in turn, could influence the economic calculus of regional actors, reinforcing the interconnectedness of security, commerce, and geopolitics.

Strategic Horizons in Maritime Security: Decoding the Houthi Impact on Global Trade and Red Sea Geopolitics

The Red Sea: A Historical and Geopolitical Keystone

The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have, for centuries, served as critical arteries of global commerce and regional power projection. From ancient trade caravans to modern-day shipping superhighways, this chokepoint connects continents, civilizations, and economic ecosystems. Its significance has drawn empires, military coalitions, and non-state actors into a perennial struggle for dominance. The recent Houthi maritime campaign has inserted yet another chapter into this storied history, bringing novel challenges to bear on an already complex geopolitical landscape.

A Technological Shift: The Houthi Arsenal and Tactical Evolution

The Houthis have embraced a technological transformation in asymmetric warfare, deploying a sophisticated mix of unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), precision-guided missiles, and aerial drones. These innovations mark a significant departure from traditional insurgent tactics, elevating the threat profile of non-state actors on a global scale. For example:

• Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)
  • These remotely operated vessels are equipped with explosive payloads capable of targeting both military and commercial vessels. Unlike conventional naval mines, USVs can actively pursue moving targets, increasing their lethality.
  • Specific incidents demonstrate their effectiveness. A December 2023 attack on a Liberian-flagged tanker revealed the Houthis’ ability to penetrate advanced radar systems, challenging even the most sophisticated maritime defenses.
• Missiles and Aerial Drones
  • The Houthis’ use of missiles, including the Iranian-supplied Quds-1 and Quds-2 series, has redefined the threat landscape. These long-range systems, combined with aerial drones for reconnaissance and strike capabilities, create a layered offensive strategy.
  • Tactical analysis of an incident in January 2024, involving the targeting of a European commercial vessel, reveals a coordinated use of these assets, designed to overwhelm defensive systems.

Economic Ramifications: Beyond Shipping Costs

The economic impact of the Houthi campaign transcends the immediate financial losses associated with damaged vessels and rerouted trade. Key dimensions include:

• Insurance Premiums and Risk Pricing
  • Maritime insurance rates for vessels traversing the Red Sea have surged by over 300%, reflecting heightened risk perceptions.
  • The reclassification of the Red Sea as a “war risk zone” by Lloyd’s of London in early 2024 further underscores the financial strain on the shipping industry.
• Regional Trade and Supply Chain Disruption
  • Countries heavily reliant on the Red Sea corridor, such as Egypt, have reported significant declines in canal revenues. The Suez Canal Authority estimates a loss of $2 billion in 2024 alone, directly attributable to rerouted traffic.
  • Global industries, including energy and consumer goods, have faced cascading delays, with the average transit time for key shipments increasing by 30%.

Military Countermeasures: Costs and Strategic Implications

The international response, spearheaded by U.S. and allied naval forces, has been both robust and resource-intensive. A detailed breakdown includes:

• Interceptor Deployments
  • Over the past year, U.S. naval vessels have launched an estimated 100 Standard Missile interceptors, with a unit cost exceeding $1.5 million each. This highlights the escalating financial burden of maintaining maritime security in the region.
• Operational Limitations
  • The strain on naval resources is evident. Continuous Red Sea patrols have necessitated frequent replenishment cycles, reducing the availability of forces for other strategic theaters.
  • The operational fatigue among crew members and the logistical demands of sustained deployments further complicate the equation.

Legal and Diplomatic Dimensions: Navigating Uncharted Waters

The Houthis’ maritime activities also raise complex legal and diplomatic questions. These include:

• Maritime Law and Accountability
  • Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the targeting of civilian vessels constitutes a clear violation. However, enforcing accountability against non-state actors like the Houthis presents unique challenges, particularly given their backing by state actors such as Iran.
• Regional Diplomacy
  • Efforts to address the crisis have exposed fault lines within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While Saudi Arabia and the UAE advocate for aggressive countermeasures, Oman and Qatar have pushed for a negotiated resolution, reflecting divergent regional priorities.

Towards a Comprehensive Strategy: Future Imperatives

Achieving sustainable security in the Red Sea requires a multi-pronged approach:

• Technological Innovation in Defense
  • The development of advanced counter-USV technologies, such as directed-energy weapons, is essential to neutralizing emerging threats.
  • Enhanced satellite-based monitoring systems can provide real-time intelligence on Houthi movements, enabling preemptive action.
• Economic Incentives for Stability
  • Establishing a Red Sea security fund, supported by international contributions, could help mitigate the economic impact on vulnerable states like Yemen and Egypt.
• Political Solutions
  • Addressing the underlying political drivers of the Yemeni conflict, including economic deprivation and governance deficits, remains critical to long-term stability.

Strategic Maritime Security in Transition: Evaluating Commitments and Regional Implications

Ambrey’s Assessment in Context: A Benchmark for Maritime Risk Analysis

The recent assessment by Ambrey, a leading maritime security firm, serves as a critical touchstone for understanding the evolving dynamics of Red Sea security in the wake of the HOCC’s announcement. Ambrey’s cautious optimism, grounded in historical precedent and real-time intelligence, underscores the inherent volatility of maritime security in regions marked by protracted conflict. The firm’s emphasis on the coming weeks as a “litmus test” for the Houthis’ credibility aligns with a broader recognition of the fragility of unilateral commitments in geopolitically sensitive zones.

Differential Risk Profiles: Navigating Nuances in Maritime Threats

Ambrey’s evaluation identifies a bifurcation in threat levels:

• Non-Israeli-Linked Shipping
  • The HOCC’s declaration has prompted a recalibration of perceived risks for non-Israeli-linked vessels. While this subset may experience a temporary reprieve, Ambrey’s analysis warns against overestimating the durability of this shift. Historical patterns suggest that ceasefires in similar contexts often serve as strategic pauses, allowing actors to regroup and recalibrate.
• Israeli-Owned and Flagged Vessels
  • In stark contrast, Israeli-linked shipping remains a focal point for potential Houthi aggression. The asymmetry in risk exposure stems from the Houthis’ explicit narrative positioning Israel as a principal adversary. Ambrey’s assessment highlights the tactical implications of this targeting, which extends beyond immediate kinetic threats to include psychological and economic dimensions, such as deterrence through unpredictability.

The Precarious Ceasefire: A Geopolitical Powder Keg

Ambrey’s warning about the ceasefire’s fragility reflects a deeper understanding of the regional power dynamics that underpin the agreement. Any perceived violations by Israel—whether military actions or diplomatic maneuvers—could act as a catalyst for renewed hostilities. The potential for escalation underscores the broader implications of localized maritime threats:

• Regional Spillover Effects
  • Maritime security in the Red Sea does not exist in isolation. A breakdown of the ceasefire could exacerbate tensions in adjacent theaters, including the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. This interconnectedness amplifies the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, transforming it into both a physical chokepoint and a geopolitical pressure point.
• Operational Preparedness and Industry Responses
  • The maritime industry’s cautious stance, as evidenced by Hapag-Lloyd’s operational pause, exemplifies a pragmatic approach to uncertainty. Companies are not merely responding to immediate threats but are also recalibrating their long-term risk management strategies. Ambrey’s role as a trusted advisor in this process highlights the value of intelligence-driven decision-making in navigating volatile environments.

The Role of International Stakeholders: Bridging Skepticism and Collaboration

The international community’s reaction to the HOCC’s pledge reflects a complex interplay of skepticism, caution, and strategic engagement. Key actors, such as the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC), have adopted a measured tone, emphasizing the need for vigilance in assessing Houthi claims.

Misinformation and Its Strategic Utility

The Houthis’ history of propagating unverified claims, such as the purported targeting of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, underscores the role of misinformation as a tool in asymmetric conflicts. This pattern necessitates a multi-layered approach to intelligence validation, combining technological capabilities with on-the-ground insights:

• Technological Integration
  • Advanced satellite imagery and signal intelligence (SIGINT) play a crucial role in debunking false claims. For instance, the rapid dismissal of Houthi allegations against U.S. Navy vessels illustrates the efficacy of real-time data analysis in mitigating the strategic impact of misinformation.
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
  • Complementing technological tools, HUMINT provides contextual understanding that is critical for interpreting intent and operational capabilities. The integration of these intelligence streams enhances the accuracy of risk assessments, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions.

Pragmatism in Corporate Strategy: The Case of Hapag-Lloyd

Hapag-Lloyd’s stance, articulated by spokesperson Tim Seifert, highlights the maritime industry’s nuanced understanding of geopolitical risks. By prioritizing continuous monitoring over premature action, the company exemplifies a proactive yet cautious approach to risk management. This philosophy reflects a broader trend among industry leaders, who recognize that stability in conflict zones is often transient and conditional.

Towards a Holistic Maritime Security Framework

The convergence of strategic, economic, and operational challenges necessitates a comprehensive approach to maritime security in the Red Sea. This framework must balance immediate threat mitigation with long-term conflict resolution, integrating contributions from state and non-state actors alike.

• Enhanced Intelligence Sharing
  • Regional collaboration through mechanisms like the JMIC can bridge informational gaps, ensuring that stakeholders operate with a shared understanding of emerging threats.
• Capacity Building for Regional Navies
  • Empowering local forces to assume a greater role in securing their waters is critical for sustainable security. Investments in training, technology transfer, and infrastructure development can enhance the resilience of regional actors.
• Economic and Political Stabilization
  • Addressing the root causes of instability, including economic deprivation and governance deficits, is essential for reducing the appeal of asymmetric tactics. This requires a coordinated effort involving international donors, development agencies, and local stakeholders.

Economic Realignment Through Maritime and Financial Shifts: A Comprehensive Analysis of Suez Canal and Egypt’s Economic Landscape in 2025

The Suez Canal stands as a linchpin in global trade dynamics, reflecting the profound interplay between geopolitical stability, maritime strategy, and economic imperatives. In the aftermath of significant disruptions stemming from tensions in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the canal has entered a pivotal phase of recovery, underscoring the resilience of Egypt’s infrastructure and its critical role in international commerce. The recent statement by the Suez Canal Authority (SCA) encapsulates this transition, highlighting efforts to restore maritime flows to pre-disruption levels. The canal’s resurgence as a robust trade corridor marks not just a technical achievement but a strategic recalibration in the face of multifaceted challenges.

Category	Details
Suez Canal Operations	The Suez Canal has resumed operations at maximum capacity following significant disruptions caused by geopolitical instability in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Suez Canal Authority (SCA), under the leadership of Osama Rabie, has implemented measures to restore maritime services, ensuring the seamless flow of global trade. Collaborative efforts between the SCA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) aim to secure long-term operational stability. Rabie highlighted the integration of new maritime services, including ship repair, waste management, fueling stations, and emergency response systems. Additionally, ongoing infrastructure upgrades, such as the southern canal sector expansion, have enhanced the canal’s capacity to manage increased vessel traffic and emergencies, solidifying its strategic role in international trade.
2024 Operational Challenges	In 2024, the Suez Canal faced unprecedented challenges, including a 51% drop in vessel transits during the first quarter of FY 2024/2025. Transit revenues plummeted by 61.2%, amounting to $931.2 million compared to $2.4 billion during the same period in the previous fiscal year. The annual number of ships transiting the canal fell from 26,400 in 2023 to 13,200 in 2024, with daily traffic declining from 75–80 ships to 32–35 ships. These disruptions were primarily driven by heightened tensions in the Red Sea and rerouted shipping paths. The canal’s revenue for 2024 totaled $4 billion, marking a 60.7% decrease from $10.2 billion in 2023. These figures underscore the vulnerability of critical maritime chokepoints to geopolitical instability and highlight the financial ramifications for global trade and regional economies.
Infrastructure Upgrades	The SCA has prioritized significant infrastructure developments to enhance the canal’s capacity and resilience. These upgrades include the addition of a 10-kilometer stretch of double canal from kilometer 122 to kilometer 132, supported by updated hydrographic charts developed by the Egyptian Navy’s Hydrographic Division. The operational phase of these improvements, set to commence in early 2025, aims to increase the canal’s capacity and ensure safe navigation for larger vessels. Furthermore, the SCA is constructing 29 state-of-the-art tugboats, including models with 90-ton ASD winches, and has introduced 27 aluminum pilot boats for enhanced pilot boarding operations. The deployment of these assets strengthens the canal’s ability to manage emergencies and accommodate modern shipping demands.
Green Suez Canal Initiative	The Suez Canal’s commitment to sustainability is exemplified by the “Green Suez Canal” initiative. This program focuses on reducing the environmental impact of canal operations through eco-friendly technologies. Efforts include converting vessels to biofuel, utilizing clean energy at pilot stations, and implementing sustainable waste disposal systems. These initiatives align with international maritime standards and contribute to global environmental goals, positioning the canal as a leader in sustainable maritime operations.
Strategic Maritime Partnerships	Collaboration between the SCA and international entities, including the IMO, underscores the canal’s strategic importance to global trade. During a meeting with IMO Secretary-General Arsenio Dominguez, Rabie emphasized the canal’s commitment to aligning with international maritime goals, including safety, efficiency, and environmental sustainability. Dominguez commended the SCA’s advancements in logistical services and expressed interest in future partnerships for pollution control training and other collaborative programs. These partnerships enhance the canal’s global standing and ensure alignment with evolving international trade and environmental standards.
Economic Impacts	Egypt’s broader economic landscape reflects the challenges and opportunities associated with Suez Canal operations. The country’s balance of payments (BOP) recorded a deficit of $991.2 million in Q1 FY 2024/2025, contrasting with a $228.8 million surplus in the same period the previous year. This shift was driven by a $6.1 billion increase in the trade deficit and a 22.1% reduction in the services surplus, largely due to declining Suez Canal revenues. Oil trade deficits widened significantly, with oil imports nearly doubling to $5.4 billion and oil exports falling by $415.8 million. Non-oil trade deficits also expanded by $3.2 billion, driven by increased imports of wheat, soybeans, pharmaceuticals, and spare parts. Despite these challenges, rising remittances and increased FDI inflows have provided some relief. Remittances from Egyptians abroad surged by 84.7% to $8.4 billion, and tourism revenues increased by 8.2% to $4.8 billion. Foreign direct investment in non-oil sectors grew to $2.9 billion, further supporting economic stability amid ongoing challenges.
Tourism and Remittances	Tourism and remittances emerged as key drivers of economic resilience in Egypt. Tourism revenues rose by 8.2% in Q1 FY 2024/2025, reaching $4.8 billion, fueled by an increase in tourist arrivals and extended overnight stays. Remittances from Egyptians working abroad surged dramatically, increasing by 84.4% to $8.3 billion, reflecting the importance of expatriate contributions to the national economy. These inflows partially offset the decline in canal revenues and broader trade challenges, highlighting the critical role of diversified income streams in maintaining economic stability.
Future Projections	Looking ahead, the Suez Canal is projected to generate $9 billion in revenue for FY 2024/2025, signaling a potential recovery from recent downturns. The canal’s enhanced capacity and diversified services, coupled with stability in the Red Sea region, are expected to attract increased maritime traffic. Additionally, Egypt’s ongoing investments in green energy and infrastructure projects, such as LNG terminals and advanced navigation systems, position the country for long-term growth and resilience in global trade dynamics. The strategic focus on sustainability, efficiency, and collaboration ensures that the canal remains a vital artery for international commerce, contributing significantly to Egypt’s economic recovery and global standing.

The recovery effort gains further significance when contextualized within the sharp downturn experienced in 2024. A steep 51% decline in vessel transits during the first quarter of the 2024/2025 fiscal year illustrates the gravity of disruptions, compounded by a precipitous 61.2% fall in transit revenues to $931.2 million. This contraction, contrasted against the prior year’s $2.4 billion revenue, serves as a stark indicator of the vulnerabilities inherent in global trade corridors during periods of geopolitical instability. The Suez Canal’s annual throughput in 2024, reduced to 13,200 vessels from 26,400 in 2023, with daily traffic plummeting from an average of 80 ships to just 35, underscores the scale of operational challenges.

The strategic measures undertaken by the SCA, including the integration of advanced maritime services, are pivotal in countering these setbacks. The canal’s capability to accommodate the CMA CGM shipping line as part of its EPIC trade route between South Asia and Europe exemplifies these initiatives. Chairman Osama Rabie’s emphasis on services such as ship repair, maritime ambulance operations, and waste management reflects a shift toward a comprehensive value proposition for global shipping stakeholders. Moreover, these enhancements extend to infrastructural upgrades, with the southern sector’s capacity increased to manage emergencies and sustain six to eight vessels simultaneously. The forthcoming operational phase of the canal expansion in the Small Bitter Lakes region, with the Egyptian Navy’s updated hydrographic charts, epitomizes the forward-thinking strategies underpinning the SCA’s efforts to fortify maritime reliability.

At the nexus of these advancements lies the canal’s alignment with sustainability imperatives, encapsulated in the “Green Suez Canal” initiative. The integration of biofuel-powered vessels, renewable energy at pilot stations, and eco-conscious waste disposal mechanisms signals a commitment to environmental stewardship alongside economic efficiency. Concurrently, the deployment of 27 aluminum pilot boats and ongoing construction of 29 tugboats, featuring innovations such as 90-ton ASD winches, underscores the SCA’s investment in operational excellence. The anticipated $9 billion in transit revenue for the 2024/2025 fiscal year, although ambitious, reflects cautious optimism in the canal’s capacity to rebound and adapt.

The canal’s evolution mirrors broader economic currents in Egypt, which are shaped by intricate interactions of trade, investment, and fiscal policy. The nation’s balance of payments (BOP) dynamics in the first quarter of 2024/2025 reveal stark contrasts: a shift from a surplus of $228.8 million in the prior year to a deficit of $991.2 million. This downturn is attributable to a $6.1 billion surge in the trade deficit, coupled with a 22.1% reduction in the services surplus to $4.1 billion. The dual impact of declining Suez Canal receipts and an expanded oil trade deficit exacerbates these challenges, with oil imports doubling to $5.4 billion and exports falling by $415.8 million.

Notwithstanding these headwinds, the Egyptian economy demonstrates pockets of resilience. The 84.7% surge in current transfers to $8.4 billion, bolstered by remittances from expatriates and rising tourism revenues, provides a vital counterbalance to fiscal pressures. Tourism alone, fueled by an 8.2% rise in revenue to $4.8 billion, underscores the sector’s potential as a cornerstone of economic recovery. Similarly, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, totaling $2.7 billion in Q1 FY 2024/2025, highlight the country’s ongoing appeal to international investors. Greenfield investments, capital increases in existing ventures, and rising non-resident real estate investments collectively signal a diversified and resilient FDI portfolio.

The intricate dynamics of Egypt’s oil and non-oil trade reveal nuanced trends. The widening of the non-oil trade deficit to $9.8 billion, driven by increased imports of wheat, soybeans, pharmaceuticals, and spare parts, reflects both domestic consumption patterns and external supply chain dependencies. Conversely, export growth in agricultural produce, aluminum, and industrial goods such as wires and cables points to areas of competitive strength. These developments align with broader strategic priorities, including diversification of trade partners and enhanced value chain integration.

Despite fiscal constraints, the Egyptian government’s approach to capitalizing on strategic assets, such as the Suez Canal, reveals a coherent vision for navigating economic turbulence. Dominguez’s commendation of the SCA’s advancements aligns with the International Maritime Organization’s objectives, reinforcing Egypt’s stature as a pivotal player in global maritime governance. The integration of pollution control training and environmental initiatives within the SCA’s operations highlights a forward-looking commitment to sustainable practices, aligning with international benchmarks and bolstering Egypt’s strategic positioning.

In summation, the narrative of the Suez Canal and Egypt’s economic trajectory in 2025 is one of resilience, adaptation, and strategic foresight. From the restoration of maritime flows to the recalibration of fiscal policies, the interplay of global trade dynamics, infrastructural investments, and sustainability imperatives underscores Egypt’s capacity to navigate complex economic landscapes. As the canal resumes its role as a global trade artery, its evolution serves as a microcosm of broader economic transformations, where challenges are met with innovation, collaboration, and a steadfast commitment to progress.

Economic Category	Details
Suez Canal Revenue Trends	Suez Canal revenue in 2024 plummeted to $4 billion, a sharp 60.7% decline from $10.2 billion in 2023. In Q1 FY 2024/2025, revenue fell 61.2% year-on-year, reaching $931.2 million compared to $2.4 billion in the previous period. This downturn resulted from a 51% reduction in vessel transits, with daily traffic falling from 75-80 ships in 2023 to just 32-35 ships in 2024. Net tonnage transiting the canal decreased by 68.4%, highlighting the profound impact of geopolitical instability and rerouted shipping paths on canal operations.
Balance of Payments (BOP)	Egypt recorded a balance of payments (BOP) deficit of $991.2 million in Q1 FY 2024/2025, a stark contrast to the $228.8 million surplus in the same period the previous year. The current account deficit widened significantly to $5.9 billion, up from $2.8 billion, primarily due to a $6.1 billion expansion in the trade deficit and a 22.1% reduction in the services surplus to $4.1 billion. Declining Suez Canal revenues were a major contributing factor. However, these losses were partially mitigated by an 84.7% surge in current transfers to $8.4 billion, driven by remittances from Egyptians abroad.
Oil Trade Deficit	The oil trade deficit widened significantly to $4.2 billion in Q1 FY 2024/2025, up from $1.3 billion in the same period the previous year. Oil imports nearly doubled to $5.4 billion, driven by surging imports of oil products and natural gas. Crude oil imports declined slightly, falling by $191.9 million due to reduced quantities. Conversely, oil exports dropped by $415.8 million to $1.2 billion, reflecting a sharp decline in crude oil (-$526.6 million) and natural gas exports (-$24.2 million). These trends underline Egypt’s increasing dependency on imported energy products and the challenges posed by global energy market volatility.
Non-Oil Trade Deficit	The non-oil trade deficit expanded by $3.2 billion, reaching $9.8 billion in Q1 FY 2024/2025, compared to $6.6 billion in the previous year. This was driven by a $4.4 billion rise in non-oil merchandise imports and a $1.2 billion increase in non-oil merchandise exports. Key import increases included wheat, soybeans, pharmaceuticals, and spare parts for electric appliances. On the export side, notable growth was seen in fresh and dried fruits, aluminum, vegetables, and industrial goods like wires and cables. These trends illustrate Egypt’s continued reliance on essential imports while highlighting modest export growth in specific sectors.
Remittances	Remittances from Egyptians working abroad surged by 84.4% in Q1 FY 2024/2025, totaling $8.3 billion, compared to $4.5 billion in the previous year. This significant increase provided critical support for Egypt’s economy, partially offsetting the sharp decline in Suez Canal revenues and trade surpluses. The rise in remittances underscores the importance of expatriate contributions as a stabilizing factor in the nation’s financial system.
Tourism Revenue	Tourism revenues grew by 8.2% in Q1 FY 2024/2025, reaching $4.8 billion compared to $4.5 billion in the previous year. This growth was fueled by an increase in the number of tourist nights, reflecting improved stability in Egypt’s travel sector. Tourism remains a vital component of Egypt’s foreign exchange earnings, providing a much-needed counterbalance to other economic challenges.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)	Net FDI inflows into Egypt totaled $2.7 billion in Q1 FY 2024/2025, up from $1.8 billion in the same period last year. This growth was driven by $304.9 million in proceeds from the sale of local entities to non-residents, a significant increase from $15.4 million the previous year. Net inflows from greenfield investments and capital increases in existing companies reached $1.1 billion, while real estate investments by non-residents totaled $359.4 million. FDI outflows in the oil sector declined to $175.7 million, compared to $247.8 million previously, as payments for exploration and development by foreign partners fell to $1.4 billion from $1.6 billion.
E-Card Payments Abroad	Payments made through e-cards abroad dropped sharply by 59.7% in Q1 FY 2024/2025, falling to $406.7 million compared to $1 billion in the same period last year. This decline reflects reduced consumer spending abroad, likely influenced by broader economic challenges and currency pressures within Egypt.
Key Sectoral Insights	– Agriculture: Increased imports of wheat and soybeans reflect rising domestic demand and supply chain dependencies, while exports of fresh and dried fruits and vegetables show growth potential in niche markets. – Industrial Goods: Growth in aluminum and industrial exports such as wires and cables highlights resilience in manufacturing, despite increased import costs for spare parts and components. – Energy: Rising oil and natural gas imports underscore the challenges of meeting domestic energy needs amid declining production and exports.
Future Economic Projections	The SCA projects $9 billion in revenue for FY 2024/2025, reflecting optimism about recovering maritime traffic and canal operations. Investments in green energy, LNG infrastructure, and advanced maritime services are expected to bolster long-term economic stability. While challenges such as trade deficits and rising import costs persist, strategic investments and increasing revenues from remittances, tourism, and FDI provide a pathway toward recovery and resilience.

Comprehensive Analysis of Red Sea Maritime Reopenings: Economic, Logistical, and Market Implications for Global Shipping in 2025

The potential resumption of large-scale maritime activity through the Red Sea presents a transformative yet highly uncertain landscape for global trade. The region, a vital artery for international shipping, has been plagued by disruptions stemming from geopolitical instability, with container ship traffic diverted for over a year. The consequences of these disruptions have been profound, touching every aspect of global logistics, economic forecasting, and freight market stability. This analysis delves deeply into the data, exploring the intricate implications of a potential Red Sea reopening, backed by precise metrics and exclusive insights.

Maritime Traffic and Red Sea Importance

The Red Sea accounts for 12% of global trade flows, with an estimated 25,000 ships annually transiting through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal under normal conditions. In monetary terms, the canal facilitates the movement of $1.3 trillion worth of goods per year. However, geopolitical instability, exacerbated by the Houthi conflict in Yemen, has disrupted these flows, leading to a 51% reduction in vessel transits through the Suez Canal in 2024. This decline translated to daily traffic falling from an average of 75–80 vessels in 2023 to just 32–35 vessels in 2024.

For perspective, shipping diversions around the Cape of Good Hope increased voyage distances by an average of 6,000 nautical miles, adding 10–14 days to transit times and raising costs by $300,000–$400,000 per voyage for large container vessels. The financial burden of these rerouted shipments totaled an estimated $7 billion monthly, with global shipping costs increasing by 22% during the peak of the crisis.

Projected Impact on Freight Markets

The global shipping industry operates on finely tuned networks, where even minor disruptions can have cascading effects. A full-scale return of vessels to the Red Sea is expected to disrupt existing schedules due to the logistical complexity of transitioning routes back to their original paths. Given that a single round-trip voyage between Shanghai and New York can span 30–40 days, the realignment process is estimated to take 60–90 days to stabilize.

During the initial transition, freight rates are likely to experience significant volatility. Historically, average spot rates on the Far East–North Europe route surged by 426% in July 2024 due to capacity misalignment and congestion. For 2025, estimates suggest spot rates could initially climb by 35–40% during the adjustment period, only to decline precipitously as capacity outstrips demand. This trend is compounded by the projected delivery of 2.7 million TEU of new container capacity globally, the highest annual increase since 2008, exacerbating the oversupply problem.

Red Sea traffic volumes – Toggle between the tabs to view Bab el Mandeb and Suez Canal stats 

Images : Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence / Seasearcher

TEU-Mile Demand and Capacity Management

A return to the Red Sea would result in a sharp reduction in global TEU-mile demand, a critical metric that factors both the volume of containers transported and the distances traveled. Pre-crisis, global TEU-mile demand was approximately 135 trillion TEU-miles annually. The diversion around the Cape of Good Hope added 12–15% to this figure in 2024, increasing operational costs and raising freight prices.

In 2025, even with projected global container volume growth of 3% (to approximately 170 million TEU), the reestablishment of Red Sea routes is expected to reduce TEU-mile demand by 11% compared to 2024 levels. This reduction equates to approximately 14 trillion TEU-miles eliminated, primarily impacting carriers’ profitability metrics, as lower TEU-miles diminish the cost-efficiency of existing fleets.

To counterbalance this anticipated oversupply, the industry would need to retire or idle an estimated 1.8 million TEU of capacity. However, despite improved capacity management strategies, the projected ship scrapping volume of 500,000–700,000 TEU in 2025 is unlikely to offset the influx of new vessels, leaving the market vulnerable to downward pressure on freight rates.

Economic Implications for Shippers

The reopening of the Red Sea poses both opportunities and risks for shippers, particularly regarding freight procurement. Spot rates on the Shanghai–New York route, currently averaging $6,590 per FEU (14% higher than early 2024 levels), are expected to drop significantly as market equilibrium shifts. However, long-term contract rates remain elevated at $3,765 per FEU, reflecting carriers’ cautious approach to pricing amid ongoing uncertainties.

Index-linked contracts are emerging as a preferred solution, allowing shippers to align freight costs with market movements. For example, Xeneta data reveals that such contracts could save shippers up to 25% annually compared to fixed-rate agreements during volatile periods. This model is particularly advantageous as shippers navigate the dual challenges of adjusting supply chains and renegotiating contracts.

Operational Strategies and Phased Reentry

The resumption of container traffic through the Red Sea is unlikely to occur in a uniform manner. Major carriers, including Maersk and CMA CGM, have developed contingency plans featuring dual service schedules: one based on Cape of Good Hope diversions and another utilizing the Red Sea. Initial phases are expected to involve smaller vessels (below 10,000 TEU) to test navigational safety and operational feasibility. Gradual scaling to larger vessels (18,000–24,000 TEU) is anticipated over six to nine months, depending on the security situation.

This phased approach reflects lessons learned from prior crises, where abrupt reentries led to severe congestion and inefficiencies. For instance, when the Suez Canal was blocked in 2021, it took nearly three months for global supply chains to fully recover. The industry’s cautious strategy aims to mitigate such risks while balancing operational and financial considerations.

The sustainability of Red Sea operations hinges on the region’s political and security environment. While the ceasefire offers a promising framework, its durability remains uncertain. The history of intermittent conflict in Yemen underscores the risks of renewed hostilities, which could disrupt maritime activity once again.

From a long-term perspective, investments in infrastructure and alternative routes, such as expanded rail and pipeline networks in the Middle East, could reduce dependency on the Red Sea. However, such projects face significant financial and logistical hurdles, with costs projected to exceed $30 billion over the next decade. Meanwhile, advancements in maritime technology, including autonomous ships and AI-driven route optimization, hold the potential to enhance resilience and efficiency in the face of future disruptions.

The reopening of the Red Sea represents a critical juncture for the global shipping industry, with far-reaching implications for trade, economic stability, and supply chain resilience. The data underscores the complexity of this transition, where logistical challenges, market dynamics, and geopolitical factors intersect. As carriers, shippers, and policymakers navigate these uncharted waters, the strategies and decisions made in 2025 will shape the trajectory of global trade for years to come.

Category	Details
Strategic Importance of the Red Sea	The Red Sea serves as a critical chokepoint for global trade, facilitating the movement of 12% of worldwide commerce and $1.3 trillion in goods annually. Pre-crisis, an estimated 25,000 vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal, making the region indispensable for connecting Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Diversions around the Cape of Good Hope due to geopolitical instability added 6,000 nautical miles per trip, increasing voyage times by 10–14 days and raising costs by $300,000–$400,000 per voyage for large container vessels. These rerouted shipments cumulatively cost the global economy an estimated $7 billion monthly and increased overall shipping costs by 22% during the peak of the crisis.
Current Maritime Landscape	Despite the ceasefire agreement, a large-scale return of container ships to the Red Sea remains uncertain. Carriers are cautious, given the stability achieved through diversions around the Cape of Good Hope. Many have developed dual schedules for 2025, one utilizing the Cape and another assuming Red Sea reentry. Initial transitions will involve vessels under 10,000 TEU to test operational feasibility before scaling up to larger ships, including those between 18,000–24,000 TEU. The transition is estimated to take 1–2 months for basic schedule adjustments and an additional 6–9 months to achieve full stabilization. The cautious phased approach reflects the industry’s focus on risk mitigation and operational stability.
Economic and Logistical Challenges	The reopening of the Red Sea will disrupt current schedules, causing severe congestion and ripple effects throughout the supply chain. Historical precedents, such as the 2021 Suez Canal blockage, demonstrate that recovery from such disruptions can take months. For instance, when the Far East–North Europe route experienced a crisis in 2024, spot rates surged by 426% in July compared to pre-crisis levels. On major routes, such as Shanghai–New York, average transit times of 30–40 days will complicate the realignment of schedules. Initial disruptions could push spot rates 35–40% higher temporarily, followed by a potential collapse as capacity floods the market. This volatility will challenge both carriers and shippers to maintain operational and financial balance.
Impact on Freight Rates	Freight rates are expected to experience extreme fluctuations. The reestablishment of Red Sea routes will reduce global TEU-mile demand by an estimated 11% from 2024 levels, equivalent to 14 trillion TEU-miles eliminated. Despite a projected 3% growth in global container volumes (to approximately 170 million TEU), the influx of 2.7 million TEU in new vessel capacity will exacerbate the oversupply problem. To maintain market equilibrium, the industry would need to idle or scrap approximately 1.8 million TEU. However, current scrapping volumes of 500,000–700,000 TEU are insufficient, increasing the likelihood of a freight rate collapse. Spot rates on key routes, such as Shanghai–New York, remain elevated at $6,590 per FEU (14% above early 2024 levels), while long-term rates are $3,765 per FEU (up 11% year-on-year). Index-linked contracts are emerging as a solution, allowing shippers to adjust to market volatility without being locked into disadvantageous fixed rates.
Carrier and Shipper Strategies	Carriers are leveraging improved capacity management techniques and exploring phased approaches to reenter the Red Sea. Initial strategies involve smaller vessels, testing navigational safety and risk levels before scaling operations. Shippers, on the other hand, face challenges in freight procurement due to market volatility. Index-linked contracts, tied to real-time market indices such as Xeneta data, provide a flexible alternative to traditional fixed-rate agreements. These contracts allow shippers to align their costs with market movements, minimizing financial risks. For example, such contracts could save shippers up to 25% annually by avoiding overpayment during volatile periods. The dual focus on capacity management and procurement flexibility highlights the industry’s adaptive strategies to navigate the uncertainty surrounding the Red Sea’s reopening.
Phased Reentry Process	The transition back to Red Sea routes is expected to unfold in multiple phases. The initial phase will focus on smaller vessels (under 10,000 TEU), with gradual scaling to larger vessels over 6–9 months, contingent on the security situation. This approach minimizes risks and allows for incremental adjustments in schedules and port operations. Full stabilization is projected to take up to a year, as carriers work to realign global shipping networks. Challenges include synchronizing vessel availability with port schedules, mitigating congestion, and managing cascading effects on downstream supply chains.
Long-Term Regional Implications	The sustainability of Red Sea operations depends heavily on geopolitical stability. While the ceasefire represents a significant step forward, the region’s history of intermittent conflict poses ongoing risks. Investments in alternative infrastructure, such as expanded rail and pipeline networks in the Middle East, are being explored to reduce dependency on the Red Sea. However, these projects face significant financial and logistical barriers, with costs projected to exceed $30 billion over the next decade. Technological advancements, including autonomous vessels and AI-driven logistics solutions, offer potential long-term resilience but require substantial upfront investment and regulatory alignment.
Shipper Risks and Solutions	Shippers face a dual challenge: adjusting supply chains to accommodate new transit times and renegotiating freight contracts in a volatile market. Traditional long-term contracts expose shippers to significant risks if rates collapse after a Red Sea reopening. Index-linked contracts provide a viable solution, allowing shippers to track market trends and adapt accordingly. This approach reduces financial exposure and ensures competitiveness during periods of instability. However, shippers must also allocate resources to manage operational adjustments, including revised schedules and capacity planning.
Projected Market Dynamics	A large-scale return to Red Sea routes is likely to flood the market with capacity, driving freight rates down as global TEU-mile demand contracts. This environment will challenge carriers to balance fleet utilization with profitability. The anticipated removal of 1.8 million TEU from active fleets will partially offset oversupply but may not be sufficient to stabilize rates. Long-term investments in green energy and infrastructure, such as LNG-powered vessels and advanced port facilities, are expected to enhance efficiency and sustainability. These efforts, combined with improved capacity management, will shape the industry’s response to future disruptions and lay the groundwork for more resilient global supply chains.

Redefining Strategic Influence: Iran’s Proxy Network and Regional Realignment in a Transforming Middle East

The intricate dynamics of Iran’s role in the Middle East and its deep entanglement with proxy forces such as the Houthis have emerged as pivotal factors shaping the region’s stability and global implications. As a strategic cornerstone in Tehran’s regional influence, the Houthis provide a lens through which the larger picture of geopolitical shifts, military realignments, and economic pressures can be analyzed. This new phase of research will expand upon these connections and delve deeply into the mechanisms of influence, operational changes, and broader global repercussions in light of evolving alliances and rivalries.

Iran’s Proxy Strategy Under Pressure

Iran’s ability to maintain its network of proxies has been increasingly scrutinized following a series of strategic setbacks. The Houthis, who have received substantial military and logistical support from Tehran, remain among its most strategically significant allies. This support has historically included advanced anti-ship missiles, precision drones, and asymmetric warfare capabilities, enabling the Houthis to challenge regional powers and disrupt key maritime chokepoints.

However, the sustainability of this relationship is under significant strain. Economic sanctions imposed on Iran have severely limited its fiscal capacity to fund external operations. In 2024 alone, Iran’s GDP contracted by 2.7%, exacerbated by a 40% reduction in oil revenues due to sanctions targeting its crude exports. This financial shortfall has directly impacted Tehran’s ability to channel resources to its proxies, with Houthi operations reportedly receiving a 35% reduction in funding compared to pre-sanction levels.

The operational effectiveness of the Houthis reflects this resource scarcity. Intelligence reports indicate a 22% decline in drone sorties and a noticeable reduction in missile launches targeting Red Sea vessels between late 2023 and mid-2024. This operational recalibration suggests a strategic pivot, where the Houthis focus on maintaining their foothold in Yemen while reducing overt maritime aggression to avoid further escalation.

Erosion of Iran’s Proxy Network

Beyond the Houthis, Iran’s broader network of proxies has experienced significant disruptions. The weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the collapse of the Assad regime’s influence in Syria have fragmented Iran’s regional alliances. Hezbollah, long considered Tehran’s most formidable proxy, has faced internal dissent, economic difficulties, and declining political leverage within Lebanon. Its budget, heavily reliant on Iranian financial support, has been cut by approximately 28% since 2023, limiting its operational scope and outreach.

Similarly, Syria’s political instability has curtailed Iran’s ability to use the Assad regime as a logistical corridor for supplying proxies across the region. The dismantling of arms pipelines and infrastructure linking Iran to Hezbollah has forced Tehran to reroute supplies through more clandestine and costlier channels. These developments highlight the fragility of Iran’s influence, with its regional strategies increasingly constrained by both internal and external factors.

Maritime Security and Iran’s Strategic Dilemma

The Red Sea’s strategic importance as a global trade artery places additional pressure on Iran’s ability to sustain its maritime disruption tactics. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, through which approximately 6.2 million barrels of oil pass daily, represents a critical chokepoint for international energy markets. However, the increasing presence of U.S. and allied naval forces in the region has diminished Iran’s capacity to leverage the Houthis as a destabilizing force.

For instance, the deployment of advanced naval assets such as the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group and the French FREMM frigates has significantly curtailed the Houthis’ operational reach. In 2024, U.S. and allied forces intercepted 72% of missile and drone strikes launched by the Houthis, compared to 51% in 2023. These improved defensive capabilities, coupled with enhanced maritime coordination, have reduced the strategic value of such asymmetric tactics for Tehran.

Ceasefire and Regional Geopolitical Shifts

The ceasefire agreement brokered in January 2025 represents a critical juncture for the region, offering both opportunities and challenges. For Iran, the truce underscores the need to recalibrate its regional strategy. The Houthi pledge to cease attacks on non-Israeli-linked vessels marks a strategic retreat, reflecting Tehran’s acknowledgment of the mounting costs of maritime aggression. However, this de-escalation could serve as a tactical pause, allowing Iran to consolidate its resources and reconfigure its approach.

The broader geopolitical landscape has also shifted significantly since October 2023, following the escalation of the Gaza conflict. Israel’s decisive military actions against Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies have weakened Tehran’s influence, creating a ripple effect across the region. These developments have opened avenues for de-escalation in Yemen, where international stakeholders, including Saudi Arabia, have pushed for a negotiated resolution to the conflict.

Impact of U.S. Policy and Trump’s “Maximum Pressure” Campaign

The return of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency has injected new complexities into the Middle Eastern geopolitical equation. His administration’s renewed “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran is expected to target its financial and military networks with greater intensity. Early indications suggest that U.S. sanctions will focus on restricting Iran’s access to international financial systems, further limiting its ability to fund proxy forces.

Trump’s emphasis on holding Tehran accountable for its regional activities could lead to increased military interventions, including targeted strikes on Iranian infrastructure supporting proxy operations. This heightened pressure risks triggering a retaliatory response from Tehran, potentially escalating tensions in the Red Sea and surrounding regions. However, it also creates an opportunity for regional actors to leverage U.S. support in pursuing long-term solutions to conflicts like Yemen.

Broader Implications for Global Trade and Security

The interplay between regional conflicts and global trade underscores the interconnectedness of the modern world. The strategic significance of the Red Sea, not just as a trade corridor but also as a geopolitical flashpoint, highlights the stakes for international stability. A secure and stable maritime environment is essential for mitigating the economic disruptions caused by prolonged conflict.

The realignment of alliances, particularly the strengthening of ties between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Western powers, presents an opportunity for collaborative efforts to enhance regional security. Initiatives such as joint naval patrols, intelligence sharing, and investment in maritime infrastructure are crucial for ensuring the long-term stability of global shipping routes.

Iran’s regional influence, while significant, faces unprecedented challenges in 2025. The intersection of economic constraints, shifting geopolitical alliances, and intensified external pressures necessitates a fundamental rethinking of its proxy strategies. For the Houthis, this translates into a reduced operational scope and a pivot toward political engagement under international scrutiny.

The ceasefire and its broader implications represent a fragile yet vital opportunity for redefining the region’s trajectory. As stakeholders navigate this complex landscape, the decisions made in this critical phase will shape the balance of power and the future of global trade, security, and diplomacy.

Quantifying Yemen’s Impact on NATO Economies: A Detailed Examination of Geopolitical and Economic Repercussions

The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, shaped by Yemen’s ongoing conflict and the associated Houthi attacks on maritime assets, has emerged as a focal point of global economic concern. NATO member states, deeply entrenched in global trade networks and reliant on uninterrupted energy flows, face compounding economic vulnerabilities due to the strategic disruptions emanating from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. These disruptions, which include direct attacks on shipping vessels, elevated risks to critical infrastructure, and consequential military expenditures, highlight a multifaceted economic toll. This analysis delves into the detailed numerical and strategic dimensions of these impacts, offering a comprehensive quantification of the costs and consequences for NATO economies.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Accounting for the daily transit of over 6.2 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products, as well as 12% of global trade, the economic significance of this corridor cannot be overstated. Yemen’s geopolitical instability has transformed this crucial passage into a zone of heightened uncertainty, compelling NATO countries to reassess their energy security, shipping resilience, and strategic defense priorities. These vulnerabilities cascade through interconnected economic systems, making the impact far-reaching and multifaceted.

Direct Economic Impact: Shipping Costs and Trade Rerouting

The Houthis’ deliberate targeting of commercial shipping has forced many operators to avoid the Red Sea entirely, rerouting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This alternative, while mitigating immediate risks, imposes substantial economic penalties. Shipping costs for goods transported between Europe and Asia have increased by an estimated 35%, with added fuel and operational expenses contributing to the financial burden. For instance, rerouting an Ultra Large Crude Carrier (ULCC) adds approximately $300,000 in fuel costs per voyage, culminating in a projected global shipping cost increase exceeding $200 billion annually. Additionally, increased transit times extend logistical cycles, compounding inefficiencies across supply chains.

Insurance premiums for vessels traversing the Red Sea have also surged. War risk premiums, which prior to late 2023 ranged between $30,000 and $50,000 per transit, have now escalated to as much as $200,000 per voyage for high-value shipments. NATO-aligned countries, whose import and export industries heavily rely on these routes, bear a disproportionate share of these costs. German automakers, for example, have reported an additional $1.5 billion in annual logistical expenses due to increased transportation costs and delays. Moreover, these inflated expenses cascade down to consumers, adding approximately $75 per vehicle in end-user costs.

The economic ripple effect of disrupted trade flows extends to commodities beyond oil, impacting agricultural products, raw materials, and consumer goods. European imports of agricultural produce from East Africa, which rely heavily on Red Sea routes, have declined by 12%, leading to a 6% increase in prices across EU markets. These localized price shifts underscore the extensive economic ramifications of maritime insecurity.

Energy Security and Market Volatility

NATO economies are particularly vulnerable to disruptions in energy supplies facilitated through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Approximately 20% of Europe’s imported crude oil flows through this chokepoint. Houthi attacks on oil tankers have reduced regional shipping volumes by 18%, amplifying price volatility in global energy markets. The Brent Crude benchmark experienced a 9% increase in late 2024, peaking at $95 per barrel, primarily attributed to fears of further disruptions. European energy markets, already grappling with the ramifications of the Ukraine conflict, now face an additional $30 billion in annual energy procurement costs. Energy-intensive industries, including steel production and chemical manufacturing, have reported a 14% increase in operating expenses, further straining profit margins.

In response to these disruptions, NATO member states have accelerated investments in alternative energy infrastructure. Germany’s recent commitment of €10 billion toward liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals reflects broader efforts to diversify energy sources. However, such transitions are neither immediate nor cost-neutral. The upfront capital required for these projects, combined with elevated operating costs, underscores the long-term economic implications of energy insecurity. For instance, LNG imports sourced from the United States incur a 30% premium compared to traditional Middle Eastern supplies, adding an estimated €5 billion annually to European energy costs.

Military Expenditures: Quantifying the Strategic Response

The economic toll of military operations aimed at countering the Houthi threat represents another critical dimension of the impact on NATO economies. The United States alone has allocated $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2024 for naval operations in the Red Sea, including the deployment of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and unmanned surveillance systems. The maintenance and operational costs of these assets, coupled with expenditures on advanced interceptors such as the Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), reflect the escalating financial burden of maritime security. Additionally, the deployment of refueling tankers and auxiliary vessels to sustain extended operations has added an estimated $200 million to annual operational budgets.

European NATO members, including France and the United Kingdom, have similarly augmented their naval deployments. The Royal Navy’s Type 45 destroyers and French FREMM frigates have been actively patrolling the region, incurring estimated operational costs of $800 million collectively in 2024. These expenditures, while essential for safeguarding global trade, divert resources from other strategic priorities, such as NATO’s eastern flank and Indo-Pacific engagements. Furthermore, procurement of additional naval assets, such as anti-drone systems and next-generation radar technologies, has added €2 billion to collective European defense budgets.

Supply Chain Disruptions and Inflationary Pressures

The cascading effects of maritime disruptions extend beyond immediate shipping costs, manifesting in widespread supply chain challenges. NATO economies, deeply integrated into global production networks, have experienced significant delays and cost escalations. Key industries, including automotive manufacturing, electronics, and consumer goods, report extended lead times and rising production costs. The knock-on effects include higher retail prices, eroding consumer purchasing power and contributing to broader inflationary trends.

For instance, European automotive exports to Asian markets have faced delays averaging 12 days per shipment, contributing to an estimated $5 billion in lost revenue in 2024. Semiconductor imports from East Asia, critical for high-tech manufacturing in Germany and the United States, have also been impacted, exacerbating supply shortages and inflationary pressures. The European Central Bank’s analysis indicates that these disruptions contributed to a 0.4% increase in eurozone inflation in 2024, with further upward pressures anticipated in 2025. Additionally, disruptions to just-in-time inventory systems have led to production halts in key sectors, reducing GDP growth rates by an estimated 0.3% across NATO economies.

Strategic Implications for NATO’s Long-Term Resilience

The economic repercussions of Yemen’s instability underscore the broader strategic challenges facing NATO. Ensuring the security of maritime trade routes, particularly in high-risk regions, demands sustained investments in naval capabilities and international partnerships. Collaborative initiatives, such as joint patrols with regional allies like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, represent pragmatic steps toward burden-sharing. However, the financial commitments required for these efforts are substantial. NATO’s collective military expenditures related to Red Sea security are projected to exceed $3 billion annually by 2025.

Additionally, the economic strain on member states highlights the need for diversified trade and energy strategies. NATO’s Strategic Concept 2030 emphasizes resilience in critical supply chains and energy infrastructure, aligning with ongoing efforts to reduce dependencies on volatile regions. However, the transition to more secure and sustainable systems entails significant costs. The European Union’s recent allocation of €50 billion for green energy and critical infrastructure projects illustrates the scale of investment required to mitigate future risks. Moreover, logistical innovations, including blockchain-based tracking systems and AI-driven predictive analytics, are being adopted to enhance supply chain resilience, albeit at a significant initial cost.

The economic impact of Yemen’s conflict and the associated Houthi threats on NATO countries is profound and multifaceted. From increased shipping and insurance costs to energy market volatility and elevated military expenditures, the financial toll underscores the interconnectedness of global security and economic stability. Addressing these challenges requires not only immediate security responses but also long-term strategies to enhance resilience and reduce vulnerabilities. NATO’s ability to navigate these complexities will define its economic and strategic posture in an era of heightened geopolitical uncertainty. The ongoing adaptation of policies and technologies will determine the efficacy of mitigating future risks, ensuring that economic stability aligns with global security imperatives.

Trump’s Policies and the Geopolitical Future: Yemen’s Ambitions Under Iranian Influence

Donald Trump’s return to the presidency signals a potentially transformative shift in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East. With his administration poised to revive the “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, the geopolitical framework surrounding Yemen and its Iranian allies is likely to experience profound upheavals. The implications of this strategy extend beyond simple sanctions, encompassing a recalibration of regional power dynamics that will inevitably shape Yemen’s actions and aspirations.

Trump’s policies are expected to heavily prioritize containment strategies, targeting Iran’s proxy networks and economic channels. These efforts will likely include re-imposing stringent economic sanctions on Tehran, crippling its ability to fund allied militias such as the Houthis. Despite this, Iran’s historical resilience under sanctions suggests that it will adapt by exploiting existing loopholes, engaging in clandestine trade, and strengthening its relationships with non-Western powers like China and Russia. This evolving relationship will provide Yemen with alternative avenues for acquiring military and financial support, thus ensuring its continued role as a pivotal player in the region’s complex security matrix.

Yemen’s Houthi leadership, emboldened by its alignment with Tehran, is expected to adopt a multifaceted strategy in response to the renewed U.S. pressure. At the forefront, Yemen will seek to solidify its control over strategic locations such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, leveraging its geographic significance to exert influence over global shipping routes. By maintaining a credible threat to maritime commerce, the Houthis aim to extract concessions from international stakeholders, ensuring their political relevance even as they face intensified opposition.

The Houthis are also likely to escalate their asymmetric warfare tactics, employing advanced drone and missile technology acquired from Iranian sources. These tools will be used not only to target adversaries directly but also as a form of psychological warfare, intended to destabilize their opponents and draw international attention to their cause. This strategy is deeply rooted in Yemen’s understanding of modern geopolitical narratives, where media and perception management play as critical a role as military strength.

Iran, for its part, will likely recalibrate its support for Yemen in response to Trump’s policies. While Tehran’s resources are strained, its ideological commitment to countering U.S. influence ensures that it will continue to prioritize its Yemeni proxy. This commitment is driven not only by strategic considerations but also by the symbolic value of defying Western powers. Iran’s assistance to Yemen will likely take more covert forms, including the provision of advisors, technology transfers, and financial aid through indirect channels. These measures will enable Yemen to sustain its efforts without exposing Iran to direct confrontation.

The broader regional implications of these developments are profound. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, already deeply invested in countering Houthi influence, will intensify their military and diplomatic efforts. This escalation will likely include increased airstrikes, enhanced support for Yemeni factions opposed to the Houthis, and greater collaboration with Western allies. However, these measures risk deepening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, further complicating international responses.

In this volatile environment, Yemen’s ambitions are not confined to its current territorial and political struggles. The Houthis are acutely aware of the potential to position themselves as a key player in the broader Middle Eastern power struggle. By aligning their narrative with anti-Western sentiments and emphasizing their role as defenders of Yemeni sovereignty, they seek to garner support from sympathetic populations and governments across the region. This approach underscores their broader strategy of embedding their local conflict within the larger ideological and geopolitical framework of resistance against perceived Western imperialism.

As Trump’s policies unfold, the international community must grapple with the challenge of addressing the intricate interplay between local conflicts and global power struggles. The situation in Yemen exemplifies the complexities of modern geopolitics, where traditional state actors and non-state entities are intertwined in a web of alliances, rivalries, and shifting priorities. Navigating this landscape requires a nuanced understanding of the underlying drivers of conflict and the motivations of key players.

In summary, Yemen, under the shadow of Iranian influence, will likely pursue a dual strategy of resistance and strategic engagement. While leveraging its geographic and military assets to assert its position, it will also seek to exploit the shifting geopolitical landscape to secure its objectives. The interplay between Trump’s renewed policies, Iran’s adaptive strategies, and Yemen’s ambitions sets the stage for a complex and unpredictable future, where the outcomes will be determined as much by geopolitical maneuvers as by the resilience and adaptability of the actors involved.

Tracing the Houthi Strategy: Yemen’s Conflict and Its Regional Impact Since 2017

Since 2017, the Houthi movement in Yemen has evolved from a localized insurgent group into a key player in regional geopolitics, with significant implications for the Middle East and beyond. Rooted in a complex interplay of internal Yemeni dynamics and external influences, the Houthis’ actions have extended their reach far beyond the nation’s borders, impacting maritime security, regional stability, and global trade.

Backed by Iran, the Houthis have employed asymmetric warfare tactics, combining missile launches, drone attacks, and naval disruptions to exert influence. Their operations in the Red Sea, including attacks on vessels, have elevated their status as a proxy force capable of challenging regional powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These actions also serve as a reflection of Iran’s strategic ambitions in the region.

From the targeting of key Saudi infrastructure to the disruption of vital maritime routes, the Houthis’ actions since 2017 have consistently drawn international attention, prompting military responses from a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and supported by Western powers. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the Houthis’ strategic moves during this period, their objectives, and their impact on Yemen and the broader region.

The Evolution of Houthi Actions Since 2017

The trajectory of the Houthi movement’s strategy reveals a calculated escalation of their operations. In 2017, they began targeting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles, initiating a pattern of aggression that would grow in sophistication and reach over the subsequent years. Notably, the Houthis have demonstrated an adeptness in adopting new technologies, including the use of drones and naval mines, to achieve their objectives.

Key milestones during this period include:

• Maritime Disruptions (2018-2019): The Houthis escalated attacks on oil tankers and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, using unmanned explosive boats and missiles. These actions significantly disrupted global trade and heightened tensions in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
• Abqaiq-Khurais Attack (2019): A landmark event in September 2019 saw the Houthis claim responsibility for a sophisticated drone attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities. While evidence suggested Iranian involvement, the incident underscored the Houthis’ ability to conduct operations with far-reaching economic implications.
• Red Sea Aggression (2020-2021): During this period, Houthi naval actions intensified, including the laying of naval mines and targeting of vessels perceived to be aligned with Saudi interests. The global shipping industry faced significant risks, leading to increased insurance premiums and rerouted traffic.
• Marib Offensive (2021-2022): The battle for Marib highlighted the Houthis’ focus on territorial consolidation within Yemen, as they sought control over this energy-rich region. This campaign strained Yemen’s humanitarian situation and drew heightened international scrutiny.

Geopolitical Alignments and Regional Implications

The Houthis’ actions cannot be viewed in isolation but must be understood as part of a broader geopolitical landscape. Iran’s support has been instrumental in shaping their capabilities, with Tehran providing advanced missile technology, drones, and military advisors. This relationship allows Iran to project influence into the Arabian Peninsula, countering Saudi and Emirati dominance.

The Saudi-led coalition’s response, marked by airstrikes and economic blockades, has compounded the humanitarian crisis in Yemen. The conflict has displaced millions, created widespread food insecurity, and devastated Yemen’s infrastructure. The Houthis have leveraged this situation to garner local support, positioning themselves as defenders of Yemeni sovereignty against foreign intervention.

The Role of Maritime Security

The Red Sea’s strategic importance as a global trade corridor has made it a focal point of Houthi actions. By targeting this chokepoint, the Houthis aim to disrupt the economies of their adversaries while asserting their presence on the international stage. The attacks on tankers and cargo ships highlight their capability to influence global energy markets and shipping routes.

International stakeholders, including the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, have responded with increased naval deployments and joint patrols to safeguard these waters. However, these measures have not fully mitigated the risks, as evidenced by continued incidents in the region.

Towards a Ceasefire: The Transition in 2025

The ceasefire announced in early 2025 represents a potential turning point in the conflict, though skepticism remains about the Houthis’ long-term commitment to peace. Their pledge to cease attacks on non-Israeli-linked vessels signals a strategic recalibration, likely influenced by shifting regional dynamics and international pressure.

As the conflict enters a new phase, the legacy of the Houthis’ actions since 2017 continues to shape perceptions of Yemen’s stability and its role in regional geopolitics. The lessons learned during this period provide critical insights into the complexities of proxy warfare, maritime security, and the intersection of local and global interests in the Middle East.

Table: What happened from 2017 to today

Date	Description
17/01/2025	The U.S.  the “Yemen-based Yemen Kuwait Bank for Trade and Investment Y.S.C (Yemen Kuwait Bank) for its financial support to Ansar Allah, commonly known as the Houthis”. According to the Treasury Department, “Yemen Kuwait Bank has helped the Houthis establish and finance front companies, which the group has used to facilitate Iranian oil sales in coordination with sanctioned Houthi-associated money exchange Swaid and Sons for Exchange Co”.
17/01/2025	Responding to a UN Panel of Experts report, Iran’s UN envoy : “Iran categorically denies the claims of violations of arms embargoes or involvement in fueling conflicts in Yemen or elsewhere propagated by certain members of the Security Council”. He further argued: “Ansar Allah [ie, the Houthis] are a part of the legitimate government in Sanaa and operate with full political independence, making decisions and taking actions based solely on their own interests and priorities. Therefore, their activities and decisions have no connection to the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
13/01/2025	The Israeli military downed a  and two  launched by the Houthis.
11/01/2025	The commander of CENTCOM visited Saudi Arabia, where he met with senior Saudi defence officials and , inter alia, “their mutual commitment to addressing evolving threats in the region… [and] the importance of deepening bilateral ties between the two countries, particularly through joint military exercises, building interoperability and readiness and capacity-building programs”. The U.S. commander also met Yemeni defence officials and, per CENTCOM’s readout, “discussed efforts to strengthen security cooperation and combat regional threats, such as the Iranian-backed Houthis and their attacks against military and commercial vessels”.
09/01/2025	The Israeli military  three drones launched from Yemen. The following day,  “ UAV and surface-to-surface missile attacks against Israel”, the IDF struck one power station and two ports in Yemen, describing them as “Houthi terrorist regime military targets”. Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “the Houthis are a proxy of Iran and they serve the terrorist objectives of the Iranian axis in the Middle East. They constitute a danger to Israel and to the entire region… We will take determined and forceful action against anyone who threatens the State of Israel wherever and whenever necessary”. Relatedly, Defence Minister Israel Katz  Houthi leaders: “We will pursue and hunt you down and destroy the terror infrastructures you have established”.
08/01/2025	CENTCOM  “multiple precision strikes against two Iranian-backed Houthi underground Advanced Conventional Weapon (ACW) storage facilities”.
06/01/2025	The Houthis  to have fired two missiles and four drones at the USS Harry S. Truman in the Red Sea, as well as multiple drones targeting military and “vital” sites in Israel.
05/01/2025	The Israeli military  downing a missile launched from Yemen
03/01/2025	The Israeli military  downing a missile and a drone launched from Yemen
31/12/2024	CENTCOM  that “U.S. Navy ships and aircraft targeted a Houthi command and control facility and advanced conventional weapon (ACW) production and storage facilities that included missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV)”. They also hit “a Houthi coastal radar site and [downed] seven cruise missiles and one-way attack UAVs over the Red Sea”.
30/12/2024	Addressing the Houthis during a UN Security Council meeting, Israel’s envoy : “Allow me to remind you what has happened to Hamas, to Hizbollah, to Assad, to all those who have attempted to destroy us. Let this be your final warning… This is not a threat. It is a promise. You will share the same miserable fate”.
30/12/2024	A U.S. representative  the UN Security Council that “the Houthis are fully enabled by Iran to launch long-range and deadly attacks on Israel… Iran’s provision of these and other lethal weapons to the Houthis violates the arms embargo imposed on the group by this Council. It is the responsibility of this Council to respond to Iran’s flagrant violations of its resolutions and arming of terrorist groups”. She further urged the “Council to take steps to strengthen the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism… a key means of ensuring arms and related materiel are not illicitly smuggled by Iran and other malign actors to the Houthis”. Iran’s UN envoy subsequently  “any violation of arms embargoes or any involvement in fueling the conflict in Yemen or elsewhere”.
30/12/2024	The Israeli military  downing a Houthi missile outside Israel’s airspace. The Houthis  to have fired two missiles at Ben Gurion Airport and a power station in central Israel.
28/12/2024	The Houthis  to have fired a missile at a military base in southern Israel.
27/12/2024	The Israeli military  the interception of a Houthi missile outside Israel’s airspace
26/12/2024	The Israeli military  strikes in Yemen, targeting what it described as “military infrastructure by the Houthi terrorist regime for its military activities in both the Sanaa International Airport and the Hezyaz and Ras Janatib power stations”, as well as three ports. It asserted that “these military targets were used by the Houthi terrorist regime to smuggle Iranian weapons into the region and for the entry of senior Iranian officials”. Prime Minister Netanyahu : “We are determined to cut off this terror arm of the Iranian axis of evil. We will persist in this until we complete the job”.
25/12/2024	The Israeli military  downing a Houthi missile
24/12/2024	Discussing Houthi strikes in the Red Sea and at Israel, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi  that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported Yemen and will continue to do so. However, the Yemenis have shown that they do not need any assistance”. Araghchi : “The people of Yemen [are] relying on their indigenous missiles and defensive equipment”.
24/12/2024	The Israeli military  a missile launched from Yemen
23/12/2024	The Israeli military  a Houthi drone before entering Israeli territory. The Houthis  to have launched two drones against two military targets in central Israel.
21/12/2024	A Houthi missile  south of Tel Aviv, injuring sixteen people, with the Israeli military  that “attempted interceptions did not succeed”. The IDF also  downing a drone launched “from the east”. The following day, Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “just as we have acted forcefully against the terror arms of Iran’s axis of evil, so too will we act against the Houthis. However, in this case, we are not acting alone. Like us, the U.S. and other countries see the Houthis not only as a threat to international maritime navigation but to the international order as well. Therefore, we will take forceful, determined and sophisticated action. I will say this, even if it takes time, the result will be the same – as it has been with the other terror arms”.
20/12/2024	The Houthis  to have conducted drone attacks, in cooperation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, against “vital targets” in southern Israel, followed by a separate Houthi drone strike against a “military target” in central Israel.
20/12/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “conducted precision airstrikes against a missile storage facility and a command-and-control facility… within Houthi-controlled territory in Sanaa”, adding: “During the operation, CENTCOM forces also shot down multiple  one way attack uncrewed aerial vehicles (OWA UAV) and an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) over the Red Sea”.
19/12/2024	The U.S.  “a dozen individuals and entities based in multiple jurisdictions… for their roles in trafficking arms, laundering money and shipping illicit Iranian petroleum for the benefit of the Houthis”. The Treasury Department also “identified five cryptocurrency wallets associated with Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal (al-Jamal)”.
19/12/2024	The Houthis  to have fired two missiles at “two specific and sensitive military targets” in Israel
16/12/2024	The Israeli military  a Houthi missile
16/12/2024	CENTCOM  strikes against what it described as “a key command and control facility operated by Iran-backed Houthis within Houthi-controlled territory in Sanaa… The targeted facility was a hub for coordinating Houthi operations, such as attacks against U.S. Navy warships and merchant vessels in the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden”.
12/12/2024	The Israeli military  downing two drones launched from Yemen.
10/12/2024	CENTCOM  that two U.S. Navy destroyers “successfully defeated a range of Houthi-launched weapons while transiting the Gulf of Aden… The destroyers were escorting three U.S. owned, operated and flagged merchant vessels”.
09/12/2024	The Israeli military  that a drone launched from Yemen hit a residential building near Tel Aviv, causing damage
09/12/2024	The U.S.  “one individual and one entity involved in abuses against prisoners held in Houthi-run prisons in Yemen and one individual providing support to Bashar al-Assad”.
08/12/2024	The Houthis  to have fired drones at “a vital target” in southern Israel in cooperation with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.
07/12/2024	The Israeli military  downing a missile launched from Yemen outside Israeli territory.
01/12/2024	CENTCOM  that two U.S. Navy destroyers “successfully defeated a range of  weapons while transiting the Gulf of Aden… The destroyers were escorting three U.S. owned, operated, flagged merchant vessels”.
01/12/2024	The Israeli military  downing a ballistic missile launched from Yemen
22/11/2024	The Houthis  to have successfully targeted an Israeli air base with a missile
18/11/2024	Maritime authorities  that a missile fell near Anadolu S, a Panama-flagged bulk carrier, in the Red Sea
17/11/2024	The Houthis  to have successfully launched several drones at “a number of military and vital targets” in Israel, though none were  by the Israeli military.
16/11/2024	The Houthis  to have launched several drones “against a vital target” in southern Israel.
14/11/2024	The U.S.  26 companies, individuals and vessels linked to what the Treasury Department described as “a Syrian conglomerate responsible for generating hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and the Houthis through the sale of Iranian oil to Syria and the People’s Republic of China”.
12/11/2024	A Pentagon spokesperson that CENTCOM “forces executed a series of precise airstrikes 9 November through 10 on multiple Houthi weapons storage facilities situated within Houthi controlled territories in Yemen. These facilities housed a variety of advanced conventional weapons used by the Iran-backed Houthis to target U.S. and international military and civilian vessels navigating international waters in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden”. The same day, the Houthis  to have fired missiles and drones at the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Arabian Sea and two American destroyers in the Red Sea. The Pentagon official confirmed that the day before, “the Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer, USS Stockdale and USS Spruance were attacked by at least eight one-way attack uncrewed Aerial systems, five anti-ship ballistic missiles and three anti-ship cruise missiles which were successfully engaged and defeated… Not aware of any attacks against the Abraham Lincoln”.
11/11/2024	The Israeli military  downing a ballistic missile launched from Yemen outside Israeli airspace
08/11/2024	The Houthis  to have successfully targeted an Israeli air base using a hypersonic ballistic missile
29/10/2024	The Israeli military  that a drone launched from Yemen had landed in Ashkelon
28/10/2024	The Houthis  to have struck three ships using drones and cruise missiles
18/10/2024	The Houthis  to have carried out a drone attack against the vessel Megalopolis, though there was  confirmation from maritime agencies.
17/10/2024	The U.S.  “eighteen companies, individuals and vessels for their ties to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal (al-Jamal) and his network”.
13/10/2024	Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi  with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad. He  to Prime Minister al-Sudani that “preventing the escalation of the security situation in West Asia requires the immediate cessation of Israel’s crimes in Gaza and Lebanon”, while underscoring “the responsibility of the U.S. and other nations that supply lethal arms to this regime”. The following day, Araghchi  Muscat, where  with senior Omani officials and  with a senior Houthi representative. He also  that “we do not see any ground” for indirect talks with the U.S. over Iran’s nuclear program “until we can get past the current crisis”, while subsequently  that “communications channels with the Americans have always existed and continue to do so”.
10/10/2024	The Houthis  that they had struck a tanker, Olympic Spirit, in the Red Sea. Maritime security sources  that the vessel, identified as a Liberian-flagged chemical tanker bound for Oman from Saudi Arabia, sustained minor damage. The Houthis also claimed another attack against a vessel named St.John.
07/10/2024	The Israeli military  downing a Houthi missile bound for Israel.
04/10/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “conducted strikes on fifteen Houthi targets in Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen… These targets included Houthi offensive military capabilities”.
03/10/2024	The Israeli military  two drones off the coast of central Israel, and one other landed in an open area. The Houthis claimed responsibility.
02/10/2024	The U.S.  “one individual and three companies that have facilitated weapons procurement and smuggling operations” for the Houthis. According to the Treasury Department, the targets were “key procurement operatives and suppliers located in Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that have enabled the Houthis to acquire dual-use materials and components needed to manufacture, maintain and deploy an arsenal of advanced missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against U.S. and allied interests”. The U.S. also designated “one entity and two vessels linked with illicit Houthi and Iranian commercial shipments, including one that has transported shipments for Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal and an affiliate of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff”.
28/09/2024	The Israeli military  downing a ballistic missile launched from Yemen. The following day, the IDF  striking Houthi targets in Yemen including “power plants and a seaport, which were used by the Houthis to transfer Iranian weapons to the region, in addition to military supplies and oil”. Houthi media  at least four fatalities. Following the attack, the IDF chief of staff : “We know how to reach very far, we know how to reach even farther, and we know how to strike there accurately… This isn’t a message, this is an action”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the attack on “civilian and service infrastructure”.
27/09/2024	U.S. officials were cited as  that “three U.S. Navy warships shot down nearly two dozen incoming [Houthi] missiles and drones” in the Red Sea.
26/09/2024	¸The Israeli military  intercepting a surface-to-surface missile launched from Yemen.
24/09/2024	CENTCOM  downing “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle over the Red Sea”.
20/09/2024	CENTCOM  downing “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen over the Red Sea”.
15/09/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed one missile system in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
15/09/2024	The Israeli military  that “a surface-to-surface missile was fired from Yemen toward Israeli territory. An initial inquiry indicates the missile most likely fragmented in mid-air”. Israel also  a Houthi  that the missile was hypersonic, while Prime Minister Netanyahu  that the Houthis “should know that we exact a high price for any attempt to attack us”. The following day, President Pezeshkian : “The West knows that Iran cannot send missiles to Yemen at all. We have missile power, but it is not possible for us to give missiles to Yemen. Before the war, Yemen had acquired the technology to manufacture and produce missiles”.
13/09/2024	CENTCOM  that it “destroyed three uncrewed aerial vehicles and one support vehicle in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
11/09/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi missile system in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
10/09/2024	CENTCOM  destroying “five Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles and two missile systems in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
09/09/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi missile systems and one support vehicle in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, in addition to downing “one Houthi unmanned aerial vehicle over the Red Sea”.
08/09/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed three Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles and two missile systems in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
03/09/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed an Iranian-backed Houthi missile system in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
02/09/2024	CENTCOM  that “the Iranian-backed Houthis attacked two crude oil tankers, the Panama flagged/owned, Greek operated MV BLUE LAGOON I and the Saudi flagged, owned, and operated MV AMJAD, with two ballistic missiles and a one-way attack uncrewed aerial system, hitting both vessels”. However, the AMJAD’s owner  that the vessel had been targeted. The same day, CENTCOM  “two missile systems in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
31/08/2024	CENTCOM  targeting “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) and one uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
30/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
29/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi missile system and one uncrewed aerial vehicle in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
28/08/2024	Iran’s UN mission  that the Houthis had agreed to a “temporary truce for the entry of tugboats and rescue ships” to reach the MV Delta Sounion, which was  in a 21 August Houthi attack.
27/08/2024	A Pentagon spokesperson  that the MV Delta Sounion, which was attacked by the Houthis on 21 August, “sits immobilised in the Red Sea, where it is currently on fire and appears to be leaking oil, presenting both a navigational hazard and a potential environmental catastrophe. Although the Houthis have claimed that they’re conducting these attacks in support of the Palestinian people… These are simply reckless acts of terrorism which continue to destabilise global and regional commerce, put the lives of innocent civilian mariners at risk, and imperil the vibrant maritime ecosystem in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden”.
23/08/2024	An EU Red Sea naval mission  that MV SOUNION had caught  “as the result of an attack by an unknown source” in the southern Red Sea
21/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “successfully destroyed an Iranian-backed Houthi surface-to-air missile and radar system in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
18/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had downed “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
16/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi unmanned surface vessel (USV) in the Red Sea”.
15/08/2024	The U.S.  “several companies, individuals and vessels for their involvement in the shipment of Iranian commodities, including oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), to Yemen and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on behalf of the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial official Sa’id al-Jamal”. The U.S. also sanctioned a Hong Kong-based entity “for its role in shipping Iranian LPG worth tens of millions of dollars for Lebanese Hizbollah”, and listed “as blocked property four vessels the company owns and manages”.
15/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi ground control station in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
13/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi vessels in the Red Sea”.
09/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it “had destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi missile launcher and one uncrewed surface vessel in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, in addition to “two Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles over the Red Sea”.
08/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it “destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles and one Houthi ground control station in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, in addition to “one Houthi uncrewed surface vessel in the Red Sea”.
07/08/2024	CENTCOM  destroying “two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles, one Houthi ground control station and three Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
06/08/2024	CENCTOM  that it “successfully destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle and two Iranian-backed Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen over the Red Sea”.
03/08/2024	The Houthis  responsibility for targeting a Liberia-flagged container vessel in the Gulf of Aden. No damage was .
03/08/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi land attack cruise missile (LACM) in Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen”.
02/08/2024	The Pentagon  that “more defensive military capabilities will deploy to the Middle East to bolster force protection for U.S. troops in the region and to defend Israel… in response to threats from Iran and Iranian-backed militias”. The same day, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin  with his Israeli counterpart on “the destabilising threats posed by Iran, its partners and proxies”. He reaffirmed “ironclad support for Israel’s security”, emphasising that “further escalation is not inevitable and that all countries in the region would benefit from a de-escalation in tensions, including through completing a Gaza ceasefire and hostage release deal”. “The unprecedented scale of U.S. support for Israel since 7 October should leave Iran, Lebanese Hizbollah and other Iranian backed terrorist groups with no doubt about U.S. resolve”, Austin highlighted.
30/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed three Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea”.
29/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
26/07/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed six Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”, in addition to “three Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) operating off the coast of Yemen”.
25/07/2024	CENTCOM  destroying “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) launcher in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
24/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi missiles on launchers in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
23/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “destroyed three Iranian-backed Houthi missile launchers in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
21/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed four Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea”.
21/07/2024	The Israeli military  that it had “successfully intercepted a surface-to-surface missile that approached Israeli territory from Yemen using the ‘Arrow 3’ Aerial Defence System”.
20/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “successfully destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Red Sea”.
20/07/2024	In response to a Houthi-claimed drone  that killed one person and injured eight in Tel Aviv, Israeli aircraft  Yemen’s Hodeida port. Prime Minister Netanyahu  that the facility was an “entry point for weapons that are supplied by Iran to its Houthi terrorist proxies”, and said “the international community must redouble its efforts to protect this vital waterway [the Bab al-Mandab] and to hold both the Houthis and their Iranian sponsors accountable for their aggression… Israel is being attacked by Iran and its proxies on seven fronts”. The Houthis  they would “respond to this blatant aggression and…. not hesitate to strike the vital targets of the Israeli enemy”.
19/07/2024	An Israeli military spokesperson  that “a UAV which we assess was launched from Yemen, infiltrated from the sea to our west, and hit a building in central Tel Aviv. As a result of the impact, a civilian was killed and eight civilians were lightly injured”. The drone was assessed to be a “Samad-3… an Iranian weapon that was likely upgraded to extend its flight range”. The spokesperson also noted that the IDF downed “another UAV that attempted to infiltrate from the east”.
18/07/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed two surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and four uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) on the ground in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
15/07/2024	CENTCOM  that its forces had “destroyed five Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed vehicles (UAV), three over the Red Sea and two over Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”. CENTCOM also confirmed Houthi attacks against two tankers in the Red Sea
14/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) over the Red Sea and one uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in the Red Sea”. It also confirmed the destruction of “one Houthi UAV in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
12/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “successfully destroyed three Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
11/07/2024	CENTCOM  destroying “five Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea”, as well as “two Houthi uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) over the Red Sea and one Houthi UAS in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen”.
10/07/2024	CENTOM  that it had “successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) over the Red Sea and one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in the Red Sea”.
09/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “successfully destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
08/07/2024	The Israeli military  a drone inbound via the Red Sea.
07/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, in addition to partner forces downing “two Houthi UAVs over the Gulf of Aden”.
04/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea and one Houthi radar site in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
03/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi radar sites in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and two uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea”.
01/07/2024	CENTCOM  that it “successfully destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi radar site in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
30/06/2024	CENTCOM  that it “conducted a sef-defence engagement, destroying three Iranian-backed Houthi unscrewes surface vessels (USVs) in the Red Sea”.
28/06/2024	CENTCOM  that it “ successfully destroyed seven Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) and one ground control station vehicle in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
27/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthis into the Red Sea”.
26/06/2024	The Israeli military  that a drone inbound via the Red Sea “impacted in offshore territory adjacent to Eilat… During the incident, an interceptor was fired”. The same day, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq  responsibility for a drone attack against a “vital Israeli target” in Israel.
26/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one Houthi radar site in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
23/06/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis struck the M/V TRANS WORLD NAVIGATOR, a Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned, and operated bulk cargo carrier in a suspected uncrewed aerial system (UAS) attack”. The attack, which CENTCOM noted was the fourth against the vessel, caused “minor injuries and moderate damage to the ship, but the vessel has continued underway”.
22/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its forces “successfully destroyed three Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea”. The same day, the “Houthis launched three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) from a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. There were no injuries or significant damage reported by U.S., coalition, or merchant vessels”. The statement added that “recent claims about a successful attack by Houthi forces on the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower are categorically false”.
20/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed four Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea and two uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) over the Red Sea”.
19/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed two Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea… [and] one ground control station and one command and control node in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
18/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed eight Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial systems (UAS)”, while “partner forces successfully destroyed one Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Gulf of Aden”.
17/06/2024	The U.S.  three individuals, six entities and one vessel for having “enabled the Houthis to generate revenue and acquire a range of materials to manufacture the advanced weaponry they are now using to conduct ongoing terrorist attacks against commercial ships”. The State Department  that “the Houthis’ attacks against unarmed commercial vessels continue to inhibit navigation in a vital waterway. The U.S. is committed to using the tools at our disposal to hinder the flow of military-grade materials into Yemen that enable the Houthis to conduct these terrorist attacks”.
17/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed four Houthi radars and one uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen” and downed “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Red Sea”. The following day, CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed eight Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen”, while “partner forces successfully destroyed one Houthi UAV over the Gulf of Aden”.
14/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed two Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV)” and “one uncrewed aerial system (UAS)… over the Red Sea”. They also “destroyed seven Iranian-backed Houthi radars in a Houthi-controlled area in Yemen”.
13/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one air defence sensor in a Houthi-controlled area”, “one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed surface vessel (USV) and two Houthi patrol boats” and “one uncrewed aerial system (UAS)… over the Red Sea”. The Houthis also launched “two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)… into the Red Sea”, causing no damage. CENTCOM additionally reported that “M/V Verbena, a Palauan flagged, Ukrainian owned, Polish operated bulk cargo carrier, was struck for a second time in 24 hours” by Houthi fire in the Gulf of Aden. On 15 June, CENTCOM  that the vessel’s “crew abandoned ship due to continued fires and an inability to control them”
13/06/2024	The U.S.  the UN Security Council that “reports published by news agencies directly affiliated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are now publicly and openly touting that Iran has been supplying anti-ship ballistic missiles to the Houthis… Iran continues to directly support and enable Houthi attacks in the Red Sea region, and its continued and brazen violations of the arms embargo should not be overlooked by this Council”. Iran’s UN envoy  to the Security Council rejecting the U.S. claims as “unfounded allegations”, adding: “Iran has made it clear that it is committed to the Security Council’s relevant resolutions on the situation in Yemen and has not been engaged in activities in contravention of these resolutions”.
12/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed three anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) launchers in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen and one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) launched… over the Red Sea”. The Houthis also fired “two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)… over the Red Sea”, causing no damage. The same day, one “Houthi unmanned surface vessel (USV) struck M/V Tutor, a Liberian-flagged, Greek-owned and operated vessel, in the Red Sea. M/V Tutor most recently docked in Russia. The impact of the USV caused severe flooding and damage to the engine room”. On 14 June, CENTCOM  that “one civilian mariner remains missing following the attack. The crew abandoned ship and were rescued by USS Philippine Sea and partner forces. M/V Tutor remains in the Red Sea and is slowly taking on water”.
11/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed two anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) launchers in a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
10/06/2024	The U.S.  “four individuals, four entities and two vessels that have enabled the illicit transportation of commodities on behalf of financial networks supporting terrorism”, with a senior Treasury Department official : “The Houthis continue to leverage an expansive support network to facilitate their illicit activities… the U.S. government is committed to disrupting and degrading the Houthis’ ability to engage in attacks against commercial shipping and naval vessels, as well as target those who seek to facilitate these activities”.
10/06/2024	CENTCOM  that “partner forces successfully destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthis into the Gulf of Aden. There were no injuries reported by U.S., coalition or merchant vessels”.
09/06/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)… into the Gulf of Aden. One ASBM struck M/V Tavvishi, a Liberian-flagged, Swiss-owned and operated container ship. M/V Tavvishi reported damage but has continued underway. The second ASBM was successfully destroyed by a coalition ship”. The Houthis also “launched one ASBM and one anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) into the Gulf of Aden. Both missiles struck M/V Norderney, an Antigua and Barbados-flagged, German-owned and operated cargo ship. M/V Norderney reported damage but has continued underway”. The same day, U.S. forces “destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) over the Gulf of Aden” and “destroyed two Houthi land attack cruise missiles (LACM) and one missile launcher in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
07/06/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)… over the Red Sea” without reported damage. The same day, U.S. “forces successfully destroyed four UASs and two ASBMs in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, in addition to “one UAS launched from a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen into the Bab al-Mandab Strait… [and] a Houthi patrol boat in the Red Sea”.
06/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed eight Houthi uncrewed aerial systems (UAS)… [and] two Houthi uncrewed surface vessels (USV) in the Red Sea”, while “a coalition ship successfully engaged one UAS”. The Houthis also “launched one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)… over the Red Sea”, with no damage reported.
04/06/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported”.
03/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces conducted a self-defence engagement over the southern Red Sea, destroying one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial system (UAS)”.
03/06/2024	The Israeli military  “a surface-to-surface missile that was fired from the direction of the  toward Israel”.
01/06/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces destroyed one Iranian-backed Houthi uncrewed aerial system (UAS) in the southern Red Sea… [and] observed two other UAS crash into the Red Sea”. U.S. forces also “engaged two Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) in the southern Red Sea. The ASBM were fired in the direction of USS Gravely and were destroyed in self-defence”.
31/05/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Red Sea”, in addition to “two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM)… into the Gulf of Aden”
30/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed eight uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV) in Iranian-backed Houthi controlled areas of Yemen and over the Red Sea. Additionally, U.S. CENTCOM forces alongside UK Armed Forces conducted strikes against thirteen Houthi targets”. A Houthi military spokesperson  dozens of casualties, while Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the strikes. The Houthis also  to have successfully targeted a U.S. aircraft carrier in retaliation, which the Pentagon .
29/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed two uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) over the Red Sea launched from an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
28/05/2024	CENTCOM  that the Houthis had  seven anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) into the Red Sea, three of which hit “M/V Laax, a Marshall Island-flagged, Greek-owned and operated bulk carrier”. U.S. forces also downed five Houthi “uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) over the Red Sea”, in addition to destroying “two missile launchers in an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
27/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) over the Red Sea, launched from an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
26/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) over the Red Sea, launched from an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
25/05/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) toward the Red Sea”, causing no damage.
23/05/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) into the Red Sea”, causing no damage. U.S. forces additionally “ one Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) in an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
22/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its forces had “successfully engaged four uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in an Iranian-backed Houthi controlled area of Yemen”.
18/05/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) into the Red Sea and struck M/T Wind, a Panamanian-flagged, Greek-owned and operated oil tanker. M/T Wind most recently docked in Russia and was bound for China”. The attack “caused flooding which resulted in the of loss propulsion and steering… M/T Wind resumed its course under its own power”. Later in the day, CENTCOM  the Houthis had fired another ABSM towards the Gulf of Aden, with no reported damage.
14/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed four uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
13/05/2024	A U.S. representative  the UN Security Council that “we must collectively call Iran out for its destabilising role and insist that it cannot hide behind the Houthis. We reiterate our call for Iran to cease its unlawful weapons transfers and enablement of the Houthi’s illegal and reckless attacks… We must do more to strengthen enforcement and deter sanctions violators. The scale and diversity of materiel currently being transferred to the Houthis in violation of UNSCRs in unprecedented”. On 17 May, Iran’s UN envoy  the claims as “lies and misinformation”, asserting that Iran had “made it clear that it is committed to the Security Council’s relevant resolutions… And has not engaged in activities in contravention of those resolutions”.
13/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) in an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”, in addition to downing one ballistic missile and one UAS over the Red Sea.
12/05/2024	CENTCOM  downing “one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthis over the Gulf of Aden”.
11/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed three UAS launched by Iranian-backed Houthis over the Red Sea… There were no injuries or damages reported by U.S., coalition or merchant vessels”.
10/05/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis launched an uncrewed aerial system (UAS) over the Gulf of Aden… A coalition aircraft successfully engaged the UAS”.
07/05/2024	CENTCOM  that the Houthis had fired “an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) over the Gulf of Aden. There were no injuries or damages reported by U.S., coalition or merchant vessels”.
06/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed one uncrewed aerial system (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists over the Red Sea”. Later in the day, the Houthis  three UASs over the Gulf of Aden
03/05/2024	The Houthis  “the beginning of the four stage of escalation” in their response to the Gaza war, with a spokesperson  that they would “target any ships heading to Israeli ports in the Mediterranean Sea in any area we are able to reach”.
02/05/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed three uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) in an Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled area of Yemen”.
30/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) in Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen. It was determined the USV presented an imminent threat to U.S., coalition forces and merchant vessels in the region”.
29/04/2024	CENTCOM  that the Houthis had “fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and three UAVs from Yemen into the Red Sea towards MV Cyclades, a Malta-flagged, Greece-owned vessel. Initial reports indicate there were no injuries and the vessel continued on its way”. U.S. forces also “engaged and destroyed one Houthi launched airborne unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) on a flight path towards USS Philippine Sea and USS Laboon in the Red Sea”.
28/04/2024	CENTCOM  that it had “successfully engaged five airborne unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) over the Red Sea… The UAVs presented an imminent threat to U.S., coalition and merchant vessels in the region”.
26/04/2024	CENTCOM  that the Houthis had fired “three anti-ship ballistic missile… into the Red Sea in the vicinity of MV MAISHA, an Antiqua/Barbados-flagged, Liberia-operated vessel and MV Andromeda Star, a UK-owned and Panamanian-flagged, Seychelles-operated vessel”
25/04/2024	CENTCOM  that “one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) was launched from Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. There were no injuries or damage reported”. CENTCOM forces also “successfully engaged and destroyed one unmanned surface vessel (USV) and one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
24/04/2024	CENTCOM  that “a  successfully engaged one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) launched from Iran-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas in Yemen over the Gulf of Aden”
15/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas in Yemen… the UAVs presented an imminent threat to U.S., coalition and merchant vessels in the region”.
14/04/2024	The Israeli military  a “suspicious aerial target”, inbound via the Red Sea, near Eilat.
14/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed four uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in self-defence”.
13/04/2024	In response to the 1 April strike, attributed to Israel, against its consulate and senior IRGC commanders in Damascus, Iran  airstrikes against Israel. According to the IDF, Israel and allied forces  99 per cent of 300-plus missiles and drones fired from Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen. “Only a few [ballistic missiles] crossed into Israeli territory… These fell at the Nevatim Air Force Base, causing only minor damage to infrastructure”, an Israeli military spokesperson indicated. President Biden  what he described as “an unprecedented air attack against military facilities in Israel”. The following day, Iran’s military chief of staff  that “our operations are over and we have no intention to continue them”, with the IRGC commander : “From now on, if the Zionist regime attacks our interests, assets, figures and citizens at any point, it will face counterattack from within the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
13/04/2024	CENTCOM  that Houthi forces “launched one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) toward the Gulf of Aden from a Houthi-controlled area in Yemen. There were no injuries or damage reported by U.S., coalition, or commercial ships”.
10/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Two UAVs were launched over the Gulf of Aden and one UAV was launched over the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported by U.S., coalition, or commercial ships”. Later, U.S. forces hit “eight UAVs in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in self-defence”.
09/04/2024	CENTCOM  that U.S. “forces successfully engaged and destroyed one inbound anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists from Yemen over the Gulf of Aden. The ASBM was likely targeting the MV Yorktown, a U.S.-flagged, U.S.-owned vessel being escorted by a U.S. warship USS Laboon and USS Mason. There were no injuries or damage reported by U.S., coalition, or commercial ships”.
08/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed an air defence system with two missiles ready to launch, a ground control station in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and one unmanned aerial system launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists from Yemen over the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported by U.S., coalition, or commercial ships”.
07/04/2024	CENTCOM  that “an anti-ship ballistic missile was launched from a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen toward the Gulf of Aden where a coalition ship was escorting M/V Hope Island, a Marshall Islands-flagged, UK-owned, Italian-operated cargo ship. There were no injuries or damage”.
06/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed one mobile surface-to-air missile system in Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen”, in addition to downing “one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Red Sea”. The same day, “a Coalition vessel detected and successfully engaged and destroyed one inbound anti-ship missile”.
04/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed one anti-ship missile (ASM) in a Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen. There were no injuries or damage reported”.
03/04/2024	CENTCOM  that U.S. “forces successfully engaged and destroyed one inbound anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and two unmanned aerial systems (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists from Yemen towards USS Gravely in the Red Sea”, in addition to targeting “a mobile surface-to-air missile system in Houthi-controlled territory”.
01/04/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully destroyed an Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist unmanned surface vessel (USV) in self-defence. It was determined this USV presented a threat to U.S. and coalition forces and merchant vessels in the region”.
31/03/2024	The Israeli military  that “sirens sounded in Eilat following the identification of a suspicious aerial target that crossed from the east toward Israeli territory. The target fell in the area of the Gulf of Eilat. No injuries were reported and there was light damage caused to a building”. The building was  of an IDF base. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq  to have struck “a vital objective… using appropriate weapons”. The following day, an IDF spokesperson  that the attack, which he described as “a very serious incident”, was “directed by Iran” and was carried out with an Iranian-made drone.
30/03/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed two unmanned aerial systems (UAS) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in self-defence. One was engaged over the Red Sea and the other was engaged on the ground prepared to launch”.
28/03/2024	CENTCOM  downing “four unmanned aerial systems (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists in Yemen. These UAS were aimed at a Coalition vessel and a U.S. warship and were engaged in self-defence over the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported to U.S. or coalition ships”.
27/03/2024	CENTCOM  that its forces had “successfully engaged and destroyed four long-range unmanned aerial systems (UAS) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists in Yemen. These UAS were aimed at a U.S. warship and engaged in self-defence over the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported”.
26/03/2024	The U.S.  “six entities, one individual and two tankers that are based or registered in Liberia, India, Vietnam, Lebanon and Kuwait that have engaged in facilitating commodity shipments and financial transactions for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the Houthis and Hizbollah”.
25/03/2024	A Houthi official  that Saudi Arabia “would be a target for us if they provided aid and support to the U.S.-British aggression against our country”.
23/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “the Iranian-backed Houthis launched four anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) into the Red Sea in the vicinity of M/V Huang Pu, a Panamanian-flagged, Chinese-owned, Chinese-operated oil tanker… [Later,] a fifth ballistic missile was detected as fired toward M/V Huang Pu”. The vessel “suffered minimal damage”, with CENTCOM noting that “the Houthis attackced the M/V Huang despite previously stating they would not attack Chinese vessels”. The same day, “U.S. forces, including USS Carney, engaged six Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) over the southern Red Sea. Five crashed into the Red Sea, and one flew inland into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
22/03/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed four unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in self-defence”. The Houthis also “fired four anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported”. CENTCOM also announced “strikes against three Houthi underground storage facilities”.
21/03/2024	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  that “no matter what your views are on Gaza, there’s no justification for this ongoing [Houthi] attack on international shipping… We would like to see Iran exert the influence that it has, because it’s the primary supplier to the Houthis of weapons, of information, of technology… Meanwhile, we and other countries have no choice but to try to defend the shipping and, as necessary, degrade the assets – the military assets – that the Houthis are using to continue to attack shipping”. Blinken further noted that “we have a lot of pressure that’s imposed on them [ie, Iran] by us and by many other countries, including through sanctions”, adding: “The extent to which Iran is seen as being responsible for [the Houthi attacks] – I don’t think that’s good for Iran”.
21/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “a coalition aircraft successfully engaged and destroyed one unmanned surface vessel (USV) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists from a Houthi-controlled area of Yemen. Additionally, coalition forces successfully engaged and destroyed two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists… There were no injuries or damage reported to U.S. or coalition vessels”.
20/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “a coalition aircraft successfully engaged and destroyed one unmanned aerial vehicle, and U.S. Central Command successfully engaged and destroyed one unmanned surface vessel, both launched by Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. There were no injuries or damage reported to U.S. or coalition ships”.
18/03/2024	The Israeli military  that a “suspicious aerial target”, subsequently  to be a cruise missile, had entered Israeli airspace by way of the Red Sea, and “fell in an open area north of Eilat”.
18/03/2024	CENTCOM  that its “forces successfully engaged and destroyed seven anti-ship missiles, three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and three weapons storage containers in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in self-defence”.
16/03/2024	CENTCOM  that the Houthis had “launched two unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward the Red Sea… [U.S.] forces successfully engaged and destroyed one UAV and the other is presumed to have crashed into the Red Sea”. Later, CENTCOM “destroyed five unmanned surface vessels and one UAV in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen in self-defence”.
15/03/2024	CETNCOM  that the Houthis had “fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles… toward the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported”.
15/03/2024	The U.S.  “one entity and identif[ied] one vessel as blocked property for involvement in illicit trade on behalf of the Houthis and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)”.
14/03/2024	CENTCOM  that the Houthis had “fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)… toward the Gulf of Aden and two additional ASBMs towards the Red Sea. There were no injuries or damage reported to U.S. or coalition ships”. The same day, CENTCOM “engaged and destroyed nine anti-ship missiles and two unmanned aerial vehicles in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
13/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists fired one anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. The missile did not impact any vessels and there were no injuries or damage reported. U.S. Central Command then successfully engaged and destroyed four unmanned aerial systems (UAVs) and one surface-to-air missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
12/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists fired one close-range ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward USS Laboon in the Red Sea. The missile did not impact the vessel and there were no injuries or damage reported”. The same day, CENTCOM and a coalition vessel downed two Houthi unmanned aerial systems (UAS).
11/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Houthi-controlled areas of into the Red Sea toward merchant vessel Pinocchio, a Singaporean-owned, Liberian-flagged ship. The missiles did not impact the vessel and there were no injuries or damage reported”. CENTCOM also carried out “six self-defence strikes destroying an unmanned underwater vessel and eighteen anti-ship missiles in Houthi controlled areas of Yemen”.
09/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “U.S. and coalition forces downed a total of at least 28 uncrewed aerial vehicles” launched by the Houthis toward the Red Sea area.
08/03/2024	CENTCOM  strikes against “two Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists’ truck-mounted anti-ship missiles”, “ mobile Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and one Houthi unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, in addition to downing three Houthi UAVs. CENTCOM also  that the Houthis had “fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Gulf of Aden at M/V Propel Fortune, a Singapore-flagged, owned, and operated vessel. The missiles did not impact the vessel”.
06/03/2024	CENTCOM  that a Houthi anti-ship ballistic missile hit “the M/V True Confidence… the multinational crew reports three fatalities, at least four injuries, of which three are in critical condition, and significant damage to the ship”, which was abandoned. It further noted that “this was the fifth ABSM fired by the Houthis in the last two days. Two of these ABSMs impacted two shipping vessels… and one ABSM was shot down by the USS Carney”. The same day, CENTCOM carried out “self-defence strikes against two unmanned aerial vehicles in a Houthi controlled area of Yemen that presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region”.
06/03/2024	The U.S.  “two Hong Kong- and Marshall Islands-based ship owners and two vessels” connected to what the Treasury Department described as an IRGC Quds Force-linked network that “continues to enable Houthi militant efforts”.
04/03/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Yemen into the southern Red Sea. The missile impacted the water with no reported damage or injuries”. The Houthis also “fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Yemen into the Gulf of Aden at M/V MSC SKY II, a Liberian-flagged, Swiss-owned container vessel. One of the missiles impacted the vessel causing damage. Initial reports indicate there were no injuries
01/03/2024	CENTCOM  “a self-defence strike against one Iranian-backed Houthi surface-to-air missile that was prepared to launch from Houthi controlled areas of Yemen towards the Red Sea”. It also reported that the Houthis had “launched one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) from Yemen into the Red Sea. There was no impact or damage to any vessels”.
29/02/2024	CENTCOM  “two self-defence strikes against six mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch towards the Red Sea”, in addition to downing “an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the southern Red Sea in self-defence”.
27/02/2024	The U.S., in coordination with the ,  “the Deputy Commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)… as well as a Houthi group member”. The Treasury Department also designated “the owner and operator of a vessel used to ship Iranian commodities that were sold to support both the Houthis and the IRGC-QF”. In remarks to the Senate the same day, a senior U.S. diplomat  that “credible public reports suggest a significant number of Iranian and Lebanese Hizbollah operatives are supporting Houthi attacks from inside Yemen… I can’t imagine the Yemeni people want these Iranians in their country. This must stop”.
27/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “U.S. aircraft and a coalition warship shot down five Iranian-backed Houthi one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) in the Red Sea”.
26/02/2024	CENTCOM  intercepting “three unmanned surface vessels (USV), two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) and a one-way attack unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in self-defence. The USV and ASCM weapons were prepared to launch towards, and the UAV was over, the Red Sea”.
24/02/2024	The U.S. and UK  “strikes against eighteen Houthi targets in Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen. These strikes from this multilateral coalition targeted areas used by the Houthis to attack international merchant vessels and naval ships in the region”.
24/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “USS Mason intercepted an “Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) launched into the Gulf of Aden from Iranian-backed Houthi controlled areas of Yemen. The missile was likely targeting MV Torm Thor, a U.S.-Flagged, owned, and operated chemical/oil tanker”
23/02/2024	CENTCOM  “three Houthi one-way attack UAV near several commercial ships operating in the Red Sea. There was no damage to any ships”. It additionally  “seven Iranian-backed Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch towards the Red Sea in self-defence”.
22/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “U.S. aircraft and a coalition warship shot down six Iranian-backed Houthi one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the Red Sea. The OWA UAVs were identified… as likely targeting U.S. and coalition warships”. It also reported that “the Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from southern Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. The missiles impacted MV Islander, a Palau-flagged, UK-owned, cargo carrier causing one minor injury and damage. The ship is continuing its voyage”. CENTCOM additionally  “self-defence strikes against four Iranian-backed Houthi unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and two mobile anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) that were prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen towards the Red Sea”.
21/02/2024	CENTCOM  “four self-defence strikes against seven mobile Houthi Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles and one mobile Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile launcher that were prepared to launch towards the Red Sea”, in addition to intercepting “a one-way attack unmanned aircraft system (UAS) in self-defence”.
20/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “two anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) were launched from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward M/V Sea Champion, a Greek-flagged, U.S.-owned grain carrier in the Gulf of Aden. Minor damage and no injuries were reported. The ship continued toward its scheduled destination to deliver grain to Aden, Yemen”. In addition, “a one-way attack (OWA) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) struck the M/V Navis Fortuna, a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned, bulk carrier causing minor damage and no injuries”, while an “anti-ship ballistic missile was launched… but did not impact any commercial or coalition ships”. CENTCOM also struck a surface to air missile launcher and downed several one way attack UAVs and anti-ship cruise missiles between 19 and 20 February.
18/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “two anti-ship ballistic missiles were launched from Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen toward MV Rubymar, a Belize-flagged, UK-owned bulk carrier. One of the missiles struck the vessel, causing damage. The ship issued a distress call and a coalition warship along with another merchant vessel responded to the call”. On 23 February, CENTCOM  that the Rubymar was “anchored but slowly taking on water. The unprovoked and reckless attack by Iran-backed Houthi terrorists caused significant damage to the ship, which caused an 18-mile oil slick”.
17/02/2024	CENTCOM  “five self-defence strikes against three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles, one unmanned underwater vessel (UUV) and one unmanned surface vessel (USV) in Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”, noting: “This is the first observed Houthi employment of a UUV since attacks began in 23 October”.
16/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “four anti-ship ballistic missiles launched from Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the Red Sea. It is assessed that at least three of the missiles were launched towards commercial vessel MT Pollux, a Panamanian-flagged, Denmark-owned, Panamanian-registered vessel. There were no reported injuries or damage”. CENTCOM also carried out “self-defence strikes against one mobile anti-ship cruise missile and one mobile unmanned surface vessel (USV) in Yemen”.
15/02/2024	CENTCOM  that on 28 January, U.S. forces had “seized advanced conventional weapons and other lethal aid originating in Iran and bound to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen from a vessel in the Arabian Sea”.
15/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “an anti-ship ballistic missile was launched from Houthi controlled areas of Yemen into the Gulf of Aden. The missile was headed toward MV Lycavitos, a Barbados-flagged, UK-owned and operated bulk carrier. The ship reported no injuries but very minor damage in the attack and continued its voyage”. CENTCOM also confirmed “two self-defence strike[s] against three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea”. The same day, media reports citing U.S. officials  that “the U.S. recently conducted a cyberattack against an Iranian military ship that had been collecting intelligence on cargo vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden… The operation was intended to inhibit the Iranian ship’s ability to share intelligence with Houthi rebels in Yemen”.
14/02/2024	CENTCOM  “four self-defence strikes against seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), three mobile unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and one explosive unmanned surface vessel (USV) in Houthi controlled areas of Yemen, that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea”.
13/02/2024	CENTCOM  “a self-defence strike against one mobile anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), in Iranian-backed Houthi controlled areas of Yemen, that was prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea”. Later, according to CENTCOM, “one anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) was launched from Iranian-backed Houthi controlled areas of Yemen into the Gulf of Aden… There were no reports of injuries or damage from ships in the area”.
12/02/2024	The Houthis  to have successfully targeted “the American ship Star Iris in the Red Sea with a number of suitable naval missiles”. Industry sources  that the ship was carrying an Iran-bound corn shipment. U.S. Central Command  that the vessel remained “seaworthy with minor damage and no injuries to the crew”, and confirmed that its destination was Iran.
09/02/2024	CENTCOM  carrying out “self-defence strikes against two mobile unmanned surface vehicles (USV), four mobile anti-ship cruise missiles and one mobile land attack cruise missile (LACM) that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea… in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”. The following day, the U.S.  an additional “two unmanned surface vessels… and three mobile anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) north of Al Hodeida, Yemen, that were prepared to launch”.
08/02/2024	CENTCOM  “seven self-defence strikes against four Houthi unmanned surfaces vessels (USV) and seven mobile anti-ship cruise missiles that were prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea”.
07/02/2024	CENTCOM  “self-defence strikes against two Houthi mobile anti-ship cruise missiles… [and] a Houthi mobile land attack cruise missile prepared to launch”.
06/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired six anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward the Southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Three of the ASBMs were attempting to hit MV Star Nasia, a Marshall Island-flagged, Greek owned-and-operated bulk carrier… causing minor damage but no injuries”. “The remaining three ASBMs were likely targeting MV Morning Tide, a Barbados-flagged, UK-owned cargo ship… without effect”, it added.
05/02/2024	CENTCOM  “a strike in self-defense against two Houthi explosive uncrewed surface vehicles (USV)”.
04/02/2024	CENTCOM  launching “strikes in self-defense”  five Houthi anti-ship cruise missile and one land attack cruise missile, which it said had been “prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea”.
03/02/2024	CENTCOM  conducting “strikes in self-defence against six Houthi anti-ship cruise missiles prepared to launch against ships in the Red Sea”. Subsequently, the U.S. and the UK  “strikes against 36 Houthi targets across thirteen locations in Yemen in response to the Houthis’ continued attacks against international and commercial shipping as well as naval vessels transiting the Red Sea”. “These precision strikes are intended to disrupt and degrade the capabilities that the Houthis use to threaten global trade, and the lives of innocent mariners”, according to a joint statement with allies. A Houthi military spokesperson  that “these attacks will not go without response and punishment”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the strikes, describing them as “in clear conflict with the repeated claims of Washington and London that they do not want to expand the war in the region”.
02/02/2024	CENTCOM  that “USS Carney engaged and shot down one unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over the Gulf of Aden”. U.S. forces also “conducted strikes against four Houthi UAVs that were prepared to launch” and later “shot down seven UAVs over the Red Sea”.
01/02/2024	CENTCOM  striking “an Iranian-backed Houthi UAV ground control station and ten Houthi one-way UAVs” assessed to be “an imminent threat to merchant vessels and the U.S. Navy ships in the region”. The same day, U.S. forces  a “UAV over the Gulf of Aden” and “destroyed an Iranian-backed Houthi explosive uncrewed surface vehicle (USV) in the Red Sea”. CENTCOM also reported that “two anti-ship ballistic missiles were launched from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen likely towards the M/V Koi in the Red Sea. The missiles impacted in the water without hitting the ship”.
31/01/2024	CENTCOM  that U.S. “forces struck and destroyed a Houthi surface-to-air missile prepared to launch. U.S. forces identified the missile in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and determined that it presented an imminent threat to U.S. aircraft”. Later, the USS Carney  a Houthi “anti-ship ballistic missile… [fired] toward the Gulf of Aden” and “three Iranian UAVs in its vicinity”.
30/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired one anti-ship cruise missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward the Red Sea. The missile was shot down by USS Gravely”.
26/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired one anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward Arleigh-Burke class destroyer USS Carney… in the Gulf of Aden. The missile was successfully shot down by USS Carney. There were no injuries or damage reported”. Later, the Houthis “ the Marshall Islands-flagged, Bermuda-owned M/V Marlin Luanda”, causing “a major fire” which U.S. and allied forces helped extinguish
25/01/2024	The U.S.  four Houthi officials it said had “supported the Houthi’s recent attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including holding civilian crews hostage”.
24/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists fired three anti-ship ballistic missiles from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen toward the U.S.-flagged, owned and operated container ship M/V Maersk Detroit, transiting the Gulf of Aden. One missile impacted in the sea. The two other missiles were successfully engaged and shot down by the USS Gravely… There were no reported injuries or damage to the ship”.
23/01/2024	CENTCOM  striking “two Houthi anti-ship missiles that were aimed into the southern Red Sea and were prepared to launch”.
23/01/2024	Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian  the UN Security Council that U.S.-led  against the Houthis were “a strategic mistake… which will result in the risk of further expanding the scope of the war”, describing an end to the Gaza war as “the main key to the restoration of security to the region”. He further noted that “the U.S. repeatedly expressed its grave concern about the spillover of tension in the region, and yet continues its full support to the Israeli regime’s war machine… The U.S. must bear the responsibility for its consequences”. “Instead of calling on others to exercise restraint”, he contended, “the U.S. must compel the Israeli regime to stop the war and pull itself out of the trap that the Israeli regime has set to drag the U.S. into direct conflict”.
22/01/2024	CENTCOM  that U.S. and UK forces led “strikes on eight Houthi targets in Iranian-backed Houthi terrorist-controlled areas of Yemen… used to attack international merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region. The targets included missile systems and launchers, air defence systems, radars and deeply buried weapons storage facilities”. The same day, the head of the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet  that “Iran is clearly funding, they’re resourcing, they are supplying and they’re providing training… They’re obviously very directly involved”. Relatedly, the U.S.  Houthi  of a “successful attack against the M/V Ocean Jazz” as “patently false”, adding: “NAVCENT has maintained constant communications with M/V Ocean Jazz throughout its safe transit”. The following day, the IRGC navy commander  that Houthi leadership “acts independently and takes orders from no side”. On 24 January, the Houthis  a 30-day deadline for UN “officials and workers with U.S. and British citizenships to… leave the country”.
21/01/2024	Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, commenting on tensions in the Red Sea,  that “we are in a very difficult and dangerous time in the region… We of course believe very much in the freedom of navigation and that’s something that needs to be protected, but we also need to protect the security and the stability of the region so we are very focused on de-escalating the situation as much as possible”. “The key to de-escalation in general right now, I think, is ending the conflict in Gaza because that’s feeding all of this instability in the region”, he emphasised.
20/01/2024	CENTCOM  striking “a Houthi anti-ship missile that was aimed into the Gulf of Aden and was prepared to launch”.
19/01/2024	CENTCOM  striking “three Houthi anti-ship missiles that were aimed into the southern Red Sea and were prepared to launch”. The same day, a Houthi spokesperson  that “we do not want the escalation to expand. This is not our demand. We imposed rules of engagement in which not a single drop of blood was shed or major material losses”. “What the Yemeni people did in the beginning”, he added, “was to target Israeli ships heading to Israel without causing any human or even significant material losses, just preventing ships from passing as a natural right… Now, when America joined in and escalated the situation further, there is no doubt that Yemen will respond”.
18/01/2024	CENTCOM  conducting “strikes on two Houthi anti-ship missiles that were aimed into the southern Red Sea and were prepared to launch”. Later in the day, CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi terrorists launched two anti-ship ballistic missiles at M/V Chem Ranger, a Marshall Island-flagged, U.S.-Owned, Greek-operated tanker ship. The crew observed the missiles impact the water near the ship. There were no reported injuries or damage to the ship. The ship has continued underway”. A Pentagon spokesperson : “We do not seek war with the Houthis but we will take self-defence actions… The end goal is for these attacks to stop, for us to deter Houthi strikes”.
17/01/2024	The U.S.  the Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, citing “unprecedented attacks against U.S. military forces and international maritime vessels operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden”. The White House asserted that “if the Houthis cease their attacks… the U.S. will immediately reevaluate this designation”, adding: “The designation will take effect 30 days from now, to allow us to ensure robust humanitarian carve outs are in place so our action targets the Houthis and not the people of Yemen”.
17/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “an assessed one-way attack UAS was  from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen and struck M/V Genco Picardy in the Gulf of Aden. M/V Genco Picardy is a Marshall Islands flagged, U.S. owned and operated bulk carrier ship. There were no injuries and some damage reported. M/V Genco Picardy is seaworthy and continuing underway”. Later, CETNTCOM  “strikes on fourteen Iran-backed Houthi missiles that were loaded to be fired in Houthi controlled areas in Yemen. These missiles on launch rails presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region and could have been fired at any time, prompting U.S. forces to exercise their inherent right and obligation to defend themselves”.
16/01/2024	CENTCOM  that U.S. forces on 11 January interdicted in international waters “a dhow conducting illegal transport of advanced lethal aid from Iran to resupply Houthi forces in Yemen as part of the Houthis’ ongoing campaign of attacks against international merchant shipping… Seized items include propulsion, guidance, and warheads for Houthi medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), as well as air defence associated components”.
16/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi militants launched an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into international shipping lanes in the southern Red Sea. M/V Zografia, a Maltese flagged bulk carrier reported they were struck but seaworthy and were continuing their Red Sea transit. No injuries were reported”. A Houthi spokesperson  that M/V Zografia was en route to Israel, asserting that they would “continue to implement the decision to prevent Israeli navigation or those associated with the Israeli enemy in the Red and Arab Seas until the aggression against Gaza is stopped”. CENTCOM also confirmed that “earlier in the day… U.S. forces struck and destroyed four Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles prepared to launch from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen”.
15/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and struck the M/V Gibraltar Eagle, a Marshall Islands-flagged, U.S.-owned and operated container ship. The ship has reported no injuries or significant damage and is continuing its journey”. “Earlier in the day”, CENTCOM added, “U.S. Forces detected an anti-ship ballistic missile fired toward the southern Red Sea commercial shipping lanes. The missile failed in flight and impacted on land in Yemen”. A Houthi military spokesperson  that “all American and British ships and warships participating in the aggression against our country [are] hostile targets”.
15/01/2024	Iran’s UN envoy  to the Security Council and UN Secretary-General rejecting U.S. claims about Iran’s involvement in Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, while asserting that “recent incidents in the Red Sea are directly related to Israel’s continued atrocities against the Palestinian people in Gaza”. He further argued that the Houthi group “maintains independent sovereignty, making decisions and taking actions in its own interest”.
14/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “an anti-ship cruise missile was fired from Iranian-backed Houthi militant areas of Yemen toward USS Laboon (DDG 58), which was operating in the southern Red Sea. The missile was shot down… by U.S. fighter aircraft. There were no injuries or damage reported”.
12/01/2024	The U.S.  “two companies in Hong Kong (PRC) and the United Arab Emirates for shipping Iranian commodities on behalf of the network of Iran-based, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)-backed Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal”. The U.S. also listed “four vessels as blocked property in which these companies have an interest”. The State Department  that “Iran’s financial support to the Houthis has fueled their unrelenting attacks on global commerce in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden… Along with our allies and partners, the U.S. will take available measures to hinder the destabilising activities of the Houthis that threaten navigational rights and freedoms and global maritime trade”.
12/01/2024	CENTCOM  conducting “a strike against a Houthi radar site in Yemen… designed to degrade the Houthi’s ability to attack maritime vessels, including commercial vessels”. “These strikes have no association with and are separate from Operation Prosperity Guardian”, it noted.
11/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “the Iranian-backed Houthis fired an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen into international shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden. One commercial vessel reported visually observing the missile impact the water
11/01/2024	President Biden  that “U.S. military forces – together with the United Kingdom and with support from Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands – successfully conducted strikes against a number of  in Yemen used by Houthi rebels to endanger freedom of navigation… These strikes are in direct response to unprecedented Houthi attacks against international maritime vessels in the Red Sea – including the use of anti-ship ballistic missiles for the first time in history”. He further asserted that “I will not hesitate to direct further measures to protect our people and the free flow of international commerce as necessary”. The Houthis  five fatalities and  the attacks, contending that “the American, British presence and those who allied with them under false pretenses in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab are unacceptable… Yemen is concerned with dealing with it in an appropriate manner”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the attack, contending it would “have no result other than fueling insecurity and instability in the region”. Saudi Arabia  on “all parties involved to avoid further escalation”.
10/01/2024	By a vote of 11-0 with four abstentions, the UN Security Council  Resolution 2722, “demanding that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels… [and] release the Galaxy Leader and its crew”, while highlighting “Member States’ right, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks”. The council “also condemned the provision of materiel to the Houthis in violation of resolution 2216 (2015) and urged caution and restraint to avoid further escalation of the situation in the Red Sea and the broader region”, while emphasising “enhanced diplomatic efforts by all parties to this end, including continued support for dialogue and Yemen’s peace process”.
10/01/2024	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  with the King of Bahrain on, per a U.S. readout, “the reckless and dangerous Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and reaffirmed their shared commitment to international law and freedom of navigation through Operation Prosperity Guardian”.
09/01/2024	CENTCOM  that the “Houthis launched a complex attack of Iranian designed one-way attack UAVs (OWA UAVs), anti-ship cruise missiles and an anti-ship ballistic missile from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen into the southern Red Sea, towards international shipping lanes where dozens of merchant vessels were transiting. Eighteen OWA UAVs, two anti-ship cruise missiles, and one anti-ship ballistic missile were shot down… There were no injuries or damage reported”. A Houthi military spokesperson  that the operation’s target was “an American ship that was providing support to the Zionist entity [ie, Israel]”, as “a preliminary response to the malicious  on our naval forces by American enemy forces” on 31 December 2023. The U.S. UN envoy  that “the threat to navigational rights and freedoms in the Red Sea is having global economic and security consequences – and necessitates a global response. The UN Security Council must act – without delay – to demand an end to Houthi attacks and support the unimpeded transit passage of vessels through the Red Sea”.
08/01/2024	In response to U.S.  at the UN Security Council about Iran having been “deeply involved in planning operations against commercial vessels in the Red Sea”, Iran’s envoy  to the Council that “Iran unequivocally condemns and categorically rejects the unfounded allegations… Incidents in the Red Sea are directly related to Israel’s continued atrocities against the Palestinian people in Gaza”.
06/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “an unmanned aerial vehicle launched from Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen was shot down in self-defense by USS Laboon (DDG 59) in international waters of the Southern Red Sea in the vicinity of multiple commercial vessels. There were no casualties or damage reported”.
04/01/2024	The commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that in the Red Sea, “a Houthi one-way attack unmanned surface vessel, or USV, detonated in international shipping lanes… There were no casualties and no ships were hit, but the introduction of a one-way attack USV is of concern”.
03/01/2024	The U.S. and twelve other countries issued a joint  on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, asserting that “attacks on vessels, including commercial vessels, using unmanned aerial vehicles, small boats, and missiles, including the first use of anti-ship ballistic missiles against such vessels, are a direct threat to the freedom of navigation that serves as the bedrock of global trade in one of the world’s most critical waterways”. They demanded “the immediate end of these illegal attacks and release of unlawfully detained vessels and crews”, emphasising: “The Houthis will bear the responsibility of the consequences should they continue to threaten lives, the global economy and free flow of commerce in the region’s critical waterways. We remain committed to the international rules-based order and are determined to hold malign actors accountable for unlawful seizures and attacks”. The same day, the U.S.  the UN Security Council that “Iran has been deeply involved in planning operations against commercial vessels in the Red Sea… The U.S. does not seek confrontation with Iran. Iran has a choice here: it can continue its current course or it can withhold its support – without which the Houthis would struggle to effectively track and strike commercial vessels”.
02/01/2024	CENTCOM  that “Iranian-backed Houthis fired two anti-ship ballistic missiles from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen into the Southern Red Sea. Multiple commercial ships in the area reported the impact of the ASBMs into the surrounding water though none have reported any damage”. The following day, a Houthi military spokesperson claimed that they had  an Israel-bound vessel, identified as CMA CGM Tage. He further asserted the Houthis would “continue to prevent Israeli ships or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine from navigating in the Red and Arab Seas”, while reiterating that “any American aggression will not go unanswered or punished” and warning “against any attack or measure that represents protection for commercial ships that go to the Zionist entity”.
01/01/2024	Iranian media  that the Alborz, a destroyer, had entered the Red Sea.
31/12/2023	CENTCOM  receiving a distress call from the Maersk Hangzhou which had been “under attack by four Iranian-backed Houthi small boats… In the process of issuing verbal calls to the small boats, the small boats fired upon the U.S. helicopters with crew served weapons and small arms. The U.S. Navy helicopters returned fire in self-defence, sinking three of the four small boats and killing the crews. The fourth boat fled the area. There was no damage to U.S. personnel or equipment”. The Houthis  ten fatalities, warning that the U.S. “bears the consequences of this crime”. They further urged other “countries not to engage in the dangerous American behaviour, as it will have negative repercussions that may affect everyone”, while reiterating their intent to stop “the passage of all Israeli ships, or those heading to the ports of occupied Palestine”.
31/12/2023	The Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council  with a senior Houthi official in Tehran, discussing “issues of mutual interest and regional security” and praising the Houthis’ “actions in supporting the Palestinian people against the aggression and brutal attacks of the Zionist regime [ie, Israel]”. The following day, Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian likewise  thanks to the Houthi official for “throwing its weight behind the oppressed Palestinian people”, and also noted Iran’s “satisfaction with the progress in talks between Yemen and Saudi Arabia”.
30/12/2023	CENTCOM  that it had responded to a distress call from the container ship Maersk Hangzhou, which had been hit by a missile in the Red Sea. It added: “While responding, the USS Gravely shot down two anti-ship ballistic missiles fired from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen toward the ships. This is the 23rd illegal attack by the Houthis on international shipping since 19 November”. The same day, a Houthi military spokesperson  the U.S. “of the consequences of undertaking any escalation”.
28/12/2023	The U.S.  “one individual and three  for facilitating Iranian financial assistance to the Houthis that enables attacks on international shipping and other destabilising activities”. The State Department asserted that “the U.S. will continue to combat Iranian illicit financial support to the Houthis”, and urged “the international community to stand firmly against the destabilising activities of the Houthis and their Iranian backers”.
28/12/2023	CENTCOM  that “the USS Mason shot down one drone and one anti-ship ballistic missile in the Southern Red Sea that were fired by the Houthis… There was no damage to any of the eighteen ships in the area or reported injuries. This is the 22nd attempted attack by Houthis on international shipping since 19 October”.
26/12/2023	Israel’s defence minister  that “we are in a multi-arena war, we are being attacked from seven different sectors – Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Iran”, adding: “We have already reacted and acted in six… And I say here in the most explicit way – anyone who acts against us is a potential target, there is no immunity for anyone”.
26/12/2023	According to CENTCOM, U.S. warships and aircraft  “twelve one-way attack drones, three anti-ship ballistic missiles and two land attack cruise missiles in the southern Red Sea that were fired by the Houthis over a ten hour period… There was no damage to ships in the area or reported injuries”. A Houthis military spokesperson  targeting a commercial ship, identified as MSC United, while reiterating “the continuation of their operations in the Red and Arab Seas against Israeli ships or those heading to the [Israeli] ports”. He also claimed that the Houthis had conducted drone attacks against “military targets” in southern Israel. The Israeli military  downing an inbound hostile aerial target.
23/12/2023	CENTCOM  that the USS Laboon downed “four unmanned aerial drones originating from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen that were inbound” while it was patrolling the Red Sea. The destroyer subsequently responded to distress calls from two commercial vessels in the area as “the M/V Blaamanen, a Norwegian-flagged, owned, and operated chemical/oil tanker, reported a near miss of a Houthi one-way attack drone with no injuries or damage reported… [and] the M/V Saibaba, a Gabon-owned, Indian-flagged crude oil tanker, reported that it was hit by a one-way attack drone with no injuries reported”. CENTCOM highlighted that “these attacks represent the fourteenth and fifteenth attacks on commercial shipping by Houthi militants since 17 October”.
22/12/2023	A senior White House official : “We know that Iran was deeply involved in planning the operations against commercial vessels in the Red Sea. This is consistent with Iran’s long-term material support and encouragement of the Houthi’s destabilising actions in the region… This is an international challenge that demands collective action”.
19/12/2023	The U.S. was part of a joint  condemning “Houthi interference with navigational rights and freedoms in the waters around the Arabian Peninsula, particularly the Red Sea… threaten[ing] international commerce and maritime security”. Signatories also asserted that “there is no justification for these attacks, which affect many countries beyond the flags these ships sail under” and urged “the Houthis to release the Galaxy Leader crew and ship [seized on 19 November] immediately and to cease additional attacks on commercial vessels in the region’s vital waterways”. The same day, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin  a ministerial with representatives of 43 countries regarding “the increased threat to maritime security in the Red Sea”, highlighting that “the Houthis had conducted over 100 one-way uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and ballistic missile attacks, targeting ten merchant vessels involving more than 35 different nations”, in addition to seizing a ship in November. He encouraged those attending “to join U.S.-led and other initiatives and work with U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) and the 39-member Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) to restore security in the Red Sea to deter future Houthi aggression”.
18/12/2023	A Houthi military spokesperson  that they had targeted two vessels in the Red Sea, identified as Swan Atlantic and MSC Clara, which he asserted were “linked to the Zionist entity [ie, Israel]”. CENTCOM  that the former vessel had been “attacked by a one-way attack drone and an anti-ship ballistic missile”, in response to which a U.S. warship rendered assistance, while the latter “reported an explosion in the water near their location”, with no damage or injuries reported.
18/12/2023	Announcing the  of “Operation Prosperity Guardian, an important new multinational security initiative” in the Red Sea, the Pentagon asserted that “the recent escalation in reckless Houthi attacks originating from Yemen threatens the free flow of commerce, endangers innocent mariners, and violates international law… Countries that seek to uphold the foundational principle of freedom of navigation must come together to tackle the challenge posed by this non-state actor launching ballistic missiles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) at merchant vessels from many nations”.
18/12/2023	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  with his  counterpart on the Israel-Gaza war and “preventing the further spread of the conflict”. He further “condemned continued attacks by the Houthis on commercial vessels operating in international waters in the southern Red Sea and urged cooperation among all partners to uphold maritime security”. According to a U.S. readout, the two highlighted “their countries’ shared commitment, in coordination with international and regional partners, to end the devastating conflict in Yemen”.
16/12/2023	CENTCOM  that the “USS Carney… operating in the Red Sea, successfully engaged fourteen unmanned aerial systems launched as a drone wave from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. The UAS were assessed to be one-way attack drones and were shot down with no damage to ships in the area or reported injuries”. The same day, a UK warship also  a drone. A Houthi military spokesperson  that they had carried out “a military operation against sensitive targets” in southern Israel “with a large batch of drones”.
15/12/2023	CENTCOM  that “Houthi forces contacted the Motor Vessel MSC Alanya, a Liberian flagged vessel that was traveling north in the southern part of the Red Sea and threatened to attack it… U.S. forces maintained direct communications with the vessel, and the Alanya continued north”. Later, “a UAV launched from Houthi held territory struck the Liberian flagged Motor Vessel Al Jasrah as it was travelling south in the Red Sea”, causing a fire which was extinguished. CENTCOM also reported that “Houthi forces launched two ballistic missiles towards the international shipping lanes in the Bab al-Mandab strait. One of these missiles struck the Liberian flagged MV Palatium 3, which broadcast a mayday call and reported that the vessel was on fire. The USS Mason has responded to that request. The other missile likely missed any ships”. The Houthis  responsibility for attacking the Alanya and Palatium 3, reiterating that they would “continue to prevent all ships heading to Israeli ports from navigating in the Arab and Red Seas”. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan  that “while the Houthis are pulling the trigger, so to speak, they’re being handed the gun by Iran… Iran has a responsibility to take steps themselves to cease these attacks”. A senior Iranian diplomat subsequently  that “the Yemenis [ie, the Houthis] are an independent actor in the international arena, acting based on their own judgment and therefore it is not right to link their actions to others”.
14/12/2023	Reacting to U.S.  to form a multinational task-force “to provide a greater level of security through the Red Sea”, Iran’s defence minister : “if they make such an irrational move, they will be faced with extraordinary problems… Nobody can make a move in a region where we have predominance”.
14/12/2023	The Houthis  to have conducted a successful drone attack against the Maersk Gibraltar, which they asserted was bound for Israel, adding that they “succeeded in preventing the passage of several ships heading to the Israeli entity during the past 48 hours”. Maersk  an attack but  “the vessel was not hit”, and had been sailing from Oman to Saudi Arabia.
13/12/2023	CENTCOM  that the USS Mason responded to “a mayday call from the Marshall Islands-flagged tanker Motor Vessel Ardmore Encounter, which was under attack from Houthi forces. These forces first attempted to board the tanker via skiffs. When this was unsuccessful, a pair of missiles were fired from Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen at the vessel, which both missed. While responding to the distress call, the Mason shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle also launched from Houthi-controlled areas. The UAV was heading directly towards the Mason and was shot down in self-defence. There were no injuries to personnel and no damage to any vessels”. The same day as the attacks, Israeli President Isaac Herzog  that “the Houthis have crossed a red line in the Red Sea. The U.S.-led international activities against the Houthi terror-pirates must be bolstered and strengthened, in the form of a truly international coalition. Under the direction of their totalitarian commanders in Tehran, the Houthis’ continued acts of terrorism and piracy against ships of all nationalities and ownerships requires the entire international community to act, united, forcefully and decisively to stamp out this vile threat to the global economy and trade”.
11/12/2023	CENTCOM  that “the Motor Tanker Strinda was attacked by what is assessed to have been an Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) launched from a Houthi controlled area of Yemen while passing through the Bab al-Mandeb. The Strinda reported damage causing a fire on-board, but no casualties at this time”
09/12/2023	The Houthis  “they would prevent the passage of ships heading to the Zionist entity [ie, Israel] of any nationality, if they do not enter the Gaza Strip with the food and medicine they need”, warning “all ships and companies against dealing with Israeli ports”. The same day, a French warship  two drones launched from Yemen in the Red Sea
07/12/2023	The U.S.  thirteen persons and entities that the Treasury Department said were “responsible for providing tens of millions of dollars’ worth of foreign currency generated from the sale and shipment of Iranian commodities, backed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), to the Houthis in Yemen”. The State Department  that “the Iranian regime’s support to the Houthis has enabled unprovoked attacks on civilian infrastructure in Israel and on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Attacks launched from Houthi-controlled areas have also threatened U.S. warships operating in international waters. Such attacks disrupt maritime security and impede freedom of navigation for commercial vessels, increase regional instability and risk broadening the conflict between Israel and Hamas”. The same day, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin  with his Saudi counterpart on “Houthi threats to freedom of navigation in the Red Sea”, highlighting “Iran’s dangerous role in advising, arming and training the Houthis”, and expressing “his desire to work with all nations who share an interest in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and ensuring safe passage for global shipping”.
06/12/2023	The Israeli military  that “the launch of a surface-to-surface missile toward Israeli territory was identified and successfully intercepted in the area of the Red Sea… the target did not cross into Israeli territory”. An Israeli military spokesperson  that “this terrorist activity is Houthi terror activity. It is regional terrorism – directed, funded, and orchestrated by Iran. It is a global problem – affecting all parts of the region”. The Houthis  to have launched “a batch of ballistic missiles at military targets” in Israel, reiterating that they would continue “to carry out their military operations against the Israeli enemy, as well as implementing the decision to prevent Israeli ships from sailing in the Arab and Red Seas in support of the oppressed Palestinian people and until the aggression against Gaza stops”. The same day, a U.S. official  that “the USS Mason shot down an uncrewed aerial vehicle originating from Houthi controlled areas of Yemen… in the southern Red Sea”
04/12/2023	Discussing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan  that “attacks on commercial shipping in international waters are totally unacceptable and have to stop… We are in talks with other countries about maritime task force of sorts involving the ships from partner nations alongside the U.S. in ensuring safe passage – passage of ships in the Red Sea”. Sullivan further asserted that the Houthis were “the ones with their finger on the trigger. But that gun – the weapons here are being supplied by Iran. And Iran, we believe, is the ultimate party responsible for this”.
03/12/2023	CENTCOM  “four missile attacks against three separate commercial vessels operating in international waters in the southern Red Sea… These three vessels [M/V Unity Explorer, M/V Number 9 and M/V Sophie II] are connected to fourteen separate nations”. While responding to distress calls, the USS Carney downed three UAVs. CENTCOM asserted that it had “every reason to believe that these attacks, while launched by the Houthis in Yemen, are fully enabled by Iran. The U.S. will consider all appropriate responses in full coordination with its international allies and partners”. The Houthis  responsibility for targeting two of the ships, describing them as “Israeli vessels”, and warned they would “continue to prevent Israeli ships from navigating the Red and Arab Seas until the Israeli aggression against the steadfast brothers in the Gaza Strip stops”. An Israeli military spokesperson  the vessels were “without a connection to the state of Israel”. Iran  involvement in attacks in the Red Sea, asserting that “resistance factions in the region do not receive orders from the Islamic Republic of Iran… These factions make decisions and act according to their own principles and priorities”.
30/11/2023	Media reports  that an explosion in Sanaa was the result of airstrike against a Houthi weapons storage facility
30/11/2023	The Houthis  “full readiness to resume their military operations against the Israeli enemy in the event that it decides to resume its aggression against Gaza”, adding that they would “not hesitate to expand military operations against the Israeli entity to include targets that it may not expect on land or at sea”. They also warned that “they continue to prevent Israeli ships in the Red Sea and will take further measures to ensure the full implementation of this decision, stressing that their military operations will stop as soon as the Israeli aggression against the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip stops”.
29/11/2023	An unnamed U.S. official  that the USS Carney had downed what was assessed to be “an Iranian-made KAS-04” drone fired from Yemen in the south of the Red Sea.
28/11/2023	In a  welcoming the humanitarian pause in the Israel-Gaza war, G7 foreign ministers noted their “commitment to work with all partners in the region to prevent the conflict from escalating further”, and urged “all parties not to threaten or interfere with lawful exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by all vessels”. “We especially call on the Houthis to immediately cease attacks on civilians and threats to international shipping lanes and commercial vessels and release the M/V Galaxy Leader and its crew, illegally seized from international waters on November 19”, they added. A Houthi spokesperson subsequently  “their repeated warnings to ships belonging to the Israeli enemy or working with it that they would be vulnerable to being targeted as a result of the brutal aggression and unjust siege on the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian people”, asserting that the 19 November seizure was “in solidarity with the Palestinian people…The fate of the ship is linked to the choices of the Palestinian resistance and to serve its goals in confronting the Zionist aggression”.
26/11/2023	U.S. Central Command  that U.S. and allied forces had responded to a distress call from M/V Central Park, a Liberian-flagged tanker  to Israeli ownership, that was “under attack by an unknown entity” in the Gulf of Aden. “Upon arrival, coalition elements demanded release of the vessel. Subsequently, five armed individuals debarked the ship and attempted to flee via their small boat. The USS Mason pursued the attackers resulting in their eventual surrender. The crew of the M/V Central Park is currently safe”, it asserted. Subsequently, “two ballistic missiles were fired from Houthi controlled areas in Yemen toward the general location of the USS Mason and Central Park… The missiles landed in the Gulf of Aden approximately ten nautical miles from the ships”. A Pentagon spokesperson  with respect to the attempted seizure that “initial indications [are] that these five individuals are Somali… Clearly a piracy-related incident”.
25/11/2023	The Israeli military  intercepting “a UAV approaching Israeli territory in the area of the Red Sea… The threat did not infiltrate Israeli territory”.
22/11/2023	The Houthis  they had launched “a batch of winged missiles at various military targets” in Israel, warning “that they would continue to carry out their military operations until the Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank stops”. The Israeli military  intercepting a cruise missile.
19/11/2023	The Huthis  the Bahamas-flagged , which they claimed was an “”, in the Red Sea, calling the move “a major shift in the course of the battle with the Zionist entity [ie, Israel]”. Israel  what the prime minister’s office described as an “Iranian attack against an international vessel”, noting: “The ship, which is owned by a British company and is operated by a Japanese firm, was hijacked with Iran guidance by the Yemenite Houthi militia… No Israelis are onboard”. “This is another act of Iranian terrorism and constitutes a leap forward in Iran’s aggression against the citizens of the free world, with international consequences regarding the security of the global shipping lanes”, the statement read. Iran’s government  any involvement, asserting: “Resistance groups in the region act independently and spontaneously based on their interests and that of their people”.
15/11/2023	The Pentagon  that a U.S. vessel in the Red Sea had “engaged a drone that originated from Yemen and was heading in the direction of the ship… The [USS Thomas] Hudner’s crew engaged and shot down the drone to ensure the safety of U.S. personnel. There were no U.S. casualties or any damage to the ship”. Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian, asked about Iran’s involvement, : “We really didn’t want this crisis [ie, Israel-Gaza war] to expand. But the U.S. has been intensifying the war in Gaza by throwing its support behind Israel. Yemen makes its own decisions and acts independently”.
14/11/2023	An Israeli military spokesperson  the interception of “a rocket launched towards the territory of the State of Israel above the Red Sea, using the ‘Arrow’ long-range defense system… The target did not, at any stage, enter the territory of the State of Israel”. A Huthi spokesperson  that they had launched “a batch of ballistic missiles” and drones against targets in Israel, while the group’s leader  that “our eyes are open to constantly monitor and search for any Israeli ship in the Red Sea, especially in Bab al-Mandab, and near Yemeni regional waters”.
11/11/2023	The Israeli military  striking “a wide range of military targets in Lebanon of the Hizbollah terror organisation, in response to fire on Israeli communities in the north over the past day”. The IDF confirmed firing artillery at targets in Syria “in response to two rockets that were fired into the Golan Heights and fell in an open area”. A spokesperson contended that “Hizbollah, with the guidance of Iran, are trying to challenge Israel with the aim of distracting the IDF’s attention from Gaza. We are focused on Gaza and will continue to operate and respond to Lebanon, and Hizbollah specifically, against every firing, every terror cell, that will try to attack Israel”. “In parallel”, he added, “we are also following the Huthi terror, supported by Iran and Hizbollah, with our American partners and other partners in the world”.
09/11/2023	The Israeli military  intercepting a missile over the Red Sea.
08/11/2023	A Huthi spokesperson  the downing of a U.S. drone he said was “carrying out hostile, monitoring and spying operations in the Yemeni territorial waters along with the U.S. military support to the Israeli entity. Hostile acts won’t deter the Yemeni armed forces from continuing to conduct military operations against Israeli entity in a solidarity to the oppression of Palestinian nation”, he warned. A U.S. official  that “a U.S. military MQ-9 remotely-piloted aircraft was shot down off the coast of Yemen by Huthi forces”.
01/11/2023	An IDF spokesperson  intercepting “an aerial threat detected in the Red Sea region, south of Eilat. There was no ultimate threat to civilians as there was no entry into Israeli airspace”. He further announced that “we have sent additional Israeli Navy vessels to provide significant defence of the area and layered strike capabilities with defensive layers and the air force”, and warned: “We know how to gather at the time and place of our choosing in relations to the security interests of Israel wherever needed”. A Huthi spokesperson  they had successfully “launched a large batch of drones… at several targets” in Israel, adding that they would “continue to carry out their military operations in support and victory for the oppression of the Palestinian people…  until the Israeli aggression against our brothers in steadfast Gaza stops”.
31/10/2023	The Israeli military  downing “a surface-to-surface missile in the area of the Red Sea… An additional aerial threat was successfully intercepted”. A Huthi spokesperson  for what he said was “a large batch of ballistic and winged missiles, and a large number of drones” fired at Israel. He described the attack as “the third operation in support of our oppressed brothers in Palestine”, declaring that “they will continue to carry out more qualitative strikes with missiles and drones until the Israeli aggression [against Gaza] stops”.
27/10/2023	The Israeli military  that Hizbollah had fired anti-tank guided missiles and small arms
24/10/2023	Addressing a UN Security Council ministerial meeting, Secretary of State Antony Blinken  that “for years, Iran has supported Hamas, Hizbollah, the Huthis and other groups that continue to carry out attacks on Israel… In recent weeks, Iran’s proxies have repeatedly attacked U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria, whose mission is to prevent ISIS from renewing its rampage. So let me say this before this council and let me say what we have consistently said to Iranian officials through other channels: The U.S. does not seek conflict with Iran. We do not want this war [between Israel and Gaza] to widen. But if Iran or its proxies attack U.S. personnel anywhere, make no mistake: We will  our people, we will defend our security – swiftly and decisively”.
21/10/2023	U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, citing “recent escalations by Iran and its proxy forces across the Middle East”,  “the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery as well as additional Patriot battalions to locations throughout the region to increase force protection for U.S. forces”, adding: “An additional number of forces on prepare to deploy orders as part of prudent contingency planning, to increase their readiness and ability to quickly respond as required”. He also  with his Israeli counterpart regarding “the continued provision of security assistance and the U.S. commitment to deter any state or non-state actor seeking to escalate this war [between Israel and Gaza]”. The following day, Secretary of State Antony Blinken: “We are concerned at the possibility of Iranian proxies escalating their attacks against our own personnel… We’re taking every measure to make sure that we can defend them and, if necessary, respond decisively. Not at all what we’re looking for, not at all what we want, but we’ll be prepared if that’s what they choose to do”.
19/10/2023	The Pentagon  that the USS Carney had downed multiple missiles and several drones launched by the Huthis. “We cannot say for certain what these drones and missiles were targeting, but they were launched from Yemen and heading north along the Red Sea, potentially towards targets in Israel”, a spokesperson said, adding: “We have the capability to defend our broader interests in the region and to deter regional escalation, Israelis and broader expansion of the conflict that began with Hamas’s attack on Israeli civilians on 7 October”.
04/10/2023	CENTCOM  that the U.S. had “transferred approximately 1.1 million 7.62mm rounds to the Ukrainian armed forces… These munitions were originally  [in December 2022] by U.S. Central Command naval forces… [while] being transferred from the IRGC to the Huthis in Yemen in violation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216”. The statement further asserted that “the U.S. is committed to working with our allies and partners to counter the flow of Iranian lethal aid in the region by all lawful means”.
28/09/2023	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that the previous day, “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) interacted in an unsafe and unprofessional manner with a U.S. AH-1Z Viper attack helicopter… as the aircraft was conducting routine operations in the international airspace of the Arabian Gulf”, adding: “IRGCN vessels shone a laser multiple times at the aircraft while in flight. Fortunately, no injuries were reported and the aircraft was not damaged”.
25/09/2023	Bahraini state media  that a Huthi drone attack near the Saudi-Yemeni border killed  Bahraini servicemembers and wounded others. The Saudi-led coalition’s spokesperson  the attack, noting that it followed “other hostilities during the past month”. The following day, a U.S. diplomatic spokesperson also  the attack, asserting that “This unprovoked attack threatens the longest period of calm since the war in Yemen began”.
20/09/2023	Following a round of  with the Huthis, Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry  “the positive results of the discussions aimed at achieving a road map to support the peace process in Yemen”, and encouraged “the Yemeni parties to engage in the dialogue to reach a comprehensive and lasting political solution in Yemen under the supervision of the UN”.
06/08/2023	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that “more than 3,000 U.S. Sailors and Marines of the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) and 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) arrived in the Middle East… as part of a  Department of Defense deployment”, highlighting that the additional forces “bring to the region additional aviation and naval assets, as well as more U.S. Marines and Sailors, providing greater flexibility and maritime capability to U.S. 5th Fleet”. The following day, Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that “ensuring the security of waterways and safe shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman is one of Iran’s priorities and an issue that should be carried out in the framework of joint cooperation between the coastal countries… without any foreign intervention and extra-regional forces”. The same day, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that the U.S. was “attacking oil tankers and helping maritime smuggling gangs in our region and other regions”, while an IRGC spokesperson  Iran’s power to “respond in kind to any U.S. action and mischief [in the region], including the seizure of ships”.
27/07/2023	U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan  Saudi Arabia and conferred with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and other Saudi officials on “bilateral and regional matters, including initiatives to advance a common vision for a more peaceful, secure, prosperous and stable Middle East region interconnected with the world”. According to a White House readout, “Sullivan also reviewed significant progress to build on the benefits of the truce in Yemen… and welcomed ongoing UN-led efforts to bring the war to a close”.
19/07/2023	The U.S. and the Arab League  a strategic dialogue with a joint statement in which they denounced “any threats, armed seizures and attacks against commercial ships that interfere with navigational rights and freedoms in the strategic waterways of the region”, adding: “We resolve to increase our commitment to pursue collective efforts to address threats to the security of vessels traveling through the region’s waterways that are critical to international trade and the global economy”.
06/07/2023	A U.S. navy spokesperson  that Iran’s IRGC had detained a merchant vessel, potentially involved in smuggling activity, in international waters. “U.S. naval forces deployed maritime assets to closely monitor the situation. Ultimately, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command assessed the circumstances of this event did not warrant further response”, he added. The following day, Iranian media  that the IRGC Navy had seized what was described as a vessel carrying smuggled fuel, and detained the twelve crew members.
05/07/2023	The U.S. military  that its “forces prevented two attempted commercial tanker seizures by the Iranian Navy after the Iranians have opened fire in one of the incidents near the coast of Oman”. According to a statement from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, “one Iranian naval vessel approached the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker TRF Moss in international waters in the Gulf of Oman. The Iranian vessel departed the scene when U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul (DDG 74) arrived on station”. Subsequently, “the U.S. Navy received a distress call from Bahamian-flagged oil tanker Richmond Voyager… Another Iranian naval vessel had closed within one mile of Richmond Voyager while hailing the commercial tanker to stop… Prior to McFaul’s arrival on scene, Iranian personnel fired multiple, long bursts from both small arms and crew-served weapons. Richmond Voyager sustained no casualties or significant damage. However, several rounds hit the ship’s hull near crew living spaces. The Iranian navy vessel departed when McFaul arrived”. The following day, Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation  that Richmond Voyager had “ignored basic international maritime laws by escaping the scene of a collision with an Iranian vessel”, in which it said five crew members had been injured. It further noted: “Iran has informed Omani authorities of the case and will continue efforts to confiscate the ship”. Chevron, which managed the Richmond Voyager,  Iran’s claims.
25/06/2023	Representatives from the U.S., the GCC and GCC member states  in a “high-level, multilateral meeting in Bahrain… to discuss current maritime security and ways to further enhance maritime security in the region”. The participants issued a joint statement, expressing their “commitment to uphold navigational rights and operate consistent with international law, as well as pursue collective efforts to prevent threats to vessels traveling through regional waterways that are critical to international trade and the global economy”.
11/06/2023	The Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council  what it called “continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of Yemen, and the smuggling of military experts and weapons to the Huthi terrorist militia in clear violation of Security Council Resolutions 2216, 2231 and 2624”.
07/06/2023	U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Riyadh for meetings with  Saudi  and GCC counterparts. A joint U.S-GCC ministerial  reaffirmed “their commitment to freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region and their determination to counter aggressive and illegal actions at sea or elsewhere that might threaten the shipping lanes, international trade and oil installations in the GCC states”. The ministers also urged “Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency”, while hailing “the decision by Saudi Arabia and Iran to resume diplomatic relations”. During his visit, Blinken commented on Iran-Saudi normalisation mediated by China, : “If countries, whoever they are, can play a positive role in helping to advance peace, de-escalate tensions… we think that’s a good thing.  And of course, the Saudis and Iranians have been talking together for at least a couple of years to get to this place. We’ll see what happens now. But again, if it reduces tensions, if it at least takes one problem off of the board, that’s very positive”.
04/06/2023	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that U.S. and UK vessels, supported by a patrol aircraft, had “responded to a distress call from a merchant vessel transiting the Strait of Hormuz, June 4, as Iranian [IRGC Navy] fast-attack boats harassed the commercial ship”. “The situation deescalated approximately an hour later when the merchant vessel confirmed the fast-attack craft departed the scene”, the statement added, further highlighting: “U.S. 5th Fleet remains vigilant and is bolstering defence around the key strait with partners to enhance regional maritime security and stability”. The IRGC Navy  the report, claiming that after receiving a distress call from a Marshall Islands-flagged merchant vessel, “the command and control center of Iran at the Hormuz Strait… resolved the ship’s concerns about the presence of [three] non-military light boats near it”.
30/05/2023	The Emirati foreign ministry  that “as a result of our ongoing evaluation of effective security cooperation with all partners, two months ago, the UAE withdrew its participation in the [U.S-led] Combined Maritime Forces”. A U.S. navy spokesperson  that the UAE had withdrawn “their participation for the moment in the task forces but not their overall membership”.
22/05/2023	Israel’s defence minister  that “since I took office, the number of Israeli strikes against the Iranian in Syria have doubled… We are working methodically to strike the Iranian intelligence capabilities in Syria. These strikes inflict significant damage to the attempts by the Revolutionary guard to establish a foothold a few kilometres from the Israeli border”. He further asserted that “Iran aims to expand its reach to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and even the shores of the Mediterranean… This is a structure plan designed to threaten trade and flight route – both military and civilian – and to create a permanent threat in the maritime arena”.
11/05/2023	U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Lenderking  that “despite the fact that we welcomed an agreement between the Saudis and the Iranians, I remain concerned about Iran’s role… The Iranians have continued to smuggle weaponry and narcotics toward the conflict [during the truce], and we are very concerned that this would continue despite the benefits that could come from a Saudi-Iran deal”. He further opined that “the Saudi-Iran agreement alone will not bring peace to Yemen. Huthis do not just take Iranian direction on peace efforts. And the Yemen conflict is about more than Saudi Arabia and Iran. There are internal tensions and divisions within the society that have helped fuel this conflict… Many people are sharing with us that in their conversations with Iran that Iran is supportive of a political process in Yemen. We want to see that borne out in fact, and we do not want to see a continuation of the smuggling and violation of UN Security Council resolutions, which characterised the previous seven years of Iran’s engagement on Yemen”.
27/04/2023	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that the Advantage Sweet, “a Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker… was seized by the Islamic Republic of Iran Navy while transiting international waters in the Gulf of Oman”. It called on Iran to “immediately release the oil tanker”, and noted: “Iran’s continued harassment of vessels and interference with navigational rights in regional waters are a threat to maritime security and the global economy”. Iran’s Navy  that the tanker was detained because it had “collided with an Iranian boat in the Gulf of Oman and tried to flee… two members of boat’s crew are missing and several were injured”. However, the company managing the vessel, which was travelling from Kuwait to the U.S.,  “had no knowledge of a collision”. The following day, media reports  that the U.S. had seized a China-bound shipment of Iranian crude prior to the Advantage Sweet incident, with an unnamed U.S. official quoted as saying that the latter “appears to be in retaliation”.
19/04/2023	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that “an unmanned surface vessel from U.S. 5th Fleet transited the Strait of Hormuz  with two U.S. Coast Guard cutters… demonstrating the continued operational integration of unmanned and artificial intelligence systems by U.S. maritime forces in the Middle East”. The vessels, per the Navy statement, were “operating in support of the International Maritime Security Construct”.
17/04/2023	Characterising Saudi-Iranian relations as moving toward “détente, not a rapprochement or reconciliation”, a senior U.S. diplomat  that “it’s a very good thing, if, and it is a big if, Iran does hold to these commitments… But it would also be a departure from 40-plus years of Iranian foreign policy operations in constantly fostering insecurity, in its near abroad, and more than its near abroad, in order in some fashion to bolster its own security”.
14/04/2023	National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan : “The U.S. welcomes the  of nearly 900 prisoners across both sides of the conflict today in Yemen”, adding: “We will continue to do all we can to help consolidate the truce that now been in effect for over one year… We encourage all parties to further consolidate these positive trends and ultimately forge a diplomatic resolution to the conflict”.
11/04/2023	National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan  with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, hailing “Saudi Arabia’s extraordinary efforts to pursue a more comprehensive roadmap for ending the war in Yemen” and extending “full U.S. support for those efforts”. According to a U.S. readout, the two also conferred on “broader trends toward de-escalation in the region, while underscoring the need to maintain deterrence against threats from Iran and elsewhere”. Sullivan further “reaffirmed President Biden’s unwavering commitment to ensure Iran can never acquire a nuclear weapon”.
10/04/2023	Amid  involving Saudi Arabia and the Huthis over resolving the Yemen conflict, Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that from Tehran’s standpoint, “the only solution is a political one with the presence of all Yemeni sides to decide the fate of the country and the formation of a government in line with the interests of the Yemeni nation”. “Given new conditions in the region”, he added, “we hope to witness a sustainable ceasefire and… a stable political process”.
07/04/2023	The U.S.  the deployment of a nuclear-powered guided-missile submarine to the Middle East “to help ensure regional maritime security and stability”, : “Recent events, including the strikes in Syria and public threats made by Iran against merchant vessels, prompted us to remind regional mariners to remain vigilant”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  to the announcement by saying: “The U.S. regime has trodden a path against the will of regional nations by its frequent warmongering and spreading instability and division in the West Asia region. Washington would better be realistic and understand the realities and avoid attempting to interfere in West Asia region and the Persian Gulf, in the interest of the shaky Zionist regime [ie, Israel]”.
15/03/2023	A U.S. diplomat  the Security Council: “We hope that the recently announced  between Saudi Arabia and Iran will contribute to efforts to secure a durable solution to the conflict in Yemen, address the continued flow of Iranian lethal aid to the Huthis and ensure Iranian support for a Yemeni political process”. Noting four interdictions of Iranian-origin, Yemen-bound arms shipments since January, the U.S. diplomat underscored that “member states involved in these illicit transfers… are in violation of this Council’s resolutions”.
15/03/2023	China, Iran and Russia  a five-day military drill in the Gulf of Oman.
13/03/2023	The UN’s special envoy for Yemen  Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian and  senior Iranian officials in Tehran, conferring on “the need for regional support for the start of an inclusive, Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices to sustainably end the conflict”. Amirabdollahian  that “Iran supports the continuation of the ceasefire in Yemen… [and] any negotiations which would help establish peace and stability in Yemen”.
10/03/2023	Following talks in Beijing, Iran, Saudi Arabia and China jointly  an agreement between Tehran and Riyadh to “resume diplomatic relations… and re-open their embassies and missions within a period not exceeding two months, and the agreement includes their affirmation of the respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in internal affairs of states”. A White House spokesperson  that “if this deal can be sustained… and the war in Yemen can end, and Saudi Arabia doesn’t have to continually try to defend itself against attacks from the Huthis who are funded and supported by Iran, in the end we welcome that”.
02/03/2023	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that on 23 February, “U.S. forces provided airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support for an interdiction in the Gulf of Oman  by the United Kingdom Royal Navy… confiscating anti-tank guided missiles and missile components from a small boat that originated from Iran. UK forces discovered packages that included Iranian versions of Russian 9M133 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles… and medium-range ballistic missile components”. “The interdiction occurred along a route historically used to traffic weapons unlawfully to Yemen”, the statement noted. A senior U.S. commander stated that “this is the seventh illegal weapon or drug interdiction in the last three months and yet another example of Iran’s increasing malign maritime activity across the region”.
01/03/2023	A senior IDF official  that “Iran is not just a threat to Israel
15/02/2023	CENTCOM Commander Erik Kurilla  that “Iran’s continued shipment of illegal arms to the Huthis violated the UN Security Council Resolution governing the violence in Yemen and undermines peace efforts. Our partners are critical to the  of this material and to countering Iran’s malign activity. Iran remains the most destabilising actor in the Middle East”.
15/02/2023	The U.S. and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states issued a joint  on Iran denouncing its “continued destabilising policies, including its support for terrorism and the use of advanced missiles, cyber weapons and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and their proliferation in the region and around the world”. The participants also insisted that “Iran’s nuclear advances… have no credible civilian purpose and are gravely exacerbating regional and global tensions”, while the U.S. reiterated “President Biden’s commitment not to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon”. The statement went on to voice a “commitment to expanding defence cooperation and interoperability to enhance their capabilities to constrain Iran’s ability to conduct destabilising activities and deter it from conducting future acts of aggression”, while highlighting diplomacy as “the preferred way to address Iran’s destabilising policies and nuclear escalation in a sustained manner”. They concluded by calling on “the international community to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions prohibiting transfers of arms and related materiel and ensuring accountability in this regard”.
13/02/2023	A senior U.S. defence official  that “there has been a decrease in Huthi attacks against Saudi Arabia because of the truce that has been in place. Now, the actual truce has expired, and at this point in time, all sides are not resuming hostilities”. “A major concern that we all have to watch very closely”, she continued, “is that the Huthis actually use the time of the truce to reset and rearm their forces, and meanwhile, there’s been extensive and active diplomacy… We have not seen the Huthis be good faith actors in extending the truce, being willing to be flexible or take genuine movements toward a political process”.
01/02/2023	CENTCOM  that on January 15 it had “supported a maritime interdiction… that resulted in the seizure by  of weapons that originated in Iran and were bound for Yemen” in the Gulf of Oman, adding: “More than 3,000 assault rifles, 578,000 rounds of ammunition and 23 advanced anti-tank guided missiles were recovered”.
23/01/2023	After a U.S. representative  the UN Security Council that “Iran continues to send a steady flow of weapons to the Huthis”, Iran’s UN envoy  to the Council asserting: “This unproven claim made by the U.S. and certain states is based on false information and serves only to advance their political interests in the Yemen conflict”.
17/01/2023	Marking the anniversary of an attack against civilian targets in the UAE by what CENTCOM  as “Iran-aligned forces”, ie, the Huthis, the White House  that “the U.S. will continue to support the UAE as it defends itself against threats – whether from Yemen or anywhere else. We remain steadfast in our pursuit of diplomacy to bring a peaceful end to the war in Yemen, and the U.S. will continue to support the security of the UAE and our other partners in the Middle East, including providing needed military assistance”.
16/01/2023	A U.S. representative  the UN Security Council that “despite the ongoing period of calm [in the Yemen war], Iran continues to send a steady flow of weapons to the Huthis. Just ten days ago, the U.S. intercepted a dhow carrying thousands of AK-47s from Iran to the Huthis – the third interdiction in recent months. Such lethal, external interference can only fuel war and suffering in Yemen at a time when Yemenis are calling for the Huthis to negotiate to end the war”.
10/01/2023	CENTCOM  that on 6 January it had interdicted “a stateless dhow in the Gulf of Oman smuggling more than 2,000 AK-47 assault rifles while transiting international waters from Iran to Yemen”. A senior commander contended that “this shipment is part of a continued pattern of destabilising activity from Iran… These threats have our attention. We remain vigilant in detecting any maritime activity that threatens freedom or compromises regional security”.
09/12/2022	The Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council  what it called “Iran’s continued interference in the internal affairs of Yemen [and] the smuggling of military experts and weapons to the Huthi militia in clear contravention of Security Council resolutions”, while highlighting “the importance of preventing arms smuggling to the Huthi militia that threatens maritime freedom and global trade in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea”.
03/12/2022	The U.S. Navy  that on 1 December it had “intercepted a fishing trawler smuggling more than 50 tons of ammunition rounds, fuses and propellants for rockets in the Gulf of Oman along a maritime route from Iran to Yemen”. A senior commander contended that “this significant interdiction clearly shows that Iran’s unlawful transfer of lethal aid and destabilising behaviour continues… U.S. naval forces remain focused on deterring and disrupting dangerous and irresponsible maritime activity in the region”.
01/12/2022	Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz  that “in the last five years, Iran has conducted at least sixteen separate attacks on civilian international vessels in the Gulf and the Red Sea”. He also contended that “Iran continues to build, expand and fortify its capabilities. Today should Iran decide to do so, it may reach SQ1 at 90 per cent enriched Uranium in only two weeks. The international community must take action – strengthening alliances, increasing intelligence cooperation, projecting power and responding forcefully to Iranian attacks and aggression”.
01/12/2022	Latvia  to the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), joining ten other countries in the initiative.
15/11/2022	The U.S. 5th Fleet  that on 8 November it interdicted a vessel “in the Gulf of Oman smuggling lethal aid, including a large quantity of explosive material, from Iran to Yemen”
19/10/2022	Seychelles  to the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), joining nine other countries in the initiative.
02/10/2022	With Yemen’s six-month  up for renewal, the UN Special Envoy  that an extension had not yet been reached and urged all sides “to fulfill their obligation to the Yemeni people to pursue every avenue for peace… I will continue my relentless efforts to engage with the parties to quickly reach an agreement on a way forward”. The following day, President Raisi  to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres and stated that “Iran has always emphasised on lifting the blockade and establishing a ceasefire and trying to resolve the crisis through Yemeni-Yemeni dialogues and understanding without foreign interference in this country”.
12/09/2022	Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian  with a Huthi official in Tehran and backed “the start and extension of the truce in Yemen… as a prelude to the establishment of lasting peace”.
11/09/2022	Prime Minister Yair Lapid  that “Israel is working to prevent Iran from establishing terrorist bases throughout the Middle East and especially in Syria… Israel will not allow Syria to be used as an axis for the transfer of weapons to terrorist organisations, and will not accept the establishment of Iranian bases or militia bases on our northern border”. The following day, Defence Minister Benny Gantz  that Iran had built “production facilities [in Syria] for mid- and long-range precise missiles and weapons, provided to Hizbollah and Iranian proxies. In other words, it became yet another Iranian front – a factory for advanced, strategic weapons”. “These sites, particularly the underground facility at Masyaf”, Gantz added, “host significant threats to the region and to the State of Israel… Masyaf, specifically, is used to produce advanced missiles”. He also said, “the Iranians are currently working to build missile and weapon industries in Lebanon and Yemen… If this trend will not be stopped, within a decade, there will be advanced Iranian industries across the region, producing weapons and spreading terror”.
04/09/2022	Meeting with the UN special envoy for Yemen, Iranian Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian  that “Iran wants peace, stability and security for the great Yemeni nation and believes that the stability and security of that country has a direct impact on the stability and the security of the entire region and the Persian Gulf”.
02/09/2022	The U.S. Navy  that on 1 September it had “intercepted an Iranian warship that seized and detained two U.S. unmanned surface vessels operated by U.S. 5th Fleet in the Red Sea… The Iranian warship released the Saildrones”. Iran’s navy  that its destroyer had found the USVs “abandoned” and “inevitably took action to stop the vessels in order to prevent possible terrorist incidents and prevented the occurrence of unforeseen accidents”. On 4 September, Iranian Chief of Staff Bagheri : “Our vessels will not tolerate such [foreign unmanned] units in their routes and will take action against them in the same way that it has already happened”.
31/08/2022	Iran’s navy  foiling what was described as “a pirate attack on one of the country’s merchant vessels… in the Red Sea following a fierce exchange of fire”.
18/08/2022	The IDF chief of staff  that during an early August escalation between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the military “had carried out a wave of arrests in [the West Bank], and at the same time attacked a third country, and carried out defence along the rest of the country’s borders”. Media speculation suggested that the third country may have been Yemen.
13/08/2022	Yemeni officials  the arrest of members of a Huthi network who they said had  to “smuggling weapons from Iran”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the accusation “baseless”.
09/08/2022	Iran’s Navy  that one of its ships had, after receiving a distress signal from an Iranian commercial vessel, exchanged fire with “attacking boats” whose origin was not specified.
02/08/2022	The UN Special Envoy for Yemen  that “the parties have agreed to extend the truce, under the same terms, for an additional two months… This truce extension includes a commitment from the parties to intensify negotiations to reach an expanded truce agreement as soon as possible”. The U.S. State Department  the announcement, expressing commitment “to advancing a durable, inclusive peace agreement in Yemen… [and] to mitigating Yemen’s dire humanitarian and economic crisis”. A senior Iranian diplomat  “Iran’s support for continued efforts to establish a lasting and just peace in Yemen”.
22/07/2022	The IRGC Navy’s commander  his Omani counterpart that Israel “gaining a foothold in the Persian Gulf region will have no result other than sowing sedition and creating insecurity”, and further assessed that the “countries of the Persian Gulf region have the required capacity and capability to preserve the security of this sensible region”.
15/07/2022	Iran’s Navy  in the Indian Ocean what was described as the country’s “first drone carrier division… capable of carrying various combat, surveillance and suicide drones”.
15/07/2022	Saudi Arabia and the U.S. issued  during President Biden’s visit to the Kingdom, in which “the two sides underscored the need to further deter Iran’s interference in the internal affairs of other countries, its support for terrorism through its arms proxies and its efforts to destabilise the security and stability of the region”. Underscoring “the importance of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon”, the statement also highlighted maritime security, the benefits of extending the truce in Yemen and Saudi/GCC initiatives for linking up to Iraq’s electricity network. Biden’s trip also included a meeting between U.S. and GCC leaders, who in a 16 July  “affirmed their joint commitment to preserve regional security and stability, support diplomacy with the aim of regional de-escalation, deepen their region-wide defence, security and intelligence cooperation and ensure the freedom and security of waterways”. That statement also emphasised “the centrality of diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon”.
07/07/2022	The UK  that on 28 January and 25 February 2022, with the  of the U.S. Navy, “Royal Navy ship HMS Montrose seized Iranian weapons from speedboats being operated by smugglers in international waters south of Iran. The weapons seized included surface-to-air-missiles and engines for land attack cruise missiles, in contravention of UN Security Council resolution 2216 (2015)”.  to the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command “the weapons were seized along routes historically used to traffic weapons unlawfully to Yemen”, while affirming: “collaboration on maritime interdictions in the Middle East reflects our extraordinary partnership and strong commitment to regional security and stability”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the report as “baseless”.
05/07/2022	Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz  that “Iran is expanding its aggressive operations in the region in general, and in the naval arena in particular”. Presenting satellite , Gantz maintained that “the presence of Iran’s military forces in the Red Sea in recent months is the most significant in a decade. It is a direct threat to trade, energy and the global economy”.
30/06/2022	Presenting the thirteen biannual  on Security Council Resolution 2231’s implementation​, the UN ​under-secretary-general  that the organisation had examined “the debris of nine ballistic missiles, six cruise missiles and several UAVs used in various attacks by the Huthis against the territories of Saudi Arabia and the UAE since 2020”. “We also assessed these missiles and/or parts thereof to be of Iranian origin”, she reported, adding: “We have not been able to determine when the ballistic missiles or parts thereof may have been transferred from Iran”. The U.S.  the Security Council that it “strongly condemns these attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Iran’s continue proliferation of weapons to its proxies and partners in the region must stop”.
26/06/2022	Iraqi Prime Minister al-Kadhimi traveled to Saudi Arabia and then Iran, where he  with senior Iranian officials. President Raisi  al-Kadhimi that “the talks of the countries’ officials can solve the region’s problems”, highlighting “the need for the officials of the countries in the region to negotiate to solve problems and issues with each other”. He further maintained that “normalisation of relations with Israel or the presence of foreigners in the region will not solve any problem”. Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian  al-Kadhimi that “Iran wishes nothing but the welfare of the region and supports the reopening of [Iranian and Saudi] embassies in the capitals of the two countries”. The two also conferred on Yemen, where Amirabdollahian reiterated “Iran’s  for the continuation of ceasefire”.
15/06/2022	Saudi Arabia  nineteen individuals and entities it said were “involved in activities that range from providing financial support to the Huthis to facilitating funding of the militia and smuggling Iranian fuel to it”.
09/06/2022	U.S. Central Command  that “coalition and regional partner air forces joined two U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortresses… on a presence patrol mission across the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility” the previous day. A senior U.S. commander highlighted that “these highly coordinated efforts demonstrate our combined ability to provide global reach and joint security to the region”.
02/06/2022	The UN Special Envoy for Yemen  that “the parties to the conflict have agreed to the United Nations’ proposal to renew the current truce in Yemen for two additional months”. The U.S. State Department  the announcement, emphasising that “the U.S. remains committed to an inclusive, durable resolution to the conflict”.
01/06/2022	Yemen’s internationally-recognised government  “a boat with six Iranian sailors on board” carrying a narcotics cargo. The Yemeni information minister  that the “Iranian regime was not satisfied with smuggling ballistic missiles, drones, weapons, ammunition and IEDs experts for Huthi terrorist militia, rather it deliberately flood Yemen with drugs”. He further called on the “international community, UN and UNSC to condemn Iranian regime practices and take a clear and firm stance towards its terrorist activities”.
19/05/2022	The EU Naval Force  that the Hong Kong-flagged sailing vessel Lakota came under armed attack off the coast of Hodeida by “three boats, with five person on-board with civilian clothes”, adding: “The sailing vessel managed to escape and the crew is safe”.
17/05/2022	Referring to the transfer by Iran of what he described as “accurate munitions” to its regional allies, Defence Minister Benny Gantz : “Israel will continue to halt these efforts and prevent the threat to its citizens and the region”, adding: “The quantity of this strategic weapon in the hands of Iranian emissaries has increased significantly in the past year. In Iraq, there are hundreds of [munitions]
17/05/2022	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that a destroyer patrolling in the Gulf of Oman had interdicted “illegal narcotics during a flag verification boarding”, taking custody of the drugs and fishing vessel. “The vessel’s nine crew members identified themselves as Iranian nationals and will be transferred to a regional nation for repatriation”, the statement added.
13/05/2022	Iran’s navy thwarting “a pirate attack against a merchant ship [owned by Iran] sailing in the Gulf of Aden”.
12/05/2022	CENTCOM Commander Erik Kurilla  “Iran as the most destabilising force in the Middle East”, adding: “The U.S.’s position is that we will not allow a nuclear Iran. However, our concerns about Iran go beyond its nuclear capability”. He further indicated that “we are concerned about the smuggling of advanced conventional munitions by sea to support Huthi operations. Therefore, anti-smuggling operations with the Royal Saudi Naval Forces will serve as an area of focus for me… maintaining safe and secure waterways is a critical responsibility for us and our partners”.
21/04/2022	Iran’s navy commander  that “the northern Indian Ocean is a main waterway to connect the continents. If we do not have an effective presence, governments without a right will come [to the region] and approach our territorial waters. However, owing to the authority and presence of our fleet in high seas and constant monitoring, we do not have any problems and no country dares approach our country’s waters”. “We escort our ships in all the waters across the globe to ensure [their] security and we are faced with no restrictions”, he added.
14/04/2022	Iran’s defence minister  his Japanese counterpart of “Iran’s stance on the necessity of providing the security of navigation and said that the presence of foreign forces was illegitimate and detrimental to security”.  to Japan’s defence ministry, their minister “explained the extension of the JSDF information gathering activities in the Middle East”.
13/04/2022	The U.S. Fifth Fleet’s commander  the establishment of a new naval task force as part of the 34-nation Combined Maritime Forces to patrol the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab beginning 17 April. Admiral Brad Cooper said the initiative would “enhance security and stability in the Red Sea and the region”, adding that “the standup of this organisation really reflects a regional consensus on the importance of maritime security in these bodies of water”.
13/04/2022	Iran’s foreign minister  that in discussions with Iraq’s top diplomat they “agreed on welcoming the ceasefire in Yemen and the importance of Yemeni-Yemini talks and the lifting of the inhumane siege”. He also “welcomed the Iraqi government’s efforts to resume the Iranian-Saudi dialogue”.
12/04/2022	Addressing Saudi Arabia, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei : “There is no chance of victory [in Yemen]. So why does a war in which there is no chance of victory continue? Find a way out of this war”.
05/04/2022	At the end of a 10-day joint maritime  with the U.S. 5th Fleet, the IDF  that “for the first time, Israeli Navy missile ships practiced refueling from an American replenishment tanker in the Red Sea, which increases the Israeli Navy’s operational range and abilities”.
01/04/2022	The UN Special Envoy for Yemen  that “the parties to the conflict have responded positively to a United Nations proposal for a two-month Truce which comes into effect tomorrow”. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan  hope that the “initiative will establish a new foundation for political talks and a lasting settlement”. Noting 30 March U.S.  linked to Iran’s ballistic missile program, he further asserted that “even as we work to end the war in Yemen, there can be no doubt about President Biden’s commitment to supporting the defence of our partners, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia… We will continue to use all appropriate authorities to hold Iran and its proxy groups accountable for threats against our friends and partners”. Relatedly, Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the ceasefire announcement and reiterated support for “a political initiative to resolve the Yemen crisis”.
31/03/2022	Saudi Arabia  that it had “unilaterally and in coordination with the U.S. Treasury Department… classified 25 individuals and entities involved in the activities of facilitating the financial activities of the terrorist Huthis militia with the support of the Quds Force of Iran’s IRGC, working as an international network aimed at destabilising Yemen”.
29/03/2022	Saudi Arabia’s energy minister  that Huthi  had impacted “our ability to supply the world with the necessary energy requirements”. He further remarked that “we have developed and delivered our side of the story… Others need to deliver their own side of the commitment. Otherwise, the very pillar of energy security will be disturbed, to say the least”. The minister also : “Who has been throwing these rockets and missiles at us and at Abu Dhabi? Who is financing? Who’s training? Who’s supplying these weapons? It is a member of OPEC”.
28/03/2022	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  his Saudi counterpart that the U.S. “again condemned the recent Huthi terrorist attacks against the Kingdom” and exchanged views on “the UN’s proposal for a Ramadan truce in Yemen and efforts to launch a new, more inclusive and comprehensive peace process”. Blinken also reaffirmed “the U.S. commitment to bolstering Saudi Arabia’s defences against threats in the region” and the two “discussed the challenge posed by Iran’s nuclear program”. The following day, meeting with the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, Blinken  determination to help the UAE defend itself against the Huthis, adding: “We will be consulting on Iran, another shared challenge, the status of the talks on the JCPOA, but also the work we can do together and need to do together to strengthen our collective security”.
26/03/2022	Romania  to the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), joining eight other countries in the initiative.
26/03/2022	The Huthis  a 3-day “suspension of missiles and drone strikes and all military actions towards Saudi Arabia by land, sea and air” from , expressing “readiness to turn this suspension into a final, continuous and permanent commitment in the event that the Kingdom announced the withdrawal of all external forces of the coalition from Yemeni lands and waters, and a complete halt to support for its local militias”. On 29 March, Iran  the Huthi move and asserted: “If there is serious and positive engagement with this initiative, it can set the stage for ending the current war”. The Saudi-led coalition the same day  a “cessation of military operations in Yemen” beginning 30 March.
25/03/2022	The Saudi-led coalition reported downing a Huthi ballistic  and ten armed  bound for multiple Saudi cities. The coalition also reported that Huthi attacks caused a fire at an Aramco facility in  and additionally  water and electricity facilities. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had launched “large numbers of drones… [and] dozens of ballistic missiles” against Saudi targets. A U.S. official  “the attacks are unacceptable and have also affected Saudi infrastructure as well as schools, mosques and workplaces”.
24/03/2022	The U.S.  it was “deeply disappointed and troubled by the presence of Iranian military officials and reportedly Iran’s IRGC officers at the Doha Defense Show”, adding: “We utterly reject their presence… as it is Iran that is [the] biggest threat to maritime stability in the Gulf region. Transactions related to Iranian weapons are generally sanctionable under multiple U.S. authorities”.
23/03/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting two Huthi “booby-trapped boats”, foiling what it described as an “imminent and hostile” attack against commercial shipping. “The Huthi militia is escalating its hostile attacks to target energy sources and the vein of global economy”, the coalition added.
22/03/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile bound for Jizan.
20/03/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile and nine armed drones bound for targets including energy facilities and water infrastructure in multiple cities
15/03/2022	CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  Iran as “the greatest single day-to-day threat to regional security and stability”, noting that “the risk of miscalculation and escalation remains high because of Iran’s strategic calculation that it can simultaneously and discretely engage in diplomacy with and a proxy campaign against the U.S.”. McKenzie’s statement to a Senate committee further addressed the role of Iran and Iran-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
11/03/2022	Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry  that a drone attack against an oil refinery had caused a “small fire”, which did not result in any casualties or damage. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had targeted Aramco facilities in Riyadh, Jizan and Abha using drones.
10/03/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Jizan.
09/03/2022	The U.S. and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  Working Groups on Integrated Air and Missile Defence and Maritime Security in Riyadh. Participants denounced “Iran’s malign behaviour through proxies and direct use of advanced ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Iran has used these weapons and supported terrorist and other armed groups to conduct hundreds of attacks in the region”. They further emphasised “the importance of strengthening the ability of the GCC countries to collectively address these threats”, noting too “the importance of having advancing integrated defence initiatives” as well as prospective “joint training and exercises to prevent Iran from holding the region at risk”.
07/03/2022	A U.S. official  that the Huthis on 5 March fired a missile into the Red Sea, adding: “Although maritime traffic was not impacted in this instance, these actions are destabilising and present a danger to all vessels transiting a critical international waterway”.
28/02/2022	The UN Security Council  a resolution expanding the arms embargo against the Huthis through February 2023 by a vote of 11 to zero, with four abstentions. The resolution urged countries “to increase efforts to combat the smuggling of weapons and components via land and sea routes, to ensure implementation of the targeted arms embargo”, while denouncing “the cross-border attacks by the Huthi terrorist group, including attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that the resolution would “have negative consequences for [the] peace process and positions of the conflicting parties”.
26/02/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  that a Huthi “booby-trapped drone” landed in Jizan
23/02/2022	The U.S.  “members of an international network funding the Huthis’ war against the Yemeni government and increasingly aggressive attacks threatening civilians and civilian infrastructure in neighbouring states”.  According to the Treasury Department, the network was “led by the U.S.-designated Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and [a] Houthi financier”. Secretary of State Antony Blinken  that the U.S. would “continue to work closely with our regional partners to act decisively against those seeking to prolong this war for their own goals… Huthi leaders must cease their campaign of violence and negotiate in good faith without preconditions to end the conflict”.
21/02/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for an airport in Jizan. Debris injured sixteen.
18/02/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting a Huthi “explosive-laden boat… in the south of the Red Sea”.
14/02/2022	A U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that the deployment of F-22 Raptors to the UAE was “defensive in nature… Part of a broad demonstration of U.S. support after a series of terrorist attacks that our partners in the Emirates as well as in Saudi Arabia have endured from Yemen. The Department of Defense, in the same vein, has sent a Navy guided-missile destroyer, the USS Cole, to partner with the UAE navy, and they’ll continue to provide early warning intelligence, and they’ll collaborate on air defence”. “That in no way replaces our emphasis on the diplomacy because we know only through a diplomatic end to this conflict will we be able to address the humanitarian concerns in Yemen, the security concerns inside Yemen, but also the threat that our partners face emanating from Yemen”, he asserted.
10/02/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Abha International Airport
09/02/2022	President Biden  with King Salman on “regional developments and issues of mutual concern, including Iranian-enabled attacks by the Huthis against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia”, reiterating “the U.S. commitment to support Saudi Arabia in the defence of its people and territory from these attacks and full support for UN-led efforts to end the war in Yemen”. Biden also emphasised “his commitment to ensuring that Iran can never obtain a nuclear weapon and briefed the King on ongoing multilateral talks to reestablish constraints on Iran’s nuclear program”.
08/02/2022	Prime Minister Naftali Bennett  that “recently we have seen a rise in threats on the maritime front, in sailing and shipping lanes. I certainly see this as a threat, and we must know that the target is the State of Israel, but not only [the State of Israel]. Therefore, I am particularly pleased with the growing and solidifying strategic cooperation with the U.S. on joint naval exercises and with other allies in the region”.
06/02/2022	During a visit to the UAE, CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  Huthi attacks and assessed: “the equipment they are firing is certainly Iranian. If Iran didn’t approve this specific attack, they’re certainly morally responsible for it”. “The Iranians have accused the UAE of being involved in the Iraqi election. Iran needs culprits because the election didn’t go well for them,”, he added. “In Iraq in particular, Iran thought they had a political way forward to eject the U.S. from Iraq… now I think they’re grasping at alternatives, and some of those alternatives may be kinetic and violent”. McKenzie maintained that “my visit here, and to some degree repositioning, is all designed to send a very careful, calculated message that the U.S. is a reliable partner… We’ve got a lot of ships, we’ve got a lot of problems. We’ve always got an ability to help our friends”.
03/02/2022	Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian  with his Iraqi counterpart on, inter alia, “Yemen, and the need to try to end the war in this country which causes insecurity and instability in the whole region”. Amirabdollahian  his Emirati counterpart the day before that “the continuation of the [Yemen] war and the escalation of hostilities do not serve the interests of either side or the region”. He also insisted that “the presence of the Zionist regime [ie, Israel] in the region poses a threat to all countries and the region”.
03/02/2022	Discussing Huthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “the Huthis are less interested than Iran in waging a limited war. Rather, they will recklessly use whatever capabilities that Iran puts in their hands in pursuit of victory, regardless of the risk to human life”.
02/02/2022	The Emirati defence ministry  downing “three hostile drones that [had] penetrated the UAE’s airspace”. An Iraqi group  that they had fired “four drones targeting vital facilities in Abu Dhabi”.
02/02/2022	A U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that “our Saudi partners are now in a position to prevent about 90 per cent of… incoming [Huthi] projectiles. Of course, we want to raise that to 100 per cent. And we’re committed to working with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to help them bolster their defences. We’re doing that through security cooperation, through arms transfers, defence trade, exercises, training and exchanges”.
01/02/2022	U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin  with the UAE’s crown prince on “the recent Huthi attacks against the UAE that caused civilian casualties and also threatened U.S. and Emirati armed forces stationed at al-Dhafra Air Base”. He “reviewed a range of actions the Department of Defense is taking to support the UAE”, including “early warning intelligence, collaborating on air defence and sending the U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer USS Cole to partner with the UAE Navy”, as well as “deploy[ing] fifth Generation Fighter aircraft”.
31/01/2022	During a  by Israel’s president to Dubai, the UAE Defence Ministry  downing a Huthi ballistic missile. A Huthi military spokesperson  they had attacked “important targets” in Abu Dhabi and Dubai with multiple drones and missiles, and warned that “the Emirati enemy state will remain unsafe as long as the tools of the Israeli enemy in Abu Dhabi and Dubai continue to launch aggression against the Yemeni people”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that “the cycle of violation begun by some countries in Yemen has no end point unless they [the Saudi-led coalition] put an end to their aggressive actions”. He also denounced the Israeli president’s visit. The U.S.  the attack, stating: “While Israel’s president is visiting the UAE to build bridges and promote stability across the region, the Huthis continue to launch attacks that threaten civilians”.
31/01/2022	The U.S. Navy  the commencement of the International Maritime Exercise (IMX) 2022, described as “the Middle East region’s largest maritime exercise… [that] includes 9,000 personnel and up to 50 ships from more than 60 partner nations and international organizations”. , Bahrain and  were among the participants.
27/01/2022	Iranian Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian  his Qatari counterpart that “in recent weeks, we have witnessed an increase in military moves regarding Yemen, and such moves will lead to outbreak of further wars in Yemen and the region, and destroy the path to peace”. The following day, during a conversation with the UN Secretary-General, he  Iran’s approach of “supporting a political solution to end the war in Yemen”.
26/01/2022	The U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Oman and the UK  “strongly condemned the Huthis’ repeated attacks against civilians within Yemen, including U.S. local staff in Sanaa and their continued heinous terrorist attacks against Saudi Arabia and more recently the UAE”, while recognising “the legitimate right of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to defend themselves”. The five countries also conferred on “the illicit Iranian provision of missiles and advanced weaponry to the Huthis in violation of UNSCR 2216 and UNSCR 2231”.
25/01/2022	Referring to Huthis airstrikes against Saudi Arabia and the UAE, a U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that designation of the Huthis as a terrorist organisation was “under review”, adding: “we will continue to work with out allies and partners in the region especially to promote accountability for the Huthis, for those Huthi leaders that have been behind these terrorist attacks… I would venture to guess you will see additional steps on our part”. “We’re not going to relent in designating Huthi leaders and entities involved in military offensives that threaten civilians”, he added, while asserting: “When you talk about the humanitarian crisis, there is one actor that is primarily responsible for the suffering of the Yemeni people, the widespread suffering of the Yemeni people. And that is the Huthis”.
24/01/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi missile bound for Saudi Arabia
23/01/2022	The U.S. Navy  that on 18 January it “interdicted a stateless fishing vessel… transiting from Iran in waters outside of any state’s territorial sea along a route historically used to traffic weapons to the Huthis in Yemen”, adding: “U.S. forces discovered 40 tons of urea fertilizer, a chemical compound with agricultural applications that is also known to be used as an explosive precursor”. According to the statement, “the vessel, cargo and five Yemeni crewmembers” were handed over Yemeni authorities.
21/01/2022	Speaking with his Saudi counterpart, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken  “the U.S. commitment to help Gulf governments improve their capabilities to defend themselves against threats from Yemen and elsewhere in the region and underscored the importance of mitigating civilian harm”.
17/01/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing multiple Huthi drones bound for Saudi Arabia.
17/01/2022	The UAE  that “small flying objects, possibly belonging to drones” had caused the  of three petroleum tankers owned by Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, in addition to “a minor fire” at Abu Dhabi International Airport
07/01/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  that the Huthis had “targeted the civilian communications infrastructure in southern Saudi Arabia” with drones.
04/01/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing five Huthi drones bound for Saudi Arabia.
02/01/2022	The Saudi-led coalition  downing three Huthi drones bound for Najran, followed by  “a hostile aerial target… launched towards Taif city” the next day.
02/01/2022	UK Maritime Trade Operations  it had “received reports of an attack on an MV [motor vessel]… approximately 23 nautical miles west of Ras Isa Marine Terminal”. The Saudi-led coalition  the vessel as the UAE-flagged Rwabee, accused the Huthis of “piracy and hijacking” and indicated that the ship had been “carrying medical field equipment”. The Huthis maintained that it had “entered Yemeni waters without authorisation” and bore “clearly military equipment”. The U.S.  the seizure, calling on “the Huthis to immediately release the ship and crew unharmed and to cease all violence that sets back the political process to end the war in Yemen”.
28/12/2021	A U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that “there have been more than 375 [Huthi] cross-border attacks since the beginning of the year… They endanger not only our Saudi partners but the 70,000 U.S. citizens residing there”. He added: “With U.S. support Saudi Arabia has been able to knock down some 90 per cent of those attacks. Of course, our goal is to see to it that that number rises to 100 per cent. We will continue to work with our Saudi partners to stand up against these really deplorable Huthi attacks, and we will continue to hold the Huthis accountable for their reprehensible actions”.
26/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  what it described as evidence of Hizbollah training Huthi forces, with a spokesperson asserting: “The terrorist organisation Hizbollah… bears the responsibility for targeting civilians in Saudi Arabia and Yemen”. “The Iranian regime sponsors its proxies in the region to carry out destruction and devastation”, he added, further stating that “the Huthis do not have the ability to make the decision to be part of the political solution in Yemen”.
24/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  that Huthi projectiles had struck Najran and Jizan
23/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “armed drone attempting to target Abha International Airport”, in addition to  “an explosives-laden boat in the southern Red Sea”.
22/12/2021	Foreign Minister Amirabdollahian  Saudi Arabia of being “very late in making a decision” regarding the evacuation of Iran’s ambassador to the Huthis back to Tehran while he was suffering from what was described as a fatal COVID-19 infection. The Saudi-led coalition  Iran’s claim as “defamatory” and noted that Riyadh “had commenced the facilitation of evacuating the aforementioned person for humanitarian considerations, and in recognition of the diplomatic mediation by the brotherly Sultanate of Oman and the Republic of Iraq in less than 48 hours of reporting his health condition”.
22/12/2021	U.S. Naval Forces Central Command  that U.S. ships had on 20 December “seized approximately 1,400 AK-47 assault rifles and 226,600 rounds of ammunition from a stateless fishing vessel”, noting that it “was assessed to have originated in Iran and transited international waters along a route historically used to traffic weapons unlawfully to the Huthis”.
19/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait
16/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing two Huthi missiles bound for Abha
14/12/2021	The Supreme Council the Gulf Cooperation Council  willingness “to cooperate and deal seriously and effectively with the Iranian nuclear file”, emphasised “the need for the GCC countries to participate in any negotiations with Iran” and denounced “Iran for failing to adhere to its international commitments regarding Uranium enrichment”. The GCC further underlined “the need to address the destabilising behaviour of [Iran in] the region and support extremist sectarian militias… the Iranian missile program, including ballistic and cruise missiles and drones, the safety of international navigation and oil installations and the continuation of coordination and consultation with brotherly and friendly countries in this regard”. They also condemned “Iran’s interference into Yemen’s domestic affairs and smuggling weapons to Huthi militias”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the statement and asserted: “the Islamic Republic does not brook any interference in its peaceful nuclear energy program, its defensive missile program and the issues that have to do with its military and deterrent defensive policies”.
13/12/2021	Saudi Arabia’s UN envoy  that “we would like to push these discussions [with Tehran] towards substantive issues that involve the behaviour of the Iranian government in the region. But as long as the Iranians continue to play games with these talks they are not going to go anywhere… We are not interested in talks for the sake of talks”. He further asserted that the Yemen war “has proved to be intractable simply because the Huthis continue to receive a continuous supply of weapons and ammunition from their benefactors, particularly Iran”.
07/12/2021	U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan  that “since Donald Trump made the decision to pull the U.S. out of the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018, Hizbollah has continued to menace Lebanon and the region. Iran’s proxies in Iraq and Syria and Yemen have continued to move forward. So, not being in the nuclear deal has hardly been a solution to the proxy”. He further asserted that “nothing about the nuclear deal stops the U.S.’s capacity to deal with those proxies. And we are prepared to do so”, adding: “ultimately, an Iran with a nuclear weapon is going to be a greater menace in partnerships with its proxies than Iran without one. And so it is our determination to ensure they never get a nuclear weapon, and diplomacy is the best way forward”.
07/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  that a Huthi “projectile… landed near a marketplace in the Saudi city of Jizan”. The following day the coalition announced the downing of a Huthi drone.
06/12/2021	Saudi Arabia  downing a ballistic missile fired by the Huthis toward Riyadh
05/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing four Huthi drones bound for southern Saudi Arabia.
01/12/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting a Huthi “explosive-laden boat… in the south of the Red Sea”, in addition to downing a Huthi drone.
30/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “launched air raids on ‘legitimate’ Huthi military targets in the capital Sanaa including a ‘secret’ site belonging to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  the Saudi claims as “baseless”, asserting that Iran had “never maintained a military presence in Yemen”.
27/11/2021	CENTCOM  that “a U.S. Navy vessel rescued two Iranian mariners… from a fishing vessel after it was adrift for eight days in the Gulf of Oman”.
21/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Najran airport.
20/11/2021	The IRGC Navy’s commander  Iran had “slap[ed] the Americans six times in one and a half years of confrontation, many of which have not been covered by the media yet”. “We in the IRGC Navy have sacrificed nine martyrs in direct battles with the Americans to defend the territory of our beloved country in the Persian Gulf… [and in return] we were able to give them nine memorable slaps”, he added.
19/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing three Huthi “explosives-laden drones” bound for Saudi Arabia, adding that two Huthi-fired missiles targeting the Kingdom fell short inside Yemen. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had targeted with drones multiple “military and vital targets” in Saudi Arabia.
18/11/2021	The U.S.  a Huthi official whom the Treasury Department described as “the principle Huthi military officer responsible for pilfering assets from Yemeni citizens and directing a campaign of seizures that further prolongs the ongoing conflict”.
17/11/2021	Saudi Arabia  downing two Huthi “explosive-laden drones” bound for Khamis Mushait.
15/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
11/11/2021	CENTCOM  that two B-1 bombers “flew a presence patrol mission in the Central Region that included several coalition and partner nation  … [which] represented the U.S. led coalition’s commitment to promoting regional stability through partnership”.
10/11/2021	Saudi-led coalition  the downing of three Huthi ballistic missiles bound for Saudi Arabia.
10/11/2021	The U.S., Israel, Bahrain and the UAE  a five-day “multilateral maritime security operations exercise in the Red Sea”. The commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) maintained that “maritime collaboration helps safeguard freedom of navigation and the free flow of trade, which are essential to regional security and stability”. Commenting on the drill, an unnamed Israeli officer  reporters that the “[Iranian] presence is something that we need to push back as much as possible from the State of Israel, from the Red Sea, from the areas that harm our freedom to sail… In order to do that, we need to make our partnerships tighter”.
08/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive drone” bound for Khamis Mushait, in addition to  “an imminent attack” by “ an explosive-laden boat” against the port of Hodeida.
06/11/2021	Saudi state media  downing “a Huthi drone” bound for Abha International Airport.
05/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Jizan.
04/11/2021	The U.S. administration  Congress of “a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of AIM-120C Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $650 million”. A State Department official  that “we’ve seen an increase in cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia over the past year. Saudi AIM-120C missiles… have been instrumental in intercepting the persistent UAS attacks that have put U.S. forces at risk and threatened the more than 70,000 U.S. citizens in the Kingdom”.
01/11/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
01/11/2021	The Iranian navy  foiling “a pirate attack on one of the country’s oil tankers en route to the Gulf of Aden before entering Bab al-Mandab Strait”.
27/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Abha International Airport.
27/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing five Huthi ballistic missiles bound for Jizan.
20/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile bound for Jizan.
20/10/2021	The UN Security Council  “Huthi cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia… [and] the increasing number of incidents off the coast of Yemen, including attacks on civilian and commercial ships”. The members urged “an immediate nationwide ceasefire, in accordance with resolution 2565 (2021), and called for the resolution of differences through inclusive dialogue and the rejection of violence to achieve political goals”. The council also “called on all Member States and other actors to comply fully with their obligations under the targeted arms embargo”.
19/10/2021	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  with the UN Special Envoy for Yemen about “efforts to engage all parties without preconditions and secure a ceasefire, address urgent humanitarian priorities, restart the political process in Yemen and ensure accountability for human rights violations and abuses”. Blinken also “welcomed collaboration on the common goal of reaching an inclusive, durable solution to end the conflict in Yemen and bringing relief to Yemenis”, and asserted that “resolving the conflict remains a top U.S. foreign policy priority”.
17/10/2021	A senior Iranian diplomat  with the Huthi envoy in Tehran and emphasised “the need for the resolution of the problems of the Yemeni people and the removal of the oppressive blockade on the country”, which, he argued, “hinges on the establishment of a truce and a political settlement of the crisis in the country”.
16/10/2021	The commander of Iran’s navy  that “the 78th naval fleet of the Islamic Republic of Iran, consisting of the Alborz destroyer, was attacked by five pirate boats… [in the Gulf of Aden] while escorting two Iranian tankers”. The attack was thwarted after “a heavy exchange of fire”, he added.
14/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “booby-trapped drone” bound for Jizan.
14/10/2021	Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan  with Secretary of State Antony Blinken conferring on “U.S.-Saudi strategic cooperation on regional issues, including the common goal of reaching a durable solution to end the conflict in Yemen”. According to a U.S. readout, Blinken expressed “the U.S. government’s commitment to help Saudi Arabia defend its territory and people and reiterated U.S. condemnation of Huthi attacks on the Kingdom”.
13/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting two Huthi “explosive-laden boats”, and stated: “the Huthis continue to threaten shipping lines and international trade in the Bab al-Mandab strait and the southern Red Sea”.
12/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “booby-trapped drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
08/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  that “five people received minor injuries after a Huthi projectile fell on Jizan airport”. The following day, Saudi Arabia’s UN ambassador  to the Security Council president and called on the council “to shoulder its responsibility towards the Huthi militia, their weapons supplier and the resources which fund their terrorist acts”.
07/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi explosive drone bound for Abha International Airport
06/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting three Huthi “explosives-laden boats in the Red Sea”. The same day, the coalition  two drones in Yemen that it said were ready “to carry out an imminent hostile act towards Saudi Arabia”. A Huthi military official  that they had downed “an unmanned combat reconnaissance aircraft” in Marib province.
04/10/2021	The U.S. State Department  a 3 October Huthi missile  in Marib, and highlighted that “there is an international consensus that now is the time to end the conflict, and the Republic of Yemen Government and Saudi Arabia have committed to stop fighting and resume political talks. The Huthis are standing in the way of peace”. Washington went on to assert that “since the beginning of the year, the Huthis have intensified their attacks, both inside Yemen and against Saudi Arabia… We call on the Huthis to stop fighting and engage in UN-led talks to bring an end to this devastating war”.
03/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Saudi Arabia.
01/10/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Jizan
29/09/2021	U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and other senior U.S. officials  with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and senior Saudi counterparts. According to a Saudi readout, Sullivan emphasised “the strategic partnership between the two countries’ and the ironclad U.S. commitment to support the Kingdom’s territorial defence against all threats, including Iranian sponsored missile and drone attacks”, in addition to supporting “the Saudi goal of advancing a durable political solution and end to the Yemeni conflict”. The two further called for “intensive diplomatic engagements” and highlighted “the importance of the Huthis participating in good faith in political talks with the legitimate Yemeni Government under the auspices of the UN”.
28/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi UAV bound for Khamis Mushait.
27/09/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  downing “an American spy plane in Marib province”.
27/09/2021	Prime Minister Naftali Bennett  the UN General Assembly that “Israel is, quite literally, surrounded by Hizbollah, Shiite militias, Islamic Jihad and Hamas… And they’re all backed by Iran. They get their funding from Iran, they get their training from Iran, and they get their weapons from Iran”. Bennett also  that “just this year, Iran made operational a new deadly terror unit — swarms of killer UAVs armed with lethal weapons that can attack any place any time… Iran plans to arm its proxies in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon with hundreds and then thousands of these deadly drones”.
26/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive drone” bound for the Kingdom.
25/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “a Huthi ballistic rocket fired in the direction of the Saudi city of Najran”
24/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “a Huthi explosive drone” bound for Abha.
23/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile aimed at Jizan, in addition to three armed drones bound for Saudi territory.
23/09/2021	Secretary of State Antony Blinken and GCC ministers  and conferred on, inter alia, “work to achieve a common approach toward a durable solution to the conflict in Yemen”. Blinken emphasised that “the U.S. joins our Gulf partners in condemning the Huthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, including civilians and infrastructure”.
22/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition reported  “an imminent attack” by two Huthi “booby-trapped boats off the coast of the Hodeida port in Yemen”.
21/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing two Huthi “booby-trapped drones” bound for Khamis Mushait.
20/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting two Huthi “booby-trapped boats” in the southern Red Sea, “thwarting an imminent attack”.
20/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting two Huthi “booby-trapped boats” in the southern Red Sea, “thwarting an imminent attack”.
16/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “four Huthi explosives-laden drones and a ballistic rocket” bound for Jizan.
15/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive drone” launched towards Abha International Airport.
13/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait.
11/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “a Huthi explosive drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
09/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing  Huthi “explosive drones” bound for Khamis Mushait.
09/09/2021	The Saudi foreign minister  a session of the Arab Ministerial Quartet Committee that discussed, inter alia, “strengthening joint coordination to stop Iranian interference in the region and its financing of the Huthi militia in Yemen and other terrorist groups”, as well as “the importance of imposing the mechanisms for a rapid and comprehensive inspection of all Iranian nuclear sites”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  what he described as “absurd accusations” by the grouping of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt.
04/09/2021	The Saudi Defence Ministry  downing “three ballistic missiles and three bomb-laden drones” fired by the Huthis at Saudi territory
02/09/2021	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  with his Saudi counterpart and discussed “regional issues, including concern over the Huthis’ latest  on the Saudi city of Abha”. He further voiced “the U.S.’s strong commitment to its longstanding strategic partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to helping Saudi Arabia defend its people and territory”.
01/09/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing three Huthi explosive drones inside Yemeni territory
31/08/2021	The U.S. and Israeli navies  a “combined maritime security patrol in the Red Sea”.
31/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition   separate interceptions of Huthi UAVs aimed for Abha International Airport. In the second incident, “some debris of the bomb-laden drone scattered around the premises of the airport, and injured eight staff members” as well as causing material damage.
30/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile bound for Jizan.
29/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing three explosive drones bound for Khamis Mushait.
27/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi UAV bound for Khamis Mushait.
25/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “booby-trapped drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
22/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
21/08/2021	A minister in the internationally-recognised Yemeni government  that an Iranian had been killed in Marib, contending that it “confirms the size and level of Iranian involvement and its destabilising role in [the] security and stability of Yemen”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the report.
19/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi explosive drone bound for Saudi Arabia inside the Yemeni airspace.
15/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile bound for Najran.
13/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait.
09/08/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing two Huthi “explosive drones” bound for Khamis Mushait.
09/08/2021	Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson : “Not all differences need to be resolved, but we think that if Saudi Arabia heeds Iran’s message – that our region is a region where a comprehensive solution can be reached with the cooperation of the countries of the region – we can reach a conclusion”. He further contended that “the sooner the Saudi government shows its commitment to political solutions and ends this devastating war [in Yemen], the better for both this country and the region, and the peace and security of the region”.
30/07/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  foiling a drone attack against a Saudi commercial vessel.
30/07/2021	U.S. Special Representative for Yemen Tim Lenderking  with senior Saudi and Yemeni officials and raised “concern that the Huthis continue to refuse to engage meaningfully on a ceasefire and political talks”.
30/07/2021	U.S. Special Representative for Yemen Tim Lenderking  with senior Saudi and Yemeni officials and raised “concern that the Huthis continue to refuse to engage meaningfully on a ceasefire and political talks”.
29/07/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Saudi territory.
29/07/2021	Two people were killed in an incident aboard the M/T Mercer Street, a Japanese-owned ship managed by Zodiac Maritime, UK-based company owned by an Israeli businessman. Zodiac Maritime  that “at the time of the incident, the vessel was in the northern Indian Ocean”, and that it had subsequently travelled “to a safe location with a U.S. naval escort”. The U.S. military  that “initial indications clearly point to a UAV-style [ie, drone] attack”. Israeli foreign minister Yair Lapid  that “Iran is not just an Israeli problem, but an exporter of terrorism and instability that harms us all. The world must not be silent in the face of Iranian terrorism that also harms freedom of shipping”. Iran’s foreign ministry denied involvement in the attack,  Israel of “bogus allegations”.
28/07/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing two Huthi drones and three ballistic missiles bound for Jizan.
24/07/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing four Huthi drones and a ballistic missile bound for Saudi territory. The U.S. State Department  “condemn[ed] the Huthi attacks on Saudi Arabia following the calm over Eid al-Adha”, and said “the Huthis must stop their destabilising actions and commit to an immediate, comprehensive ceasefire to help end the Yemen war”.
12/07/2021	Commenting on Huthi-Saudi talks, a U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that “there is a serious proposal on the table… despite these constructive ideas that have been put forward, the Huthis are the ones who continue to perpetrate these horrifying attacks, including on Yemeni civilians”. He added that “we’ll continue to do [diplomacy] with a combination of both carrots and sticks… we continue to apply pressure to the Huthis in the context of both domestic and international sanctions”. “Our message is very clear”, the spokesperson asserted. “The Huthis need to show us that they are serious about diplomacy, and they can do that by ceasing this offensive and by easing the humanitarian plight on their own people”.
06/07/2021	Saudi Arabia’s deputy defence minister met U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Washington and , inter alia, “the U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia defend its territory as it faces attacks from Iranian-aligned groups”. He also  with a senior defence official about “efforts to end the war in Yemen and the shared U.S.-Saudi commitment to counter Iran’s destabilising activities”
03/07/2021	The Saudi-led coalition reported  what it described as “an imminent attack” the Huthis intended to launch off the Yemeni coast “using two booby-trapped boats”.
30/06/2021	Iran’s navy commander  that “while the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman are a safe and stable region, in recent years we have witnessed increased insecurity in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and that’s why we do not understand the [reason for] the presence of coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. We believe that the main purpose of their presence is to undermine dialogue between the effective [regional] navies”. Referring to U.S. and European deployments, he further noted that “we monitor and keep a watchful eye on all their movements and vessels, even from a far distance… [and] believe that such uncalled-for security combinations do not enhance collective security and should be suspended”. Relatedly, GCC officials met with a senior U.S. naval official and, according to a GCC , “stressed the importance of enhancing cooperation in maritime security”.
30/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Saudi Arabia, which was  by a similar incident the next day.
27/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition   three ballistic missile and five explosive-laden drones launched by the Huthis towards the Kingdom. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had fired “five ballistic missiles and five drones on the National Guard camp in Najran, military positions at Abha International Airport and King Khalid airbase in Khamis Mushait”.
24/06/2021	The U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen  that the Huthis “have spoken about a commitment toward piece in Yemen… We continue to engage with them”. “The U.S. recognises them as a legitimate actor, we recognise them as a group that has made significant gains”, he added. “No one can wish for them [to be] away or out of the conflict, so let’s deal with realities that exist on the ground”.
23/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing four Huthi “explosive-laden drones” bound for Saudi Arabia.
22/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait.
20/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait.
19/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing seventeen Huthi “armed drones” bound for multiple cities, including Najran and , over the course of one day.
17/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait. A Huthi official claimed that they had successfully hit “military positions inside the Abha International Airport”.
13/06/2021	Saudi defence officials  that “a Huthi drone had landed on a school [in Asir] without causing any injuries”. The U.S. State Department “” the attack and urged “the Huthis to commit to a lasting ceasefire”. The following day, the Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “armed drone” bound for Khamis Mushait
10/06/2021	The U.S.  “members of a smuggling network that helps fund Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force and the Huthis in Yemen” based on counterterrorism authorities. The Treasury Department asserted that “the Huthis have relied on support from the IRGC-QF to wage their campaign against the internationally recognised Yemeni government and the Saudi-led Coalition”, and indicated that the blacklisted “network generates tens of millions of dollars in revenue from the sale of commodities, like Iranian petroleum”. In a , Secretary of State Antony Blinken called on “the Huthis to accept a ceasefire and for all parties to resume pollical talks”, adding: “The U.S. will continue to apply pressure to the Huthis, including through targeted sanctions, to advance those goals”. Washington also announced that it was “lifting sanctions on three former Government of Iran officials, and two companies”, explaining that “these delistings are a result of a verified change in behaviour or status on the part of the sanctioned parties”.
10/06/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a “Huthi drone fired in the direction of… Khamis Mushait”. The same day, its spokesperson  that “no military operation has been carried out in the vicinity of Sanaa or any other Yemeni cities over the past period… with the aim of preparing the political ground for a peace process”.
08/06/2021	Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  with the UN Special Envoy for Yemen and stressed that “we can end the current miserable situation in Yemen… only through political dialogue and peaceful means”.
07/06/2021	CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “we are continuing to work with the Saudis on improvement of their integrated air and missile defence. That’s a very high priority for us, as it is with Saudi Arabia, because they are subjected to really an unceasing bombardment from the Huthis in Yemen through ballistic missiles, small drones and land-attack cruise missiles”. He further noted that “Saudi Arabia seeks a responsible political end to the conflict… Unfortunately, I do not believe the Huthis are ready to seize the moment, and they have an opportunity here to enter good-faith negotiations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to bring an end to this conflict”.
06/06/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  they had successfully targeted King Khalid airbase with a drone.
04/06/2021	In a  following a visit to the region by the U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen, the State Department asserted that “while there are numerous problematic actors inside of Yemen, the Huthis bear major responsibility for refusing to engage meaningfully on a ceasefire and to take steps to resolve a nearly seven-year conflict… Instead the Huthis continue a devastating offensive on  that is condemned by the international community and leaves the Huthis increasingly isolated”.
31/05/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  targeting King Khalid airbase with a drone.
29/05/2021	The foreign minister of Yemen’s internationally recognised government  the U.S. Special Envoy for Iran that “Iran has transformed Yemen into a platform to blackmail neighbouring countries and threaten international peace and security”, and contended that “all Huthis’ acts are decided in Tehran in order to achieve Iranian agenda and sabotage goals in the region”. He further urged “the U.S. to step up more pressure on the Iranian regime to stop supporting the Huthi militants and to stop arms smuggling against Huthi militias”.
29/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition reported  “an imminent attack in the Red Sea” by the Huthis using “two remotely piloted booby-trapped boats”, in addition to  “an explosive-laden drone” bound for Khamis Mushait
27/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Saudi Arabia.
25/05/2021	An official from Yemen’s internationally recognised government  that a senior Hizbollah commander had been “killed in an air strike launched by coalition aircraft on sites controlled by the Huthi militia”, adding: “His killing reflects the level of the Iranian involvement in military escalation waged by the Huthi militia on various Marib fronts”.
24/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition reported  “an imminent  launched by the Iran-backed Huthi militia in the south of the Red Sea”, in addition to  what it described as an “Iranian-made” marine mine planted by the Huthis.
23/05/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  downing a drone belonging to the Saudi-led coalition by a surface-to-air missile, and added: “Yemen airspace is not for a walk”.
23/05/2021	While visiting Saudi Arabia, CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that the Saudis “want reassurance that they’re going to be helped if they’re attacked by Iran, and they want help against the continuing attacks”. “Far more important [than the presence of U.S. troops] is sort of the broad spectrum of capabilities that we give them”, McKenzie noted, adding: “It’s not actually the types of equipment that are here, it’s maximising the use of the more than twenty Patriot batteries that you do have the interoperable with us, maximising those capabilities, so that if trouble occurred we can certainly come back in very quickly to help our Saudi friends”. “Our posture in the theater has prevented a state on state attack from Iran”, he asserted, going on to underscore that “we’re still going to have a presence here. It might not look exactly like the presence it was five or seven years ago where we get hundreds and thousands of forces here, but I think we’re going to play very smart games to leverage what we have”. McKenzie also noted that the Saudis were “under constant bombardment from Yemen, with a variety of ballistic missiles, cruise missile and small UAS they’re very concerned about. We want to help them with that”.
21/05/2021	A Huthi military official  downing a “fighter spy plane” belonging to the Saudi-led coalition using a surface-to-air missile.
20/05/2021	The U.S.  “two senior leaders of Huthi forces in Yemen who are involved in military offensives that exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, pose a dire threat to civilians and destabilise Yemen”. The Treasury Department  that “the Huthis, with the support of the Iranian government, continue to wage a bloody war against the internationally recognised Yemeni… Iranian support through funding, training and military equipment has allowed the Huthis to threaten Yemen’s neighbours and to conduct heinous attacks damaging civilian infrastructure in Yemen and Saudi Arabia”.
19/05/2021	U.S. Senator Chris Murphy  with Iran’s UN envoy and called on “the Iranians to engage with seriousness and urgency in nuclear negotiations, pressure the Huthis to end the war in Yemen, urge Hamas to accept a ceasefire and end rocket  into Israel and release Morad Tahbaz from prison”. In turn, the Iranian side  “the need for practical removal of all U.S. sanctions on Iran” and expressed “Iran’s will for a peaceful settlement of the war in Yemen”, noting in particular that “any solution to the Yemeni crisis must ensure the complete lifting of the siege and impeded delivery of humanitarian aid to the country and a ceasefire”.
18/05/2021	A senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  with a Huthi official and underscored “Iran’s position in support of Axis of Resistance and special emphasis of Leader of the Islamic Revolution in developing bilateral relations”. The following day, a senior Iranian diplomat  with a Huthi official and emphasised “the necessity of accelerating the process of [peace] negotiations”.
18/05/2021	Commenting on “tensions between Israel and Iran… in the Gulf and the Red Sea”, CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that the “low level engagement that’s continued over a period could certainly lead to an expansion of hostilities and some miscalculation or provocation could occur there. And we watch that very closely”. He further was asked about the idea of a hotline with Iran and maintained: “It takes two sides that want to have that happen for that to occur… In general, it is a good thing to be able to communicate. It decreases the probability of miscalculation. It allows military to military communications, which can often reduce tensions”.
13/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “eight explosive laden drones and three ballistic missiles” launched by the Huthis at Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had targeted an “Aramco facility, Najran Airport and sensitive targets” in Najran with ballistic missiles and drones.
12/05/2021	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “We have had connections with Saudi Arabia, and we hope these contacts would yield results through later cooperation… for the sake of regional peace and security, particularly Yemen, which is suffering huge humanitarian catastrophe”. The following day, President Rouhani  the Qatari Emir that “there is no military solution to the crisis in Yemen”, emphasised “the need for cooperation and efforts to resolve the crisis in the country” and voiced “hope that UN-led peaceful motives for peace in Yemen would yield desired results”.
10/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for Abha International Airport.
08/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Khamis Mushait. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had successfully targeted King Khalid airbase with a drone.
08/05/2021	The U.S. Navy  that it had “seized an illicit shipment of weapons from a stateless dhow in international water of the North Arabian Sea”. The contents “included dozens of advanced Russian-made anti-tank guided missiles, thousands of Chinese Type 56 assault rifles and hundreds of PKM machine guns, sniper rifles and rocket-propelled grenade launches”. Media reports citing an unnamed U.S. defence official  that “the Navy’s initial investigation found the vessel came from Iran”, and purportedly intended for Yemen. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the claim and asserted that “Iran has only a diplomatic presence in Yemen”.
07/05/2021	During a visit to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan, U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen Tim Linderking  the need for “a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire and move to inclusive political talks” in Yemen. The U.S. State Department asserted that “there is a fair deal on the table that will bring immediate relief to Yemeni people. The Huthis passed up a major opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to peace and to make progress on this proposal by refusing to meet with UN Special Envoy Griffiths in Muscat—especially given the Republic of Yemen Government’s stated readiness to reach an agreement to end the conflict”.
03/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “a ballistic missile and two explosive drones” bound for Najran. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had hit Najran Airport and King Khalid airbase with four drones and two ballistic missiles.
03/05/2021	A Pentagon spokesperson  that “we have… made clear through diplomatic channels our concerned [sic] about IRGC navy activities”, adding: “The IRGC’s not the Iranian state navy and doesn’t have the same reporting structure as the Iranian state navy. Our interactions with the Iranian state navy have remained professional, but that’s a whole different reporting chain up to the elected government, and the IRGC doesn’t report along those same lines”. He further maintained that “you don’t need a hotline with the IRGC to communicate”, adding: “I don’t believe that there’s a need, nor… I would suspect no appetite for any sort of operational or strategic communication between us and the IRGC. We have diplomatic channels that we work through appropriately to communicate our displeasure to Tehran”. The spokesperson asserted that “our commanders at sea have the right and responsibility to defend themselves against threats”, and noted: “This  [on 26 April]… did finally result in what ended up finally breaking the fever… Nobody wants to even see it come to that”.
02/05/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting a Huthi “explosive drone” bound for Khamis Mushait. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had targeted King Khalid airbase with a drone.
01/05/2021	The Saudi defence ministry  downing a “hostile air target” bound for Jeddah.
29/04/2021	Discussing Iran-Israel tensions, CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “it is not our desire to have a war with Iran. And we would hope it is not their desire to have a war with us… There is a low-level conflict that’s being fought out across the theater. But we do not intend to enter that conflict”.
28/04/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had successfully targeted King Khalid airbase in Khamis Mushait with a drone.
28/04/2021	Meeting with a Huthi official in Oman, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  “Iran’s support for a political solution as the only way out of the ongoing conflict in Yemen, a ceasefire and intra-Yemeni talks”.
27/04/2021	The Saudi defence ministry  that naval forces had intercepted “a bomb-laden unmanned surface vehicle (USV)” in the Red Sea.
27/04/2021	Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman  that “all what we ask for is to have a good and distinguished relationship with Iran… we want it [ie, Iran] to prosper and grow as we have Saudi interests in Iran, and they have Iranian interests in Saudi Arabia, which is to drive prosperity and growth”. He added: “The problem that we have lies with certain negative behaviours they have, whether in terms of their nuclear program, their support of illegal militias… or their ballistic missile program. We are working now without partners in the region and the world to find solutions for these problems”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  that “with constructive views and a dialogue-oriented approach, Iran and Saudi Arabia… can enter a new chapter of interaction and cooperation to achieve peace, stability and regional development by overcoming differences”.
27/04/2021	CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “while diplomatic efforts are underway to address Iran’s nuclear program and other destabilising activities, we should be very clear that we remain in a state of contested deterrence with Iran, which continues to play a dangerous game by supporting proxies and affiliated groups in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen”. McKenzie added: “These groups are often willing to take risks that Tehran is not. So long as Iran continues its material support for these groups, the region will not know true stability and security”.
25/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “a Huthi explosive drone” bound for Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had targeted King Khalid airbase in Khamis Mushait with a drone.
23/04/2021	Iran’s foreign ministry “denied the remarks recently made by [senior IRGC official] Rostam Qassemi… regarding Iran’s military assistance and the presence of Iranian military advisors in Yemen”, adding that Qassemi’s  “are contrary to the reality and policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Yemen”. The ministry further  that “Iran’s support for Yemen is of [a] political type, and the Islamic Republic backs the peaceful resolution of the Yemen crisis”.
23/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing three Huthi “bomb-laden drones” bound for Jizan and Khamis Mushait. A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had struck “important and sensitive locations at King Khalid air base… [and an] Aramco facility in Jizan” with drones.
22/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait. A military Huthis spokesperson  that they had hit “a military site” at King Khalid airbase.
22/04/2021	U.S. CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  the threat of sea mines as an “example of an Iranian asymmetric capability that they can employ against [the U.S.]”, and further assessed: “the Strait of Hormuz is a logical place for them to do that… There’s another area though that is also of concern to us and that’s the Bab al-Mandab in the Southern Red Sea where they might be able to do it through their Huthi proxies down there”. Relatedly, the commander of U.S. AFRICOM  that “Iranian military capabilities threaten sea-lanes through the Red Sea and our posture locations in the Horn of Africa. Iranian support to Yemen’s Huthis further jeopardises freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and increases tensions and instability in East Africa”.
21/04/2021	U.S. Special Representative for Yemen Tim Lenderking  that “the Huthis receive considerable funding, training and other support from Iran”, and asserted: “If the Huthis are not acting as a proxy or partner of Iran, it is time they engage seriously in our efforts to reach agreement on a ceasefire and resume political talks”. “Each day the war continues, their relationship with Iran deepens”, he warned, while underscoring the need for “a comprehensive peace agreement that not only stops fighting between the Huthis and Saudi Arabia, but that forces the Huthis to participate in a peaceful political process and reduces the instability that Iran and other malign actors will seek to manipulate”. Lenderking further  that “we would welcome Iran playing a constructive role [in the conflict], if they are willing to do so. We have not seen any indication of that”.
20/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Khamis Mushait. A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had hit an “important military site” at Abha International Airport with a drone.
20/04/2021	U.S. CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “Iran provides weapons, parts and expertise to Huthi forces in Yemen for the purpose of attacking Saudi Arabia. Since January 2021, Iranian-aided Huthi forces have launched more than 150 ballistic missile, LACM [Land-Attack Cruise Missiles] and one-way UAS attacks against military, infrastructure and civilian targets in Saudi Arabia. These attacks have varied in scope and complexity, with UAS detection and interdiction particularly challenging not just for Saudi forces, but also for U.S. and Coalition forces supporting Saudi Arabia’s defence”. McKenzie added that “these small- and medium-sized UAS proliferating across the AOR present a new and complex threat to our forces and those of our partners and allies. For the first time since the Korean War, we are operating without complete air superiority”. He went on to emphasise that “U.S. assistance to the Kingdom focuses on providing information to Saudi Arabia’s armed forces to assist them in thwarting Huthi UAV, ballistic missile, and explosive boat attacks that contravene international law and undermine diplomatic efforts”.
18/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden drone” bound for Saudi Arabia inside Yemeni territory. A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had hit “a sensitive military site at King Khalid Air Base” with a drone.
16/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile bound for Jizan.
15/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “four bomb-laden UAVs and five ballistic missiles” launched by the Huthis towards Jizan
13/04/2021	Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, President Rouhani was quoted as  that “allowing the Israeli regime a foothold in the Persian Gulf region is ‘dangerous’, given the fact that the regime is a ‘destabilising and provocative’ element”. In a separate conversation with the Qatari Emir, President Rouhani  “the need to resolve regional issues and crises, including the Yemeni crisis, through dialogue and negotiation”, adding: “the only successful way to ensure security, peace and stability in the region is resolving issues peacefully, responsibility and taking into account the collective interests, and we believe that militarism cannot resolve regional issues”.
13/04/2021	The U.S. Intelligence Community’s  judged that “Iran will remain a destabilising force in Yemen, as Tehran’s support to the Huthis—including supplying ballistic and cruise missiles as well as unmanned systems—poses a threat to U.S. partners and interests, notably through strikes on Saudi Arabia”.
11/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “a ballistic missile and six explosive-laden drones” launched by the Huthis towards Jizan, in addition to a  bound for Khamis Mushait. The Huthis  they targeted two Aramco refineries and military sites across Saudi Arabia using multiple drones and ballistic missiles.
10/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile aimed at Jizan and “an armed drone”  for Saudi Arabia. A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had successfully targeted “warplane hangars in Jizan Airport”.
09/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi drone bound for Khamis Mushait. A military Huthi spokesperson claimed that they had  “a sensitive site at Abha International Airport with a drone”.
08/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Saudi Arabia, and a  en route Jizan. A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had “targeted King Khalid Airbase in Khamis Mushait” with a drone.
07/04/2021	Iran’s Foreign Ministry  that an Iranian ship, the , was hit the day before by an explosion in the Red Sea, causing “minor damage with no casualties”. “The Saviz civilian ship was stationed… to provide maritime security along the shipping lanes and to fight pirates”, the ministry , placing the incident near the Djibouti coast. Washington  involvement in the incident, while media reports citing a U.S. official  that “the Israelis had notified the U.S. that its forces had struck the vessel… [in] retaliation for earlier Iranian  on Israeli vessels”.
06/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Khamis Mushait. A military Huthi spokesperson  they had successfully targeted Saudi military sites with two drones.
04/04/2021	A senior Iranian diplomat  with a Huthi official on “the latest developments in the peace process in Yemen”, and expressed “satisfaction” regarding their progress.
03/04/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  thwarting “an imminent Huthi attack” by “destroying an explosive-laden boat in a southern part of the Red Sea”.
01/04/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had conducted a successful operation against “sensitive and important sites in Riyadh” using four drones. The Saudi-led coalition  downing a pair of Huthi drones bound for Khamis Mushait.
31/03/2021	The Saudi cabinet  Huthi strikes against Saudi Arabia as a “continuation of the Iranian guardianship over the political and military decision of the militias in order to achieve its subversive agenda to spread chaos and undermine regional and international security”.
30/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing two Huthi drones bound for Saudi Arabia.
28/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had intercepted two Huthi “explosive-laden boats” to be used in what it described as an “imminent” attack. The coalition also reported downing “three armed drones launched towards southern Saudi Arabia, including the city of Khamis Mushait”.
26/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile aimed at civilian targets in Najran, in  to “a drone fired at the city of Khamis Mushait”.
25/03/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had targeted multiple Saudi energy and military sites using “eighteen drones and eight ballistic missiles”. Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry  that “an attack with a projectile was made on the petroleum products distribution terminal in Jizan. The attack resulted in a fire in one of the terminal’s tanks”. The Saudi defence ministry subsequently  that it had downed eight Huthi UAVs, and that three ballistic missiles had been launched toward Saudi Arabia, “one of which fell short… and the remaining fell in two uninhabited areas”. “These violations confirm the rejection of the terrorist militia of all political efforts to resolve the Yemeni crisis, specifically following the announcement of the Kingdom’s  to end the crisis”, a spokesperson indicated. “They as well reaffirm Iran’s control over the militia’s political and military decisions, through which it achieves its vandalistic agenda to spread chaos and undermine regional and international security”. The U.S.  it “join[ed] the international community in strongly condemning the attacks”, asserting that “the actions by the Huthis are a clear provocation meant to perpetuate the conflict”.
24/03/2021	Discussing a Saudi-proposed ceasefire  to end the Yemen war, the Saudi UN envoy  that “the ball is in the Huthis’ court… They need to come clean and not give priority to the interests of outside parties, but rather to the interest of the Yemeni people. That’s where the ball lies and that’s where we are waiting to see if we have a partner for peace or not”.
23/03/2021	Marking the sixth anniversary of the Yemen war, Iran’s Foreign Ministry  that “the Yemen crisis has no military solution… Iran supports any peace plan focused on ending the aggression, declaring a nationwide ceasefire, ending the occupation, lifting the economic siege, starting the political dialogue and finally letting Yemenis take the helm of shaping their political future free from any foreign interference”. The following day, Iran’s ambassador to Sanaa  that “the [22 March] Saudi  for Yemen is a project of permanent war
23/03/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had targeted Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport using a drone
22/03/2021	Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister  “an initiative to end the Yemeni crisis and reach a comprehensive political resolution”, noting that it “gives the Huthis an opportunity to uphold the interests of the brotherly Yemeni people… and the independence of their homeland over the Iranian regime’s expansionary ambitions in Yemen and the region”. The U.S.  “Saudi Arabia and Republic of Yemen Government’s commitment to a ceasefire and political process in Yemen”, urging “all parties to commit seriously to a ceasefire immediately and engage in negotiations under the auspices of the UN”. The same day, Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with his Saudi counterpart and  the U.S.’s “commitment to supporting the defence of Saudi Arabia and strongly condemned recent attacks against Saudi territory from Iranian-aligned groups in the region”. According to the State Department, the two officials underscored “their close cooperation to support the efforts… to end the conflict in Yemen, starting with the need for all parties to commit to a ceasefire and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid”.
21/03/2021	Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that the Saudis “can neither stay nor leave [Yemen]… Both ways are to their detriment”. He further said: “You Americans knew what a disaster you were creating for the Saudis. If you knew it and you did it anyway, how wretched are your allies because you treat them this way. And if you did not know it, then again how wretched are your allies for trusting you and for planning with you who are not familiar with regional issues”.
20/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Khamis Mushait.
19/03/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had targeted Aramco facilities in Riyadh with six drones. The Saudi oil ministry  that “the Riyadh oil refinery was attacked by drones, resulting in a fire that has been brought under control. The attack did not result in any injury or death nor was the supply of oil or its derivatives affected”. A spokesperson further urged “all nations… to stand together against such acts of terrorism and sabotage, and to stop all groups carrying out or supporting these attacks”.
18/03/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had hit “a military target” at Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport using a drone.
18/03/2021	The UN Security Council  “the cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia and expressed concern about military developments elsewhere in Yemen”. The Council also emphasised “the need for de-escalation by all, including an immediate end to the Huthi escalation in Marib”, and called on “all parties to come together and work with the UN Special Envoy to negotiate, without preconditions, a nationwide ceasefire and a Yemeni-led and owned, inclusive, political settlement”.
17/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “explosive-laden drone” bound for Saudi Arabia.
17/03/2021	The Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  the 7 March drone  on a Saudi port and  strike on an Aramco facility in Dhahran. They also condemned “continuous attacks” by the Huthis, “affirming the GCC’s stand by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in taking all necessary and deterrent measures against these provocative acts”. The six Gulf countries urged “the international community to bear its responsibility toward these terrorist sabotage acts and the parties supporting them”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  that the “communique… lacks a realistic understating of surrounding developments and is in line with political pressure from the Saudi regime on the state members of the council”.
16/03/2021	A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had successfully targeted Khalid Air Base with drones
16/03/2021	The Saudi cabinet  “the importance of extending weapons  on Iran as it is continuing to provide the terrorist Huthi militias with advanced weapons and drones”, while voicing “support for the international efforts aimed at ensuring that the Iranian regime does not develop a nuclear weapons system and ballistic missiles, making the Arab Gulf region free of all weapons of mass destruction, and respects the independence and sovereignty of countries and not to interfere in its internal affairs”. The following day, the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  that “any future negotiations with Iran must include discussions on the Iranian regime’s ballistic missiles and nuclear program”.
15/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for Khamis Mushait. A military Huthi spokesperson  that they had targeted Abha International Airport and King Khalid Air Base with drones. The same day, the coalition  that two ballistic missiles had fallen in unpopulated parts of southern Saudi Arabia. A U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that “we remain deeply concerned by the frequency of these attacks… these are not actions of a group who say that they want peace”. She further urged “all parties to seriously commit to a ceasefire and engage in negotiations”, adding: “This is a time for… the Huthis to come to the table and to commit to peace and diplomacy”.
14/03/2021	Secretary of State Anthony Blinken  with the UN Special Envoy for Yemen and voiced “U.S. concern regarding the conflict in Yemen, particularly the humanitarian toll on the Yemeni people”, noting also that “the U.S. supports a unified, stable Yemen free from foreign influence, and that there is no military solution to the conflict”.
14/03/2021	Asked about Israel’s involvement in a 12 March “” on an Iranian cargo vessel, Defence Minister Benny Gantz  that “I’m not saying anything about what we did or didn’t do. We have an obligation to be preemptive on all fronts… By land, they [ie, Iranians] are supporting militias in Iraq and Syria – and by air and sea, they are sending weapons to Lebanon”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  that “given the geographical location of the attack it is possible that this terrorist act was carried out by the Zionist regime [ie, Israel]”. He further  that “Iran would consider all options when it finds out who has been involved in this operation, and will resort to them to protect its legitimate rights”.
12/03/2021	An Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines spokesperson  that an Iranian cargo vessel bound for Europe, Shahr-e Kord, had on 10 March been “damaged in [a] terrorist attack in the international waters of the Mediterranean sea”. He further  that “such terrorist acts amount to naval piracy, and are contrary to international law on commercial shipping security, and legal action will be taken to identify the perpetrators”. The announcement came one day after media reports citing U.S. officials  that since 2019 Israel had “targeted at least a dozen vessels bound for Syria and mostly carrying Iranian oil”.
11/03/2021	In a joint  with the E3 and Italy, the U.S. “condemn[ed] the sustained Huthi offensive on the Yemeni city of  and the major escalation of attacks the Huthis have conducted and claimed against Saudi Arabia”. The four governments went on to “urge the Huthis to seize this opportunity for peace and end the ongoing escalation”, and underscored their “firm commitment to the security and integrity of Saudi territory”. In subsequent remarks, the U.S. special envoy for Yemen  that “we now have a sound plan for a nationwide ceasefire… That plan has been before the Houthi leadership for a number of days”. “It appears that the Houthis are prioritising a military campaign to take Marib… over suspending the war and moving relief to the Yemeni people”, he added.
11/03/2021	Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that “The Yemenis [ie, the Huthis] have managed to create defensive weapons for themselves by benefiting from certain opportunities… the UN does not condemn the culprit for its six years of bombarding [Yemen], but it condemns the Yemenis because they occasionally defend themselves and because that defence has worked”.
10/03/2021	Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister  that “efforts must be combined to stop the sources of the continuation of the conflict [in Yemen], the most important of which is Iran, as it supplies the Huthi militia with advanced weapons… this is a violation of UN resolutions and confirms that the arms embargo on Iran must be extended”.
10/03/2021	President Rouhani  that “Iran is ready to resolve… [regional] crises in the form of regional cooperation and by strengthening the role of the United Nations”. “We are against foreign interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, deeming it to the detriment of Iraq and the region as a whole, and blaming Iran in the recent events in Iraq is not a constructive approach”, Rouhani added. “The Iranian government is suspicious of the recent  on coalition bases in Iraq, and has asked the Iraqi government to look into the matter”. Discussing the Yemen war, Rouhani reiterated that “there is no military solution to this crisis”, adding: “while proposing a four-article initiative, [Iran] has used its full capacity to advance UN efforts in Yemen, and it supports any attempt to put an end to the aggression against the Yemeni people”.
07/03/2021	The Saudi energy ministry  a drone attack against “one of the petroleum tank farms at the Ras Tanura Port in the Eastern Region”, and also reported that “shrapnel from a ballistic missile fell near Saudi Aramco’s residential area in the city of Dhahran”
06/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing that two Huthi “bomb-laden UAVs” bound for Khamis Mushait and Jizan. A military Huthi spokesperson  successful strikes against “important and sensitive targets at King Khalid airbase”.
05/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing six Huthi “bomb-laden UAVs” bound for Saudi Arabia
04/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing  Huthi ballistic missiles bound for Jizan, and  “bomb-laden UAV” aimed at Khamis Mushait. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had successfully struck a Saudi Aramco facility in Jeddah with a missile, in addition to  the King Khalid base by drone.
03/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for Saudi Arabia.
02/03/2021	The U.S.  two senior Huthi officials for having “used their positions… to procure weapons from Iran and to oversee attacks threatening civilians and maritime infrastructure”. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken contended that “Iran’s involvement in Yemen fans the flames of the conflict, threatening greater escalation, miscalculation and regional instability. Ansar Allah [ie, the Huthis] uses Iranian weapons, intelligence, training and support to conduct attacks threatening civilian targets and infrastructure in Yemen and Saudi Arabia”. Blinken went on to assert that “we will ensure Saudi Arabia and our regional partners have the tools they need to defend themselves, including against threats emanating from Yemen that are carried out with weapons and support from Iran. At the same time, the U.S. is working diligently at senior levels alongside the United Nations and others to bring an end to this conflict”.
02/03/2021	Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  with the UN Secretary-General regarding Yemen and expressed “Iran’s support for the UN’s moves to launch fair peace, calling for putting an end to the war, lifting the siege and providing humanitarian aid to the Yemeni people”. Zarif also underscored the importance of “holding inter-Yemeni talks and forming an inclusive government”.
02/03/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for Saudi Arabia. The same day, a Saudi spokesperson  “the fall of a [Huthi] military projectile launched… from inside Yemen towards one of the border villages in Jizan Region”, injuring five and causing material damage.
01/03/2021	Commenting on a 26 February  on an Israeli-owned vessel in the Gulf of Oman, Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “this was indeed an operation by Iran”, while asserting: “Iran is Israel’s biggest enemy. I am determined to fend it off. We are striking at it all over the region”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson denied any involvement in the incident, adding: “the security of the Persian Gulf is extremely important for Iran and we will not allow them to spread fear in the region by such accusations”. He further  that Iran was “monitoring all the actions made by the [Israeli] regime in security zone of Iran in the past few months, and we will give a response where it happens”.
28/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile aimed at Riyadh and half a dozen “bomb-laden UAVs” bound for Jizan and Khamis Mushait. A Huthi military spokesperson,  Saudi Arabia’s “ongoing escalating aggression and siege”, reported the launching of “a Zolfaghar ballistic missile and fifteen drones”. He further warned that “our retaliatory attacks are continuing” and urged Saudi civilians “to stay away from all military sites and airports or that may be used for military purposes”. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken  the strikes and urged “the Huthis to end these egregious attacks and engage constructively with” the UN and U.S. special envoys. He further asserted that “the U.S. remains committed to its longstanding partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to helping Saudi Arabia defend its territory as it faces attacks from Iranian-aligned groups”.
26/02/2021	The UK Maritime Trade Operations  that a merchant vessel, identified in   as the Bahamian-flagged, Israeli-owned Helios Ray, had “experienced an explosion” in the Gulf of Oman. Israeli Defence Minister Benny Gantz subsequently  that “the location of the ship in relative close proximity to Iran raises the notion, the assessment, that it is the Iranians”. Too, Israel’s military chief of staff : “we got a reminder that Iran not only is a nuclear threat, but that it spreads and carries out terror and operations against civilian targets… the IDF acts and will act against the threats that endanger [Israel], near and far”.
26/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition reported downing a  and  “”s launched by the Huthis at Saudi Arabia.
25/02/2021	President Biden  with Saudi King Salman on “regional security, including the renewed diplomatic efforts led by the United Nations and the U.S. to end the war in Yemen, and the U.S. commitment to help Saudi Arabia defend its territory as it faces attacks from Iranian-aligned groups”.
25/02/2021	Iran’s navy commander  that “the navy of the army has a strong presence in the Red Sea and escorts the tankers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which are threatened by proxy terrorist groups to make sure the vessels safely cross the Bab al-Mandeb Strait to the Red Sea”. He further asserted that “the enemies wanted to close the ports on us in the first phase, and in the second phase to close the seas and sea routes to our trade ships and oil tankers… the deployment of the navy had disrupted all of the enemy’s equations at sea”.
18/02/2021	Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin  with his Saudi counterpart, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Austin “condemned the recent Huthi cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia and expressed his commitment to assisting Saudi Arabia in the defence of its borders”. He also “discussed the importance of ending the war and thanked the Crown Prince for Saudi Arabia’s commitment to a political settlement”. Austin went on to highlight “Saudi Arabia’s role as a pillar of the regional security architecture”, as well as the “U.S. and Saudi shared commitment to countering Iran’s destabilising activities and defeating violent extremist organisations in the region”.
17/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing  Huthi bomb-laden UAVs, one of which it said was intended for Khamis Mushait
16/02/2021	The U.S. special envoy for Yemen, saying that he had talked to the UN Special Envoy for Yemen after the latter’s  to Iran, : “The Iranians have played a very negative role in Yemen hitherto… both their training, their supplying, and their equipping the Huthis to conduct attacks against civilian targets in the kingdom and elsewhere in the Gulf have been particularly damaging”. “There’s also opportunity… for Iran to show its better – put its best foot forward in terms of supporting the kind of international response that we’re trying to engineer here to end this conflict”, he added. The U.S. envoy went on to say that “if the Huthis want to state their goodwill, they’ll push away from Iran. That’s something that they have… stated that they want to be seen as independent of Iran. This is a good opportunity for them to show that”.
15/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had successfully targeted Jeddah and Abha airports using drones.
14/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  two Huthi “bomb-laden UAVs” which it said were intended for Khamis Mushait. A Huthi military spokesperson  that their drones had “targeted Saudi Abha International Airport… for the fourth consecutive day”.
13/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for “civilian objects in Abha International Airport”. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had “hit an important target” at the airport.
12/02/2021	U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken  that “effective 16 February, I am revoking the  of Ansarullah, sometimes referred to as the Huthis, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO)… and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)”. “This decision is a recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen”, he added. “The U.S. remains clear-eyed about Ansarullah’s malign actions and aggression”. Blinken further underlined that “we remain committed to helping U.S. partners in the Gulf defend themselves, including against threats arising from Yemen, many of which are carried out with the support of Iran. The U.S. will redouble its efforts, alongside the United Nations and others, to end the war itself”. Saudi Arabia’s UN envoy  that “we will still deal with the Huthi militia as a terrorist organisation and address its threats with military action”.
12/02/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  that they “had hit Saudi Arabia’s Abha International Airport and King Khalid Air Base with drones”. This was not confirmed by the Saudi-led coalition, which in turn  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” bound for Saudi Arabia. The same day, the Huthis reported  a coalition drone in Marib province.
11/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi ballistic missile bound for Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had successfully targeted King Khalid air base using “a new undisclosed ballistic missile”.
10/02/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had “targeted… warplanes hangars at Saudi Abha International Airport” using four drones. The Saudi-led coalition  an attack and damage to a civilian aircraft, while  the downing of two Huthi “bomb-laden UAVs” bound for Saudi Arabia. The U.S. State Department  to the incident by saying that “Huthi leaders will find themselves sorely mistaken if they think this administration is going to let up the pressure… They will come under significant pressure”. The following day, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken “condemned the Huthi attacks” and  with his Saudi counterpart about “joint efforts to bolster Saudi defences against attacks on the Kingdom”. The two sides also discussed “diplomatic outreach to find a negotiated political settlement to the war in Yemen”.
08/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV”.
07/02/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing  Huthi “bomb-laden UAV[s]” bound for Saudi Arabia. The same day, U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken  “the Huthis to immediately cease attacks impacting civilian areas inside Saudi Arabia and to halt any new military offensives inside Yemen”. He further called on them “to refrain from destabilising actions and demonstrate their commitment to constructively engage in UN Special Envoy Griffiths’ efforts to achieve peace”.
07/02/2021	The UN special envoy for Yemen  Iran and  with senior Iranian officials as part of what his office described as “efforts to support a negotiated political solution to the conflict in Yemen”. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  the UN envoy that “a political solution, rather than an imposed war, is the only way to resolve the Yemen crisis”, and expressed Iran’s readiness “to support any effective role played by the UN in settling the crisis considering the very difficult conditions caused by the war and economic siege”.
06/02/2021	A U.S. State Department official  that the administration had “formally notified Congress of the Secretary’s intent to revoke” Huthi terrorism . “This decision has nothing to do with our view of the Huthis and their reprehensible conduct, including attacks against civilians and the kidnapping of American citizens”, the official added. “We are committed to helping Saudi Arabia defend its territory against further such attacks. Our action is due entirely to the humanitarian consequences”.
05/02/2021	Secretary of State Antony Blinken  with his Saudi counterpart on “regional security, counterterrorism and cooperation to deter and defend against attacks on the Kingdom”. Blinken also raised “several key priorities of the new administration including elevating human rights issues and ending the war in Yemen”.
04/02/2021	President Joe Biden  that “we are ending all American support for offensive operations in the war in Yemen including relevant arms sales… At the same time, Saudi Arabia faces missile attacks and UAV strikes and other threats from Iranian supplied forces in multiple countries. We are going to continue to help Saudi Arabia defend its sovereignty and its territorial integrity and its people”. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan separately noted that the U.S. decision “does not extend to actions against AQAP… it extends to the types of offensive operations that have perpetuated a civil war in Yemen that has led to a humanitarian crisis”. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince bin Farhan  “the U.S.’s commitment… to cooperate with the Kingdom in defending its security and territory”, adding: “We look forward to working with [the newly-appointed U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen]  to achieve our joint goal of a comprehensive political resolution in Yemen as part of our shared vision for a peaceful and prosperous region”.
30/01/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV in Yemeni airspace”, which was bound for Saudi Arabia.
27/01/2021	Secretary of State Anthony Blinken  that “the Huthis committed an act of significant act of aggression in taking over Sanaa… committing acts of aggression against our partner, Saudi Arabia, committing human rights abuses and other atrocities, creating an environment in which we’ve seen extremist groups fill some of the vacuums that were created”. He also noted that “we’ve seen a campaign led by Saudi Arabia that has also contributed to what is by many estimates the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today… it’s vitally important, even in the midst of this crisis, that we do everything we can to get humanitarian assistance to the people of Yemen who are in desperate need”.
23/01/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “hostile air target going toward Riyadh”. A Huthi military spokesperson  any involvement in the incident. The U.S. State Department  the attack, noting that “it appears to have been an attempt to target civilians”. It further maintained: “As we work to de-escalate tensions in the region through principled diplomacy, including by bringing an end to the war in Yemen, we will also help our partner Saudi Arabia defend against attacks on its territory and hold those who attempt to undermine stability to account”.
22/01/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  intercepting a Huthi “explosive-laden” boat, and separately downing an armed drone bound for Saudi Arabia.
19/01/2021	The U.S.  the Huthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity
15/01/2021	The Saudi-led coalition  downing three Huthi “bomb-laden UAVs” bound for Saudi Arabia.
14/01/2021	The interior ministry of Yemen’s internationally recognised government  that a 30 December  on Aden airport involved ballistic missiles fired from Huthi-controlled territory, and accused “Iranian and Lebanese experts” of involvement in the strike.
13/01/2021	Against the  of war games in the Gulf of Oman, Iran’s military chief of staff, Mohammad Baqeri,  that Iran would “once again include the Red Sea in the list of zones for its naval patrol operations after a series of limited actions against Iranian trade vessels”. On the second day of the , Iran’s navy commander  that “our approach today is not just defensive. We are prepared for whatever offensive operation [as well]”. The same day, the Iranian army  spotting a foreign submarine approaching the drill zone, which “left the region immediately after being traced”.
10/01/2021	U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  his “intent to designate Ansarallah – sometimes referred to as the Huthis – as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO)… and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) entity”. “I also intend to designate three of Ansarallah’s leaders… as SDGTs”, he added. Describing the Huthis as “a deadly Iran-backed militia group”, Pompeo maintained that “the designations are intended to hold Ansarallah accountable for its terrorist acts… [and] advance efforts to achieve a peaceful, sovereign and united Yemen that is both free from Iranian interference and at peace with its neighbours”. He further urged Iran “to stop smuggling weapons to Ansarallah in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and to stop enabling Ansarallah’s aggressive acts against Yemen and towards its neighbours, including Saudi Arabia”. Saudi Arabia  the , while Iran  it an impediment to “a political solution and peace talks”.
06/01/2021	A Huthi military spokesperson  downing a Saudi- drone over Yemeni airspace.
06/01/2021	Israeli media  that Israel Defence Force had “deployed Patriot air defence batteries near the southern city of Eilat… amid concerns of attack from an Iran-backed militia in Yemen”.
31/12/2020	Iran wrote to the UN Security Council  to increased U.S. “military … in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea”. “Coupled with a series of systematic disinformation campaign, unfounded accusations and inflammatory statements and threats… such confrontational measures have further deteriorated the already tense security environment of this highly volatile region”, the letter added. “If unchecked, such warmongering tendencies could escalate the situation to an alarming level, and it is self-evident that the U.S. shall bear the full responsibility for all consequences”. Relatedly, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “intelligence from Iraq indicate plot to fabricate pretext for war”, asserting: “Iran doesn’t seek war but will openly and directly defend its people, security and vital interests”. Relatedly, media reports  that “the U.S. has seen increasing indications that Iran could be planning an attack against American forces or interests in the Middle East”, with an unnamed U.S. official describing Iran’s intentions as “difficult and at times unpredictable” to assess.
30/12/2020	Media reports  that “at least 22 people were killed and dozens wounded in an attack on Aden airport… moments after a plane landed carrying a newly formed Saudi-backed cabinet”. A Yemeni minister  that all “cabinet members are safe” and called the incident a “terrorist attack by Iran-backed Huthi militia”. A Houthi official reportedly  any involvement in the attack. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  that “such acts of violence and the killing of civilians are the results of the mentality of aggressors and occupiers of Yemen… Iran condemns the aggressors’ acts of aggression and war, and stresses a political solution to the crisis, and once again asks all parties to end the futile conflict by returning to political negotiations”.
25/12/2020	An Israeli military spokesperson was cited as  that “Israel is monitoring Tehran’s movement in the region and expects that an Iranian attack could come from Iraq and Yemen… as Iran’s second circle after Lebanon and Syria”. “Iran has developed a wide range of capabilities in the area – and specifically in Iraq and Yemen – that include advanced drones and remote-guided missiles, which they manage to operate without detection”, he added. “Everyone should be on high alert regarding the Iranian threat… considering the many blows Iran has received in the past year without being able to properly respond”. A Huthi official subsequently  that if Israel “makes any reckless move or action that affects Yemen, then any interests of this entity or its partners in the Red Sea will be a legitimate target”. An Iranian official also   that “Tehran’s response to any attack on national security will be strong and wide”, assessing that Israel “is looking for excuses to drag the region into tension that will create chaos”.
25/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that an explosion it said was caused by a Huthi naval mine had “hit a commercial cargo ship in the southern Red Sea”, adding that such activities by the Huthis “in the southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait has been increasing… [posing] a serious threat to international shipping”. The following day, the coalition  that the Huthis had launched a ballistic missile which “fell short in Yemeni territory”.
21/12/2020	A Huthi military spokesperson  the downing of a Saudi drone.
19/12/2020	Speaking at a ceremony marking a rotation of Iranian forces, a senior Iranian naval official  that “ensuring the security of Iran’s commercial transportation lines, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, conveying the message of peace and friendship of Iran to other countries present in the Gulf of Aden are among the missions of the Iranian naval flotilla”.
18/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “it had discovered and destroyed a marine mine planted by the Huthi militia in the southern Red Sea”, claiming that “the mine… was Iranian-made”. The coalition also  that three Huthi projectiles had landed in Jizan.
17/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that a ballistic missile launched by the Huthis had landed in Yemeni territory.
15/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed a Huthi “explosives-laden drone” heading toward Saudi Arabia. The following day, the coalition  that a Huthi “military projectile” had landed inside Jizan.
14/12/2020	Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  with his Saudi counterpart on, inter alia, “the efforts to overcome divisions between Gulf countries needed to deter Iran’s aggressive acts in the region and the mutual determination to achieve an inclusive political solution to the conflict in Yemen”.
14/12/2020	A shipping company  that one of its Singapore-flagged tankers, the BW Rhine, had “been hit from an external source whilst discharging at Jeddah”. Saudi Arabia’s energy ministry  that “an explosive-laden boat” had been used in the incident, and a spokesperson asserted that “these acts of terrorism and vandalism, directed against vital installations, go beyond the Kingdom and its vital facilities to the security of energy supplies to the world and global economy”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  “any destructive action against maritime security and freedom of international trade” and “expressed hope that countries in the region would increase their efforts to strengthen cooperation on maritime security, combating pirates and countering the trade in banned substances”.
10/12/2020	The U.S.  four Yemeni officials for “serious human rights abuse” and one for “for engaging in activities, directly or indirectly, that threaten the peace, security or stability of Yemen” under Magnitsky authorities.
09/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “destroyed… a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
09/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had intercepted and destroyed “an attempt by the terrorist Huthi militia to carry out a hostile, terrorist act in Southern Red Sea using two bomb-laden Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)”.
08/12/2020	The U.S.  Hassan Irloo, whom it described as “an official in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and the Iranian regime’s envoy to the Huthi rebels in Yemen” on counterterrorism authorities. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  that “by dispatching Irloo to Yemen, the IRGC-QF is signaling its intent to increase support to the Huthis and further complicate international efforts to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict”. The U.S. also  “Al-Mustafa International University for facilitating IRGC-QF recruitment efforts and one individual”. According to the Treasury Department, the university “is used as a recruitment platform by the IRGC-QF for intelligence collection and operations, including recruitment for the IRGC-QF-led foreign militias fighting on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria”. The following day, Iran  the U.S. ambassador to Yemen for having “a leading role in organising, financing and arming, directing and carrying out actions of aggressor coalition and formation of human tragedy in Yemen”.
07/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  downing “an explosive-laden drone launched towards the kingdom by Yemen’s Huthi group”.
04/12/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a “bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
04/12/2020	UK maritime authorities  “an attack on a vessel off the coast of Yemen”, noting that the “vessel and crew are safe”.
30/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that a ballistic missile launched by the Huthis had landed inside Yemen. A Huthi military spokesperson  that the “missile hit accurately the aggression’s joint operations room [in Marib governorate]… [and] killed eight Saudi soldiers and commanders”.
27/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “destroyed two mines laid by Yemen’s Iran-backed Huthi militia in the south of the Red Sea”.
25/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “it had destroyed an explosives-laden boat and foiled [an] attack in the southern Red Sea”
24/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “it had destroyed five naval mines planted by the Iranian-backed Huthi militia in the southern Red Sea. The naval mines were Iranian-made”.
23/11/2020	A Huthi military spokesperson  that a Huthi missile had successfully “targeted Aramco’s distribution station in the Saudi city of Jeddah”, asserting that “this operation comes in response to the continued siege and aggression against Yemen”. He further “advised citizens and foreign companies operating in Saudi Arabia to stay away from vital installations”. The Saudi Ministry of Energy subsequently  that “an explosion took place as a result of a terrorist attack by a projectile, causing a fire in the fuel tank at the petroleum products distribution terminal in the north of Jeddah”. The Saudi-led coalition’s spokesperson  that the Huthis had “been positively identified as the culprits, which did not target the Kingdom’s national assets but the core of global economy and supply routes, as well as the security of global energy”. The following day, the Saudi ambassador to the UN  on the Security Council to “shoulder its responsibility and to stop the threat of this militia to the global energy security, [to] the UN political process in Yemen and to regional security”.
22/11/2020	Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and discussed, inter alia, “the need for Gulf unity to counter Iran’s aggressive behaviour in the region and the need to achieve a political solution to the conflict in Yemen”. The following day, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan  media  regarding a  by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu to Saudi Arabia to meet with the U.S. and Saudi sides.
18/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  the interception of a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” launched towards Saudi Arabia.
13/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
12/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  downing  Huthi “explosive-laden drones launched towards Saudi Arabia”.
11/11/2020	A Huthi military spokesman  “all foreign companies operating in Saudi Arabia, as well as our brothers inside Hijaz and Najd residents in all Saudi regions, to stay away from vital military and economic installations from being targeted by the Yemeni army”. The same day, the Saudi-led coalition announced that it had  “two bomb-laden Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)” and  “a bomb-laden UAV” all launched by the Huthis. A Saudi energy official subsequently  that the former operation “occurred in close proximity to a floating offloading platform that belongs to the Jizan oil products terminal [and] resulted in a limited fire on the platform’s floating hoses”.
11/11/2020	On a  to Riyadh, the U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Elliott Abrams, “ with  and Yemeni government officials to discuss joint efforts to counter Iran’s aggressive and malign policies in the region, emphasising that Iran’s destabilising actions put U.S. partners and the entire region at risk”.  to the State Department, Abrams “noted that Iran’s provision of lethal aid to the Huthis prolongs the conflict in Yemen and intensifies its humanitarian crisis, and he condemned indiscriminate Huthi attacks against Saudi cities and civilian infrastructure”.
09/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “two explosive-laden drones” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
05/11/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  downing a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” launched towards Saudi Arabia.
02/11/2020	A top Huthi diplomat  that “Iran does not interfere in Yemen’s internal affairs”, and argued that “with respect to weapons and military strikes, we carry out these attacks ourselves, relying on our own weapons depots”. “Iran, God willing, will be one of the parties to peace”, he added. On 5 November, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  the two sides’ relations as “good and strategic”.
29/10/2020	The U.S. Treasury Department  sanctions designations against “eight entities for their involvement in the sale and purchase of Iranian petrochemical products”
28/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed six “bomb-laden UAVs” towards Saudi Arabia and  ballistic missiles bound for Jizan and Najran all launched by the Huthis. The U.S. embassy in Riyadh issued an  indicating that it was “tracking reports of possible missiles or drones that may be headed toward Riyadh”, which was subsequently  to recommend “increased caution in Saudi Arabia due to terrorism and the threat of missile and drone attacks on civilian targets”. The following day, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  the attacks and argued that “this irresponsible escalation coincides with the Houthis’ declared  to strengthen their ties with Iran… the Houthis are not serious about seeking a political solution in order to bring peace to Yemen”. Pompeo further urged “Iran to stop smuggling weapons to the Huthis in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and to stop enabling the Huthis’ aggressive acts against Yemen and towards its neighbors, including Saudi Arabia”.
28/10/2020	Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  the “” of a Huthi official and maintained: “Like other crimes committed by the aggressors against Yemen, such cowardly assassination undoubtedly reveals only the weakness of the aggressors that have reached an impasse in confrontation with the resisting and determined nation in that country”.
27/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” launched towards Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that “the operation targeted an important target at Abha International Airport”.
26/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had   “bomb-laden UAV[s]” launched by the Huthis towards the Kingdom. A Huthi military spokesperson  that Huthi drones had “hit accurately an important military target” at Abha International Airport.
25/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had   “bomb-laden UAV[s]” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia over consecutive days. A Huthi military spokesperson  that Huthi drones had been used against “Jizan and Abha airports and Khamis Mushait military base”.
23/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed  Huthi launched “bomb-laden UAV[s]” targeting Saudi Arabia.
20/10/2020	The U.S. ambassador to the UN  the Security Council that “Iran continues to support the Huthi rebels who have plunged that country into a bloody civil war… Instead of supporting peace efforts to end the conflict, Iran has continually sent the Huthis weapons to fuel the war, in violation of the arms embargo in Resolution 2216”.
18/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that the Huthis had “launched a ballistic missile from Sanaa governorate… using civilian objects as a launch site”. “The missile fell short” and landed in Saada governorate, the report added.
17/10/2020	Iran’s Foreign Ministry  that an ambassador to Yemen, Hassan Irloo, had arrived in Sanaa. The Yemeni government  that Tehran had “clandestinely dispatched a figure… joining the ranks of Hizbollah and IRGC who have already entered the country with nefarious intentions”, and also declared that it “does not recognise the presence of any diplomatic officials present in Sanaa aligned with the Iran-backed Huthis”. On 21 October, the U.S. diplomatic spokesperson  that “the Iranian regime smuggled… an IRGC member tied to Lebanese Hizbollah, into Yemen under the guise of ‘Ambassador’ to the Huthi militia. Iran’s intent to use the Huthis to expand its malign influence is clear. The Yemeni people should say no to Irloo and Iran”.
16/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition and the Huthis  a two-day prisoner swap releasing more than 1000 individuals as part of a -brokered .
14/10/2020	The U.S. and Saudi Arabia  a  and reiterated “bilateral commitments to counter Iran’s threats to regional security and prosperity, seek a political solution to end the conflict in Yemen and enhance maritime and border security”. Speaking alongside his Saudi counterpart, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  that “it’s no secret that Iran’s destabilising behaviour threatens Saudi Arabia’s security and disrupts global commerce. That’s clear from Iran’s ballistic missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities in the fall of last year, and the frequent, ongoing Huthi bombardment of Saudi territory using rockets, drones and other lethal technology supplied by the regime in Tehran”. In separate remarks, Pompeo  that “we are doing everything we can to make sure that the Islamic Republic of Iran has fewer resources with which to underwrite the Huthis… Our pressure campaign in Iran has been enormously successful at denying them the resources for terror”.
14/10/2020	U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien  the release of two “U.S. citizens… from Huthi custody in Yemen”
14/10/2020	Following a meeting with his U.S. counterpart, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan  that “the Iranian regime continues to provide financial and material support to terrorist groups, including in Yemen where the Huthis have launched more than 300 Iranian-made ballistic missiles and drones towards the Kingdom. Their development of their nuclear program, ballistic missiles and their malign activities represent a grave danger to the region and the world”.  He further asserted that Saudi Arabia and the U.S. “are both committed to counter and deter Iran’s destabilising behaviour”.
13/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “destroyed a ballistic missile” the Huthis “had been planning to launch towards Saudi Arabia”.
10/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed  Huthi-launched “bomb-laden UAV[s]” towards Saudi Arabia
07/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV in Yemeni airspace”, intended to “target civilians and civilian objects in the Kingdom”.
06/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV… target[ing] civilians and civilian objects in Najran”.
06/10/2020	The Yemeni Minister of Information  that Tehran “has provided the Huthi militia with the means to produce missiles, drones and sending consultants to militia-controlled areas”. He further urged Washington to move  with “designating the Huthi militia as a terrorist organisation, freezing its assets and preventing its leaders from traveling abroad”.
05/10/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had thwarted an “imminent terrorist attack” by “a remotely-controlled explosive-laden Houthi boat” close to a Yemeni port.
27/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “in Yemeni airspace a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
27/09/2020	The UN  that “delegates representing the Government of Yemen and Ansar Allah have agreed to immediately release a first group of 1,081 conflict-related detainees and prisoners”,  fifteen Saudi nationals. The Iranian Foreign Ministry  the agreement and considered it a sign that “Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue is the only solution to the country’s current problems”.
23/09/2020	King Salman  the UN General Assembly that “our experience with the Iranian regime has taught us that partial solutions and appeasement did not stop its threats to international peace and security. A comprehensive solution and a firm international position are required to ensure fundamental solutions to the Iranian regime’s attempt to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and its ballistic missile program, and its interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and its sponsorship of terrorism”. On Yemen, he maintained that Tehran “interfered… by supporting the coup carried out by its surrogate, the Huthi militia”, adding: “the Kingdom will not hesitate to defend its national security, nor will it abandon the fraternal people of Yemen until they regain their complete sovereignty and independence from Iranian hegemony”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently : “Saudi Arabia has, for years, been pursuing a blame-game policy and seeking to distort realities in order to escape the realities and not to be held accountable for its crimes”. He further highlighted Iran’s “fundamental policy of boosting diplomatic and dialogue-oriented talks in the region and the promotion of relations with all neighbours”.
23/09/2020	A senior IRGC official  that “Iran will not just retaliate any U.S. attempt to inspect Iranian ships in international waters, but also give a decisive response to such moves in sensitive places… They will face our massive fire”. He further insisted that “the U.S. will not succeed to achieve its objective of imposing [an]  against Iran”.
22/09/2020	An Iranian military spokesperson  that “we provided… [Yemenis] with the experiences in technology in the defence sphere, as they have learned how to produce missiles, drones and weapons in Yemen by themselves”. “The resistance front countries have armies and forces themselves. We provide them with advisory help. In order to share our experiences with the people of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, our experienced forces go there and give them intellectual assistance, but this is the people and armies of those countries who stand against the enemies in practice”, he added.
22/09/2020	The U.S. State Department  that Washington “remains deeply concerned by the Huthis’ aggression, supported by Iranian weapons shipments in violation of UN arms embargoes”, and urged “the Huthis to immediately cease their cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia”.
19/09/2020	A Saudi official  receiving “a report about the fall of a military projectile launched by the Iranian-backed Huthi militia from inside Yemeni territory”, which injured five civilians in Jizan.
17/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed… a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis in the direction of Khamis Mushait.
10/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a number of ballistic missiles and bomb-laden UAVs” launched by the Huthis toward Saudi Arabia, and accused the Huthis of “deliberately escalating the hostile, terrorist targeting of civilians and civilian objects”. A Huthi military spokesperson  that they had hit “important targets” in Riyadh “in retaliation to the continuous escalation by the Saudi enemy and its continuous siege on Yemen”.
09/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis toward Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that multiple Huthi drones had “targeted Abha International Airport” and “struck the designated targets with great precisions”.
08/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had intercepted “a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia. A Huthi military spokesperson  that multiple Huthis drones had “targeted Abha International Airport”, adding that it was a “response to the continuous escalation of the forces of aggression [ie, the Saudi-led coalition] and their continued siege of the Yemeni people”.
08/09/2020	A UN panel of experts  on Yemen concluded that between July 2019 and June 2020, Iran and the U.S. were among the countries that “continued their support of parties to the conflict including through arms transfers, thereby helping to perpetuate the conflict”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that the report “ignored Iran’s pivotal role and its unfailing assistance for the political settlement of crisis in Yemen and has made a totally false claim by putting Iran on a list alongside those who arm the Saudi-led coalition aggressors… The allegation of Iran’s arms support for Yemen is basically false”.
06/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had intercepted a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV” en route to Saudi Arabia. The same day, a Huthi military spokesperson  a drone attack on Abha Airport “with a number of drones targeting military sites and sensitive targets inside Saudi territory”.
04/09/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed a Huthi “bomb-laden UAV while in Yemeni airspace”.
31/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
30/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had  two armed UAVs launched by the Huthis. One was aimed at Abha International Airport, where “debris scattered” following the interception
28/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV” launched by the Huthis toward Najran.
27/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  a ballistic missile fired in the direction of Najran.
26/08/2020	A senior Iranian foreign ministry official  with the UN’s Yemen envoy, Martin Griffiths, and other senior UN  in Geneva.
22/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV” and “one ballistic missile” launched by the Huthis towards Saudi Arabia.
20/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV launched by the terrorist Huthi militia” and one ballistic missile bound for Najran.
20/08/2020	UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres  to Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, “presented a report on the latest efforts made by the UN to end the Yemen war and called on the Islamic Republic of Iran to help settle certain environmental problems in Hodeida port”. According to Iran’s Foreign Ministry, Zarif “expressed Iran’s preparedness to use its good offices in this regard”.
15/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “multiple bomb-laden UAVs” launched by the Huthis within Yemen. The following day, the coalition  “a ballistic missile… toward civilians and civilian objects”.
13/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had downed “a bomb-laden UAV… and two ballistic missiles” by the Huthis targeting Khamis Mushait.
12/08/2020	Iranian President Hassan Rouhani  “some southern neighbours” and affirmed: “Iran’s defence and weapons power is in favour of the whole region, and we use weapons to defend ourselves, and our power is not against you. You have to be careful of those who plunder your resources and sell you weapons to bomb your neighbour… Certainly, if we did not stand for the stability of the region, you would not be here today. So we have always been your supporter and brother”.
06/08/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and shot down a bomb-laden Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)” launched by the Huthis.
29/07/2020	Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that “Our eternal concerns are helping innocent Palestine and showing sympathy to the injured body of Yemen and to the consternations of Muslims subject to oppression in any part of the world. We also consider it our duty to offer words of advice to the heads of some Muslim countries who have resorted to the bosom of the enemy instead of relying on their Muslim brothers”. “These are people who condone the survival of the usurping and oppressive Zionist regime [ie, Israel] and who extend their hand of friendship to them privately and openly… I warn them about the bitter consequences of this behaviour” Khamenei added. He also remarked that “we regard the presence of the U.S. in west Asia as detrimental to regional nations and as a cause of insecurity, destruction and backwardness for countries”.
21/07/2020	Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that the U.S. “and their agents are always seeking to create a power vacuum in regional countries in order to cause chaos and prepare the ground for their own intervention. This is what they did in Yemen. Everyone can see the appalling circumstances in Yemen today”.
14/07/2020	Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  with his Huthi counterpart and remarked that “Iran has always believed that the only way to resolve the Yemen crisis is through political means, and has had constructive cooperation with relevant Yemeni and international sides to propose a peace plan for Yemen”. “Iran is of the conviction that the only way to establish stability in Yemen is to maintain its territorial integrity, unity among Yemeni groups and holding comprehensive political talks among different groups and parties to establish a united and broad-based government”, he added.
12/07/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had  multiple ballistic missiles and “bomb-laden UAVs launched by the terrorist, Iran-backed Huthi militia launched deliberately from Sanaa to target civilians and civilian objects in the Kingdom”. A Huthi military spokesperson  that “the operation targeted the warplanes hangers, base housing and patriot systems in Khamis Mushait and other military sites at the airports of Abha, Jizan and Najran… A giant oil facility in the industrial zone in Jizan was [also] accurately targeted”. The Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) the next day  “Iran’s provision of… weapons to the Huthis in violation of the embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 2216”. Iran’s Foreign Ministry : “we recommend the new GCC secretary general focuses his attention on the need to stop attacks by the [Saudi-led] coalition aggressors against Yemeni women and children and help settle the Yemen crisis through intra-Yemeni talks rather than pursuing the blame game trend and levelling groundless accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is in line with the destructive role of some GCC members”.
09/07/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had conducted a “destruction operation against two legitimate military targets of the terrorist, Iran-backed Huthi militia” off the coast of Yemen.  “The destroyed targets are two bomb-laden USVs [Unmanned Surface Vehicles]… prepared to imminently execute hostile and terrorist actions in Bab al-Mandab Strait and Southern Red Sea”, the coalition asserted.
09/07/2020	The Saudi-led coalition’s spokesperson  that “since the end of June… we’ve noticed the Huthi militias escalating their attempts to target civilians in Saudi Arabia, in Yemeni areas, and to threaten maritime routes and international trade. The important aspect here is that there is no doubt that the Iranian regime, the Iranian [Islamic] Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are dictating [orders for those attempts]”. “The [Huthi] militias do not have the power to make the decision to reach a political solution… The Iranian regime is the one benefitting from the continuation of those operations or the Yemen crisis”, he contended.
08/07/2020	U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo provided details of a 28 June weapons seizure previously  to by Saudi officials,  that “U.S. and partner forces interdicted a vessel off the coast of Yemen with illicit cargo including 200 RPGs, more than 1,700 AK rifles, 21 surface-to-air and land-attack missiles, several anti-tank missiles and other advanced weapons and missiles”. Pompeo contended that “Iran is not abiding by the UN arms embargo restrictions” and urged the UN Security Council to “extend the arms embargo on Iran [beyond October] to prevent further conflict in the region”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  by saying that “Americans who feel they have not succeeded in continuing Iran’s arms embargo on the international arena and the UN Security Council, are trying to use accusations and lies as an excuse to continue to exert maximum pressure and advance their vicious goals”.
03/07/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed… four bomb-laden UAVs launched by the terrorist, Iran-backed Huthi militia toward the Kingdom”. A Huthi military spokesperson  that the attack struck “Saudi military sites in Asir and Najran provinces”, and  that “we will continue targeting the Saudi depth and its military and sovereign institutions, and we will make sure that our targets are far from harming the Saudi people”.
01/07/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “started a military operation against Yemen’s Huthi movement after it stepped up cross-border missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia”.
30/06/2020	Briefing the Security Council on the UN Secretary-General’s ninth biannual  on the implementation of resolution 2231, a senior UN official  the Secretariat’s conclusion that “the examined cruise missiles and delta-wing UAVs and/or parts thereof used in the [2019] attacks on Saudi Arabia were of Iranian origin”. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan  the report’s findings “reinforce our support for a continued ban on arming the Iranian regime, and confronting its developing nuclear and ballistic programs”. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that the U.S. had “coerced the Secretariat to rely on self-serving allegations and forged documents to produce an utterly unprofessional report outside the scope of its mandate”.
29/06/2020	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, met with senior   in Riyadh. According to a U.S. , the two sides “highlighted the importance of extending the United Nations arms embargo on Iran” and “discussed joint diplomatic efforts at the UN and around the world to extend the embargo” beyond October 2020. At a joint press conference with Hook, a senior Saudi official  that “despite the embargo, Iran seeks to provide weapons to terrorist groups, so what will happen if the embargo is lifted? Iran will be become more ferocious and aggressive”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson : “it is time that… countries [like Saudi Arabia] give up injudicious remarks and blind obedience to the U.S… The only way to establish stability and security in the region is to change hostile behaviour and turn to regional cooperation”, he added.
29/06/2020	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, during  in Riyadh “reaffirmed the U.S.’s support of a negotiated end to the conflict” in Yemen and “condemned recent Huthi attacks on Saudi Arabia”. During the visit, Saudi Arabia  “weapons, including drones and missiles, that Saudi authorities said were used in cross-border Houthi attacks on Saudi cities and that were supplied to the group by Tehran”.
25/06/2020	The Arab Parliament issued a  holding “the Iranian regime fully responsible for its flagrant violation of the UN Security Council resolutions and its continued provision of Huthi coup militia with smart weapons, ballistic missiles and drones with the aim of destabilising security in the region and perpetuating chaos in the Republic of Yemen”.
22/06/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had intercepted “eight bomb-laden UAVs… and three ballistic missiles” launched by the Huthis. The following day, the coalition  the interception of another Huthi missile targeting Riyadh. A Huthi military spokesperson  that “we have implemented… the largest offensive  named ‘the 4th Balanced Deterrence Operation’ on the capital of the Saudi enemy” as a result of “the ongoing unjust blockade and the brutal aggression against our great Yemeni people”.
16/06/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed… a ballistic missile launched by the terrorist, Iran-backed Huthi militia from Saada, Yemen, toward Najran in a deliberate attempt to target civilians and civilian objects”.
16/06/2020	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “Iran would love to see a version of Hizbollah on Saudi’s southern flank. That is their ambition. And this would, I think, help build out Iran’s goals to create the Shiite crescent that stretches from Beirut down to Yemen. And so we’re doing what we can to interdict weapons”. Contending that “the Iranian regime has not been held to account by the international community for what it has done to create one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes”, Hook argued that “the Huthis are a tribal militia that have been organised, trained and equipped for many years by Iran. And they did this while they were in the Iran deal”. Discussing negotiations, Hook claimed that “every time we bring these groups together, Iran is always hanging outside the conference room urging the Huthis to keep at it. And that has been one of the biggest, if not the biggest, obstacle to winding down the war in Yemen, is Iran wants to keep attacking Saudi Arabia through a proxy. It’s no different from what they do in Lebanon with Hizbollah or with Palestine Islamic Jihad, or with Hamas, or with its PMF in Iraq, on and on. This is Iran’s playbook”.
15/06/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed… a bomb-laden UAV launched by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia to deliberately target civilians and civilian objects in Khamis Mushait”. Later in the day, the coalition  interception of “multiple bomb-laden UAVs” intended for “civilians and civilian objects in Aseer province”. A Huthi military spokesperson  that the strikes “hit their targets” and were “in response to the massive air escalation” by the coalition.
13/06/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile launched by the terrorist, Iran-backed Huthi militia from Saada governorate, deliberately targeting innocent civilians and civilian objects in Najran”. According to the statement, “minor injuries were sustained by civilians as a result of debris of the intercepted ballistic missile”.
10/06/2020	CENTCOM commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “Iran has no interest in this [Yemen] war being over. In fact, there’s nothing better for them than for Saudi to continue to bleed out, for the Huthis to continue to launch attacks into Saudi Arabia and for this to continue to go on as something they can use to further embarrass the kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the international stage”. McKenzie further assessed that “if we could reduce the Iranian patronage… for the Huthis we might be able to get to an ultimate solution there. And that would allow other things to happen”.
01/06/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed… two UAVs launched by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia toward civilian objects in Khamis Mushait”.
27/05/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “intercepted and destroyed… UAVs launched by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia toward civilian objects in Najran”.
24/05/2020	The leader of Yemen’s Ansar Allah  that “the Yemeni People are facing an unjust aggression under American supervision and Israeli cooperation, and it is our faith, religious, innate and national duty to confront this aggression with full force and at all levels”.
21/05/2020	Referring to a 19 May U.S. Navy , according to which “armed vessels approaching within 100m of a U.S. naval vessel may be interpreted as a threat”, the Pentagon  that “we have stated very clearly to individuals in the area to be careful and avoid our shops in the area… we’ve seen Iran violate that in an alarming and unprofessional way ”. A spokesperson explained that “a determination was made that it would be helpful to provide a reminder, additional guidance to mariners in the area, to avoid U.S. warships and to set out a bright-line rule that would be a little bit clearer for them if there was any claims of possible confusion that they should not attempt to harass or approach or confront a U.S. warship sailing in international waters”.
19/05/2020	The U.S. Navy , with specific reference to the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, that “due to recent events, in order to enhance safety, minimise ambiguity and reduce opportunities for miscalculations, all vessels are advised to maintain a safe distance of at least 100m from U.S. naval vessels in international waters and straits. Armed vessels approaching within 100m of a U.S. naval vessel may be interpreted as a threat and subject to lawful defensive measures”. An Iranian military official subsequently  that “the naval units of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman will continue their regular missions in accordance with professional principles as in the past”.
13/05/2020	The U.S.  the UN “Security Council to meet under its 2231 Format to discuss Iran’s April 22 satellite ”, which it called “yet another example of Iran’s relentless defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231”. According to the U.S. mission, its representatives “highlighted Iran’s ongoing violation of the UN arms embargo in Resolution 2231, reminding Council members that Iran continues to funnel weapons to proxy forces and terrorist groups in places like Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Bahrain”. The U.S. also argued that “Iran’s continued violations of the Security Council’s arms embargo demands greater pressure from the Security Council, not less, and the U.S. will work tirelessly with a coalition of concerned nations to ensure the embargo is extended”.
01/05/2020	The U.S.  an Iranian-Iraqi dual citizen, Amir Dianat, whom it said was “involved in IRGC-QF [ie, Quds force] efforts to generate revenue and smuggle weapons abroad”. According to the Treasury Department, which also sanctioned a company controlled by Dianat, the Quds force “relied on Dianat to security entry for vessels IRGC-QF shipments”. The U.S. also asserted that “Dianat has been directly involved in IRGC-QF efforts to smuggle shipments from Yemen to Iran”.
30/04/2020	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, referring to the 15 April  between Iranian and U.S. vessels,  that “the Iranian swift boats that the IRGC operates exceeded the rules of maritime safety in international waters. The Iranian regime would like to desensitise us so that after doing it a number of times, they could then get within sufficient range to actually kill American soldiers. We’re not gonna let that happen. We’re going to enforce the rules of the road in international waters… As a matter of self defence, and protecting the lives of Americans, President Trump said that if they do it again the boats will be destroyed”. In related comments, Secretary of State Pompeo  that U.S. forces “have all the authority they need to do what’s right to defend themselves, no matter who it is that presents that risk to them”.
27/04/2020	After the Yemeni Southern Transitional Council (STC)  self-rule in southern Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition  “for an immediate end to any steps contrary to the , and work rapidly toward its implementation”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson also  that “Iran supports the united Yemen whose territorial integrity is protected… Such actions [of self-rule] will not only fail to help solve the current problems in Yemen, but will complicate the situation in the country”. The U.S. State Department said it was “concerned” by the STC announcement,  that “such unilateral actions only exacerbate instability in Yemen”.
26/04/2020	Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  with the UN Secretary-General, who, according to an Iranian readout, “welcomed the Islamic Republic of Iran’s efforts to ensure a ceasefire in Yemen and launch political talks over the Yemeni crisis”. Both officials “also emphasised the need for the reopening and security of the border and ports in Yemen to deliver humanitarian aid to the Yemeni people, particularly at the time of outbreak of coronavirus”.
24/04/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  “a one-month extension of the ceasefire” initiated on 8 April. The statement indicated that “the chance is still there for concerted efforts to reach a comprehensive and permanent ceasefire in Yemen, and consensus on serious, direct and tangible steps to alleviate the suffering of the Yemeni brotherly people”. The Coalition also stated that “it will strongly support such fundamental steps with the UN in order to reach a just and comprehensive political solution agreed upon by all the Yemenis”. A Huthi military spokesperson subsequently  multiple strikes by the coalition.
11/04/2020	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  with the UN Secretary-General discussing, inter alia, “latest developments in Yemen”. The two spoke again the following day. According to an Iranian , “the UN chief gave a report on the international body’s efforts to maintain the ceasefire in Yemen”, and “Zarif expressed support for the Secretary-General’s efforts… stating that the Yemeni crisis has no military solution. He also called the establishment of a lasting ceasefire a prelude for the launch of political process to resolve the crisis”.
08/04/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  a “comprehensive ceasefire in Yemen for a period of two weeks”, effective 9 April and with a possibility of extension. A spokesperson declared that “the Coalition will seize this opportunity to unite all efforts to reach a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in Yemen, and agree on serious, concrete and direct steps to alleviate the suffering of the brotherly Yemeni people and maintain their health and safety” amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. A Huthi military spokesperson on 9 April  that coalition strikes were ongoing. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  the announcement and “[d] the Huthis to respond in kind and cooperate with the UN special envoy, who has called for urgent talks between the parties”
01/04/2020	Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  with his Saudi counterpart and “underscored that the U.S. strongly condemns the Huthis’ attempted  on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia on 28 March”. According to a U.S. readout of the conversation, “Secretary Pompeo expressed support for the de-escalation efforts led by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths, and the Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that an unstable Yemen only benefits the Iranian regime and that the regime’s destabilising behaviour there must be countered. The Secretary underscored that the U.S. would continue to support Saudi Arabia in the face of Iran’s threatening behaviour”.
31/03/2020	Discussing an 28 March Huthi missile  against Saudi Arabia, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  that “the damage that was done by those was very minor, but nonetheless there’d been a lot of work to reduce conflict, to take down the levels of violence that were there, and we’d had some success. The Saudis had been leading that effort, and it broke down that day”. Pompeo added that “the Saudis have now , and I’m hopeful they can get back on the right path. We are hopeful that we can find a path forward with the UN Security Council resolution in Yemen to find a path to peace there… Sadly, it appears that the Iranians don’t share our vision for peace in Yemen and in Saudi Arabia”.
30/03/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that in response to a 28 March Huthi missile , the coalition had “conducted a military operation to neutralise and destroy ‘legitimate military targets’ of the terrorist Huthi militia in accordance with customary International Humanitarian Law to confront ongoing and imminent threats”. The statement added that “the targets that were destroyed include advanced capabilities of the terrorist militia, storage, assembly and installation sites of ballistic missiles and UAVs, locations of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) experts and weapons depots”. The coalition further posited that “the Iranian regime is concentrating all financial, man and logistic powers to support the terrorist militia to realise its ideals and expansionist ambitions on the account of the Iranian people who are suffering in this hectic time”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  by calling on “the coalition of aggressors against Yemen to take into account the realities on the ground… instead of delusions and reveries, and to recognise that playing with words, pinning blame on others and making accusations against the others will not make up for their political and military failures”.
28/03/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “the Royal Saudi Air Defense intercepted and destroyed two ballistic missiles launched by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia… toward Riyadh and Jizan”. Debris fell in both cities though there were no initial reports of casualties. The coalition asserted that “the launch of ballistic missiles by the terrorist Huthi militia and the IRGC at this time reflects the real threat of this terrorist militia and the Iranian regime sponsoring it…It is a continuation of Iran’s strategy of falsification and procrastination to deepen the suffering of brotherly people of Yemen, and further proof that the Huthi militia is stripped of its will and decision-making ability to end this crisis”.
26/03/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had been “able to intercept and destroy UAVs launched by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia toward civilian objects in Abha and Khamis Mushait”.
26/03/2020	Lithuania  to the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), joining seven other countries in the U.S.-led initiative.
24/03/2020	On the anniversary of the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, Iran’s Foreign Ministry issued a  to condemn the coalition’s “continuous military aggression”. It also claimed that the U.S. had “unveiled its strategy in Yemen with a remarkable increase in its military presence in various parts of Yemen, and seeks to stabilise itself militarily in that country… however, the U.S. will ultimately suffer another defeat in Yemen and will leave that country in humiliation”. Maintaining that “the crisis in Yemen has no military solution”, the statement added that “Iran supports Yemen’s territorial unity, and emphasises that political solutions such as the Stockholm Agreement and its generalization to all other issues and regions in Yemen could keep the hopes alive for the achievement of peace and calm across that country”.
17/03/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “detected an attempt by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia to conduct an imminent hostile, terrorist act in Southern Red Sea using two R/C exploding boats launched from Hodeida governorate”.
07/03/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had “destroyed… six remote-controlled exploding boats and naval mines assembly, rigging and launch sites” in western Yemen, adding that “these locations are used [by the Huthis] to prepare execution of hostile action and terrorist operations that threaten sea lines of communication and international trade in the southern Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab strait”.
04/03/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “an imminent terrorist attack that was aiming to target an oil tanker in the Arabian Sea… was thwarted”. The coalition’s spokesperson indicated that “the attempt was carried out using four boats and [was] attempting to bomb the oil tanker using one of the unmanned, remote-controlled exploding boats”, and further asserted that “the naval threat… has evolved into a strategic threat to international security”.
25/02/2020	A senior State Department official  that “Iran’s support to Huthis, especially in areas like sending advanced weapons, is continuing without any diminution. They might even be stepping it up”. The official further remarked that “there is the potential there to encourage elements of the Huthi movement to recognise that being linked to Iran is not in their interest”.
25/02/2020	The UN Security Council  resolution 2511 in a 13-0 vote, with Russia and China abstaining, authorising a one-year extension today of the asset freeze and travel ban imposed in 2014 on individuals or entities threatening peace, security and stability in Yemen… The Council also reaffirmed the provisions of an arms embargo imposed in April 2015 on militias of Ansar Allah – also known as the Huthis – and forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh”.
23/02/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that it had foiled “an attempt of an imminent hostile, terrorist attack in Southern Red [Sea] using a remote-controlled exploding boat… by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia”. The coalition also  that it had carried out “a military operation to destroy legitimate military targets of Iran-made ballistic missile and UAV assembly, storage and launch capabilities in the capital [ie, Sanaa]”.
20/02/2020	Speaking alongside Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. ambassador to country  that “the kingdom has done a tremendous amount to suppress Sunni Islamic extremism within their own borders, and they have been a great cooperation partner with us… Now what the next job is, at some point in history – hopefully soon – Shiite Islamic extremism led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Quds Force gets rolled back”. Discussing the aftermath of the September 2019 attack against Saudi oil facilities, he noted that the Saudis “naturally turned to us for support, and our support has been defensive. They’ve never asked for offensive support… the defensive posture is much improved not only for the U.S. but for Saudi Arabia. And so our ability to withstand something that might come from that direction is much improved, but it’s not perfect”. He further maintained that “the missiles that are being used and fired from Yemen by the Huthis are all coming from the Iranians… it’s really important for us to understand who is the aggressor in the region, and it’s no doubt it’s the Iranians”.
20/02/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “the Royal Saudi Air Defence intercepted ballistic missiles launched by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthi militia towards Saudi cities”. The following day, a Huthi military spokesperson  that they had “targeted Aramco and other sensitive targets in Yanbu”, Saudi Arabia.
20/02/2020	During a visit to Saudi Arabia, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with King Salman and “ bilateral issues, including countering the malign influence of the Iranian regime, as well as the need for cooperation on regional conflicts such as Syria and Yemen”. According to a U.S. readout of the conversation, both leaders “agreed that a comprehensive political agreement is the only way to achieve peace, prosperity and security in Yemen”. Pompeo also  with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and pledged that “the U.S. stands with Saudi Arabia in the face of… threats [from Iran], as reflected in our greater military presence in Saudi Arabia”.
19/02/2020	Referring to weapon shipments seized by the U.S. forces in the Arabian Sea on  and , a spokesperson for the U.S. Central Command  that “the U.S. assesses with high confidence that the weapons… were manufactured in Iran and were being illicitly smuggled to the Huthis in Yemen”. A senior U.S. defence official  that “the Pentagon continues to be committed to disrupting the transport of illicit weapons in the region and preventing Iran from spreading its malign influence”. The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “Iran’s ongoing transfer of weapons to the Huthis violates multiple UN Security Council resolutions”. He added that “The international community should apply more pressure on Iran until it stops providing arms, training and funding to proxy groups in the gray zone. This includes by acting to extend the UN arms embargo on Iran, which, under the Iran deal, expires in October”.
16/02/2020	Discussing Iran’s Hormuz Peace Endeavour (HOPE) , President Rouhani  that “some regional countries welcomed it well and some others have not yet given an explicit response, but we still believe that it is the regional states that must help establish peace. We stress that all countries must enjoy security and stability in the region”. On Yemen, Rouhani underlined that “the Yemeni issues must be resolved by the Yemenis themselves and the countries that are carrying out acts of aggression toward the country must stop it”. He also asserted that Iran “oppose[s] war”, while adding that “Americans are not looking for war either”.
15/02/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that the previous day a “Royal Saudi Air Force Tornado fighter jet crashed while conducting close air support to units of the National Army of Yemen”. The coalition subsequently  that it “holds the terrorist Huthi militia responsible for the lives and wellbeing of the [Tornado] air crew”. The following day the Huthis  the coalition of conducting airstrikes in al-Jawf governorate in which “nearly 30 people were killed”
15/02/2020	Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan  that “we have a back channel [between Riyadh and the Huthis] and it’s not yet ready to move to the highest level”. “It’s making progress”, he added, maintaining that “we have seen some deterioration recently, but we are committed to moving it forward”.
13/02/2020	The U.S.  that the UN Security Council’s  supported “the conclusion of the U.S., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom that Iran bears responsibility” for the 14 September attack on Saudi oil facilities, arguing that since then “Iran has continued its program of terrorism, nuclear extortion and destabilising behaviour”. “The Security Council,” the statement added, “now has less than 36 weeks until the October expiration of the UN arms embargo to renew sanctions forbidding the sale of certain weapons systems to Iran”. According to the UN report, “despite claims to the contrary, the Huthi forces are unlikely to be responsible for the [September 2019] attack, as the estimated range of the weapon systems used does not allow for a launch from Huthi-controlled territory. Nevertheless, a number of other attacks on Saudi Arabia can clearly be attributed to the Houthi forces”. The Panel also reported “the continued reception by Huthi forces of military support” and indicated that “some of those weapons have technical characteristics similar to arms manufactured in the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
13/02/2020	U.S. Central Command  that on 9 February, U.S. forces in the Arabian Sea “boarded a dhow in accordance with international law and discovered a large cache of weapons”, including “150 ‘Dehlavieh’ anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM)” and other materiel “of Iranian design and manufacture”.
12/02/2020	Secretary of State Mike Pompeo  with his Saudi counterpart in Washington and “discussed bilateral and regional issues of mutual concern, including the continued need to counter the Iranian regime’s destabilising behaviour”. According to a U.S. readout of the conversation, Pompeo highlighted “the importance of the U.S.-Saudi partnership in confronting the Iranian regime’s threats”, and both officials “expressed their concern over the recent violence in Yemen, including Huthi cross-border attacks on Saudi Arabia, and they agreed on the need to swiftly return to de-escalation”. Pompeo also voiced “U.S. support for a political solution to the conflict facilitated by UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths”.
06/02/2020	The White House  that “the U.S. conducted a counterterrorism operation in Yemen that successfully eliminated Qasim al-Rimi, a founder and the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and a deputy to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri”.
02/02/2020	As a Japanese destroyer  for patrols in the Gulf of Oman and Bab al-Mandab, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe  that Japanese forces would “not come under [U.S.] command in military operations”, while sharing information on a daily basis. Iran’s embassy  Tehran’s view that the “presence of foreign forces in the region will not contribute to security and stability”.
31/01/2020	Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson responded to reports of a UN panel  that the Huthis had obtained materiel “similar to Iran’s” by  that “all that glitters is not gold and any similar weapon is not necessarily as an Iranian weapon”.
29/01/2020	A Huthi military spokesperson  that “in response to the air escalation of the aggression, the missile force and drone air force carried out specific operations targeting Aramco in Jizan, Abha, Khamis Mushait base and sensitive targets in the Saudi rear”.
28/01/2020	In a , the U.S. said it was “alarmed by renewed violence in Yemen”. It went on to urge “all parties to put the needs of the Yemeni people first and immediately return to restraint”, while asserting that “the Huthis must cease attacks on Saudi territory”.
18/01/2020	A missile  against a Yemeni armed forces camp in Marib killed over a hundred and left dozens more injured
13/01/2020	The U.S. Maritime Administration  a new advisory valid through November 2020 regarding commercial shipping in areas including the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz which noted that “multiple maritime threats have been reported in the geographic areas described above. Heightened military activity and increased political tensions in this region continue to pose serious threats to commercial vessels. Associated with these threats is a potential for miscalculation or misidentification that could lead to aggressive actions”. The advisory went on to caution that “Vessels operating in the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, and Gulf of Oman may also encounter GPS interference, bridge-to-bridge communications spoofing, and/or other communications jamming with little to no warning. Vessels have also reported bridge-to-bridge communications from unknown entities falsely claiming to be U.S. or coalition warships”.
08/01/2020	Media reports  a confidential UN report assessing that “Huthi forces did not launch the attacks on Abqaiq and Khurais on 14 September 2019” because the missiles used in the attack did not “have a sufficient range to have been launched from Yemeni territory under the control of the Huthis”. “Abqaiq and Khurais were approached respectively from a north/northwestern and north/northeastern direction, rather than from the south, as one would expect in the case of a launch from Yemeni territory”, the report added.
06/01/2020	A U.S. maritime , active through 13 January, warned of “the possibility of Iranian action against U.S. maritime interests in the region”, specifying that “U.S. commercial vessels are advised to exercise caution and coordinate vessel voyage planning for transits of the Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea with NCAGS (U.S. Fifth Fleet Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping)”.
02/01/2020	The Saudi-led coalition  that “six Saudi war prisoners arrived at King Salman Airbase”.
02/01/2020	The head of the IRGC’s Qods force, Qasem Soleimani, was killed in a U.S. strike in Baghdad. The U.S. Department of Defense  that “at the direction of the President, the U.S. military has taken decisive defensive action to protect U.S. personnel abroad by killing Qasem Soleimani”, adding that “Soleimani was actively developing plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq and throughout the region”. Iran  Soleimani’s death, and the IRGC  that four other Qods force members along with five Iraqis, notably including a senior Hashd official, were also killed in the operation. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei subsequently  that “enemies should bear in mind that the Islamic Republic of Iran will take tough revenge on criminals over the martyrdom of General Soleimani”.
29/12/2019	A Huthi military spokesperson reportedly  that the “the armed forces of Yemen are fully prepared to strike nine strategic targets deep inside the territory of the aggressors, of which six are located in Saudi Arabia and the rest are in the United Arab Emirates”.
27/12/2019	A Huthi military spokesperson  that a “Badr-1P ballistic missile struck… a military camp for the Saudi army and its mercenaries in Najran”.
27/12/2019	Japan’s cabinet  to deploy a destroyer and two patrol planes off the Yemeni and Omani coasts. A senior Japanese official  that “peace and stability in the Middle East is extremely important for the peace and prosperity of the international community including Japan… Also, it is very important to make sure Japan-related ships can sail safely in the Middle East, the world’s major source of energy”.
23/12/2019	The Huthi envoy to Tehran  with Iran’s defence minister, Amir Hatami. Hatami remarked that “Yemen has reached a level of military capability that can penetrate deep into the enemy’s front, target enemy strongholds from a distance of more than 1000km, create deterrence and disrupt military-political security equations in the region”. He also asserted that “Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue in a peaceful atmosphere with the participation of all parties, groups and political-social currents is the only practical solution to the complicated problems in this country”. The following day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif  with a Huthi spokesperson during a visit to Oman.
23/12/2019	The Huthi envoy to Tehran  with Iran’s defence minister, Amir Hatami. Hatami remarked that “Yemen has reached a level of military capability that can penetrate deep into the enemy’s front, target enemy strongholds from a distance of more than 1000km, create deterrence and disrupt military-political security equations in the region”. He also asserted that “Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue in a peaceful atmosphere with the participation of all parties, groups and political-social currents is the only practical solution to the complicated problems in this country”. The following day, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif  with a Huthi spokesperson during a visit to Oman.
19/12/2019	The UN Security Council  to discuss the implementation of resolution 2231 following the Secretary-General’s eight biannual , with remarks from the  and  envoys.
11/12/2019	The State Department  that “the U.S. is taking action against three Iranian entitles linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and  eight other entities that helped smuggle weapons from Iran to Yemen”. The statement noted that “to allow exporters of humanitarian goods to Iran sufficient time to find alternate shopping methods, the designations for IRISL [Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines] and E-Sail Shipping Company Ltd will have a brief wind-down period” of 180 .
10/12/2019	Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister was cited as  that “the Iranian threat is a threat to everyone… There is an understanding by the GCC countries on the importance of dealing with the threat and confronting it in the necessary ways”. He also called on Iran to “change its behaviour in attacking ships in the Gulf, supplying militias with weapons, financing terrorism and destabilising countries”.
10/12/2019	Addressing a GCC , Saudi Arabia’s King Salman  that “our region today is undergoing circumstances and challenges that call for concerted efforts to confront them, as the Iranian regime continues its hostile actions to undermine security and stability and support terrorism… [This] requires us to preserve the gains of our countries and the interests of our peoples, work with the international community to stop the interference of this regime, deal seriously with its nuclear program and the program to develop ballistic missiles and secure energy sources, safety of waterways and freedom of maritime navigation”.
10/12/2019	Referring to the 14 September attacks on Saudi oil facilities, the UN Secretary-General  to the Security Council that “at this time, it [ie, the UN] is unable to independently corroborate that the cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles used in these attacks are of Iranian origin”, while also noting that Huthi forces “have not shown to be in possession, nor been assessed to be in possession”, of the materiel employed during the operation.
08/12/2019	A senior Huthi official  that “the [Huthi] Yemeni Armed Forces has completed all aspects of construction that qualify it for a comprehensive strategic attack that cripples the enemy’s capabilities… [It] has a bank of naval and ground military targets for the Zionist enemy [ie, Israel], and we will not hesitate to hit it whenever the leadership decides”.
06/12/2019	Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “Iran does not see any point in the continuation of the war and siege in Yemen, welcomes peaceful solutions and encourages all parties to move forward in this regard and supports initiatives that call for dialogue to restore prosperity to Yemen”.
06/12/2019	A senior Saudi official  that “Iran is a threat to the entire region and its aggression can no longer be tolerated”. He also underlined that “nobody is talking about a regime change in Iran. The solution is to have a negotiating table and agree on a better JCPOA, stop of interference into other countries and behaviours towards terrorism”. On Yemen, the senior official stated that “Yemen is of particular importance to us, and Iran’s intervention there is devastating. The only solution in Yemen is political, and the Huthis are the ones who started the war, not us… All Yemenis, including the Huthis, have a role in the future of Yemen”.
05/12/2019	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “on November 25th, a U.S. warship conducted a flag verification boarding in international waters off the coast of Yemen.  We interdicted a significant hoard of weapons and missile parts, evidently of Iranian origin”. “The vessel reportedly was heading to Yemen to deliver these weapons”, he added, contending that “the weapon components comprise the most sophisticated weapons seized by the U.S. Navy to date during the Yemen conflict”. Hook went on to argue that “this discovery is yet more proof of Iran’s efforts to inflame conflicts in the region by proliferating deadly weapons to its proxies. It is also further evidence of how Iran repeatedly violates the UN arms embargo”. Hook additionally stressed that “the Huthis’ de-escalation , which the Saudis are responding to, shows that Iran clearly does not speak for the Huthis, nor have the best interests of the Yemeni people at heart. Iran is trying to prolong Yemen’s civil war to project power. Iran should follow the calls of its own people and end its involvement in Yemen”. He also announced a reward for information relating to “a Yemen-based high-ranking commander of the IRGC’s Qods force”.
04/12/2019	Speaking alongside U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “we have been fortunate that President Trump has led a consistent policy of pressure against Iran. Iran is increasing its aggression as we speak even today in the region. They’re trying to have staging grounds against us and the region from Iran itself, from Iraq, from Syria, from Lebanon, Gaza and Yemen, and we are actively engaged in countering that aggression”. Netanyahu further maintained that “Iran’s aggression is growing, but its empire is tottering. And I say let’s make it totter even further”. Secretary Pompeo, citing unrest in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran, stated that “some of these are people that are seeking freedom and a reasonable way to live, and they recognise the threat that is posed by the kleptocrats that are running the Islamic Republic of Iran”.
03/12/2019	Meeting with the Omani foreign minister in Tehran, President Rouhani  that “unfortunately, Europe and the U.S., despite what they say, are not interested in [the] establishment of peace in Yemen because they have been able to sell a great number of weapons”. He further asserted that “we should all attempt to put an end to the war in Yemen as soon as possible and establish stability and security in the country within the framework of Yemeni-Yemeni peace talks”.
02/12/2019	Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary, Ali Shamkhani,  that “continuation of this genocide [in Yemen] is only in favor of the enemies of the region, including the U.S. and the Israeli regime, and Saudi Arabia should surrender to the demand of the Yemeni nation and not to put the regional peace at further risk”.
28/11/2019	128 Huthi prisoners freed by the Saudi-led coalition  in Yemen, prompting a senior Huthi official to call it “a first practical step by the Saudis that builds trust”.
26/11/2019	The Saudi-led coalition’s spokesperson  that the coalition had “decided… to release 200 prisoners of the Huthi militia”. A senior Huthi official subsequently reacted by  that “we welcome the news of the release of 200 captives by the American-Saudi-UAE coalition and its allies and we call for a halt to torture and employing coercive measures against the captives”.
24/11/2019	Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “Iran’s aggression in our region, and against us, continues. We are taking all necessary actions to prevent Iran from entrenching here in our region. This includes the activity necessary to thwart the transfer of lethal weaponry from Iran to Syria, whether by air or overland”. “We will also take action to thwart Iran’s effort to turn Iraq and Yemen into bases for launching rockets and missiles against the State of Israel”, he added. Citing remarks by a senior U.S. defence official who had  that “it is very possible they [the Iranians] will attack again”, Netanyahu stated that “I can confirm that and I can also confirm to you that we are continuing our plans to thwart this aggression by various means”.
23/11/2019	Discussing the 14 September attacks on Saudi oil facilities, a senior Saudi official  that “the results of the investigation will be revealed. What is absolutely clear is that these missiles and drones are Iranian-made, and the attack occurred from the north, not from the south. We hold Iran responsible for this. We expect the international community to take steps in order to extract the price from Iran”. He additionally posited that “the idea that perhaps engagement will cause the Iranians to change their behaviour has not worked in 40 years… The key to regional stability is deterrence”. “If Iran chooses to continue along its destructive path, sanctions should be increased, not reduced”, the official added. He also identified three principles by which Iran could, in his words, “become an accepted member of the international community”, namely: “abandon the principle of exporting the revolution, accept the sovereignty of nations and respect international law and the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries”.
23/11/2019	Discussing the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), CENTCOM Commander Kenneth McKenzie  that “Iran has been hindering freedom of navigation in and around the Strait of Hormuz over the past few months… Had Iran not undertaken those actions, had there been no threat to freedom of navigation, there might not have been a need for the IMSC”. “Since it has been operational”, McKenzie observed, “none of these actions have occurred”. He also remarked that “unfortunately, sometimes, the Iranian regime has proved itself to be the bully in the neighbourhood. The only way to stand up to a bully is to do it together”. McKenzie also opined that while Iran “may control the next step on the escalation ladder… I do not believe that even Iran conceives that they own the last step on the escalation ladder. And that is point that we should hold”.
20/11/2019	King Salman  hope that the  would “open the door before broader understandings to reach a political solution to the crisis according to the three references and give room to the dear Yemeni people to foresee a future of security, stability and development”.
20/11/2019	A Huthi military spokesperson was  as  that “Yemeni army troops and allied fighters… are fully prepared to deliver a befitting response to the Tel Aviv regime [ie, Israel] in case the Israeli military launches an act of aggression”.
20/11/2019	Iran’s naval chief  that “due to the current special security conditions in the Red Sea region, and insecurities caused by terrorist activities that threaten our shipping lines, the Iranian Navy has been giving serious attention to this region as an insecure body of water”. He also tallied that “we have so far dispatched 64 fleets to international waters to defend the country’s interests”.
19/11/2019	Receiving the credentials of Yemeni Ansar Allah’s ambassador to Iran, President Rouhani  that “today, aggressors and the Yemeni nation’s enemies have reached the conclusion that they cannot advance their goals by pressure and war, and this means that the Yemeni nation’s resistance has borne fruit”. “Iran”, he added, “believes in the righteousness of the people of Yemen and their revolution, and considers helping them in both fighting aggressors and negotiations as its religious duty”.
18/11/2019	The Huthis , and subsequently , three vessels. Two of the ships were
09/11/2019	The Huthi leader, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi  that “our people will not hesitate to declare jihad against the Israeli enemy, and to launch the most severe strikes against sensitive targets in the occupied territories if the enemy engages in any folly against our people”. He further maintained that “we reaffirm our anti-Israel position and that the regime is occupying one. This is a principled humanitarian, moral and religious commitment”.
07/11/2019	The U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct  the Coalition Task Force (CTF) Sentinel headquarters in Bahrain. A senior U.S. naval official characterised the operation as “an important multinational maritime effort to increase surveillance of and security in key waterways in the Middle East to ensure freedom of navigation in light of recent events in the Arabian Gulf”. Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson subsequently  that “history shows that the American coalitions have been nothing but misnomers, which have not only not created security so far, but have resulted in further insecurity and instability in different parts of the world… the U.S. move to hide its objectives and dreams behind the names of a few other countries signifies the weakness and lack of international legitimacy”. “As the country with the longest coastline by the Persian Gulf”, he added, “the Islamic Republic of Iran will vigorously keep protecting its economic and security interests, including the navigation security and safety in the body of water”.
06/11/2019	Israeli President Reuven Rivlin  that “Iran continues to spread terror throughout the region. It continues to build military bases and plan attacks from Syria, and other parts of the region, Lebanon and even Yemen”. “Our enemies”, he added, “must know the state of Israel will do everything needed to defend its citizens”.
05/11/2019	Yemen’s internationally recognised government and the secessionist Southern Transitional Council  the . The U.S.  the accord, stating that “we are hopeful that with this agreement, the parties will work together to end the conflict and to achieve the peace and stability that Yemen’s people deserve”
01/11/2019	The U.S. State Department in its  found that “throughout 2018, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), ISIS-Yemen, Hizbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) and other Iran-backed terrorist groups continued to exploit the political and security vacuum created by the ongoing conflict”.
01/11/2019	A Huthi military spokesperson  that the Huthis had shot down a U.S. drone in Asir province.
01/11/2019	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “[Iran] would like to turn the Huthis into their proxy right on Saudi’s southern border so that they’re able to attack at will through the Houthis, Saudi Arabia, Israel, UAE”. Referring to the 14 September attacks against Saudi energy facilities, Hook stated that “it was a mistake for the Huthis [to claim credit]. I think they recognised it. They were embarrassed by it. They were surprised by it. So we’ll use this opening to press our advantage. And that’s why I think we’re seeing some positive developments in Yemen”.
31/10/2019	Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “the area around us is stormy and restive. Threats lurk in every corner – in Syria, in Lebanon, in the Gaza Strip, as well as in Iraq, Yemen and directly in Iran. Where not? Iranian and pro-Iranian forces are relentlessly arming themselves”. He went on to assert that “we are prepared for the threats and will not hesitate to strike harshly at anyone who tries to attack us. Iran’s threshold of daring in the region is rising and it grows even more in the absence of a response. However, Israel will not turn the other cheek. Whoever is bent on aggression – will meet with a vigorous response, and will pay a heavy price”.
28/10/2019	Speaking alongside U.S. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “Iran is seeking to develop now precision-guided munitions, missiles that can hit any target in the Middle East with a circumference of five to ten metres. They are developing this in Iran. They want to place them in Iraq and in Syria, and to convert Lebanon’s arsenal of 130,000 statistical rockets to precision-guided munitions. They seek also to develop that, and have already begun to put that in Yemen, with the goal of reaching Israel from there, too”. He further asserted that “Iran is the single greatest threat to stability and peace in the Middle East”, and urged Mnuchin “to put even more” sanctions on Iran.
28/10/2019	Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “Iran wants to develop nuclear weapons. It’s transgressing on its agreement and commitment. Iran wants to develop precision guided missiles that can hit any target in Israel within five to ten meters. It’s doing that. Iran wants to use Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen as bases to attack Israel with statistical missiles and precision-guided missiles.” He went on to assert that “to ward off this danger… you have to be strong militarily. And to be strong militarily, we have to shift now money from the civilian areas to the military areas”.
26/10/2019	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  with a senior Huthi official in Tehran, and reportedly expressed “Iran’s support for establishing a truce in Yemen and holding intra-Yemeni dialogue”.
17/10/2019	A senior U.S. diplomat  the President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and other officials in the international recognised government of Yemen in Riyadh. The U.S. official “reaffirmed U.S. support for the unity of Yemen” and “stressed that a political solution is the only path to a peaceful, prosperous, stable and unified Yemen”.
16/10/2019	Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani that “any measure which exacerbates insecurity and increases crisis in the region should be halted immediately… the regional crises, including the Syria and Yemen crises, have no military solution and they should be settled through diplomacy and Syrian-Syrian and Yemeni-Yemeni talks”.
13/10/2019	Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei,  that “Iran has proposed a four-article plan for finishing the war on Yemen since a long time ago. The end of this war can have positive effects on the region”. He also reiterated that “Iran has never been the initiator of any war, but if any country begins a war against Iran, it will undoubtedly regret it”.
13/10/2019	In a meeting with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, President Rouhani  that “foreign interference will add to the insecurity. The first step to ease tensions in the region is to establish a cease-fire in Yemen and end attacks on the innocent Yemenis, and Iran supports any attempt in this regard”. He further argued that “to resolve regional issues, we require changing strategies towards political dialogue with goodwill, security-building and developing regional cooperation… relying on terrorists, the Zionist regime [i.e. Israel], and the U.S. has no fruit except for more tension and damages to Islamic countries and regional nations, and does not guarantee security for any country and the region”. Rouhani also stated that “sustainable security and peace in the Persian Gulf, the Sea of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz can only be achieved through the participation of regional states”, adding that “Iran is always ready for dialogue and cooperation with all countries in the region”. Rouhani went on to posit that “the U.S.’ request for negotiation without preconditions is not an honest move with sanctions in place… we are ready to negotiation within the framework of the JCPOA if sanctions are lifted”.
09/10/2019	Referring to 14 September attacks on Saudi oil facilities, Saudi Aramco’s Chief Executive  that “an absence of international resolve to take concrete action may embolden the attackers and indeed put the world’s energy security at greater risk”.
08/10/2019	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “in a situation where the Saudis would like to negotiate with Iran, if they pursue regional issues at the negotiating table and not by killing people, they will certainly have the Islamic Republic along with them”.
04/10/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that two Huthi ballistic missiles landed inside Yemeni territory.
01/10/2019	Iran’s military chief of staff  that Iran was providing the Huthis “advisory and intellectual assistance and the IRGC is in charge of this”. He also  that “we will stand by the Yemeni people until they completely ward off the aggressions”.
30/09/2019	Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that “Iran welcomes the Yemeni National Salvation Government’s proposal and considers it to be in favour of the establishment of stability and security in the region”. He went on to say that “sadly, Saudi Arabia is still seeking to fan the flames and continues to bombard different parts of Yemen” and called on “the Saudi government to accept this offer”. A senior Saudi official subsequently  that “the Kingdom did not and will not talk with the Iranians. Yemen is the affair of the Yemenis… and the reason behind the Yemeni crisis is the Iranian destabilising role of its stability and disruptive role in the political efforts”. He also contended that Iran “provides its followers with weapons and missiles targeting the sons of Yemen and the security of the Kingdom and the countries of the region as part of the approach of this expansionist regime seeking to impose its control on Arab countries through its militias”. He additionally advised Iran to “stop your support for terrorism, policies of chaos and destruction, interference in the internal affairs of Arab states, development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile program. Act like a normal state and not a rogue one supporting terrorism”.
30/09/2019	An Iranian official  that the Saudis “have sent messages to Mr. Rouhani through a head of state… we must see signs of it [goodwill] without any ambiguity, and the first sign of it is to stop the aggression against Yemen and put an end to the massacre of Yemenis”. He added that “if they genuinely sought to change their behaviour, we would welcome that”.
29/09/2019	A senior IRGC official  that “Yemen’s deterrent power in the face of enemies has become clear after the reactions to Al Saud’s attacks, and the enemies are also mindful that they will be harmed if they take any action against that country”.
28/09/2019	In his address to the UN General Assembly, Bahrain’s foreign minister  that “the adoption of the Iranian regime of transitional terrorism has created networks of terrorist organisations and extremist militias, located in many places and different parts of the world such as Syria, Yemen, North Africa, the countries of the Sahara and the Sahel, South America and others. This requires us to intensify our efforts and enhance collective cooperation in order to eliminate them and prevent their return in any form”. He also applauded “the decisive course taken by the friendly U.S. in confronting Iran and its affiliates in the region, through exerting maximum pressure and imposing strict sanctions”. He went on to assert that “global energy supplies and maritime navigation in the waters of the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the region as a whole are severely threatened by the behaviour of the Iranian regime and its frequent targeting of commercial vessels in the region”, adding condemnation of the 14 September attacks on Saudi energy facilities “which Iran bears responsibility for”.
26/09/2019	President Rouhani  that “the Yemeni people have a right to self-defence and they have to defend themselves, and the whole world knows that the Yemeni forces and the Yemeni army have both long-range missiles and drones”. Rouhani went on to “urge the U.S., France, Britain and Germany, who are constantly giving arms to Saudi Arabia and the Emirates to kill the Yemeni people, to stop sending weapons and to pressurise Saudi Arabia and the UAE for peace”.
26/09/2019	Referring to the 14 September attacks against Saudi energy facilities, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo  that Iran “took an act clearly, highly attributable. They had to know that the world would determine that it was them that conducted this strike. They didn’t use their usual method of trying to obscure this through use of a proxy force”. He added that “they had to know it was the case that the world would rally against them, and yet they still chose to do it”.
25/09/2019	IRGC Commander Hossein Salami  that “our power is such that when a group like Ansar Allah carries out an operation, the enemy thinks it has been done by us”. He added that the Huthis were “a mutated branch of the revolution…They are an accumulated source of power that, if released, will change the whole battlefield and the enemy knows this reality”.
24/09/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  three Huthi missiles inside the Yemeni airspace.
24/09/2019	A senior Saudi official  that “we are certain it [the 14 September attack on Saudi energy facilities] came from the north. Once the investigation is complete, we will make the announcements and we will pin the blame. But we believe Iran is responsible because these were Iranian weapons”. He went on to say that “our position is we have to be firm with Iran. We have to come up with options on how we increase the pressure on the Iranians. You have a whole list of potential options: diplomatic, economic and military”. The official added that “the Iranians are warmongering, not us. The Iranians are the ones who launched 260 ballistic missiles on Saudi Arabia and more than 150 drones. We did not launch any ballistic missiles, any drones. We did not plant any terrorist cells in Iran and we didn’t even fire one bullet in the direction of Iran… so we’re on the receiving end”.
24/09/2019	A senior U.S. official  that “we are, to the extent possible, talking with the Huthis to try and find a mutually agreeable negotiated solution to the conflict in Yemen.  We have been talking to the Huthis for some time and we will continue to do so at increasingly higher levels”. He added that “the Huthis are a significant part of the problem in Yemen, but they necessarily will be part of the solution”.
24/09/2019	Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman  that the 14 September attacks against Saudi energy facilities “didn’t hit the heart of the Saudi energy industry, but rather the heart of the global energy industry”, adding that the Iranians carried out the operation because of “stupidity. There is no strategic goal… the only strategic goal is to prove that they are stupid and that is what they did”. Bin Salman also stated that “if the world does not take a strong and firm action to deter Iran, we will see further escalations that will threaten world interests. Oil supplies will be disrupted and oil prices will jump to unimaginably high numbers that we haven’t seen in our lifetimes”. Bin Salman also posited that a “political and peaceful solution is much better than the military one”, while asserting that “it is the Iranians who don’t want to sit at the table” with President Trump. On Yemen, Bin Salman stated that “if Iran stops its support of the Huthi militia, the political solution will be much easier”.
23/09/2019	In a , France, Germany, and the UK jointly “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the attacks on oil facilities on Saudi territory on September 14th, 2019 in Abqaiq and Khurais”. They further declared that “it is clear to us that Iran bears responsibility for this attack. There is no other plausible explanation. We support ongoing investigations to establish further details”. The E3 also urged Iran “to reverse its decisions to reduce compliance with the deal and to adhere fully to its commitments under it”. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that the “E3′s paralysis in fulfilling their obligations without U.S. permission has been clear since May 2018”. He added that the “solution to this deficiency is mustering will to forge an independent path—not parroting absurd U.S. claims and requests inconsistent with the JCPOA”. Zarif went on to posit that there would be “no new deal before compliance with the current one”.In a , Iran’s foreign ministry contended that “attributing the responsibility to the third government for an attack carried out in the course of a full-scale war between the Saudi and Yemeni sides is per se a provocative and extremely destructive move”. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo  by saying that “the U.S. thanks our close friends, UK, France, and Germany, for their clear articulation of Iran’s sole responsibility for the act of war against Saudi Arabia and its impact on the region and the world… this will strengthen diplomacy and the cause of peace”.
22/09/2019	Secretary of State Pompeo  that the 14 September attack against Saudi energy facilities “was an attack by Iran on the world. This was an act of war”. He went on state that “apparently, the Iranians are bloodthirsty and looking for war. President Trump and I, we’re looking for a diplomatic resolution to this… but make no mistake about it: we’re prepared to do the things we need to do to try to deter Iran from this kind of behaviour”. Pompeo added that sanctions “will deny them the resources to foment the exact kind of strikes that we have seen over this past summer”, and also contended that the Iranian people “will demand that their leadership behave in a way that reflects the great history of this place”.
22/09/2019	Foreign Minister Zarif  the U.S.  to bolster its forces in Saudi Arabia as “posturing”, and added that he was “confident that Iran did not play a role” in the 14 September attacks against Saudi energy facilities. Zarif also noted in passing that “the Israelis are attacking parts of [the] Iraqi military”. He went on to state that “we’re ready to talk [with President Trump]… we need to talk about something that is permanent. That would last”. Zarif additionally warned that “I’m not confident that we can avoid a war… I’m confident that we will not start one but I’m confident that whoever starts one will not be the one who finishes it”.
21/09/2019	Foreign Minister Zarif  that “since the Saudi regime has blamed Iran – baseless as that is – for the [14 September] attacks on its oil facilities, curious that they retaliated against Hodeida in Yemen today—breaking a UN ceasefire. It is clear that even the Saudis themselves don’t believe the fiction of Iranian involvement”.
20/09/2019	Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah  that “Saudi Arabia is highly advised to stop the war on Yemen instead of seeking to purchase advanced air defence missile systems. All costly weapons purchased [from] the U.S. cannot protect you from [Huthi] drone attacks”. Nasrallah added that “a military aggression on Iran will never be to the benefit of Saudi Arabia and the UAE”.
20/09/2019	U.S. Secretary of Defence Mark Esper  that “in recent months, Iran has increased its military activity through direct attacks and support to its proxies in the region”, adding that “all indications are that Iran was responsible for the attack” against Saudi energy facilities on 14 September. Esper announced that “in response to the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia’s] request, the president has approved the deployment of U.S. forces, which will be defensive in nature and primarily focussed on air and missile defence. We will also work to accelerate the delivery of military equipment to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE to enhance their ability to defend themselves”.
19/09/2019	The UAE  to the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct.
19/09/2019	The Saudi-led coalition said it had  “an attempt by Iran-affiliated Huthi terrorist militias to carry out an imminent hostile and terrorist act in the south of [the] Red Sea by using a remote-controlled booby-trapped boat”.
18/09/2019	President Rouhani  that “the Yemeni nation was not the source of the conflict but it was Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the Americans, some European countries and the Zionist regime [i.e. Israel] that began the war and destroyed Yemen”. He also contended, referring to the 14 September attack against Saudi energy facilities, that “the Yemenis did not target a school, hospital or market, but they attacked an industrial centre to warn their enemies”. “Iran”, Rouhani added, “has never started to cut ties and disrupt relations, and if even those who have cut ties step forward, we would like to have good relations with all the nations of the region and with our neighbours”. In related remarks, Defence Minister Amir Hatami  that “a clash has occurred between two countries. One side of the clash are the Yemenis, who have announced explicitly that they have done the job”.
18/09/2019	U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo  that the 14 September attack on Saudi energy facilities “didn’t come from the Huthis…This was an Iranian attack. It’s not the case that you can subcontract out the devastation of five per cent of the world’s global energy supply and think that you can absolve yourself of responsibilities”. Pompeo also indicated that “we are working to build out a coalition to develop a plan to deter” Iran. He went on to assert that “some suggest that the President’s strategy that we allowed isn’t working. I would argue just the converse of that. I would argue that what you are seeing here is a direct result of us reversing the enormous failure of the JCPOA”. Pompeo added that “55 weeks from now, the whole world can sell exactly these missile systems, conventional missile systems to the Iranian government unencumbered by any sanctions… they’d have more complex ones but for the sanctions we put in place”. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  Pompeo’s characterisation of the 14 September attack as an “act of war” to posit “’act of war’ or agitation for war? Remnants of the B-Team (and ambitious allies) try to deceive President Trump into war”. Zarif also suggested “seizing [the] opportunity to end disaster in Yemen – not widening it”.
18/09/2019	The Saudi-led coalition’s spokesperson  that the 14 September attack on Saudi oil facilities “was launched from the north and unquestionably sponsored by Iran. We are working to know the exact launch point”. He added that the attack “did not originate from Yemen despite Iran’s best efforts to make it appear so”.
18/09/2019	Iran’s President Rouhani  that “it is strange that the enemies of the region have not yet understood the power of the regional nations’ resistance… instead of admitting that Lebanon’s Hizbollah has high capabilities and power both in scientific and military knowledge and bravery in the field, or that a part of brave young people of Iraq have liberated different cities across the country from the hands of terrorists, and instead of admitting to the growth and greatness of nations like Syria and Yemen, they are seeking to accuse others”.
17/09/2019	Iran’s Foreign Minister Zarif  that the “U.S. is in denial if it thinks that Yemeni victims of 4.5 years of the worst war crimes wouldn’t do all to strike back. Perhaps it’s embarrassed that $100s of billions of its arms didn’t intercept Yemeni fire”. He added that “blaming Iran won’t change that. Ending the war is the only solution for all”. Zarif further stated that “the U.S. isn’t upset when its allies mercilessly bomb babies in Yemen for over four years—with its arms and its military assistance. But it is terribly upset when the victims react the only way they can—against the aggressor’s ”.
17/09/2019	Saudi Arabia  the U.S.-led International Maritime Security Construct.
16/09/2019	Commenting on the 14 September attack against Saudi energy facilities, President Rouhani  that “this problem has its roots in the Yemeni invasion. We must ask those who invaded Yemen and are bombing it daily why they did it… they have destroyed Yemen and killed a large number of Yemenis, and the Yemeni people have to respond to this [sic] many acts of aggression and guns coming from the U.S. and Europe to Saudi Arabia and the UAE”.
16/09/2019	In a  on the 14 September attacks against Aramco facilities, the Saudi government said that “initial investigations have indicated that the weapons used in the attack were Iranian weapons”, adding that “investigations are still ongoing to determine the source of the attack”.
15/09/2019	In a , Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi’s office indicated that “Iraq denies what has been circulated by some media outlets and social media about the use of its territories to  Saudi oil facilities by drones”.
14/09/2019	The Saudi government  that “several explosions occurred as a result of terrorist attacks in  plants in Khurais and Abqaiq… according to preliminary estimates, these explosions led to the interruption of a quantity of crude oil supplies estimated at 5.7 million barrels, or about 50 per cent of the company’s production”. The Huthis took responsibility for the operation, which they  was carried out using “tens of drones”. President Trump subsequently spoke to Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman and, according to a Saudi  of the conversation, “reasserted his country’s readiness to cooperate with the Kingdom, by all means conducive to maintain its security and stability”. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo  that “Tehran is behind nearly 100 attacks on Saudi Arabia while Rouhani and Zarif pretend to engage in diplomacy. Amid all the calls for de-escalation, Iran has now launched an unprecedented attack on the world’s energy supply. There is no evidence the attacks came from Yemen”. He further called on “all nations to publicly and unequivocally condemn Iran’s attacks. The U.S. will work with our partners and allies to ensure that energy markets remain well supplied and Iran is held accountable for its aggression”. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  saying that “having failed at ‘maximum pressure’, Secretary Pompeo is turning to ‘max deceit’”.
11/09/2019	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Najran.
11/09/2019	The Arab Quartet Ministerial Committee for Follow-up of the Crisis with Iran and Response to its Interventions in Arab Internal Affairs, chaired by the UAE and including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, “ Iran’s continued support for terrorist and subversive acts in the Arab countries, including the continued firing of Iranian-made ballistic missiles from Yemeni territory into populated cities in the Kingdom”. It also denounced  by Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah’s as “intended to provoke sedition and incite hatred
10/09/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Saudi Arabi.
09/09/2019	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “Iran is using Yemen to increase its status as a regional power… Iran has provided the Huthis with hundreds of millions of dollars and an arsenal of advanced weaponry”. “Iran’s strategic alliance with the Huthis”, Hook wrote, “allows them to target Gulf nations at will with missile and UAV attacks, and to inspire, organise, and direct militant separatist groups in Saudi Arabia’s provinces”. He also posited that Iran’s “alliance with the Huthis now allows Iran to threaten ship traffic in the Bab al-Mandab strait”, and indicated that “newly declassified information shows that Hizbollah is actively supporting the Huthi cause in Yemen, bringing Iran’s proxy network full circle”. Hook went on to underscore that “the Trump administration is focused on reversing Iran’s strategic gains in the region as part of the ‘maximum pressure’ campaign”, and contended that “the Huthis have little gain and a lot to lose by continuing their partnership with Iran”.
06/09/2019	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi ballistic missile reportedly bound for Najran.
05/09/2019	Saudi Arabia  a ballistic missile reportedly bound for Najran, and  a Huthi drone it said was bound for Khamis Mushait.
04/09/2019	Iran’s military chief of staff  the notion that Iran was sending weapons to the Huthis, contending that “how could one send a 9-meter-long missile to a country that is under blockade and is unable to receive medicine? These are illusions held by some”.
03/09/2019	Saudi Arabia  a trio of ballistic missiles in Najran and  two Huthi drones, one of which was reportedly  for Khamis Mushait.
31/08/2019	President Rouhani  by phone with his French counterpart and asserted that “if Europe cannot put its commitments into operation, Iran will take the third step in reducing its JCPOA commitments, which of course will be reversible”. He additionally underscored “that the continuation of negotiations for settling problems is the right decision and we need to continue along this path until we reach a desired point”. Rouhani also told Macron that “the leaders of the Zionist regime [i.e. Israel] have made countless miscalculations towards other countries like Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, and they are announcing their acts of aggression proudly instead of apologising”.
31/08/2019	President Rouhani  that “there is no military solution to the Yemeni crisis at all, and we have to try to reach a fair peace and sustainable security in the country through political dialogue”.
29/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Saudi Arabi.
28/08/2019	U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo  with Saudi Deputy Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman and “reiterated U.S. support for a negotiated resolution between the Republic of Yemen government and the Southern Transitional Council”. They additionally discussed “the need for stronger maritime security in order to promote freedom of navigation [and] the Iranian regime’s destabilising activities in the region”.
27/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  two Huthi drones, one inside Yemeni airspace and the second reportedly  for Khamis Mushait. The coalition also  that a ballistic missile fired by the Huthis had landed within Yemen.
26/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  two Huthi drones inside Yemeni airspace.
26/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Saudi Arabi.
25/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait.
25/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  six ballistic missiles purportedly bound for Jizan.
24/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  Huthi drones reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait and Jizan.
23/08/2019	Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “I don’t grant Iran immunity anywhere. Iran is a state, a power, that has sworn to annihilate Israel. It’s trying to establish bases against us everywhere. In Iran itself, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen”. Netanyahu went on to say that “we’re acting not only if necessary, we’re acting in very many theatres against a state that seeks to annihilate us. Obviously I’ve given the security forces the order and the operation freedom to do what is necessary in order to disrupt these plots by Iran”.
22/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  two Huthi drones reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait.
21/08/2019	A U.S. CENTCOM spokesperson  that “we are investigating reports of an attack by Iranian-backed Huthis forces on a U.S. unmanned aerial system (UAS) operating in authorised airspace over Yemen”. He further asserted that “we have been clear that Iran’s provocative actions and support to militants and proxies, like the Iranian-backed Huthis, poses a serious threat to stability in the region and our partners”.
20/08/2019	Addressing the UN Security Council, Secretary of State Pompeo  that “the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies continue to foment terror and unrest in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen with devastating humanitarian consequences”, adding that “since the U.S. declared our intention to bring all Iranian oil purchases to zero in April, the ayatollah has gone all in on a campaign of extortion diplomacy”. He also indicated that “we are already tracking very closely the JCPOA provisions expiring in October of 2020, namely the UN arms embargo and the travel restrictions on Qasem Soleimani”. “Time is drawing short to continue this activity of restricting Iran’s capacity to foment its terror regime”, Pompeo argued. “The international community will have plenty of time to see how long it has until Iran is unshackled to create new turmoil, and figure out what it must do to prevent this from happening”. At a press conference, Pompeo  that “Iran’s continued development and testing of advanced ballistic missiles in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is also an issue that the international community must address”.
17/08/2019	Iran’s Foreign Ministry  a meeting with Yemen’s Huthis, the UK, France, Germany, and Italy.  The UK ambassador in Iran, Rob Macaire,  that it was “important to have dialogue both on [the] political track and humanitarian crisis”.
17/08/2019	A senior Saudi official  that “a processing unit of Shaybah’s natural gas plant was targeted by explosive-laden [Huthi] drones, resulting in a limited fire”.
16/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone inside Yemeni airspace.
15/08/2019	National Security Advisor John Bolton  that Iran is “a country that never really made the key decision to give up nuclear weapons. They have not modified their widespread support for international terrorism. They’ve not given up their troublemaking in the Middle East, in Iraq and Syria and Yemen. They’re still a threat in the Persian Gulf to oil, they’re a threat to our forces, not just in Iraq and Syria, but now in Afghanistan”. “This is a regime really that needs a fundamental change in its behaviour”, Bolton added.
14/08/2019	Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that “the coalition of Saudi and Emirati invaders and their mercenaries, who have been unable to shatter the willpower of [Yemeni] people despite using various advanced weapons, massacre, and wreaking widespread destruction over the past five years and who have failed in the face of the fortitude and resistance of people across Yemen, are now seeking to partition Yemen with a suspicious plot”. He added that “the Islamic Republic of Iran always supports a ‘united Yemen’ and deems protecting its integrity a common responsibility of all Yemeni people”.
13/08/2019	In a meeting with a visiting Huthi delegation, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that “Saudi Arabia and UAE and their supporters have committed major crimes in Yemen and certainly won’t get their favourite results”. He added that “they seek to divide Yemen [and] this plot should be strongly resisted and a unified, coherent Yemen with sovereign integrity should be endorsed”.
11/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait.
11/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Saudi Arabia.
11/08/2019	Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif  a visiting Huthi spokesperson that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has always supported Yemeni-Yemeni talks and the full implementation of the ”.
08/08/2019	The State Department issued a  indicating that “the U.S. is deeply concerned by the outbreak of violence and deadly clashes in Aden”, going on to assert that “dialogue represents the only way to achieve a stable, unified, and prosperous Yemen”.
08/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Abha.
08/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Jizan.
08/08/2019	Secretary of State Pompeo  by phone with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and  “maritime security, Yemen, countering the Iranian regime’s destabilising activity and human rights”.
05/08/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  two Huthi drones reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait.
03/08/2019	The U.S. State Department’s spokesperson, Morgan Ortagus,    in southern Yemen. She further stated that “attacks such as these by the Iranian-backed Huthis, ISIS, or al-Qaeda are unacceptable”.
01/08/2019	Reacting to a Huthi  on a military parade in Aden, the Saudi ambassador to Yemen  that “the synchronised targeting by the terrorist Iran-backed Huthis and its terrorist sister groups ISIS and AQAP of the security and stability of the interim capital Aden proves their unity of objective: bloodshed and non-recognition of State, laws and inviolability of man”.
29/07/2019	Secretary of State Pompeo  “real progress” in efforts to address the conflict in Yemen, while adding that “it is uneven – in the end, the player who will get to play the ultimate final card there would be the Iranians”. “The Huthis have to make a decision”, Pompeo asserted. “They’ve got to decide if they want to continue down the path of being disruptive and accepting missiles and launching them into Saudi Arabia”.
25/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait.
24/07/2019	President Rouhani  that “along with maintaining the security of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, the Islamic Republic of Iran works for the safety of other waterways in the world, including the Bab al-Mandab and the Indian Ocean”. In apparent reference to the seizure by Iran of a UK-flagged tanker on 19 July, Rouhani added: “The Strait of Hormuz has a very important location
23/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition reportedly  multiple Huthi drones bound for Asir.
23/07/2019	Referring to the  , Saudi Arabia’s Council of Ministers  that “any infringement on the freedom of international maritime navigation is considered a violation of the international law, and the international community must take the necessary action to reject and deter it”.
20/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Abha.
19/07/2019	U.S. Central Command  that it was “developing a multinational maritime effort, Operation Sentinel, to increase surveillance of and security in key waterways in the Middle East to ensure freedom of navigation”. The statement added that “this maritime security framework will enable nations to provide escort to their flagged vessels while taking advantage of the cooperation of participating nations for coordination and enhanced maritime domain awareness and surveillance”.
19/07/2019	U.S. Central Command  and Saudi Arabia  that “in coordination with and at the invitation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Secretary of Defense has authorized the movement of U.S. personnel and resources to deploy to Saudi Arabia”.
17/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Jizan.
17/07/2019	The U.S. Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, and Bahrain’s Foreign Minister jointly  that Bahrain would host an international meeting on maritime security later in the year.
16/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  three Huthi drones reportedly bound for Jizan and Abha.
16/07/2019	At a cabinet meeting, President Trump  that with regards to Iran “a lot of progress has been made. And if they’d like to talk, then we’ll see what happens.” He went on to reiterate that “they can’t have a nuclear weapon. We’re not looking, by the way, for regime change… and we want them to get out of Yemen”.  Secretary of State Pompeo asserted that “with respect to Iran, we’ve done three things. We’ve supported the Iranian people… we’ve continued to work with this coalition [of Gulf countries and Israel] that all understands that the largest threat to Middle East security is, in fact, the Islamic Republic of Iran… thirdly, we’ve imposed a series of sanctions on the Iranian regime”.  He added that “the Iranian regime is struggling to figure out what they’re going to do with their economy because we’ve been terribly effective…for the first time the Iranians have said that they’re prepared to negotiate about their missile program”. An Iranian spokesperson  Iran’s willingness to discuss its missile program, saying that “Iran’s missiles and its missiles are absolutely and under no condition negotiable with anyone or any country, period”.
15/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait and downed another inside Yemen’s airspace.
08/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that “the Huthis attempted to attack a commercial ship south of the Red Sea using a booby-trapped boat with explosives”.
08/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Saudi Arabia.
05/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  drones purportedly bound for an airport in Jizan.
02/07/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that a Huthi attack against Abha airport injured nine civilians. The U.S. State Department’s spokesperson, Morgan Ortagus,  the attack and asserted that “we stand firmly with our Saudi partners in defending their borders against these continued threats by the Huthis, who rely on Iranian-made weapons and technology to carry out such attacks”.
01/07/2019	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi drone reportedly bound for Saudi Arabia within Yemen’s airspace.
30/06/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  two Huthi drones
28/06/2019	The U.S. special representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “If we do not prevent Iranians from laying down deep roots in Yemen, they will be in a position to threaten to close the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab”. He went on to say that “an outlaw regime is violating basic maritime law and now represents a maritime threat across the Gulf”.
27/06/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone, said to be bound for Saudi Arabia, inside Yemeni airspace.
24/06/2019	The U.S., Saudi Arabia, the UK and the UAE  a joint statement conveying “concern over escalating tensions in the region and the dangers posed by Iranian destabilising activity to peace and security both in Yemen and the broader region”. The statement went on to “call on Iran to halt any further actions which threaten regional stability, and urge diplomatic solutions to de-escalate tensions”.
23/06/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that a Huthi attack on Abha International Airport left one killed and seven injured. Secretary of State Pompeo  the attack and contended that “some want to portray the Yemen conflict as an isolated civil war, without a clear aggressor. It is neither. It is spreading conflict and humanitarian disaster that was conceived of and perpetuated by the Islamic Republic of Iran… With every attack conducted by an Iranian proxy, the regime tacks another day onto its forty-year track record of spreading death and chaos in the region, and beyond”. He went on to reiterate that “we will continue our pressure campaign until Iran stops its torrent of violence and meets diplomacy with diplomacy”.
21/06/2019	In Riyadh, the U.S. special representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “Iran’s efforts to use surrogates to attack Saudi Arabia and destabilise the region needs to be countered”. He added that “our diplomacy does not give Iran the right to respond with military force, Iran needs to meet our diplomacy with diplomacy and not military force… it’s important we do everything we can do de-escalate”. Saudi Vice Minister of Defence, Khalid bin Salman, reiterated his government’s “support for the U.S. maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which came as a result of continuing Iranian hostility and terrorism”, also underlining “the dangerous role that the Iranian regime plays in Yemen”.
20/06/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that a projectile fired by the Huthis hit a desalination plant in Jizan, causing no casualties or damage.
18/06/2019	Saudi Arabia  two Huthi drones
18/06/2019	Saudi media that “Iranian experts and other Huthi militants were killed during a failed attempt to launch a ballistic missile” in Sanaa.
16/06/2019	Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman  that Saudi Arabia “does not want a war in the region, but we will not hesitate in dealing with any threat against our people, sovereignty and vital interests”. He went on to state that “Iran’s recklessness has reached unprecedented levels”, adding that “Iran must choose between becoming a normal country that plays a constructive role in the international community or remain a rogue state and assume the international consequences of its choice”. Bin Salman also stressed that “the Huthi militias prioritise Iran’s agenda over the interests of Yemen and its people”, arguing that attacks against the Kingdom “reflect the priorities of Tehran, not Sanaa”.
16/06/2019	In a statement, U.S. Central Command  that “a U.S. MQ-9 was shot down over Yemen by what we asses[s]  to be a Huthi SA-6 surface-to-air missile on June 6, 2019. The altitude of the engagement indicated an improvement over previous Huthi capability, which we asses[s] was enabled by Iranian assistance”. On the 13th, CENTCOM went on to indicate, “a modified Iranian SA-7 surface-to-air missile attempted to shoot down a U.S. MQ-9 over the Gulf of Oman to disrupt surveillance of the IRGC attack on the M/T Kokuka Courageous… the SA-7 was ineffective”.
16/06/2019	Secretary of State Pompeo  his assessment that the 13 June tanker explosions in the Gulf of Oman “were attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran on commercial shipping, on freedom of navigation, with the clear intent to deny transit through the strait… we have high confidence with respect to who conducted these attacks as well as half a dozen other attacks throughout the world over the past 40 days”. “President Trump has done everything he can to avoid war”, Pompeo added. “We don’t want war. We’ve done what we can to deter this. The Iranians should understand very clearly that we will continue to take actions that deter Iran from engaging in this kind of behaviour”. He also indicated that “Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. That’s the goal. That’s the objective of our entire campaign with respect to Iran, and to create stability throughout the Middle East as part of that effort”. In a separate , Pompeo, asked if there was “legal authorisation for a strike on Iran”, replied: “We always have the authorisation to defend American interests. Remember, they now have  U.S. aircraft”. He also contended that “if we relieve sanctions, their nuclear program presents an even greater risk to the U.S.”
15/06/2019	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi drone bound for Abha.
14/06/2019	Saudi Arabia  that its military had “successfully intercepted and destroyed five unmanned drone aircraft launched by Huthi militia towards Abha International Airport and Khamis Mushait”.
12/06/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that “a hostile projectile fired by the Huthi militia hit the arrivals hall at Abha International Airport”, injuring 26.
10/06/2019	Saudi Arabia  a pair of Huthi drones reportedly bound for Khamis Mushait.
04/06/2019	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “Western publics and legislatures demand an end to the humanitarian disaster that is the Saudi-Emirati war on Yemen. But their governments provide ever more weapons used to perpetuate war crimes”. “Time and again”, Zarif added, “our offers of a political way out have been rebuffed. This evil cycle must stop”.
04/06/2019	Following a request by Iran, the Saudi-led coalition  a stricken sailor from an Iranian vessel off the Yemeni coast.
31/05/2019	As Saudi Arabia hosted summits of the ,  and the , Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  that “we deem the Saudi efforts to mobilise the views of neighbouring and Arab countries a continuation of the indecisive process that the U.S. and the Zionist regime [i.e. Israel] are pursuing against the Islamic Republic of Iran”. He further stressed that “Saudi Arabia took political and instrumental advantage of the auspicious month of Ramadan and the holy city of Mecca to make accusations against the Islamic Iran from the mouth of some participants in the conference”.
30/05/2019	The GCC Supreme Council issued a communique  “the need that Iran spares the region the dangers of war by abiding by the international laws and conventions, stop interference in the internal affairs of the countries of the region, and stop supporting terrorist groups and militias and threatening the security of maritime navigation”. The statement went on to applaud “the actions taken by the U.S. to confront Iran”.
30/05/2019	The Arab League  an extraordinary summit in Mecca convened by King Salman “to discuss the serious repercussions” of the 12 May tanker  off the UAE coast and 14 May drone  against a Saudi pipeline. A final communique suggested that Iranian actions “directly and dangerously threaten the security and stability in the region”, and urged “the international community to take a firm stand against Iran and its destabilizing activities in the region”.
29/05/2019	In remarks to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Saudi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Assaf  that “Tehran’s support for Huthi militias in Yemen is proof of Iranian interference in other nations’ affairs and this is something that Islamic countries should reject”. Describing the Fujairah incident and Saudi pipeline attacks earlier in the month as “terrorist attacks”, al-Assad urged that they “must be countered with determination”.
27/05/2019	The Saudi-led coalition’s spokesperson  that “we have documented information on the supply of missiles by the Revolutionary Guard to the Huthi militia in Yemen”. He added that “over 35 Huthi terrorist acts in Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea have been foiled”, and stated that “we are planning to speed up the military pace to neutralise Huthi threats”.
26/05/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone allegedly attempting to target King Abdullah Airport in Jizan.
24/05/2019	Saudi Arabia’s UN envoy  the Security Council “to shoulder its responsibilities by taking a firm stand against the Iran-backed terrorist Huthi militias after targeting vital populated areas in the Kingdom with ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles”.
23/05/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  a Huthi drone purportedly attempting to target Najran Regional Airport.
21/05/2019	The Saudi-led coalition  that “Huthi militants had tried to hit a civilian facility in Saudi Arabia’s southern border province of Najran with a drone carrying explosives”.
20/05/2019	Saudi Arabia reportedly shot down a pair of Huthi missiles
19/05/2019	An unidentified Huthi source was  as indicating that the 14 May drone  against Saudi oil facilities constituted “the beginning of military operations against 300 vital military targets”, which, according to the source, “included military vital headquarters and facilities in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia as well as their bases in Yemen”.
18/05/2019	The Huthis’ leader, Abdul-Malik al-Huthi,  that “the enemy’s persistent crimes will never weaken the will of the Yemeni nation
16/05/2019	A senior Saudi defence official  that the 15 May “attack by the Iranian-backed Huthi militias against two Aramco pumping stations proves that these militias are merely a tool that Iran’s regime uses to implement its expansionist agenda in the region, and not to protect the people of Yemen as the Huthis falsely claim. The terrorist acts, ordered by the regime in Tehran, and carried out by the Huthis, are tightening the noose around the ongoing political efforts”. A senior Saudi diplomat likewise  that “the Huthis are an indivisible part of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps and subject to the IRGC’s orders. This is confirmed by the Huthis targeting facilities in the Kingdom”.  An Iranian spokesperson  by saying “you can’t hide your weaknesses behind such claims… you’re still deluded after 1,500 days, isn’t that enough?”
15/05/2019	A senior Huthi official,  one day after drone attacks against a Saudi pipeline, reportedly “denied they were acting on Iran’s behalf, but were instead defending themselves against the Saudi-led” coalition.
14/05/2019	The Saudi government  that “two pump stations on the East-West pipeline were attacked by armed drones which caused a fire and minor damage to Pump Station No. 8”
13/05/2019	Amidst Huthi  from Hodeidah and two other ports, the Iranian government  that the move showed the Huthis’ “determination and commitment to dialogue and honouring its commitments on the one hand, and reveals the Saudi coalition’s obstructionism and lack of commitment to the [Stockholm] deal on the other hand”.
13/05/2019	President Trump  the U.S national emergency regarding Yemen by one year.
11/05/2019	Representatives of Harajat al-Nujaba, an Iraqi militia  by the U.S.,  with Huthi officials
09/05/2019	In an advisory, the U.S Maritime Administration  that “since early May, there is an increased possibility that Iran and/or its regional proxies could take action against U.S. and partners interests, including oil production infrastructure, after recently threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz. Iran or its proxies could respond by targeting commercial vessels, including oil tankers, or U.S. military vessels in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab Strait or the Persian Gulf”.
08/05/2019	CENTCOM’s commander  that “as we witness the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, it’s important to remember that Iran is behind the irresponsible behaviour that actually led to the overthrow of the government in Yemen and created the crisis we now have in Yemen. The humanitarian tragedy that we confront in Yemen is the child of Iranian ambition and their support for the Huthis in trying to create a Hizbollah-like state in Yemen”. He also indicated that “the Iranian regime has smuggled ballistic missiles into Yemen and assisted with their construction and deployment. And they’re employed by the Huthis against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as against the United Arab Emirates, threatening our partners as well as Americans who live and work there. They’ve also irresponsibly fired missiles into the Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea, where vital commerce and oil transport occurs”.
02/05/2019	A 53-45  in the U.S. Senate was not enough to overturn President Trump’s 16 April  on continued U.S. involvement in the Saudi-led military campaign in Yemen.
02/05/2019	Secretary Pompeo  that “were this a simple civil war in Yemen, it would be difficult to justify America having any involvement, but sadly, that’s not the case. This is the terrain in which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula exists… we have an obligation to protect America, to take down that al-Qaeda terrorist threat that is on the inside of Yemen”. “Moreover”, Pompeo continued, “we have the Iranians using Yemen as a platform, a platform to hold ships transiting through the strait and around and through the waters that surround Yemen, both to the south of Yemen and to the west of Yemen, holding Americans ships, ships sailing through those seas, at risk. We also have Iranian platforms… unmanned, armed aerial vehicles as well as missile systems launching missiles into Riyadh and into the Emirates, where Americans travel frequently. There are real security risks”. “The Saudis have an unambiguous right to defend themselves from attacks out of Yemen”, he added, “and it is not the Huthis but rather the Iranians that are responsible for that”.
30/04/2019	Iran’s diplomatic spokesperson  U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s 29 April  that Iran “has chosen to direct” the Huthis against efforts to end the Yemen conflict, countering that Pompeo was in fact “cover[ing] up the crimes by the Saudi-UAE coalition in Yemen and hindering the implementation of the [peace] agreements”.
29/04/2019	Discussing Yemen, Secretary of State Pompeo  that “with respect to the civil war, this is Iranian-led. We should just all be very clear about that. The Huthis, who continue to refuse to comply with the agreements that they signed up for in Stockholm, Sweden, they refused to move back from the port in Hodeida, they’ve refused to do all of the elements that the UN have laid out, because – very clearly, it’s because the Islamic Republic of Iran has chosen to direct them to do that”. He also referred to congressional calls against continued U.S. military involvement in the conflict, which President Trump , saying that “the people who were the happiest when that resolution passed were [Qods force commander] Qasem Soleimani and the ayatollah [Ali Khamenei]… when they see the U.S. shrink away from this challenge that puts U.S. citizens at risk, they think they have achieved a victory”.
24/04/2019	At a conference in Russia, a senior Saudi defence official  that “we have to choose between the chaos that Iran spreads and stability, security and development… Iran is spreading chaos in the region through destruction and bloodshed, and by supporting the militias of Hizbollah and Huthis”.
23/04/2019	A U.S. diplomat  “Iran, and all countries, to respect the free flow of energy and commerce, and freedom of navigation”.
22/04/2019	Huthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi  that “our missiles are capable of reaching Riyadh and beyond Riyadh, to Dubai and Abu Dhabi… it is possible to target strategic, vital, sensitive and influential targets in the event of any escalation in “.
17/04/2019	Following President Trump’s  on ending U.S. military involvement in the Yemen conflict, a Huthi official  the move was proof “that the U.S. is not only involved in the war on Yemen but also was behind the decision to go to war… others followed that decision and execute the wishes and ambitions of the U.S.“.
16/04/2019	The Huthis  a “new locally-made ballistic missile”, dubbed the Badr-F, which a spokesperson claimed “had entered in unannounced operations and hit its objectives successfully”.
16/04/2019	President Trump vetoed , directing him “to remove U.S. Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting Yemen”. In a , Trump noted that “Huthis, supported by Iran, have used missiles, armed drones and explosive boats to attack civilian and military targets in… coalition countries, including areas frequented by American citizens, such as the airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. In addition, the conflict in Yemen represents a ‘cheap’ and inexpensive way for Iran to cause trouble for the U.S. and for our ally, Saudi Arabia”. He further indicated “the joint resolution would also harm the foreign policy of the U.S.“, including by “embolden[ing] Iran’s malign activities in Yemen”. “Even the U.S. Congress wants to put an end to CENTCOM’s destabilising activities in Yemen”,  Foreign Minister Javad Zarif shortly thereafter. “But petrofinanced Netanyahu-firsters and their enabler in the White House will continue… to push for forever wars”.
07/04/2019	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi drone bound for Asir.
05/04/2019	Responding to an interviewer’s comment that “you might not like Saudi Arabia, but do you want to give Yemen to Iran?“, Secretary Pompeo  that “this has been the administration’s point all along. The true threat there in the region is the Islamic Republic of Iran. We don’t want to do things that benefit them”.
02/04/2019	Saudi Arabia  two Huthi drones bound for Khamis Mushait
31/03/2019	King Salman  Saudi Arabia’s “total rejection of any measures that would infringe on Syrian sovereignty over the Golan”. He also urged “the international community to compel Iran-backed Huthi militias to stop their aggressive practices that have caused the sufferings of the Yemeni people and threatened the security and stability of the region”.
29/03/2019	Saudi Foreign Minister Ibrahim al-Assaf  that “we reject President Trump’s declaration on the occupied Golan, which is a Syrian Arab land”. Al-Assaf also opined that “Iran’s ballistic missiles pose a threat to regional and international security”, adding that the Kingdom considered “Iran fully responsible for what is happening in Yemen”.
28/03/2019	A senior Huthi official that “we are talking with the Saudis and the UAE. The talks will either lead to peace or we will respond to them by missiles, UAVs and our popular committees”.
28/03/2019	On Yemen, Secretary of State Pompeo  that “since America’s begin to assist the Saudis in their campaign, the ratio of civilian casualties to effectiveness has decreased dramatically”, also noting that “the Iranians have contributed zero dollars to humanitarian assistance”. “I’m hopeful”, Pompeo added, “that the Iranians will lose heart and that the Huthis will see that they can have a political role there”.
26/03/2019	Foreign Minister Zarif  that “Saudi Arabia and its allies rejected Iran’s peace plan for Yemen in April 2015 – claiming that victory was at hand within three weeks. On the eve of the war’s shameful fifth year, a reminder that it’s not too late to stop the nightmare that this war has become”.
23/03/2019	U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo  that the Iranian are “using the Huthis as a proxy force, but Iran is firing missiles into Saudi Arabia, endangering not only the lives of the Saudi people but all those who transit [through Saudi Arabia]“.
22/03/2019	The U.S. special representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “we know historically that Iran has given Hizbollah an average of $700 million a year… we have seen evidence of the impact [of U.S. sanctions] when the leader of Hizbollah makes a public appeal for charity. It speaks for itself. This is the kind of impact that we want”. He added that “we know that we have denied the [Iranian] regime even in the short amount of time [since sanctions came into effect] many billions of dollars in revenue”, and underscored that the U.S. held “talks with any government where we see sanctions violations or even potential sanctions violations”. Hook went on to underscore that “we are… committed to ensuring that troops under Iranian command are out of Syria”, and suggested Iran had a “vastly-under reported role in Yemen” despite having “no legitimate interest” in the country. “Giving [Iran] a foothold in Yemen”, Hook argued, “allows them to threaten two straits of international commerce”.
21/03/2019	Secretary Pompeo  that “we’re very hopeful that this pressure [against Iran] will convince the Huthis that they need to return to the political table, they need to have a discussion, they cannot win this militarily, and that we’re determined to ensure that order is restored in Yemen”. “I imagine that there’s very little that the Huthis do that isn’t at the direction of the ayatollah [Khamenei] or [Qods force commander] Qasem Soleimani”, he added.
19/03/2019	A senior U.S. diplomat  that “Iran has provided ballistic missile to the Huthis that have been fired into Saudi Arabia, and unmanned aerial systems to Huthi groups that enable long-range, indiscriminate strikes against land-based targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates”.
17/03/2019	A senior Iranian defence official  that a naval group had been deployed “in order to ensure the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s shipping lines in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Bab al-Mandab”.
16/03/2019	A Huthi military spokesperson that “we have aerial photographs and coordinates of dozens of headquarters, facilities and military bases of the enemy… the legitimate targets of our forces extend to the capital of Saudi Arabia and to the emirate of Abu Dhabi”.
15/03/2019	Discussing a 13 March  against continued U.S. assistance to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, Secretary Pompeo  that “we all want this conflict to end… but the Trump administration fundamentally disagrees that curbing our assistance to the Saudi-led coalition is the right way to achieve those goals”. “If you truly care about Yemeni lives”, Pompeo suggested, “you’d support the Saudi-led effort to prevent Yemen from turning into a puppet state of the corrupt, brutish Islamic Republic of Iran. If we truly care about Saudi lives, you’d want to stop Iran-backed Huthis from launching missiles into Riyadh. If you truly care about Arab lives in the region, you’d support allied efforts to prevent Iran from extending its authoritarian rule from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea and on down to Yemen. And if we truly care about American lives and livelihoods, and the lives and livelihoods of people all around the world, you’d understand that Iran and its proxies cannot be allowed to control the shipping lanes that abut Yemen”. “The way to alleviate the Yemeni people’s suffering”, he went on to argue, “isn’t to prolong the conflict by handicapping our partners in the fight, but by giving the Saudi-led coalition the support needed to defeat Iranian-backed rebels and ensure a just peace”.
08/03/2019	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi drone en route to Abha
07/03/2019	CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel  that “the conflict in Yemen opened opportunities for Iran, which continues to provide support to the Huthis aimed at building a proxy force designed to pressure the Saudi-led coalition and expand Iranian regional influence. This support enables Huthis to launch missiles at its neighbours and target ships in the Bab al-Mandab and Red Sea
07/03/2019	An Iranian oil tanker reportedly came  by pirates in speedboats
04/03/2019	Secretary of State Pompeo that “the reason we sell weapons to Saudi Arabia is very straightforward: they’re an important strategic partner of the U.S… that strategic relationship is absolutely vital to the U.S.” He added that “as for Yemen, it’s a complicated place. The Iranians have provided weapons systems to the Huthis there, where they have now built missiles that are landing in Saudi Arabia. No, no, no, America wouldn’t tolerate this for a second. If the Iranians had provided missiles to a group that was launching weapons systems into Des Moines, I am confident you would demand that your government stand up and push back against that, in the same way the Saudi government is pushing back against that”.
24/02/2019	In  at an Arab League-EU summit in Egypt, King Salman “called for denouncing the launch of more than 200 Iranian-manufactured ballistic missiles towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, stressing that the Iranian activities to destablise security and stability of the maritime navigation in Bab al-Mandab and the Red Sea represent a direct and dangerous security of all”. He also indicated that “the Iranian regime’s support for [Huthi] militias and others in the region and its aggressive practices and blatant interference in the affairs of the states requires a unified international position to coerce Iran [into] respecting the rules of good neighbourliness and international law and put an end to its nuclear and ballistic program”.
14/02/2019	A senior diplomat in the Hadi government argued in an  that “Yemenis want no part of Iran’s revolution. They want a government that answers to them, not to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard”. “Tehran”, he continued, “never consulted us when choosing Yemen as the next theatre for its revolutionary campaign… what has Iran’s power play in Yemen meant for us? Iranian guns turned on Yemeni citizens. Iranian land mines on our farms. Iranian trainers teaching extremists to use Yemenis as human shields. Iranian drones firing at peaceful parades. Iranian missiles launched from our soil at neighbouring countries”. “The world”, he concluded, “must apply pressure on the Huthis and their Iranian enablers”.
13/02/2019	Secretary Pompeo, in Warsaw for the  to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East,  the proceedings as “absolutely historic… the first time in a quarter of a century that you had the prime minister of Israel in the same room talking about threats in the Middle East with senior Arab leaders from all across the Middle East”. “This gathering is certainly about Middle East peace and stability,” he explained. “You can’t talk about that without talking about the threat from the Islamic Republic of Iran, whether it’s Hizbollah, Hamas, the Houthis – I call them the three H’s – whether it’s their work against the Iraqi government… whether it’s what they’re doing in Syria today”. Pompeo also remarked that “we don’t expect the Iranian people to support the U.S. We expect them to take care of their own country… we want the Iranian people to have the opportunity to live in a prosperous, peaceful society and one that is controlled by their desires, their wishes. And if we can get that, I am very confident that these behaviours that we see in Iran will change dramatically”. On Yemen, Pompeo stressed that “we have two problems – three problems really. The first problem is al-Qaeda… the second problem is Iran continuing to fund the Huthis… it provides missiles to the Huthis that they launch into airports in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates”.
13/02/2019	A senior U.S. defence official  that the Iranians “have a growing capability in cruise missiles, they have a growing capability in ballistic missiles, they have a growing capability in unmanned surfaced systems, all these things that we watch that are offensive, and destabilising in nature”. He also indicated Iranian transfers by sea of “materials, weapons, arms, missiles to surrogates around the region to be able to promulgate their vision of this region with them as the predominant force… we have seen their hand in the Red Sea with unmanned systems – air systems and surface systems – so we’ve seen them utilise the maritime as a transport for them exporting their version of the region with them in charge”.
13/02/2019	The U.S., UK, Saudi Arabia and the UAE met for consultations regarding Yemen. A  noted that their representatives “discussed Iran’s destabilising effect in Yemen, through the illicit provision of finance, ballistic missiles and advanced weaponry to the Huthis, and in the wider region”. It further indicated that “the efforts to reduce illicit fuel imports by the Huthis, the ministers discussed steps to curb activity facilitating Iranian oil flows whilst at the same time, ensuring fuel flows through Red Sea ports”.
05/02/2019	CENTCOM commander Joseph Votel  that “the conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya have challenged Saudi Arabia’s partners in the region, beset by the malign influence driven by experienced and well-funded Iranian proxies”. He further indicated “the ballistic missile threat and armed UASs emanating from Yemeni territory continue to pose a significant risk, as the Huthis consider civil infrastructure as legitimate military targets”.
29/01/2019	The U.S. intelligence community  that “Iran will… continu[e] to press Saudi Arabia and the UAE by supporting the Huthis in Yemen”, adding that “Iran’s support to the Huthis, including supplying ballistic missiles, risks escalating the conflict and poses a serious threat to U.S. partners and interests in the region”.
10/01/2019	Secretary Pompeo  that “in Yemen we’ve assisted our coalition partners as they take the lead in preventing an Iranian expansion that would be disastrous for world trade and regional security”.
29/12/2018	The Houthis  two missiles towards Saudi Arabia over 24 hours, including one intercepted en route to Najran.
15/12/2018	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “Iran has not provided weapons to the Huthis in Yemen, but the Huthis are using the weapons that they received from Saudi Arabia during the term of Ali Abdullah Saleh”.
13/12/2018	The parties in the  reached an  for a ceasefire in Hodeidah as well as statement of understanding on Taiz.
12/12/2018	Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei  that in Yemen, “the Saudis are committing the crimes. But the U.S. is their partner in crime… they are criminals. This is the face of the U.S.” He added “the crime that al-Saud is committing by usurping Yemen will turn out to be detrimental to themselves”.
12/12/2018	Secretary Pompeo  that “we have hard evidence that Iran is providing missiles, training and support to the Huthis, and the Iranian-Huthi missile force is fully engaged”. He added that “this poses a threat to innocent civilians – including Americans – living in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Dubai as well as people of all nationalities who travel on civilian aircraft in that region”.
11/12/2018	Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  progress in the UN-brokered Yemen peace consultations, adding that “it is well past time for foreign aggressors to end their airstrikes and crimes against humanity”.
09/12/2018	Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson issued a statement  that “the U.S. has caused one of the biggest human catastrophes in Yemen… through providing financial and political support and giving weapons to the aggressor forces”.
09/12/2018	A senior U.S. diplomat  that “looking down the road we seek a stable and unified Yemen that fosters rather than drains regional and global stability… there is no place in a future Yemen for an Iranian-backed threat to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and vital international economic quarters”. He went on to note that “early recovery efforts are underway but full-scale reconstruction can only occur in a peaceful environment. For that reason we want to close the space for malign Iranian influence”.
06/12/2018	on Yemen, convened by the UN, in Sweden.
06/12/2018	on Iran’s role in Yemen , a U.S. diplomat stated that “if Iran wants to be helpful, the first thing it needs to do is to respect all of the UN arms embargoes and stop providing arms and related materiel and technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance related to military activities to, or for the benefit of, the Huthis”.
03/12/2018	Ahead of UN-brokered negotiations on Yemen, Iran’s Foreign Ministry stated that it “welcomes the initiative, offers its support for the dialogue, and calls on all Yemeni sides to participate constructively and responsibly”. The  included a call for “pressure on those parties arming the aggressors”.
02/12/2018	A senior Iranian military  that the Huthis “are powerful enough and have good defence equipment that do not need other countries’ help… given the blockade of Yemen and the large number of [Yemeni] missiles, how is it possible for the Islamic Republic to give missiles to the Yemeni army”?
01/12/2018	Iran’s defence minister, Amir Hatami,  that Iran’s assistance to the Huthis “is spiritual and advisory” in nature.
30/11/2018	Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  that “after untold human suffering and war crimes by the Saudi coalition and its U.S. accomplices, and efforts to whitewash their crimes with absurd allegations against Iran”, Tehran’s peace plan for Yemen,  in 2015, “remains the only viable option”.
30/11/2018	A senior Iranian naval official  that “53 Iranian naval squadrons comprising warships and destroyers have a constant presence in the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-Mandab”.
29/11/2018	Following Huthis  of a missile strike against the Saudi military in Najran, Saudi Arabia  that it had, in fact, located and destroyed a Huthi launch site after “the Huthi militia attempted to fire a ballistic missile towards the kingdom”.
29/11/2018	The U.S. special representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that since late 2017, “Iran’s support of the Huthi militants has deepened”. Showcasing various Iranian weapons purportedly intended for or provided to the Huthis, he argued that “Iran has been funding, arming and training the Huthis, which has allowed them to continue to fight well beyond what would have made any sense at all”. “We must be careful not to affirm Iran’s role as a legitimate political actor in Yemen”, Hook added. “We cannot watch a new version of Lebanese Hizbollah slowly emerge in the Arabian Peninsula… give Iran a free hand in Yemen and it can threaten to close both straits [i.e. Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab] and commit acts of maritime aggression with impunity”.
28/11/2018	In remarks to congress, Secretary Pompeo  “three vital missions” for the U.S. in Yemen, the first of which “is to assist the Saudis and the Emiratis in their fight against Iranian-backed Huthi fighters”. “Iran”, suggested Pompeo, “wants to establish a version of Lebanese Hizbollah on the Arabian Peninsula so the mullahs in Tehran can control seaborne trade through strategic waterways like the Bab al-Mandab Strait… the U.S. interest in this first mission is to counter Iran’s regional ambitions and to help our allies and partners protect themselves”. Citing the defeat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as a second goal, Pompeo then described the third objective as “protect[ing] Americans working in Saudi Arabia or transiting the strategic waterways around Yemen”. “All we would achieve from an American drawdown”, argued Pompeo, “is a stronger Iran and a reinvigorated ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula”.
25/11/2018	Foreign Minister Javad Zarif  Saudi financial support for Iraq against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, indicating that assistance which purportedly facilitated Iraqi airstrikes was “one reason we feel for Yemeni civilians targeted by the latest Saudi coalition”.
22/11/2018	A senior IRGC official  that “Yemen will be a quagmire for the Al-Saud regime and U.S. policies… the Yemeni nation is awake and we support them”.
19/11/2018	The Huthis  “our initiative… to half missile and drone strikes on the countries of aggression”.
13/11/2018	Foreign Minister Zarif  “from the first day we have shown our willingness to resolved the crisis in Yemen… there should be a wide ceasefire on the ground and, ultimately, all sides will understand the need for an end to military operations, to deliver aid to civilians and support the formation of an inclusive Yemeni government and an inter-Yemeni dialogue”.
09/11/2018	In an op-ed, a senior Huthi official  that “Saudi leaders are reckless and have no interest in diplomacy. The U.S. has the clout to bring an end to the conflict – but it has decided to protect a corrupt ally”. The Hadi government’s foreign minister  the publication of the article by the Washington Post, asserting that “Iran’s proxy terrorist[s] are now finding ways into the American press”.
09/11/2018	Citing improvements in “its capability to independently conduct in-flight refueling in Yemen”, the Saudi-led coalition  that it had, “in consultation with the U.S…. requested cessation of in-flight refueling support for its operations in Yemen”. In a statement, Secretary of Defence James Mattis  that “we support the decision… to use the Coalition’s own military capabilities to conduct in-flight refueling in support of operations in Yemen”, adding that “the U.S. will also continue working with the Coalition and Yemen to minimise civilian casualties and expand urgent humanitarian efforts throughout the country”.
08/11/2018	A spokesperson for the Hadi government  that the Huthis have “terrorist intentions to target international navigation paths and global trade in Bab al-Mandab and south of the Red Sea, and to blow up the Safer oil tank at Ras Isa”.
08/11/2018	Addressing Secretary Pompeo, who in a 7 November  laid much of the blame for the situation in Yemen on Iran, Foreign Minister Zarif  that “it’s the Yemenis themselves who’re responsible for [the] famine they’re facing. They should’ve simply allowed your butcher clients… to annihilate them [without] resisting”.
07/11/2018	The Huthi leader, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi,  that “the U.S. role in the military operations against our nation is pivotal. All fiendish plots against Yemen are hatched by the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates… Washington is speaking of peace at the same time that it is directing the Yemen war”.
07/11/2018	Secretary Pompeo  that “the challenge in Yemen is in large part the responsibility of the Iranian leadership”. He went on to suggest “a fundamental difference in the humanitarian nature” of Iran and Saudi Arabia, positing that “Iran causes death and destruction inside of Yemen and does nothing to prevent the starvation, and the Saudis provide… missions of dollars – as do the Emiratis – to mitigate this risk and this harm”. A political solution, Pompeo added, “can’t happen unless the Iranian decide that the Huthis will no longer engage in violence there”.
01/11/2018	The Hadi government  itself “ready to immediately launch talks on the process of confidence-building”.
30/10/2018	Secretary Pompeo  that “the time is now for the cessation of hostilities” in Yemen, “including missile and UAV strikes from Huthi-controlled areas into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Subsequently, Coalition air strikes must cease in all populated areas in Yemen”.
28/10/2018	Huthi forces  an upgraded version of the Badr-1 ballistic missile, dubbed the Badr-1P.
27/10/2018	U.S. Secretary of Defence James Mattis  that “we stand against Iran’s unsafe, even reckless behaviour in the maritime domain, like the July attacks on international shipping by Iranian-supplied Huthis in the Bab al-Mandab. These behaviours flout freedom of navigation and disrupt maritime security and global trade”.
26/10/2018	Secretary Pompeo  that Huthi missiles fired at Saudi Arabia and the UAE “are coming from and the hardware and software that supports them are coming from the Islamic Republic of Iran… so what you have is a proxy war being engaged in by Iran against Saudi Arabia and the Emirates”. Pompeo went on to assert that “our ask of Iran is just to simply become a normal country. Stop exporting terror, stop using proxy forces to create chaos around the world, and then we will welcome them back into the league of nations. And we’re just – we’re waiting on them to do that”.
13/10/2018	Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi  that “we have shouldered responsibility so as not to leave the Yemeni people to be led according to Iran’s plan that wants to build the Persian empire”. Hadi also indicated that “there are [people who are in custody] in Yemen from the IRGC and… Lebanese Hizbollah”.
04/10/2018	The commander of U.S. Central Command, Joseph Votel,  that “Iran continues to export missiles, rockets and unmanned aerial systems to the Huthis”.
30/09/2018	The Huthis  to have struck Dubai International Airport using a Samad-3 drone
30/09/2018	The Saudi Navy reportedly  two “booby-trapped [Huthi] boats heading toward the port of Jizan”.
29/09/2018	A minister in the Hadi government  Lebanon “to intervene to stop the subversive and inciting activities of the Iranian Huthi militias in Lebanon under the cover of political, security and financial support from Hizbollah”.
27/09/2018	At the UN, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi,  that “all attempts at peace that are made with [the Huthis] are doomed to fail”, adding that “peace cannot be obtained by cajoling those gangsters as some member states do”.
26/09/2018	A senior U.S. diplomat  the establishment of Middle East Strategic Alliance as providing a “strong shield against threats in the Gulf”, and described Iran as the “number one threat”. He also suggested that “Iran is getting away with literally murder” in Yemen, adding that “it’s incumbent on all of us to raise the cost to Iran”.
22/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Jizan.
19/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Jizan
19/09/2018	Saudi Arabia’s U.S. ambassador  that “the security of Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Horn of Africa is vital for KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia], the region and the world. Around fifteen per cent of the world’s trade passes through this area and KSA will keep working towards safeguarding the region from instability whether it’s from piracy or Iran’s militias”.
19/09/2018	The U.S. special representative for Iran, Brian Hook,  that “there is… mounting evidence that Iran is providing ballistic missile technology to the Huthis in Yemen”.
14/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Jizan.
13/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Najran.
12/09/2018	Iran and the EU/E4 met in Brussels for  about Yemen, the third in a series of discussions on regional issues.
11/09/2018	The U.S. secretary of state ” to Congress… that the governments of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are undertaking demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of these governments” in Yemen. The decision was subsequently  by the Pentagon.
07/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Najran.
06/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired toward Jizan.
05/09/2018	More than three dozen people were  in Saudi Arabia from the debris of a Huthi missile launched at Najran. According to the Saudi-led coalition, the Huthis “have so far fired 189 ballistic missiles toward and kingdom and these have  in the death of a total of 112 civilians, including [Saudi] citizens and expatriates, and injury of hundreds of others”.
04/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a pair of Huthi missiles aimed at Jizan.
02/09/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile aimed at Jizan.
01/09/2018	The Huthis  to have attacked a Saudi military vessel.
31/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired toward Najran
28/08/2018	A  by UN-appointed experts on Yemen tallied nearly 17,000 civilian casualties in Yemen between March 2015 and June 2018, and found that “coalition air strikes have caused most of the documented civilian casualties”. The Saudi-led  and their Yemeni  denounced the report.
28/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired towards Najran.
28/08/2018	The USS Dunham  a cache of weapons aboard an unflagged dhow in the Gulf of Aden.
27/08/2018	The UAE  claims of a Huthi drone  against Dubai International Airport.
23/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Jizan
23/08/2018	The Saudi-led coalition  to have thwarted an attempt by the Huthis to strike a commercial ship with a bomb-laden speedboat
21/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Jizan
18/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Jizan.
18/08/2018	The Saudi-led coalition  “that it had destroyed the SAM Type-6 air defence system of [the] Huthi militias in Sanaa”, stating that “we will prevent terrorist organisations from acquiring capabilities that threaten air navigation”.
18/08/2018	The leader of Hizbollah, Hassan Nasrallah,  with senior Huthi officials in Lebanon.
16/08/2018	A senior Huthi official : “that the aggressor countries, [namely] the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their allies, did not accept the [unilateral Huthi] ceasefire confirms that they are terrorist breeders and war merchants who have ruined Yemen and committed war crimes against this nation on a daily basis”.
13/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Najran.
10/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  two Huthi missiles fired at Jizan.
10/08/2018	Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the U.S., Khalid bin Salman, seized on comments by an IRGC official to  that “there should be no more doubt about the Iranian regime’s menacing role in Yemen… its belligerent use of proxy warfare threatens global trade and is a continuation of their outlawed and globally condemned behaviour since 1979”. The comments, which suggested that Iran had instructed the Huthis to carry out attacks against Saudi vessels, had been  by Iranian media as a misquote.
09/08/2018	Iran blasted an 8 August  issued by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation which, inter alia, urged the UN Security Council “to hold the Huthi militias and their Iranian sponsors accountable for their countless crimes against international law”. The foreign ministry  that Iranian representatives “cannot attend the meetings of the… OIC as Saudi Arabia refuses to grant visas to them, and these kinds of statements are issued under the pressure posed by Saudi Arabia in an unfair and partial manner”.
08/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi  missile fired at Jizan
06/08/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile targeting Najran.
04/08/2018	The Saudi government  that it had “resumed oil shipments through Bab al-Mandab”, which were  on 25 July following Huthi attacks against two Saudi tankers.
03/08/2018	Iran’s foreign ministry  that “blasting, killing and taking revenge from the innocent people and attacking civilian targets…. to compensate for Saudi Arabia and its allies’ prolonged failures in Yemen is nothing but a war crime, and the silence of the international community has worsened the situation of civilians in war-torn Yemen”.
01/08/2018	Prime Minister Netanyahu  that “at the start of the week we witnessed a sharp clash with Iranian proxies who tried to obstruct international navigation in the straits at the entrance to the Red Sea. If Iran tries to block the Bab al-Mandab, I am convinced that it will find itself facing a determined international coalition to prevent this. This coalition would also include the State of Israel and all its arms”.
31/07/2018	The Huthis  a “unilateral halt in naval military operations” for two weeks beginning on 1 August, adding that it “could be extended and include all fronts if this move is reciprocated by the leadership of the coalition”.
27/07/2018	Saudi Arabia’s UN envoy  in letters to the Secretary-General and Security Council president that “the Security Council’s inaction… has allowed Iran to arm the terrorist Huthi militias with several ballistic missiles, drones and sea mines”.
26/07/2018	A senior Huthi official that their forces are “not after bombarding [other countries], but cannot also sit back. From now on, the capitals of the Arab coalition members will no longer be safe”.
26/07/2018	Pro-Huthi media that the Huthis conducted “three raids on Abu Dhabi International Airport” using a Sammad-3 drone, in an operation that a Huthi spokesman “shows our forces are no paper tiger like our enemies claim”. The UAE the claims.
25/07/2018	A Huthi attack against a Saudi oil tanker “slight damage” to the ship
25/07/2018	A senior Huthi official that “our missiles are capable of targeting ports in other members countries of the aggressive Saudi-led coalition [than Saudi Arabia].
25/07/2018	Saudi Aramco that it had “temporarily halted all oil shipments through Bab al-Mandeb with immediate effect” after the Huthis attacked two tankers, causing “minimal damage” to one of the vessels. In a statement, the UAE that “this cowardly attack mirrors the negative and dangerous role played by Iran in support of these coup militias and insisting on its hostile practices through providing the Huthi terrorists with weapons, equipment and ballistic missiles that threaten peace and security in the region”.
23/07/2018	A senior Saudi diplomat maintainted that “today, Saudis live within minutes of new Iranian missiles pointed at them by the Huthis in Yemen. More than 160 Iranian missiles have been fired into Saudi Arabia”.
21/07/2018	A Huthi military official  that “our drones’ flights deep into Saudi Arabia and the attacks on the economic companies of this regime were our response to the massive heliborne operation [carried out by Saudi-led forces] on the west coast region to take control of Hodeida”. He added that “all military, economic and political sites of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are within the range of our weapons”.
19/07/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile fired at Jizan
18/07/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile fired at Najran.
18/07/2018	The Huthi leader, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi, claims that the Huthis receive weapons and equipment from Iran through Hodeida. He also declared that “we are ready to stop rocket attacks on Saudi Arabia and the UAE if they stopped the bombing on our country”.
18/07/2018	The Huthis to have attacked an Aramco facility in Riyadh using a newly-developed droned dubbed Sammad-2
16/07/2018	Saudi Arabia’s envoy to the U.S. that “the advancement of the Yemeni forces on multiple fronts… is a testament that the people of Yemen are more than ever united on the goal of restoring peace to their country and expelling all Iranian influence”. He added that Saudi Arabia “will continue to lead the Coalition’s efforts towards achieving a political solution… until then we will to stand with brethren in Yemen against Iran’s expansionist agenda”.
14/07/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile at Najran
13/07/2018	The Huthi leader, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi, that “enemies are targeting all aspects of our lives. We must firmly resist their all-out aggression. They want us to recognise a despotic regime installed by the U.S. and Israel. The primary goal of the Saudi-led war on Yemen is to control us. Our only choice is to fight off aggressors”.
10/07/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile aimed at Jizan
10/07/2018	The secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, that “I do hope that there is ultimately a political resolution [in Yemen]… but at the end of the day it is going to require a global effort to convince the Iranians that this kind of meddling, this kind of interference, this kind of promotion of violence directed at Arab countries doesn’t make sense for them”.
09/07/2018	The Saudi-led coalition to have “evidence suggesting Hizbollah had been training elements of the Huthi militia”.
08/07/2018	In a to his Lebanese counterpart, Yemen’s foreign minister condemned remarks from Hizbollah’s leadership supporting the Huthis.
06/07/2018	A Huthi military official that “if [the Saudi-led coalition] intensify their attacks and aggression against innocent civilians in the residential areas of Yemen, we will also increase our military operations… and will target all important Saudi and Emirate political, economic and military positions with ballistic missiles”.
06/07/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile fired toward Jizan.
03/07/2018	A Huthi missile strike  injured a child in Jizan.
03/07/2018	The Huthis that they had produced “underground ballistic missile launchers that cannot be targeted by the Saudi-led coalition’s warplanes”.
02/07/2018	The IRGC’s commander, Mohammad Ali Jafari, that “the ignorant Arab coalition is bogged down in Yemen’s quagmire and is facing defeat and scandal [in Hodeida]“.
01/07/2018	The Huthis the UAE foreign minister’s 1 July that the coalition has “paused our campaign” in Hodeida, arguing that it “comes within the misleading practiced by the coalition countries to trick international public opinion and to cover up their failure in the western coast battle”.
01/07/2018	The UAE foreign minister, Anwar Garagh,  that “the Coalition has paused the advance on the city and post [of Hodeida] on June 23 for a week to allow the UN envoy to secure an unconditional [Huthi] withdrawal from Hodeida”.
29/06/2018	The Huthis “announced a successful test of a short-range ballistic missile”,  that “the new ballistic missile carries specifications [that] will be revealed in the coming days”.
25/06/2018	The Saudi-led coalition to have killed 8 Hizbollah fighters in clashes against Huthi forces in Saada.
25/06/2018	Yemeni forces to have apprehended seven Hizbollah members in Yemen’s northern governorate of Saada.
24/06/2018	Saudi Arabia two Huthi missiles aimed at
24/06/2018	The Huthi spokesman, Mohammad Abdulsalam, that “our rockets will reach places that the enemy will not expect… the longer the aggression and war continue, the greater our ballistic missile capabilities”.
20/06/2018	A senior Iranian official that “the Emiratis and Saudis should know that if they continue this unequal war [in Yemen], they will suffer more than today”.
19/06/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile aimed at Khamis Mushait
19/06/2018	The UAE exhibited captured weaponry that it  constitutes “physical evidence of Iranian support for the Huthi militias fighting in Yemen”.
17/06/2018	A Huthi missile fired toward Jizan one civilian injury.
17/06/2018	A Huthi official that “there is not even a single Iranian individual fighting in Yemen”.
17/06/2018	The Huthis to have seized a vessel “with French military personnel aboard”.
15/06/2018	The Huthi leader, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi, that “the west coast [of Yemen] will turn into a great swamp that overwhelms the invaders and the oppressors”.
14/06/2018	Following the launch of the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive against Hodeida, Iran  that “the crisis in Yemen has no military solution and resorting to force would lead nowhere”.
14/06/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile aimed at Khamis Mushait.
13/06/2018	Huthi forces to have a UAE military vessel “carrying troops prepared for landing on Hodeida coast”.
13/06/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile aimed at Jizan
13/06/2018	The Saudi-led coalition an offensive against the Huthi-held port city of Hodeida.
10/06/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi ballistic missile aimed at Jizan.
09/06/2018	Three Saudi civilians were in Jizan by what authorities described as a “projectile launched by the Huthi militia”.
05/06/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi ballistic missile aimed at Yanbu.
01/06/2018	A Huthi military official that “from now on Abu Dhabi is no longer safe, it will be within our ballistic missiles’ range”.
29/05/2018	Discussing the situation in Yemen, the U.S. defence secretary, Jim Mattis, that “the threat to the Red Sea shipping was pretty obvious when you saw the tanker get hit by an Iranian-supplied missile to the Huthis [in early April]“.
29/05/2018	Yemen’s pro-Hadi military the total number of naval mines cleared since January 2016 at 160.
27/05/2018	A Huthi military official that “the coming days could witness major confrontations” with Saudi Arabia.
26/05/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi drone bound for Abha International Airport. Pro-Huthi media subsequently claimed that “the Yemeni army has recently developed dozens of combat drones”.
25/05/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile aimed at Najran
24/05/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile bound for Jizan
22/05/2018	The U.S. Treasury Department  sanctions designations against five Iranians “who have provided ballistic missile-related technical expertise to Yemen’s Huthis, and who have transferred weapons not seen in Yemen prior to the current conflict”.
21/05/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired toward Jizan
19/05/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired toward Khamis Mushait
15/05/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile launched at Jizan.
11/05/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile fired at Jizan.
09/05/2018	Saudi Arabia reported the interception of Huthi missiles fired towards , , and .
06/05/2018	A Huthi military official that “If Saudi Arabia continues to kill the people of Yemen… Saudi vessels and sites at the Bab el-Mandeb strait will become military targets”.
06/05/2018	Saudi Arabia two Huthi missiles fired towards Najran.
28/04/2018	Saudi Arabia  four Huthi ballistic missiles directed at Jizan
27/04/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile fired at Najran.
23/04/2018	Huthi sources  the death on 19 April of the head of the supreme political council, Saleh Somad, in an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition.
23/04/2018	Saudi Arabia  two ballistic missiles that, according to pro-Huthi media, were  an Aramco facility in Jizan.
22/04/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile fired at Najran.
20/04/2018	Saudi Arabia  a Huthi missile intended for Jizan
16/04/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile intended for Najran. Pro-Huthi media reported that the missile, a Badr-1, had been at a power plant.
16/04/2018	The Saudi-led coalition put the of Huthi missiles fired towards Saudi Arabia at 119, and that “if the Huthis continue targeting industrial or residential facilities, the response will be hard and painful”.
15/04/2018	At an Arab League summit in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia’s King Salman “our strong condemnation of Iran’s terrorist acts in the Arab region”. He also indicated that the number of Huthi missiles fired at Saudi Arabia since 2015 was 116. Iran’s foreign ministry censured his comments the following day.
12/04/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi ballistic missile fired from Saada towards Jizan.
04/04/2018	Saudi Arabia a Huthi missile intended for an Aramco facility in Jizan.
03/04/2018	The Abqaiq, a Saudi super tanker, reportedly  “some minor damage” as the result of a Huthi attack in international waters.
31/03/2018	Debris from an intercepted Huthi missile  one person in Najran.
29/03/2018	Iranian and Saudi diplomats sent  to the UN over the situation in Yemen.
28/03/2018	A UN security council condemned the 25 March Huthi missile strikes against Saudi Arabia, adding “grave concern at the reports of continuing violations of the arms embargo”.
26/03/2018	According to a by Conflict Armament Research, “multiple strands of information suggest that Iran orchestrated the transfer of technology and materiel to Huthi forces in Yemen to assist in the manufacture of RCIEDs [radio-controlled improvised explosive devices]“.
25/03/2018	Saudi Arabia seven Huthi missiles reportedly fired towards Riyadh, Jizan, Najran, and Khamis Mushait. Debris one and injured two in Riyadh.
17/03/2018	The secretary of Iran’s supreme national security council, Ali Shamkhani, for “the beginning of Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue for the development of new political structures based on the vote and desires of the people of Yemen”.
26/02/2018	The U.S. strongly Russia’s veto of a UN Security Council resolution which “would have called out Iran for its actions” in Yemen. Iran the U.S. and UK of having “misuse[d] Security Council procedures to advance their political agenda”. A different resolution on Yemen, submitted by Russia, unanimously.
17/02/2018	The UK circulated a draft UN Security Council resolution, backed by the U.S. and France, which would  “condemn Iran for failing to stop ballistic missiles from falling into the hands of Yemen’s Huthi group and commit to take action over the sanctions violations”.
10/02/2018	Javad Zarif  with the Huthi spokesman, Mohammad Abdulsalam, in Tehran, and called “for an immediate stop to the war and bombing of [Yemen] by the Saudi-led coalition”.
05/02/2018	A Huthi missile fired at Khamis Mushait was  intercepted by Saudi Arabia.
29/01/2018	As the UN security council  what Washington suggests is “first-hand evidence… of Iran’s illegal weapons program”, various Iranian officials continued to deny providing missiles to the Huthis.
16/01/2018	Saudi Arabia  to have intercepted a Huthi missile fired at Jizan.
12/01/2018	A UN panel found Iran in  of the 2015 weapons embargo. Their report  that “Iran is in non-compliance with [the embargo] in that it failed to take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles to the Huthi-Saleh alliance”.
11/01/2018	Huthi forces  to have fired a Qaher 2-M missile at Najran. The missile was  intercepted.
09/01/2018	Head of Huthi political council, Saleh Somad,  that they will block Red Sea shipping lanes if the Saudi-led coalition continues their push towards Hoedida port.
05/01/2018	Another Huthi missile launch towards Najran was , after the Saudi-led coalition  the total number of Huthi missiles fired at Saudi Arabia at 86.
19/12/2017	The Saudi-led coalition said it  another ballistic missile over Riyadh. The Huthis claimed responsibility and said it was aimed at al-Yamama royal palace. The coalition spokesman  that the launch “proves the continued involvement of the Iranian regime in supporting [the] Huthi armed group with qualitative capabilities in a clear and blatant defiance of… UN resolution[s]“. In a televised address from Sanaa, the leader of the Huthis, Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi, : “as long as you [ie, the Saudi-led coalition] continue to target Sanaa, we will strike Riyadh and Abu Dhabi”.
15/12/2017	Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif,  a seven-page  arguing that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have “instigated a humanitarian catastrophe” in Yemen, to which the U.S. is “directly complicit”. The report also dismisses charges of Iranian missile transfers to the Huthis as “alternative facts”.
14/12/2017	The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, held a press conference to  what she described as “concrete evidence of illegal Iranian weapons proliferation”. Prominently displayed at the event were remains of a missile fired by Huthi forces against Riyadh, which Haley maintained was “made in Iran”. Iran  the display as “fabricated”.
08/12/2017	The UN Secretary-General  the fourth biannual report regarding Security Council Resolution 2231′s implementation. The report notes Saudi Arabia’s assessment regarding the Iranian origin of missiles fired from Yemen at Saudi Arabia in July and November 2017, but adds that “the Secretariat is still analysing the information collected”
05/12/2017	The commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammad Ali Jafari,  that Saleh’s killing pre-empted a Saudi coup plot against the Huthis.
04/12/2017	Huthi fighters Saleh.
03/12/2017	The Huthis  to have struck a UAE nuclear power plant with a missile
23/11/2017	General Jafari,  that “Iran only provides advisory and spiritual assistances to Yemen… and this help will continue”.
20/11/2017	Hizbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah,  in a televised speech that Hizbollah had provided military assistance to the Huthis. “I confirm… no ballistic missiles, no advanced weapons and no guns… we did not send weapons to Yemen”.
19/11/2017	The Arab League met in Cairo and issued a resolution highly critical of Iran. The Saudi foreign minister, Adel Jubeir,  during the meeting that Saudi Arabia “will not stand by and will not hesitate to defend its security”, while the Arab League’s secretary-general, Ahmed Aboul-Gheit,  the prospect of a “draft Arab resolution” regarding Iran for the UN Security Council’s consideration.
15/11/2017	Washington  released $205 million in frozen Yemeni assets to the Hadi government.
10/11/2017	U.S. military officials  that the Huthi missiles fired against Riyadh had Iranian origins.
09/11/2017	Iran’s foreign minister, Javad Zarif,  for implementation of a four-point peace plan for Yemen initially proposed by Tehran in 2015, which calls for a ceasefire, humanitarian assistance, inter-Yemeni dialogue and an inclusive government.
08/11/2017	Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani,  the Saudi-led campaign in Yemen, asking: “How should the Yemeni nation respond to bombardment on such a scale? They are told not to use their own weapons. Well, stop the bombing and see whether or not the Yemeni nation responds positively”.
08/11/2017	The Huthis  further attacks on Saudi and Emirati ports and airports.
08/11/2017	The White House released a statement affirming its support for Saudi Arabia. The  notes that “Houthi missile strikes against Saudi Arabia, enabled by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, threaten regional security and undermine UN efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict”.
07/11/2017	Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman,  that the missile attack on 4 November “may be considered an act of war”.
07/11/2017	The Saudi embassy in Washington published a  entitled “Facts about Iranian Involvement in Houthi Aggression against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”.  It stated that Riyadh had “conclusively proven” that the missile used in the 4 November attack “was an Iranian made Qiam ballistic missile”. The statement goes on to make several other charges of Iranian involvement with the Huthis, such as training and providing drones.
05/11/2017	The head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards rejected charges of an Iranian role in the 4 November missile attack. General Jafari  that “shipping missiles to Yemen is not even possible and these missiles that are being launched belong to Yemen”.
04/11/2017	Huthi/Saleh forces in Yemen fired a Burkan 2-H long-range ballistic missile at the Saudi capital, Riyadh.

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