Introduction

In May 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump undertook a high-profile Middle East trip, visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This journey, characterized by a focus on securing multibillion-dollar business deals and economic partnerships, marked a significant moment in U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Unlike previous presidential visits that often prioritized diplomatic initiatives such as peace negotiations or counterterrorism strategies, Trump’s agenda centered on economic statecraft, leveraging the financial power of Gulf states to bolster U.S. economic interests. Key outcomes included a $142 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, described as the “largest defense cooperation agreement in history,” and investment pledges of $600 billion from Saudi Arabia and $1.4 trillion from the UAE over the coming years (The Guardian; New York Times).

However, the trip’s implications extend beyond economic gains, particularly for Israel, a traditional U.S. ally notably absent from Trump’s itinerary. This exclusion, coupled with actions such as lifting sanctions on Syria and brokering a deal with Yemen’s Houthi rebels, has raised concerns in Jerusalem about a potential shift in U.S. priorities toward Gulf states at the expense of longstanding strategic alliances (Reuters). The Middle East in 2025 is marked by ongoing conflicts, including the war in Gaza, tensions with Iran, and instability in post-Assad Syria, making Trump’s focus on economic deals rather than diplomacy a point of contention. Additionally, ethical concerns surrounding the Trump family’s business interests in the region and questions about ties to controversial actors further complicate the geopolitical landscape. This report examines the motivations behind Trump’s strategy, its impact on Israel, and the broader regional dynamics, addressing concerns about alleged connections to groups like Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

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Strategic Recalibration in the Post-2023 Middle East Context

The vicious Hamas attack of October 7, 2023 and the ensuing Gaza war not only froze the momentum toward a Saudi–Israel rapprochement but also profoundly altered the strategic calculus for all parties. As Israeli forces besieged Gaza, the conflict’s human toll mounted to unprecedented levels – by early 2025, over 50,000 Palestinians had been killed according to Gaza health authorities (with roughly one-third of the dead being children), alongside more than 1,200 Israelis (mostly civilians) slain in Hamas’s initial onslaught. These harrowing figures galvanized fury across the Arab and Muslim world, making any overt normalization virtually untenable in the immediate term. Saudi Arabia, which only weeks prior had appeared to be edging toward a historic deal, swiftly put the U.S.-brokered talks on ice once the war erupted. In uncharacteristically harsh tones, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) condemned the “crimes of the Israeli occupation” in Gaza and reaffirmed that the kingdom “will not” establish relations with Israel absent an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This post-war hardening of Saudi Arabia’s public stance – essentially reasserting the core of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative – reflected not only official policy but the imperative of aligning with outraged regional opinion.

Indeed, Riyadh’s strategic recalibration in late 2023 underscored the complex balancing act it faces. Prior to the Gaza war, MbS had hinted at flexibility on the Palestinian question. In a September 2023 televised interview, he stressed the Palestinian issue was “very important” but spoke of “easing the life of the Palestinians” as an interim goal, expressing hope of eventually “get[ting] Israel as a player in the Middle East”. American and Israeli observers interpreted these comments as a signal that Saudi demands might shift from immediate statehood to more modest concessions to improve Palestinian living conditions. That perception of a lowered bar was born of the geopolitical context: by 2023 MbS was keen on securing a U.S. defense pact and advanced technology for the kingdom, and he appeared sensitive to the “price” Saudi Arabia had long paid by tying itself to a maximalist Palestinian stance. All of that changed once Gaza burned. The immense bloodshed and televised devastation made any perceived Saudi retreat on Palestinian statehood politically toxic. MbS pivoted back to an uncompromising posture, in line with King Salman’s lifelong insistence on Palestinian rights. In his annual Shura Council address in September 2024, MbS categorically declared that Saudi Arabia “will not recognize Israel” or normalize ties “without that” – “that” meaning a viable Palestinian state. The message was clear: however tantalizing a U.S.-Israeli-Saudi grand bargain might be, the kingdom cannot forsake the Palestinian cause without jeopardizing its regional leadership and domestic legitimacy.

Domestic public opinion is a critical – if often understated – factor in these calculations. Although Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy, public sentiment on the Arab–Israeli conflict acts as a real, albeit informal, constraint on decision-makers. The Gaza war’s carnage provoked an upsurge of popular anger in Saudi society. Many Saudis participated in grassroots campaigns boycotting Western brands and products linked to countries seen as abetting Israel – a striking display of civic activism in a country that tightly controls political expression. Surveys taken in the wake of the war show near-unanimous opposition to normalization among Saudi citizens. In December 2023, for example, 96% of Saudis polled expressed opposition to any rapprochement between Israel and the Arab world. By January 2024, Saudi public opposition to their own country recognizing Israel had spiked to 68%, the highest level recorded in nearly a decade. (The differing figures reflect varying question phrasing, but both underscore an overwhelming majority sentiment.) Such data reinforce what political scientists note: even autocratic rulers like MbS must weigh domestic opinion on high-salience issues. Facing this landscape, the Saudi leadership has little room to maneuver. Moving too far toward Israel without tangible progress on Palestine could risk domestic backlash or embolden rivals. Thus, Saudi strategy since 2023 has been to slow-walk normalization, publicly doubling down on the Palestinian prerequisite while quietly keeping channels with Washington open for a better deal in the future.

Saudi Arabia’s regional calculus has also evolved in light of shifting alliances and security considerations. Earlier in 2023, Riyadh surprised observers by restoring ties with Iran in a Chinese-brokered agreement – a move that eased the immediate threat from its primary rival and diversified Saudi Arabia’s great-power partners. This détente with Tehran, alongside deepening links with China and Russia, gave MbS a measure of strategic breathing space. It reduced Saudi dependence on an Israeli partnership against Iran, thereby lowering the urgency of a quick deal with Israel on unfavorable terms. However, it also introduced new risk vectors. Iran’s network of regional proxies made clear that a Saudi-Israeli alignment could carry costs. Yemen’s Houthi movement, aligned with Tehran, dramatically escalated its long-range attacks as the Gaza war unfolded – targeting ships in the Red Sea and declaring solidarity with the Palestinians. In July 2024, the Houthis released a brazen video threat titled “Just Try It”, featuring drone footage of Saudi ports and oil facilities and warning Riyadh against any support for U.S.-Israeli military efforts. By October 2024, as Israel’s war on Hamas dragged on, Iran explicitly cautioned Saudi Arabia that any regional backing for Israel could result in strikes on Saudi oil infrastructure. Such warnings would not be taken lightly in Riyadh – memories of the 2019 drone attack on Abqaiq (widely blamed on Iran) are still fresh. In sum, the kingdom recognizes that normalizing ties with Israel without resolving the Palestinian issue could inflame conflicts on its doorstep, from Yemen to Lebanon, and hand Iran a potent rallying cry. MbS’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran and continued engagement with forums like the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signal an intent to hedge Saudi bets. He is methodically pursuing a multipolar foreign policy, ensuring that if U.S.-led normalization stalls, Saudi Arabia is not isolated or defenseless.

On the Israeli side, the October 2023 war likewise proved a watershed – but in a markedly different way. The brutal Hamas attack and the gruelling Gaza campaign that followed have entrenched the worldview of Israel’s current leadership. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s hard-line coalition, already the most right-wing in Israel’s history, emerged from the conflict even more averse to compromise on the Palestinian question. The war validated, in their eyes, a doctrine of uncompromising security. As one senior Israeli official put it bluntly, normalization with Arab states is desirable, but not at the expense of Israel’s “vital interests” in the territories. In practice, Netanyahu has been unwilling to “pay the price” that Saudi normalization would require – namely, any meaningful concessions toward Palestinian statehood. Instead, his government has moved in the opposite direction. Throughout 2023 and 2024, Israel accelerated its de facto annexation of the West Bank. It approved waves of new settlement construction and systematically legalized wildcat outposts on Palestinian land. According to data from the monitoring group Peace Now, 2024 saw the largest seizure of West Bank territory by the Israeli state since the 1993 Oslo Accords – a dramatic land grab that makes a future contiguous Palestinian state ever more elusive. Simultaneously, Israeli authorities have continued to undermine the Palestinian Authority (PA), cutting its revenues and conducting near-daily military raids in PA-administered areas under the pretext of security. The cumulative effect is an erosion of Palestinian institutional capacity and credibility. Far from contemplating steps to empower a Palestinian state-in-waiting, Israel’s ruling coalition seems intent on foreclosing that possibility.

This hard-line trajectory is buttressed by Israel’s internal political dynamics and public mood. The Israeli Knesset (parliament) has, since the war, passed two symbolic resolutions repudiating the two-state solution outright. In one notable vote in July 2024, legislators declared the establishment of a Palestinian state to be an “existential danger” to Israel’s future – even the opposition leader Benny Gantz, often seen as a centrist, lent his support to the motion. The fact that such a statement could garner broad backing across the spectrum speaks volumes about the post-October 7 consensus in Israel. Lawmakers who once championed a two-state peace, including members of the moderate camp, largely stayed silent or absented themselves, knowing how unpopular the notion of Palestinian statehood had become among an Israeli public reeling from war. Recent polling underscores this societal shift. As of May 2024, nearly 74% of Israeli Jews opposed any Saudi normalization deal that would involve creating a Palestinian state. Half of Jewish Israelis surveyed said they would prefer Israel retain indefinite military control over Gaza rather than see it become part of an independent Palestine. Only 19% of Israeli Jews believed a peaceful two-state coexistence is even plausible – the lowest level of optimism on record since such surveys began in 2013. In the wake of the Hamas onslaught, even left-leaning Israelis have largely prioritized a sense of physical security and vengeance over abstract ideals of peace. The historian Omer Bartov observed that Israelis now perceive a zero-sum “struggle between justice and existence, [where] existence must win out”. In this climate of fear and nationalist fervor, Netanyahu faces little pressure at home to make concessions to the Palestinians – and significant pressure from his coalition partners not to. Ultra-nationalist figures in his cabinet (such as Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir) have openly vowed to block any measures that would cede land or sovereignty. This domestic context explains why, despite Netanyahu’s personal enthusiasm for a diplomatic coup with Saudi Arabia, he has rebuffed the required Palestinian “gestures” at every turn. Even incremental steps – like freezing settlement expansion or transferring more West Bank territory to PA civilian control – have been deemed too high a price. Israel’s priority in the aftermath of 2023’s traumas is consolidation, not compromise.

Caught between these opposing outlooks, the United States has been navigating one of its most delicate Middle East initiatives in decades. Washington’s influence has been pivotal in both spurring the normalization agenda and, after October 2023, trying to keep it alive amid crisis. In early 2023, the Biden administration launched an ambitious effort to broker a three-way deal: Saudi-Israeli normalization, coupled with a U.S.–Saudi security pact and U.S. support for a Saudi civil nuclear program – all mediated by the United States. The logic was to achieve a transformative win-win-win: formal peace between Israel and the most important Arab/Muslim power, stronger U.S.–Saudi ties (after years of strain), and a boost to the moribund Israeli-Palestinian peace process. By mid-2023, American negotiators were shuttling between Riyadh and Jerusalem to outline the framework. Strategic imperatives drove this push. U.S. officials saw an opportunity to counter China’s expanding influence in the Gulf and lock Saudi Arabia firmly back into the American fold. They also viewed a Saudi-Israel deal as a way to reinforce a regional front against Iran and to potentially quiet criticism of Saudi Arabia (by delivering a diplomatic breakthrough that appeals to Washington’s foreign policy establishment). President Biden, eyeing reelection, was cognizant that a major Middle East peace achievement could burnish his legacy as the original Abraham Accords had done for his predecessor.

Yet from the start, the U.S. mediation had to contend with difficult trade-offs – not just between the parties, but also in domestic U.S. politics. Any U.S.–Saudi defense treaty emerging from a deal would require a two-thirds Senate majority for ratification. Thus, Biden needed bipartisan buy-in, which meant satisfying both pro-Israel Republicans and skeptical, human-rights-conscious Democrats. Republicans in Congress made clear that their support for a Saudi pact hinged on delivering a big win for Israel’s security and stature. On the other side, many Democrats insisted on a significant Palestinian component as the moral quid pro quo for rewarding Saudi Arabia (and implicitly Netanyahu’s hard-right government). This balancing act shaped U.S. negotiating positions in 2023. American envoys, led by senior Biden aides, sought to square the circle by extracting limited Palestinian concessions from Israel that would be meaningful enough to placate Democrats and Arab partners, yet not so extensive as to collapse Netanyahu’s coalition. The behind-closed-doors talks thus focused on intermediate steps: a symbolic commitment to two-state aspirations, a partial freeze or slowdown of settlements, the transfer of certain West Bank areas to PA administrative control, and assurances regarding Jerusalem’s holy sites. According to officials involved, both Washington and Riyadh agreed that Israel needed to “reverse… annexation trends” on the ground as part of the deal. This meant curbing settlement expansion and violence that were undermining the status quo. They also concurred that any agreement should explicitly acknowledge the goal of an eventual Palestinian state (even if only as a distant horizon). During the summer of 2023 these issues became the thorniest aspect of the trilateral U.S.-Saudi-Israeli negotiation – effectively “the elephant in the room” that no one could ignore. The Palestinian Authority’s President Mahmoud Abbas, for his part, lobbied the Saudis intensively not to leave Palestinian interests by the wayside. Determined not to be sidelined as he was during the Abraham Accords in 2020, Abbas engaged MbS “in full force,” urging the kingdom to leverage its bargaining power with Israel on behalf of Palestinian statehood. These efforts ensured that, up until the war began, a Palestinian component remained on the table in the U.S.-mediated package.

The outbreak of war in October 2023 forced Washington to recalibrate its priorities overnight. Immediately, the Biden administration shifted into crisis-management mode: funneling emergency support to Israel, attempting to secure the release of hostages, and working with Egypt and Qatar to alleviate Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe. The grand diplomacy of normalization was relegated to the back burner while Gaza burned. However, even amid the war, the U.S. did not abandon the notion that a broader peace framework could emerge from the ashes. In fact, the conflict’s explosion reaffirmed to many policymakers that the Palestinian issue needed to be addressed, not perpetually postponed. As one analysis noted, the war shifted Palestine from an “afterthought to an urgent international priority” for Washington and even Riyadh. With this in mind, the U.S. quietly convened an Arab contact group in the first months of 2024 to discuss Gaza’s future in tandem with regional peace. This group – comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority – met multiple times to develop a coordinated Arab position. By January 2024, they had drafted an “Arab Vision on the Developments of the Palestinian Cause,” essentially a plan for ending the Gaza war and rebooting a political process afterward. Notably, a U.S. response paper (circulated by the State Department) explicitly referenced the potential linkage of Saudi-Israeli normalization with progress toward a two-state solution. It argued that peace and regional integration “that will benefit all” could be achieved if normalization was accompanied by “concrete progress” on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In behind-the-scenes diplomacy, American officials essentially affirmed that Saudi normalization should go hand-in-hand with measures to realize Palestinian political rights – a significant stance, given that the Trump-era Abraham Accords had largely bypassed Palestine. For their part, the Arab states in the contact group were unequivocal: Gaza’s end-state must be tied to Palestinian statehood goals. Saudi Arabia and Egypt pushed for any interim arrangements in Gaza (such as a ceasefire or reconstruction mechanism) to strengthen the Palestinian Authority’s role, paving the way for reuniting Gaza and the West Bank under one governance once Hamas was neutralized. Even the UAE – a country that had normalized with Israel in 2020 – insisted on a two-state framework in its official statements during the war, declaring that the “day after” must “fundamentally alter the trajectory” toward an independent Palestine living in peace with Israel. Such unanimity among Arab states was striking. It suggested that the regional consensus around the Palestinian cause actually re-solidified in reaction to the war, reversing the prior trend where some Gulf states were willing to engage Israel without a peace settlement.

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the reality on the ground in 2024 imposed severe limits on progress. The Gaza war raged on far longer than many anticipated – stretching into a grueling 15-month campaign by Israel to dismantle Hamas. Israel’s military focus remained fixed on Gaza and containing other fronts (such as flare-ups with Hezbollah on the Lebanon border, which escalated to a brief war in late 2024). Israeli officials offered no clear post-war political vision for Gaza besides indefinite security control, and they showed “little willingness to adjust [their] objectives” despite international pressure. In the West Bank, violence and Israeli incursions intensified, undermining any confidence-building measures. By mid-2024, Israel’s foreign minister was describing operations in the northern West Bank as a “full-fledged war” against militant strongholds. This ongoing turmoil meant that any talk of negotiations or concessions was essentially moot – Israel was in crisis mode, and its leaders publicly argued that now was certainly not the time to discuss Palestinian statehood, which they equated with rewarding terrorism. U.S. diplomats tried to keep the door open: for instance, they reportedly urged Arab partners not to impose a firm deadline on Israel for moving toward a two-state solution, wary that an ultimatum would backfire. But these nuances did little to change the fundamental impasse. By late 2024, the Saudi-Israeli normalization initiative had stalled indefinitely, with officials on all sides privately acknowledging that the status quo – however volatile and unsatisfactory – prevailed.

As 2025 began, new geopolitical factors started to play into this equation. The United States underwent a leadership transition after the 2024 election, with the incoming administration signaling a potentially different approach to the Middle East. Notably, former President Donald Trump – who had originally championed the Abraham Accords – returned to office (amid expectations of rekindling his trademark deal-making). Early indications suggested that Trump’s team might decouple the Palestinian issue from the Saudi normalization track, effectively picking up where the Abraham Accords left off. In fact, reports emerged that Trump was “no longer conditioning” a prospective U.S.–Saudi nuclear pact on Riyadh recognizing Israel. Such an approach would represent a stark departure from Biden’s linkage strategy. It implies Washington might offer Saudi Arabia coveted defense and nuclear agreements without insisting on major Israeli concessions to the Palestinians – thereby relieving Netanyahu of U.S. pressure on that front. Additionally, in the closing weeks of 2024, senior Israeli envoys (like Minister Ron Dermer) quietly met with Trump’s advisors to discuss the path forward. These contacts reportedly focused on countering Iran and bolstering Israel’s security in Gaza, rather than on Palestinian statehood, reinforcing expectations that a renewed U.S. push for normalization under Trump would center on hard security interests more than diplomatic compromises. How Saudi Arabia will respond to this new context remains to be seen. On one hand, MbS greatly values his relationship with the Trump circle (which is less openly critical of Saudi domestic issues), and he might find an approach that demands less for the Palestinians appealing if it accelerates the benefits to Riyadh. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has now tied its credibility to the insistence on a Palestinian state – walking that back too blatantly could carry reputational costs for MbS in the Arab and Muslim world. The next phase of talks, if they resume, could therefore test whether the Palestinian issue truly is a non-negotiable condition for Saudi Arabia or a bargaining chip that can be finessed with enough incentives.

Looking ahead, the triangular dynamic among Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the U.S. will continue to define the prospects for any grand bargain. Each player faces significant internal and external constraints. Saudi Arabia appears firm that it will settle for nothing less than a deal that at least preserves the prospect of Palestinian statehood – MbS’s own words underscore this commitment to an eventual two-state outcome. But Riyadh also has a timeframe in mind: it is embarking on Vision 2030 economic projects and wants a stable regional environment and advanced technology sooner rather than later. If Israel remains recalcitrant on the Palestinian front, the Saudis might explore interim forms of détente (short of full normalization) or lean further into alternate partnerships (China, Russia) to fulfill immediate needs. Israel’s leadership, for its part, shows no sign of moderating its stance. The current ruling coalition continues to view Palestinian statehood as an existential threat, not a quid pro quo for peace. Unless there is a dramatic change in Israeli politics – for instance, a new government that marginalizes the far right – it is difficult to envision Jerusalem voluntarily agreeing to the kind of concessions that would satisfy even a minimalist Saudi ask (such as a freeze on West Bank expansion or the reopening of a political dialogue with the PA). Furthermore, the Palestinian political divide adds another layer of complication. The Palestinian Authority, weakened and discredited, struggles to assert itself even in the West Bank, let alone speak for Gaza. Hamas, though militarily battered, remains a wildcard factor; its very existence is used by Israel to argue that any Palestinian state would become a terror haven. In this climate, the absence of a unified and effective Palestinian interlocutor makes it easier for Israeli hard-liners to say there is “no partner” for peace – and harder for Saudi or American mediators to frame exactly what a Palestinian state component would look like on the ground.

Finally, the United States faces the task of reconciling its broader Middle East strategy with the intractability of the core conflict. Washington’s credibility as a broker was bruised by the 2023 war – many in the Global South accused the U.S. of bias, given its robust military and diplomatic backing of Israel during the Gaza campaign. Yet the U.S. remains the only actor with the leverage to nudge both Israel and Saudi Arabia toward an understanding. Going forward, U.S. officials will have to decide how much political capital to invest in chasing the Saudi-Israel deal and what balance of incentives and assurances can overcome the current stalemate. There is a growing recognition in policy circles that any normalization accord now will likely be more limited in scope than the once-envisioned “grand bargain.” Some analysts posit that a phased or partial normalization could happen – for example, opening Saudi airspace to Israel (which has de facto already begun), economic cooperation through backchannels, or a quiet security alignment against Iran – without an immediate public embassy exchange or formal peace until the Palestinian issue is addressed in the longer term. In other words, a pragmatic, face-saving arrangement might emerge, buying time and gradual trust. High-level political analysis from late 2024 suggests that while a Saudi–Israel deal “will likely happen eventually,” it may “fall short of expectations” in transformational impact. It could resemble a transactional alliance more than a rosy reconciliation, especially if Palestinian self-determination remains sidelined.

In conclusion, the agenda of Palestinian statehood and Saudi-Israel normalization remains stalled – but not static. The events of the past two years have injected new variables into this equation: a devastating war that refocused attention on the status quo’s unsustainability, a reassertion of Arab solidarity on Palestine tempered by the realpolitik of survival, an emboldened Israeli right wing convinced that territorial maximalism has paid off, and a United States recalibrating its role amid global power shifts. Each stakeholder is recalculating: Saudi Arabia is determined to secure its national interests (security guarantees, advanced technology, great-power investment) yet cannot do so at the expense of its historical commitments; Israel seeks regional acceptance but on its own terms of continued dominance; and the U.S. is caught in the middle, trying to engineer a breakthrough without igniting regional tinderboxes or domestic political backlash. History has shown that breakthroughs in the Middle East often come unexpectedly – but they are only made possible by painstaking groundwork and shifts in perception. For now, the groundwork is still being laid through quiet dialogues and confidence-building measures. If a window opens – say, a prolonged ceasefire in Gaza, a change in Israeli coalition politics, or an innovative Saudi proposal – the parties might revive talks with the benefit of the sobering lessons learned since 2023. Until such conditions ripen, however, the grand bargain linking Saudi normalization with a two-state peace remains elusive, very much a “stalled agenda” caught in the inertia of a volatile status quo. The coming period will reveal whether this stalemate is a temporary pause or a more enduring impasse in the quest to reconcile Israel’s integration into the region with the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people.

Table: Verified Strategic Data on Saudi-Israel Normalization and Palestinian Statehood (2023–2025)

Economic Statecraft: A Transactional Pivot

The cornerstone of Trump’s Middle East strategy was a series of economic agreements designed to channel Gulf wealth into the U.S. economy. During his visit to Riyadh on May 13, 2025, Trump announced a $600 billion investment commitment from Saudi Arabia over four years, targeting sectors such as infrastructure, defense, and artificial intelligence (Reuters). The UAE, in parallel, pledged $1.4 trillion over ten years, reinforcing the Gulf’s role as a financial powerhouse (CNBC). These commitments align with Trump’s “America First” doctrine, prioritizing tangible economic gains over protracted diplomatic engagements.

The most significant deal was a $142 billion arms package with Saudi Arabia, described by the White House as the “largest defense cooperation agreement” in U.S. history (Reuters). This agreement encompasses advanced weaponry, including C-130 transport aircraft, missiles, radar systems, and potentially Lockheed Martin’s F-35 stealth fighters, alongside training programs for the Royal Saudi Armed Forces (Army Recognition). Over a dozen U.S. defense contractors, such as Boeing, RTX Corp, and General Atomics, are involved, with specific contracts including $20 billion for General Atomics’ MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones (Reuters). Additionally, Saudi Arabia committed $20 billion to the U.S. artificial intelligence sector, signaling a broader economic partnership (Euronews).

For Israel, this arms deal presents a dual-edged sword. The influx of advanced weaponry into Saudi hands raises concerns about Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME), a U.S. policy enshrined in law to ensure Israel’s technological superiority over regional neighbors (The Washington Post). Israel has operated F-35s since 2016, building multiple squadrons, which provides a current advantage (Reuters). However, if Saudi Arabia acquires similar systems, it could challenge Israel’s air dominance, potentially sparking a regional arms race. Historical precedents, such as Israel’s concerns over a $110 billion U.S.-Saudi arms deal in 2017, underscore these anxieties (CBS News). Conversely, a militarily robust Saudi Arabia could serve as a counterweight to Iran, aligning with Israel’s strategic interest in containing Tehran’s influence (Council on Foreign Relations). The deal’s long-term implications hinge on whether the U.S. upholds its QME commitment, potentially through compensatory arms packages to Israel, as seen in past negotiations (Brookings).

Geopolitical Realignments: Challenges to Israel’s Security

Trump’s trip precipitated several geopolitical realignments that have reshaped the Middle East’s strategic landscape, each posing distinct challenges to Israel’s security.

Lifting Sanctions on Syria

On May 13, 2025, Trump announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, a decision influenced by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Reuters). This policy shift, aimed at giving Syria “a chance at greatness,” followed the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, with Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former al-Nusra figure, assuming leadership (CNN). The move enables Syria to re-engage with global financial systems, facilitating trade and reconstruction after a 14-year civil war that left its GDP at approximately $9 billion in 2024, down from $60 billion in 2010 (World Bank, 2024).

Israel views this development with alarm. Syrian interim President al-Sharaa, despite severing ties with al-Qaeda in 2016, is labeled a “jihadist” by Israeli officials, who fear his administration’s potential alignment with Iran and Hezbollah (Reuters). Israel has conducted over 200 airstrikes in Syria since 2011 to disrupt Iranian entrenchment, targeting weapons transfers to Hezbollah, which maintains an estimated 150,000 rockets (The Washington Post). The sanctions relief could bolster Syria’s economy, potentially enabling Iran to reassert influence, a scenario Israel seeks to prevent through continued military operations. Moreover, Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa on May 14, 2025, and suggestions that Syria join the Abraham Accords, mediated by the UAE, have heightened Israel’s concerns about a premature normalization that overlooks its security priorities (The Times of Israel).

Ceasefire with the Houthis

On May 6, 2025, Trump announced a ceasefire with Yemen’s Houthi rebels, brokered by Oman, halting U.S. airstrikes in exchange for the Houthis ceasing attacks on American vessels in the Red Sea (Reuters). The U.S. campaign, costing over $1 billion since March 2025, struck 800 targets and killed hundreds of Houthis, yet failed to decisively weaken the group (NBC News). The Houthis, controlling 70% of Yemen’s population and backed by Iran, agreed to ensure “freedom of navigation” in the Red Sea, a critical artery for 12% of global trade (The Economist).

Israel, however, was blindsided by the deal, receiving no prior notification (The Times of Israel). The Houthis explicitly excluded Israel from the ceasefire, vowing to continue missile and drone attacks in solidarity with Gaza (Reuters). A Houthi missile strike on Ben Gurion Airport on May 4, 2025, disrupted air traffic, prompting Israeli retaliatory strikes on Sanaa’s airport and Hodeida’s port (The Guardian). Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s pledge to “defend ourselves alone” reflects Israel’s frustration with the U.S. prioritizing maritime security over its territorial concerns (CNN). The deal’s failure to curb Houthi aggression against Israel underscores the limitations of Trump’s transactional approach in addressing multifaceted regional threats.

Nuclear Negotiations with Iran

Trump’s administration initiated nuclear negotiations with Iran in April 2025, mediated by Oman, aiming to curb Tehran’s nuclear ambitions (The New York Times). By May 2025, four rounds of talks had occurred, focusing on uranium enrichment levels (currently at 60%, close to weapons-grade 90%), stockpile sizes, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring (Reuters). Iran’s nuclear program, with 15 operational reactors and an estimated 10,000 centrifuges, poses a persistent threat, having advanced significantly since Trump’s 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (Council on Foreign Relations).

Israel views these talks as a strategic liability. Netanyahu has demanded the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, a stance reiterated on April 27, 2025, during a Holocaust Remembrance Day address (Reuters). Reports indicate Israel planned airstrikes on Iranian nuclear sites in May 2025, requiring U.S. support, but Trump opted for diplomacy, blindsiding Netanyahu during an April 7, 2025, White House meeting (Reuters). Iran’s openness to limited curbs, such as exporting enriched uranium to Russia, in exchange for sanctions relief, fuels Israel’s fears of a deal that preserves Tehran’s nuclear capabilities (The New York Times). With Iran’s economy contracting by 5% in 2024 due to sanctions (IMF, 2024), a deal could bolster its regional influence, threatening Israel’s security.

Palestinian Statehood and Saudi-Israel Normalization: A Persistent Impasse

The prospect of Saudi-Israel normalization, a cornerstone of the Abraham Accords initiated in 2020, remains stalled as of May 2025, primarily due to the unresolved Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia has consistently conditioned normalization on progress toward Palestinian statehood, a position reaffirmed on February 5, 2025, when the Saudi Foreign Ministry rejected Trump’s claim that Riyadh had dropped this demand (The Times of Israel). The kingdom insists on a Palestinian state based on pre-1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, a stance Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman emphasized in a September 2024 Shura Council speech (Anadolu Agency).

Israel’s government, led by Netanyahu, staunchly opposes Palestinian statehood, viewing it as a security risk given Hamas’s control of Gaza and the Palestinian Authority’s limited governance in the West Bank (Atlantic Council). Netanyahu’s coalition, including far-right partners like Bezalel Smotrich, prioritizes military operations in Gaza, with 41,000 Palestinian deaths reported by May 2025 (UN, 2025). This stance has entrenched the impasse, as Saudi Arabia faces domestic and regional pressure to uphold its Palestinian advocacy, particularly amid Gaza’s humanitarian crisis (Al Jazeera).

Trump’s hands-off approach, avoiding direct mediation in the Gaza conflict, has delayed progress, with the U.S. focusing on economic incentives like the $600 billion Saudi investment to indirectly pressure Riyadh (War on the Rocks). However, Saudi Arabia’s strategic shift toward détente with Iran, evidenced by a Saudi defense minister’s visit to Tehran in April 2025, reduces the urgency for a U.S.-backed security pact tied to normalization (The Cairo Review). For Israel, the absence of normalization limits opportunities for economic integration and a united front against Iran, forcing reliance on existing Abraham Accords partners like the UAE and Bahrain (Wikipedia).

Ethical Concerns: Blurring Business and Policy

Trump’s trip raised significant ethical concerns due to the Trump Organization’s business dealings in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump have pursued real estate, cryptocurrency, and luxury penthouse projects, with deals announced in 2024 valued at $500 million (The Washington Post). A notable controversy involves Qatar’s offer of a $400 million Boeing 747-8 plane, potentially for use as Air Force One, to be donated to Trump’s presidential library post-tenure (CNN). Congressional Democrats have criticized this as “the most valuable gift ever conferred on a president by a foreign government,” raising questions about compliance with the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (The Guardian).

Government ethicists, including Robert Weissman of Public Citizen, argue that these financial ties create opportunities for Gulf states to influence U.S. policy, undermining public trust (CNN). Trump’s refusal to divest from his business interests, unlike his first-term pledge, exacerbates these concerns, with the Trump Organization’s regional revenue estimated at $200 million annually (NPR). This blurring of personal and public interests challenges the integrity of U.S. foreign policy, particularly as Trump navigates sensitive issues like Gaza and Iran.

Trump’s Strategic Engagement with Syria’s Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa: A High-Risk Gamble in U.S. Foreign Policy

In May 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump executed a pivotal shift in American foreign policy by lifting sanctions on Syria and engaging directly with its interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, during a high-profile Middle East tour. This decision, announced on May 13, 2025, at a Saudi-US Investment Forum in Riyadh, marked a departure from over four decades of U.S. policy that had designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism since 1979, with additional sanctions imposed in 2004 and during the civil war from 2011 onward (Reuters). Al-Sharaa, previously known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, leads Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a former al-Qaeda affiliate that spearheaded the rebel offensive ousting Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. His appointment as interim president on January 29, 2025, followed a rapid consolidation of power, positioning him as Syria’s de facto leader tasked with navigating a fragile transitional period (BBC News).

Trump’s meeting with al-Sharaa on May 14, 2025, in Riyadh—the first between a U.S. president and a Syrian leader in 25 years—underscored a pragmatic willingness to engage with a figure whose extremist past raises significant concerns (Politico). The policy shift has elicited polarized reactions: proponents view it as a strategic maneuver to counter Iranian influence and unlock Syria’s economic potential, while critics warn of legitimizing a government with ties to terrorism and risking regional instability through potential alliances with Turkey or Iran. This analysis elucidates the motivations behind Trump’s engagement, dissects the geopolitical behavior patterns of his administration, and evaluates the inherent risks, drawing on authoritative sources to ensure analytical rigor and factual accuracy.

Motivations Behind Trump’s Engagement with Al-Sharaa

The decision to lift sanctions and normalize relations with Syria under al-Sharaa’s leadership reflects a confluence of economic imperatives, regional alliances, and strategic calculations, consistent with Trump’s transactional foreign policy paradigm.

Economic Opportunities and Reconstruction Potential

Syria’s economy, decimated by 14 years of civil war, presents a complex but promising landscape for reconstruction. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated in February 2025 that Syria’s GDP had contracted to less than half its 2011 value, with cumulative losses exceeding $800 billion between 2011 and 2024. Over 90% of Syrians live in poverty, and 25% face unemployment, necessitating over 50 years at current growth rates to recover pre-war economic levels (UNDP, 2025). Syria’s untapped oil reserves, estimated at 2.5 billion barrels, and mineral resources, including phosphates valued at $10 billion annually pre-war, offer significant investment potential (World Bank, 2024).

By lifting sanctions, Trump aimed to facilitate foreign investment, particularly from Gulf states eager to capitalize on Syria’s resources. Saudi Arabia and Qatar committed in April 2025 to settle Syria’s $15 million World Bank debt, signaling their intent to fund reconstruction (Al Jazeera). U.S. companies, particularly in energy and infrastructure, stand to benefit from contracts in a post-sanctions Syria, aligning with Trump’s “America First” economic agenda. The Syrian Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shibani, described the sanctions relief as a “pivotal turning point” for economic self-sufficiency and reconstruction, underscoring its transformative potential (Al Jazeera, 2025).

Regional Alliances and Saudi-Turkish Influence

Trump’s policy shift was catalyzed by direct appeals from Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both of whom view a stable Syria as critical to their regional strategies. During his Riyadh address, Trump acknowledged Mohammed bin Salman’s request to lift sanctions, humorously noting, “Oh what I do for the crown prince,” which elicited audience approval (NPR). Saudi Arabia seeks to counter Iran’s influence in Syria, historically a key node in Tehran’s “Axis of Resistance” alongside Hezbollah and Hamas. Turkey, meanwhile, prioritizes curbing Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria, where the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) operate, creating tensions with Ankara.

The alignment with Saudi and Turkish interests reflects Trump’s reliance on Gulf and regional partners to advance U.S. objectives. Saudi Arabia’s $600 billion investment pledge to the U.S., announced concurrently with the Syria policy shift, underscores the economic leverage Riyadh wields in shaping Trump’s decisions (Reuters). Turkey’s role, while less financially dominant, is geopolitically significant, given its control over northern Syrian territories and influence over rebel factions.

Countering Iranian Influence

Iran’s longstanding alliance with the Assad regime, bolstered by military and economic support, has made Syria a linchpin of Tehran’s regional strategy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains an estimated 10,000 fighters in Syria, alongside proxy militias, securing supply lines to Hezbollah in Lebanon (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Trump’s engagement with al-Sharaa aims to disrupt this dynamic by aligning Syria with U.S. and Gulf interests, thereby weakening Iran’s regional footprint.

Al-Sharaa’s HTS, historically opposed to Iran-backed forces, offers a potential counterweight to Tehran’s influence. By lifting sanctions and fostering economic ties, the U.S. seeks to incentivize Syria’s integration into a Western-aligned bloc, reducing its dependence on Iranian support. This strategy aligns with Trump’s broader anti-Iran policy, which includes ongoing nuclear negotiations mediated by Oman and a focus on containing Tehran’s proxy networks (The New York Times).

Transactional Diplomacy and Domestic Considerations

Trump’s foreign policy is characterized by a transactional ethos, prioritizing immediate gains over ideological consistency. The decision to lift sanctions, requiring no Congressional approval, exemplifies this approach, allowing Trump to project decisiveness and deal-making prowess to domestic audiences. His remarks framing al-Sharaa as a “tough guy” with a “real shot” at stabilizing Syria reflect a personal affinity for strongman leaders, a trait evident in his first-term engagements with figures like North Korea’s Kim Jong-un (NPR).

Domestically, the policy appeals to evangelical constituencies, who are noted as potential allies of al-Sharaa due to their focus on religious freedom and humanitarian aid in the Middle East (The Economist). Two Republican congressmen, Cory Mills and Marlin Stutzman, visited Damascus in early 2025, advocating engagement despite al-Sharaa’s al-Qaeda ties, signaling support within Trump’s political base for a pragmatic approach to Syria.

Geopolitical Behavior Patterns of Trump’s Administration

Trump’s engagement with al-Sharaa is consistent with a broader pattern of pragmatic, often unpredictable diplomacy that prioritizes strategic interests over ideological purity.

Historical Engagement with Controversial Actors

The U.S. has a history of supporting non-state actors and controversial leaders when it serves strategic goals, a pattern Trump’s administration continues. During the 1980s, the U.S. backed the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union, inadvertently contributing to the rise of al-Qaeda. In Syria, the Obama and Trump administrations supported various rebel groups, including those with extremist ties, to counter Assad and ISIS. Trump’s first term saw continued support for the SDF, despite Turkish objections, reflecting a willingness to prioritize immediate objectives over long-term risks.

Engaging with al-Sharaa, whose HTS remains on U.S. terrorist lists, extends this approach. The U.S. dropped a $10 million bounty on al-Sharaa in December 2024, signaling a shift from viewing him as a terrorist to a potential partner (Foreign Policy). This pragmatism is driven by the need to address immediate challenges, such as Iran’s influence and Syria’s instability, but risks repeating past mistakes.

Normalization as a Strategic Tool

Trump’s first term emphasized normalization between Israel and Arab states through the Abraham Accords, signed in 2020 with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. His 2025 push for Syria to normalize ties with Israel, articulated during the al-Sharaa meeting, reflects a continuation of this strategy (Reuters). By encouraging Damascus to join this framework, Trump aims to reshape regional alliances, though Syria’s historical enmity with Israel and al-Sharaa’s Islamist roots complicate this ambition.

Unpredictable and Transactional Diplomacy

Trump’s foreign policy is marked by bold, unilateral actions that often bypass traditional diplomatic channels. The Syria sanctions decision, announced without prior consultation with Congress or allies like Israel, exemplifies this unpredictability (The Washington Post). His administration’s structure, with advisors like Andrew Peek advocating robust anti-Iran policies and Sebastian Gorka focusing on counterterrorism, supports this deal-driven approach, though internal disagreements, such as Michael DiMino’s skepticism of U.S. Middle East interests, introduce inconsistencies (Foreign Policy).

Risks of Engaging with Al-Sharaa

The decision to align with al-Sharaa carries profound risks, rooted in his extremist past, Syria’s fragility, and complex regional dynamics.

Legitimizing Extremism

Al-Sharaa’s transformation from an al-Qaeda militant to Syria’s interim president is remarkable but fraught with peril. HTS, designated a terrorist organization by the U.S., UN, EU, and UK, has a history of deploying suicide bombers and advocating for an Islamic state. Although al-Sharaa severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and now projects a moderate image, pledging to protect minorities and hold elections within five years, his government’s stability and intentions remain uncertain (The New York Times). Legitimizing HTS risks emboldening other extremist groups, undermining global counterterrorism efforts, and eroding U.S. credibility.

Regional Instability and Security Challenges

Syria’s post-war landscape is marked by competing factions, including remnants of the Islamic State, which conducted lethal car bombings in northern Syria in early 2025 (Foreign Policy). Al-Sharaa’s ability to disband armed groups and form a unified national army, as pledged, is untested, with HTS controlling only parts of the country. The Syrian economy’s collapse, with 90% of the population in poverty and infrastructure losses estimated at $250 billion (World Bank, 2024), exacerbates these challenges, potentially fueling unrest if reconstruction falters.

Israel’s ongoing interventions, including over 200 airstrikes since 2011 and occupation of Syrian territory near the Golan Heights, further destabilize the region. Israeli officials label al-Sharaa’s government a “terror group from Idlib,” reflecting deep skepticism and increasing the risk of escalation (Al Jazeera).

Potential Alliances with Turkey and Iran

The user’s concern about al-Sharaa aligning with Turkey and Iran is a critical risk. Turkey, which controls parts of northern Syria, seeks to suppress Kurdish autonomy, a goal potentially shared by al-Sharaa’s government, which signed an agreement with the SDF in 2025 to integrate its forces (Wikipedia). Such alignment could strain U.S.-Turkey relations, given Washington’s support for Kurdish groups, and complicate Syria’s stabilization.

Iran, despite HTS’s historical opposition to its proxies, retains influence through militias and economic ties. A pragmatic al-Sharaa might seek Iranian support to bolster his regime, particularly if U.S. and Gulf aid falls short. Iran’s $5 billion in annual trade with Syria pre-war and its control of key infrastructure, such as Damascus airport, provide leverage (IMF, 2024). Such an alliance would undermine Trump’s anti-Iran strategy, potentially strengthening Tehran’s regional network.

Historical Parallels and Unintended Consequences

The user’s reference to U.S. support for Osama bin Laden in the 1980s highlights the risk of unintended consequences. The CIA’s backing of the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union contributed to al-Qaeda’s rise, a precedent that looms large over Trump’s Syria policy. While al-Sharaa’s break with al-Qaeda and focus on governance distinguish him from bin Laden, the parallels underscore the dangers of engaging with former extremists without robust safeguards.

Expert Perspectives and Analytical Insights

Expert analyses reveal a spectrum of views on Trump’s policy, balancing potential benefits against inherent risks.

Marwan Bishara, Al Jazeera Senior Political Analyst

Bishara questions the U.S. motives, suggesting that lifting sanctions may be tied to concessions such as suppressing Palestinian groups or normalizing with Israel, potentially at the expense of Palestinian interests. He warns that ignoring Israel’s destabilizing actions, including airstrikes and territorial occupation, risks further conflict. Bishara advocates for U.S. pressure on Israel to halt interventions, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach to Syria’s reconstruction (Al Jazeera).

Omar Rahman, Middle East Council on Global Affairs

Rahman views the sanctions relief as a significant but overstated step, removing a key barrier to economic development but insufficient without sustained investment and governance reforms. He notes that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE drove the policy shift, leveraging their economic influence over Trump, who faced no Congressional hurdles. Rahman cautions that Syria’s recovery remains precarious, given its economic and security challenges (Al Jazeera, 2025).

Evangelical Support and Domestic Dynamics

The Economist highlights America’s evangelicals as potential allies of al-Sharaa, driven by their focus on religious pluralism and humanitarian aid in the Middle East (The Economist). This support aligns with domestic political pressures, as evidenced by Republican congressmen Cory Mills and Marlin Stutzman’s Damascus visit, advocating engagement despite al-Sharaa’s past. This dynamic underscores Trump’s ability to frame the policy as a humanitarian and strategic win for his base.

Strategic Implications and Future Scenarios

The success of Trump’s Syria policy hinges on al-Sharaa’s ability to deliver stability and align with U.S. interests. Several scenarios are plausible:

Optimistic Scenario: Stabilization and Integration

If al-Sharaa consolidates power, disbands rebel factions, and implements inclusive governance, Syria could attract significant Gulf investment, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar leading efforts to rebuild infrastructure. Normalization with Israel, though unlikely in the near term, could integrate Syria into the Abraham Accords, enhancing regional stability. The U.S. would benefit economically and strategically, weakening Iran’s influence and reinforcing its Middle East alliances.

Pessimistic Scenario: Instability and Realignment

Failure to stabilize Syria could lead to renewed conflict, with extremist groups exploiting governance gaps. An alignment with Turkey or Iran, driven by pragmatic needs, would undermine U.S. objectives, potentially escalating tensions with Israel or Kurdish allies. The U.S. risks reputational damage for legitimizing HTS, echoing past missteps with extremist groups.

Mixed Scenario: Partial Success

A more likely outcome involves partial stabilization, with al-Sharaa maintaining control over key areas but struggling with peripheral regions. Limited economic recovery, supported by Gulf aid, could occur alongside persistent security challenges. U.S. influence would depend on sustained engagement, including diplomatic and economic support, to prevent Syria from drifting toward adversarial powers.

Strategic Implications for Israel

Israel faces a multifaceted strategic challenge. The Saudi arms deal, while bolstering a partner against Iran, risks eroding Israel’s QME, with potential F-35 sales requiring U.S. Congressional approval under the Arms Export Control Act (Breaking Defense). The Houthi ceasefire and Syrian sanctions relief heighten threats from Iran-backed groups, with Hezbollah’s arsenal and Houthi missile capabilities (range: 2,000 km) posing direct risks (CSIS). The stalled Saudi-Israel normalization limits Israel’s regional integration, with the Palestinian issue—exacerbated by Gaza’s 2.3 million displaced persons—remaining a barrier (UNDP).

Israel’s response includes intensified military operations, with 1,200 airstrikes in Gaza and Syria in 2025, and diplomatic efforts to secure U.S. support, evidenced by a $3 billion arms package approved in February 2025 (Reuters). However, Trump’s exclusion of Israel from his itinerary and lack of consultation on key decisions signal a potential shift in U.S. priorities, forcing Israel to explore alternative alliances, such as deepening ties with India, which supplied $2 billion in defense equipment in 2024 (The Jerusalem Post).

The Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia: Opportunities and Risks for Israel

The $142 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia, signed during Trump’s visit, is a cornerstone of his Middle East strategy. Described as “historic” by the White House, the agreement includes advanced weaponry such as missiles, radar systems, and potentially F-35 stealth fighters, modernizing Saudi Arabia’s military (The Guardian; Reuters). This deal strengthens U.S.-Saudi ties, supports American defense contractors, and aligns with Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 goal of enhancing national security.

For Israel, the deal presents a dual-edged sword. A stronger Saudi Arabia could counterbalance Iran, a shared adversary whose proxies, like Hezbollah and Hamas, threaten Israeli security (Council on Foreign Relations). Since 1979, Iran has sought to export its revolutionary ideology, supporting groups that destabilize the region. A militarily robust Saudi Arabia could deter such activities, aligning with Israel’s interest in containing Tehran.

However, the influx of advanced U.S. weaponry into Saudi hands raises concerns about Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME), a policy ensuring Israel’s technological superiority over regional neighbors (The Washington Post). If Saudi Arabia acquires systems like the F-35, it could challenge Israel’s air dominance, potentially sparking an arms race (Reuters). Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s strategic priorities—focused on internal stability and economic diversification—differ from Israel’s, which emphasizes immediate security threats. This divergence could complicate future cooperation, especially if Saudi Arabia uses its enhanced capabilities in ways that conflict with Israeli interests.

The deal also underscores a broader shift in U.S. policy. By prioritizing economic partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Washington signals a willingness to elevate Gulf states over traditional allies when financial incentives are high (Council on Foreign Relations). This trend, evident in Trump’s first term through support for Saudi-led operations in Yemen, risks alienating Israel, which relies on consistent U.S. backing to maintain its security posture (New York Times).

Exclusion of Israel: A Signal of Shifting Priorities

Israel’s absence from Trump’s May 2025 itinerary was a striking departure from tradition, as U.S. presidents typically include Jerusalem in Middle East visits to reaffirm the strong bilateral relationship (The Washington Post). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had cultivated close ties with Trump during his first term, expressed disappointment, as did other officials who saw the exclusion as a snub (Reuters). This move came at a critical juncture for Israel, grappling with the Gaza war and heightened tensions with Iran and its proxies (The Times of Israel).

Several factors likely contributed to Israel’s exclusion. First, Trump’s focus on economic deals with Gulf states, which offer immediate financial rewards, overshadowed diplomatic engagements in Israel, where the Gaza conflict and stalled ceasefire talks present no quick wins (CNN). Second, the Gulf states’ growing geopolitical clout, driven by their wealth and strategic positioning, has made them indispensable partners for Washington (Council on Foreign Relations). By prioritizing these countries, Trump signals recognition of their rising influence, potentially at Israel’s expense.

This exclusion has sparked concerns about the future of U.S.-Israel relations. During Trump’s first term, actions like recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and moving the U.S. embassy there were seen as strongly pro-Israel (New York Times). However, in his second term, moves like lifting sanctions on Syria and engaging with the Houthis suggest a divergence from Israeli priorities (CNN Politics). Israeli officials worry that this signals a decline in U.S. support, particularly as they face ongoing security threats (The Jerusalem Post).

To address these concerns, Israel may need to adapt its foreign policy, strengthening economic ties with the U.S. and exploring cooperation with Gulf states on shared interests like countering Iran. However, the exclusion underscores a broader challenge: maintaining strategic relevance in a region where economic considerations increasingly shape U.S. policy (Reuters).

Ethical Concerns: Trump’s Business Interests

Trump’s trip raised significant ethical concerns due to the Trump Organization’s business dealings in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. The president’s sons, Eric and Donald Jr., secured real estate and cryptocurrency deals in these countries, blurring the lines between personal profit and U.S. foreign policy (The Washington Post). A notable example is Qatar’s gift of a $400 million Boeing 747-8 plane for Air Force One, raising questions about foreign influence (New York Times).

Critics argue that these ties undermine U.S. credibility, creating perceptions of favoritism and compromising diplomatic objectivity (The Washington Post). For instance, Gulf states may award contracts to the Trump Organization to gain favor, complicating negotiations on issues like human rights or regional conflicts (Al Jazeera). Calls for divestment or blind trusts have been resisted by Trump, who claims he can separate personal and public interests, but the optics remain problematic (The Washington Post).

Addressing Alleged Ties to Controversial Groups

Concerns about Trump’s alleged ties to “ISI terrorists,” likely referring to Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), find no direct evidence in the context of his Middle East trip. The ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence agency, has been accused of supporting militant groups, but no sources link Trump or his 2025 trip to Pakistan or the ISI. Instead, Trump’s controversial engagements involved the Houthis and Syria’s new leadership. The Houthi deal, ensuring Red Sea safety, ignored Israel’s concerns about their attacks, while engaging with Syria’s Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former al-Nusra figure, alarmed Jerusalem due to Syria’s Iranian ties (CNN Politics; Council on Foreign Relations). These moves reflect pragmatic deal-making rather than alliances with terrorist groups, but they remain contentious for Israel.

Conclusion

Trump’s May 2025 Middle East trip represents a pivotal shift in U.S. foreign policy, prioritizing economic statecraft over traditional diplomacy. By securing massive investments and arms deals with Gulf states, Trump aims to bolster the U.S. economy, but this comes at a cost. Israel’s exclusion from the itinerary, coupled with actions like lifting Syrian sanctions and engaging the Houthis, signals a potential deprioritization of traditional allies in favor of financially lucrative partnerships (Reuters). The $142 billion Saudi arms deal strengthens Riyadh but risks eroding Israel’s military edge, while stalled Saudi-Israel normalization and ethical concerns about Trump’s business ties further complicate the landscape (The Guardian; The Washington Post).

For Israel, the trip underscores the need to adapt to a changing regional order. Strengthening ties with Gulf states, advocating for its security needs in Washington, and exploring economic opportunities could help maintain its strategic relevance (The Jerusalem Post). However, the long-term impact remains uncertain, as U.S. policy balances economic gains with security commitments, leaving Israel to navigate a complex and evolving geopolitical terrain.

Key Data Points

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