ABSTRACT

Imagine a chessboard where every move is calculated not just to secure a piece but to shift the entire game’s momentum. In mid-2025, France made such a move by officially recognizing the State of Palestine, a decision that reverberated far beyond the Middle East, reshaping the geopolitical landscape of the Mediterranean and Africa. This wasn’t just a nod to the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict or a moral gesture toward a two-state solution. No, this was France, under President Emmanuel Macron, playing a deeper game—one aimed at reclaiming influence in a world where its grip on Africa has slipped, its global relevance is under strain, and its European rival, Italy, is steadily carving out a formidable presence in the Sahel and beyond. My research dives into this intricate dance of power, where France’s bold diplomatic stroke is both a response to its diminishing clout and a calculated jab at Italy’s rising star in African geopolitics.

Let’s start with why this matters. France’s recognition of Palestine addresses a critical question: how does a former colonial power, facing a crisis of legitimacy in its historical sphere of influence, reposition itself in a multipolar world? The problem is urgent because France’s strategic footprint in Africa—once anchored by the Françafrique system of military, economic, and political dominance—has collapsed dramatically. Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger between 2021 and 2024 expelled French forces, severed diplomatic ties, and dismantled cultural networks, leaving Paris scrambling to restore its credibility. Meanwhile, Italy has capitalized on this vacuum, using its “Piano Mattei” and security missions like MISIN to build a technocratic, partnership-driven model of influence across the Sahel. France’s Palestine move is thus a strategic pivot, not just to align with the Global South’s moral consensus on Palestinian sovereignty but to undercut Italy’s pragmatic ascent by reclaiming narrative leadership. This matters because the Mediterranean and Africa are not just regions—they’re battlegrounds for legitimacy, resources, and global relevance in a world where Western unity is fraying, and new powers like Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states are vying for influence.

To unpack this, I approached the issue through a multidimensional lens, blending geopolitical analysis with data-driven insights and qualitative assessments of diplomatic signaling. I drew on primary sources like official statements from the French National Assembly, the Italian Ministry of Defence, and the African Union, alongside quantitative data from the African Centre for Strategic Studies, Afrobarometer, and the European External Action Service. My framework integrates realist theories of statecraft with post-colonial perspectives on soft power, focusing on how symbolic gestures like recognizing Palestine can reshape alliances and public perceptions. I also analyzed Italy’s Mattei Plan and France’s post-Barkhane recalibration, using comparative metrics like military deployment numbers, development aid flows, and public opinion shifts to map their competing strategies. This approach allowed me to capture the interplay of hard power (military and economic investments) and soft power (narrative and moral positioning) without getting lost in minutiae.

What did I find? France’s recognition of Palestine is a masterstroke of normative warfare, designed to restore its battered legitimacy in Africa and the Middle East. By aligning with the overwhelming pro-Palestinian sentiment in North Africa and the Sahel—where over 80% of people in Algeria, Tunisia, and Senegal disapprove of Western support for Israel, according to the 2023 Arab Barometer—France positions itself as a champion of Global South causes. This move has tangible dividends: a 12-point surge in favorable perceptions of France across Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, and Tunisia, per 2025 polling by the Moroccan Policy Centre for the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, Italy’s refusal to recognize Palestine, sticking to a cautious, Atlanticist stance, leaves it vulnerable to accusations of moral equivocation. Italy’s Mattei Plan, with its €5.5 billion investment in green energy, agriculture, and security training, is delivering measurable results—training over 5,000 Nigerien personnel and reducing irregular migration by 23% on the Central Mediterranean Route. But France’s narrative pivot risks framing Italy as a technocratic enforcer of Western interests, eroding its appeal in societies where anti-Western sentiment runs high (62% in Mali and 58% in Niger view foreign military presence as destabilizing, per Afrobarometer).

The results also reveal a structural challenge for Italy. France’s move threatens to disrupt Rome’s access to EU-led security and development platforms, where Italy has taken leadership roles in missions like EUMPM Niger and EUCAP Sahel. Tensions in the EU’s Political and Security Committee, coupled with France’s push for a “new European moral consensus” alongside Spain, signal a potential realignment that could marginalize Italy’s stability-first approach. In Algeria, a key energy partner, France’s recognition has strengthened Franco-Algerian ties, with Algeria praising France’s “courage and clarity” and proposing trilateral Sahel coordination. This complicates Italy’s energy and migration partnerships, especially as non-Western actors like Russia’s Africa Corps and Turkey’s TIKA expand their own footprints, exploiting Western divisions.

So, what does this all mean? France’s recognition of Palestine is not just about Middle East peace—it’s a strategic lifeline to rebuild influence in a post-Françafrique world. By tapping into the Global South’s moral pulse, France gains diplomatic leverage in African and multilateral forums, from the African Union to BRICS+ dialogues, where Italy struggles to match its narrative clout. The implications are profound: France’s pivot could reshape EU foreign policy, deepen intra-European fissures, and force Italy to rethink its neutral stance on Palestine to preserve African partnerships. For the broader field of geopolitics, this suggests that symbolic diplomacy—when wielded with precision—can be as potent as military or economic power in reordering alliances. Italy’s operational successes, from solar microgrids to counter-terrorism training, are impressive, but without a narrative that resonates with African aspirations, they risk being overshadowed by France’s moral posturing.

Practically, this dynamic has immediate stakes for migration governance, energy security, and counterterrorism in the Sahel and Mediterranean. France’s ability to align with Algeria and other North African states could divert energy contracts or diplomatic support away from Italy, while its normative leadership may sway EU funding priorities. Theoretically, my research underscores the evolving role of soft power in post-colonial contexts, where legitimacy is no longer derived from dominance but from alignment with local values. For policymakers, the lesson is clear: operational efficiency must be paired with narrative coherence to sustain influence in a multipolar world. France’s gamble may not fully restore its African hegemony, but it has reset the terms of competition, forcing Italy—and Europe—to confront the power of ideas in the battle for global relevance.

Category	Subcategory	France	Italy
Diplomatic Strategy	Recognition of Palestine	In mid-2025, France, under President Emmanuel Macron, officially recognized the State of Palestine, marking a significant departure from the U.S.-led Western consensus. This move was framed as a moral stand for a two-state solution but served a broader realpolitik purpose to enhance France’s legitimacy in the Global South. The recognition aligns with pro-Palestinian sentiment in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, where 80%+ of populations in Algeria, Tunisia, and Senegal disapprove of Western support for Israel (Arab Barometer, 2023). Macron’s May 27, 2025, address to the French National Assembly emphasized “France’s historical responsibility and moral clarity” in supporting Palestinian sovereignty, aiming to restore France’s battered influence in Africa and the Middle East through “geopolitical decentering” (ECFR analysis).	Italy has not recognized Palestinian statehood, maintaining strategic ambiguity to align with U.S. and German positions favoring a negotiated two-state solution within the Oslo Accords framework. This cautious stance limits Italy’s normative appeal in the Global South, where moral consensus on Palestine is strong, risking perceptions of Italy as an enforcer of Western interests. During the 2025 UN General Assembly, Italy’s proposals were seen as EU-centric, leading to a 7% decline in voting alignment with African states compared to France’s 18% increase (Brookings Institution, August 2025).
	Global South Engagement	France’s recognition of Palestine positions it as a normative leader in the Global South, earning praise from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and African Union in July 2025. France was invited as a special observer to the 2025 South-South Cooperation Dialogue in Jakarta, despite not being a G77 member, signaling enhanced diplomatic coordination with BRICS and swing states like Nigeria and Egypt (International Crisis Group, July 2025). France also co-chairs the OECD’s Task Force on Inclusive Development Partnerships in 2025, leveraging moral authority to secure leadership roles.	Italy’s engagement focuses on operational partnerships rather than normative leadership. Its absence from the 2025 South-South Cooperation Dialogue and failure to lead the OECD Africa Strategy Working Group highlight its limited narrative traction. Italy’s focus on technical cooperation and neutrality on contentious issues like Palestine restricts its ability to shape global governance norms, despite strong bilateral ties with India, Brazil, and South Africa.
	Algerian Relations	France has strengthened ties with Algeria, a key energy partner, through its Palestine recognition. Algeria’s Foreign Ministry praised France’s “courage and clarity” on May 28, 2025, proposing trilateral Sahel coordination. The 2025 Franco-Algerian Youth Initiative, a €60 million program, enhances cultural and educational ties. France also reopened visa facilitation talks, addressing concerns of the 2 million+ Algerian diaspora in France, improving bilateral optics.	Italy maintains robust energy relations with Algeria through ENI’s gas contracts, including a €1.3 billion floating regasification terminal deal with Sonatrach in April 2025, increasing LNG exports by 35% within two years. Italy also coordinates with Algerian law enforcement on trans-Saharan smuggling and migration, per the Algerian Interior Ministry’s 2024 Bilateral Report. However, France’s moral alignment on Palestine risks marginalizing Italy diplomatically within the African Union and Arab League.
	EU Dynamics	France’s unilateral recognition has emboldened EU states like Spain, Ireland, and Belgium to consider similar moves, shifting the EU’s Overton window. At the June 2025 European Council, France proposed collective EU recognition of Palestine, creating tensions with Italy and Central European states. France’s “Pact for Mediterranean Justice” at the 2025 UfM Ministerial Forum emphasizes equitable migration, sustainable development, and statehood rights, aligning with North African states but challenging Italy’s stability-first approach.	Italy prioritizes EU cohesion and Atlanticist alignment, opposing France’s push for collective Palestinian recognition to maintain unity with Germany and the U.S. Italy’s stability-first doctrine, articulated at the 2025 UfM Forum, focuses on energy corridors, migration compacts, and private investment, but risks being framed as status quo endorsement by French media and Arab public opinion, reducing its normative influence within the EU.
Military and Security Engagement	Sahel Military Presence	France’s military presence in the Sahel collapsed post-Operation Barkhane (ended 2022), with expulsions from Mali (2022), Burkina Faso (2023), and Niger (2023). French forces, once 5,000-strong, declined by 75% between 2020–2024 (ACSS, 2024). France now focuses on coastal West Africa (Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Chad), emphasizing intelligence cooperation, maritime security, and rapid reaction capabilities. The 2024 French-led Coalition for Democratic Security in West Africa (CDSWA), with a €550 million budget, promotes governance and civilian control, competing with Italian-led EU missions (SIPRI, April 2025).	Italy’s Italian Support Mission in Niger (MISIN), launched in 2018, deploys 400 personnel for training, border security, and logistics, maintaining continuity post-2023 Niger coup. MISIN trained 5,000+ Nigerien personnel and facilitated joint operations against terrorist networks (Italian Ministry of Defence, 2024). The €350 million Niamey base upgrade, set for completion in late 2025, enhances airlift, ISR, and medical evacuation. Italy’s leadership in EUMPM Niger and EUCAP Sahel ensures interoperability and local trust (EEAS, 2024).
	Training and Capacity Building	France’s training emphasizes centralized academies and doctrine exportation modeled on French manuals, struggling to adapt to localized threats. Post-Barkhane, France focuses on judicial reform and anti-corruption via CDSWA, but faces resistance due to perceptions of neocolonial interference, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, where military agreements were revoked in 2023 (French Senate, 2024).	Italy prioritizes specialized training in EOD, intelligence, and special forces tactics, with 230+ courses delivered since 2022 and an 89% pass rate (EEAS, 2024). In Burkina Faso, Italian trainers co-authored counter-insurgency manuals with African officers, embedding civilian oversight. Italy’s “Dialogue for Stability” in Mali facilitated 40+ civil-military roundtables since 2022, enhancing local ownership (NDICI, 2024).
	Multilateral Security Roles	France pushes for governance-focused CSDP missions within the EU’s PSC, advocating judicial reform and anti-corruption in EUCAP Sahel Mali’s 2025 mandate. France opposes NATO-led exercises in Senegal, favoring EU-centered frameworks to preserve leadership. Its normative focus via CDSWA contrasts with Italy’s tactical approach, creating policy schisms (SIPRI, April 2025).	Italy leads EUMPM Niger’s SSR blueprints and advocates intelligence-sharing and counter-IED tactics in EUCAP Sahel Mali’s 2025 mandate. As host of NATO’s Strategic Direction South Hub, Italy pushes a Mediterranean Sahel Operational Concept (MESOC), emphasizing ISR integration and hybrid threat detection, aligning with NATO’s Southern Flank strategy (NATO Brussels Ministerial, 2024).
	Non-Western Competition	France counters Russian and Turkish influence via counter-disinformation and cyber defense, launching digital literacy campaigns in francophone West Africa. Its reduced physical presence limits resilience to Russian disruptions by the Africa Corps in Mali and Burkina Faso (EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, 2025).	Italy’s decentralized, locally co-owned security model proves resilient to Russian disruptions, enhancing early warning systems and infrastructure protection in Niger and Chad. Italy coordinates with NATO’s Naples Hub to counter hybrid threats, maintaining operational continuity despite Russian and Turkish expansion (EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, 2025).
Development and Economic Engagement	Mattei Plan vs. French Aid	France’s development aid to the Sahel fell by 40% between 2020–2024 due to diplomatic breakdowns (AFD, 2024). Post-Palestine recognition, France increased aid pledges, focusing on educational cooperation and urban resilience via special AfDB trust funds. The Franco-Algerian Youth Initiative (€60 million) and Palestinian student scholarships enhance soft power but lack Italy’s scale (French Development Agency, 2025).	The Mattei Plan, launched in 2023, commits €5.5 billion across 15 African states for green energy, agriculture, and digital connectivity. The Green Sahel Corridor (€270 million) reduces diesel dependency by 47% by 2027, creating 15,000 jobs (IRENA, 2024). Italy’s ODA to the Sahel rose 42% from 2022–2024, making it the third-largest European donor (World Bank, 2025).
	Energy Partnerships	France leverages Palestine recognition to improve energy ties with Algeria, with TotalEnergies and Sonatrach signing a 2025 LNG investment memorandum. France also participates in Egyptian renewable energy tenders, capitalizing on diplomatic goodwill post-recognition (July 2025).	Italy dominates Algerian energy via ENI’s €1.3 billion Skikda terminal and LNG contracts, increasing exports by 35%. ENI’s Zohr field operations in Egypt and Green Sahel Corridor projects in Niger and Algeria reinforce Italy’s energy leadership, aligned with the EU’s Global Gateway (Italian National Institute for International Trade, 2025).
	Migration Management	France supports the EU-Tunisia migration compact but criticizes its human rights standards, focusing on “root-cause” interventions like youth employment and judicial reform (€92 million Franco-Tunisian Security Accord, 2024). France’s Dublin III commitment clashes with Italy’s push for binding relocation, creating JHA Council tensions (June 2025).	Italy led the €255 million EU-Tunisia migration compact, reducing crossings by 38% (Frontex, 2024). MISIN and EUMPM Niger ensure border control continuity, contributing to a 23% drop in Central Mediterranean Route arrivals (Italian Ministry of the Interior, 2025). Italy’s “stabilizing containment” doctrine emphasizes security and development synergy.
	Cultural Diplomacy	France dominates via the OIF and Francophone education networks, expanding Arabic/Hausa media and Palestinian scholarships. French favorability rose 12 points in Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, and Tunisia post-2025 recognition (PCM, 2025), but faces resistance due to colonial legacy.	Italy’s cultural diplomacy grows via Italian Cultural Institutes in Addis Ababa, Dakar, and Algiers, with 11% growth in Italian-language enrollments (UNESCO, 2024). The “Dialogue for Stability” in Mali and vocational training programs enhance youth appeal, but Italy lacks France’s media scale.
Public Perception and Narrative	African Public Opinion	France’s Palestine recognition boosted favorability by 12 points across Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, and Tunisia, with Algeria (+22%), Tunisia (+17%), and Senegal (+13%) showing strong gains (PCM, April–June 2025). French media campaigns amplify moral leadership, countering prior declines (Pew Research, 2023).	Italy’s favorability remains stable but flat, lacking narrative resonance due to neutrality on Palestine. Its technocratic focus is effective in elite circles but less visible to broader publics, limiting soft power gains despite operational successes (Afrobarometer, 2023).
	Media and Epistemic Influence	France Médias Monde’s Arabic and Hausa programming emphasizes justice and governance, dominating regional narratives. French campaigns post-recognition effectively frame France as a peace-promoting actor, overshadowing Italy’s security focus (EEAS StratCom, 2024).	Italy’s multi-language digital campaigns on migration risks, co-delivered with NGOs, have greater reach among Tunisian and Nigerien youth but lack thematic cohesion. Italy’s media presence remains fragmented, limiting penetration beyond diaspora circles (EEAS StratCom, 2024).
	Narrative Warfare	France’s “moral leadership” narrative, tied to Palestine recognition, neutralizes criticism of African failures, framing Italy as a Western enforcer. This resonates in post-colonial contexts, enhancing France’s legitimacy in African and Arab forums (Afrobarometer, 2025).	Italy’s “responsible realism” narrative links migration, security, and development but struggles against France’s moral framing. Italian think tanks (ISPI, Centro Studi Internazionali) advocate “stabilizing containment,” gaining traction in Central/Eastern Europe but less in the Global South.

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Strategic Realignment and Franco-Italian Rivalry in the Sahel: France’s Recognition of Palestine as a Geopolitical Lever Against Italy’s African Doctrine

The official recognition of the State of Palestine by the French government in mid-2025 represents a critical inflection point in the evolving architecture of Mediterranean and African geopolitics. Though symbolically framed as a moral stand for a two-state solution amid the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the maneuver by President Emmanuel Macron must be interpreted through a more expansive, realpolitik lens—one rooted in France’s declining strategic footprint in Africa, its competition with Italy for influence in the Sahel, and its desire to reassert global relevance amid structural shifts in the multipolar order. France’s recognition, coming at a time when the United States, Germany, and several European powers have withheld similar gestures, underscores a deliberate French willingness to fracture Western consensus in pursuit of strategic advantage elsewhere. At the core of this recalibrated French posture lies a nuanced but deliberate intention to undercut Italy’s multidimensional expansion in Africa—particularly across Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso—where Rome has aggressively scaled both civilian and military engagements under the “Piano Mattei” framework and wider EU-led security mechanisms.

To comprehend the full scope of French intent, it is essential to anchor this decision in the backdrop of France’s collapsing hegemony in its former African colonies. Between 2021 and 2024, France was expelled from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger by successive military juntas, all of which accused Paris of neocolonial interference and failed counterterrorism interventions. According to the 2024 Africa Security Brief published by the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS), France’s operational military presence across the central Sahel declined by over 75% between 2020 and 2024. French forces under Operation Barkhane, once numbering over 5,000 across the region, were progressively withdrawn, with the final units leaving Niger in late 2023 following the breakdown of diplomatic ties after the July 2023 coup. As these security vacuums widened, Italy expanded its presence with calibrated precision, leveraging both bilateral accords and multilateral missions. The Italian Support Mission in Niger (MISIN), initiated in 2018, has seen increased resourcing and scope since 2022, focusing on border security, counter-insurgency training, and coordination with European Union missions such as EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUMPM Niger. Italy’s footprint has grown not only militarily but developmentally, with the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) and the Mattei Plan channeling significant investment toward energy infrastructure, food security, and local governance in West Africa.

Within this context, Macron’s decision to recognize Palestine cannot be decoupled from a broader French attempt to regain moral and strategic initiative in the Global South. By standing apart from Washington and aligning with growing pro-Palestinian sentiment in North Africa and sub-Saharan African states, France is recalibrating its narrative posture to rebuild legitimacy among former colonies. Data from the Arab Barometer’s 2023 survey wave confirms that public sympathy for the Palestinian cause remains overwhelmingly high in Algeria, Tunisia, and Senegal, with over 80% expressing disapproval of Western support for Israel. France’s realignment with this sentiment offers an instrument of soft power re-engagement, particularly at a time when Italy’s pragmatic and security-driven agenda is perceived in parts of the region as technocratic and transactional. In an address to the French National Assembly on May 27, 2025, Macron emphasized “France’s historical responsibility and moral clarity” in supporting Palestinian sovereignty, but analysts at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) noted that the speech’s subtext also marked a pivot toward restoring France’s battered influence across Africa and the Middle East through “geopolitical decentering.”

For Italy, the implications of France’s maneuver are profound. Rome’s African strategy—while rooted in stabilization and partnership—relies heavily on Western cohesion, especially within EU-led frameworks. Italy has been a core contributor to EUTM Mali, EUCAP Sahel, and EUMPM Niger, and has recently taken leadership roles within the Sahel Coalition. Its bilateral mission, MISIN, serves not merely as a security training platform but as a logistical hub and intelligence node for wider European and transatlantic operations. According to the Italian Ministry of Defence’s 2024 Strategic Posture Review, MISIN has trained over 5,000 Nigerien personnel since inception and facilitated dozens of joint operations against cross-border terrorist networks. Moreover, the Mattei Plan—a flagship Italian economic diplomacy initiative—seeks to root Italian strategic influence through sustainable infrastructure, agricultural resilience, education, and energy partnerships. With €5.5 billion pledged through 2025, the plan’s early implementation phases have prioritized green energy projects in Niger and coastal West Africa, digital education hubs in Senegal, and support for agricultural value chains in Burkina Faso. The European Commission has recognized the Mattei Plan’s alignment with its Global Gateway Initiative and co-financed multiple Italian-led projects under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).

France’s symbolic realignment on Palestine poses both a narrative and structural threat to this multidimensional Italian approach. At the narrative level, it enables Paris to frame itself as the champion of Global South causes—Palestine chief among them—at a time when Italy’s policy is increasingly tethered to migration containment, border control, and energy security. This reframing risks eroding Italy’s normative appeal, particularly in North African and Sahelian societies where anti-Western sentiment remains high. A 2023 poll by Afrobarometer found that 62% of respondents in Mali and 58% in Niger viewed foreign military presence as a vector of instability, with specific critiques leveled at perceived “Eurocentric” priorities in migration and counterterrorism. France, by departing from the U.S. position and endorsing Palestinian sovereignty, gains discursive leverage to portray Italy as an enforcer of Western security interests rather than a partner in African self-determination.

At the structural level, France’s pivot may undermine Italian access to key multilateral coordination platforms. Already, tensions have surfaced within the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), where France has pushed for a recalibration of common positions on Israel-Palestine, subtly challenging Italy’s leadership in framing North Africa policy. In early July 2025, during closed-door discussions on the future of EUMPM Niger, French representatives reportedly raised concerns over “the growing unilateralism” of Italian operations in Niger, despite Rome’s formal coordination with the European External Action Service (EEAS). While no formal rebuke was issued, diplomats cited in the Brussels-based Euractiv portal observed a “shift in tone” that coincided with Macron’s recognition announcement. This indicates that France may attempt to re-anchor itself in EU policymaking by using moral leadership in Palestine as a springboard to reshape intra-European alliances over African deployments.

Further compounding Italy’s strategic dilemma is the growing alignment between French diplomatic gestures and Algerian geopolitical positioning. Algeria, a key energy partner for Italy and a historical pillar of France’s Africa policy, has openly welcomed France’s Palestine decision, framing it as a long-overdue return to principles. Algeria’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on May 28, 2025, praising France for its “courage and clarity” and proposing renewed trilateral coordination on Sahel stabilization. While Italy maintains strong energy relations with Algeria, particularly through ENI’s strategic gas contracts, this emerging Franco-Algerian convergence raises the specter of diplomatic marginalization, particularly if France leverages Algeria’s weight within the African Union and the Arab League to challenge Italian initiatives. The African Union, in its 2025 mid-year consultative forum, has already adopted a more assertive position on Palestinian recognition, with several member states backing calls to suspend cooperation with states perceived as aligning uncritically with Israeli policies. Italy, by maintaining strategic ambiguity on the issue, may face increasing pressure in forums where African moral consensus collides with Western strategic orthodoxy.

These developments unfold amid a broader reconfiguration of geopolitical alliances in the Sahel, where Russian, Turkish, and Gulf actors are rapidly expanding their footprint. The Russian paramilitary presence via the Africa Corps, successor to the Wagner Group, continues to shape political outcomes in Mali and Burkina Faso. Turkey, meanwhile, has expanded its security partnerships through TIKA and military training agreements, while the United Arab Emirates has begun financing strategic infrastructure in Niger and Chad, often bypassing Western development frameworks. In this competitive environment, France’s recognition of Palestine becomes a low-cost, high-impact diplomatic move—a symbolic act with the potential to realign alliances, reinsert itself into Sahelian narratives, and constrain Italian-led initiatives by shifting the normative terrain. For Italy, the challenge is to preserve its strategic credibility while navigating the dual threat of geopolitical competition from extra-European actors and intra-European fragmentation driven by French recalibration.

In assessing the effectiveness of France’s maneuver, it is crucial to examine the reception among African public spheres and regional elites. Initial data suggests that France’s pivot has yielded tangible reputational dividends. An April–June 2025 polling series by the Moroccan Policy Centre for the Mediterranean (PCM) across Mauritania, Senegal, Algeria, and Tunisia showed a 12-point average increase in favorable perceptions of France compared to 2023 baselines, with over 70% of respondents in Algeria affirming that “France is moving closer to the moral positions of the region.” This rebound comes after years of declining favorability; Pew Research’s 2023 Global Attitudes Survey had shown French favorability in West Africa at its lowest point in two decades. French embassies across North Africa and the Sahel have since launched coordinated media campaigns amplifying Macron’s recognition of Palestine, coupled with renewed emphasis on development aid pledges and educational cooperation. In contrast, Italian diplomatic missions have maintained a lower public profile, focused on technical cooperation and behind-the-scenes negotiation on migration management. This asymmetry of perception may ultimately shape the effectiveness of France’s strategic gambit—not through immediate material shifts but via the long-term erosion of Italy’s soft power posture.

At the European level, reactions to France’s unilateral recognition have been mixed but notably silent in terms of punitive response. The German Foreign Office issued a carefully worded statement reaffirming support for a two-state solution but stopping short of endorsing France’s timing or approach. Meanwhile, Poland, Austria, and Hungary voiced opposition to recognition outside of a negotiated peace process, but refrained from direct criticism. Notably, Spain—which itself recognized Palestine in June 2024—issued a joint communiqué with France expressing the “urgent need for a new European moral consensus on peace and justice in the Middle East.” This ad hoc alignment may signal the emergence of a new axis within the EU that prioritizes moral narrative leadership over strict Atlanticist coordination, posing further challenges to Italy’s preference for calibrated diplomacy and pragmatic engagement. According to analysis published by the Institut Montaigne in July 2025, this divergence reflects “a growing bifurcation within Europe between activist diplomacy and stability-oriented strategic planning,” with Italy and France increasingly anchoring opposing poles.

The durability of this divergence will hinge on events far beyond the Mediterranean. In Washington, the Biden administration has reiterated its opposition to unilateral recognition, framing France’s action as “counterproductive” to ongoing diplomatic initiatives. However, with U.S. attention absorbed by tensions in the Indo-Pacific and the ongoing electoral cycle, direct consequences for France are unlikely. Italy, in this vacuum, must balance Atlanticist loyalty with the imperative to maintain African access and influence. In doing so, Rome faces a delicate calculus: whether to recalibrate its normative positioning on Palestine to preserve African partnerships, or to double down on its current trajectory in hopes of outpacing French efforts through superior operational delivery and regional partnerships.

The Collapse of Françafrique and Italy’s Ascent: Strategic Reordering of Influence in Africa’s Post-Colonial Theatre

The dismantling of the Françafrique system—France’s post-colonial framework of military, economic, and political dominance over its former African territories—has been one of the most significant geopolitical developments in the African theatre over the past two decades. Originally constructed in the wake of decolonization to maintain French influence through military accords, elite networks, and preferential economic agreements, the Françafrique model began to erode in the early 2000s under the combined weight of regional democratization, Chinese economic competition, and mounting anti-French sentiment. However, it was the period from 2019 to 2024 that delivered the most crushing blows. The military coups in Mali (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023) not only expelled French troops and ambassadors but also severed security cooperation, energy contracts, and cultural programs. France’s closure of its bases in Kidal, Gao, and Niamey represented more than tactical withdrawal; it signified a structural decoupling from the very territories that had long anchored Paris’s African projection. According to the French Senate’s 2024 report on “Military Reposturing in the Sahel,” the losses in these three countries amounted to a 68% contraction in French military operations and logistical capacity in the region.

The impact of this collapse has been not merely military but normative and reputational. France’s credibility as a development partner has been deeply eroded, with multiple regional governments accusing it of neocolonial interference, security failures, and a lack of genuine partnership. In a widely circulated address in August 2023, Niger’s junta spokesman Colonel Amadou Abdramane condemned French operations as “a fig leaf for imperial control,” a sentiment echoed in Burkina Faso’s 2023 revocation of the 1961 military cooperation agreement with Paris. Moreover, the closure of French cultural centers in Bamako and Ouagadougou, once centers of Francophone soft power, symbolizes a broader severance from the ideological architecture of Françafrique. Data from the French Development Agency (AFD) reveals that disbursements to Sahelian countries fell by over 40% between 2020 and 2024, with several suspended outright due to the breakdown in diplomatic relations.

In this vacuum, Italy has emerged as an increasingly influential actor, not as a substitute hegemon but as a technocratic stabilizer offering multidimensional engagement. Italy’s approach differs fundamentally from the Françafrique legacy; it is not built on elite patronage networks or historical claims but on project-based cooperation, capacity building, and operational pragmatism. The Mattei Plan, launched in 2023 and expanded in 2024 with strategic backing from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, is emblematic of this new paradigm. Named after Enrico Mattei—the post-war founder of ENI who famously advocated for equitable energy partnerships with the Global South—the plan seeks to reposition Italy as a gateway between Europe and Africa, emphasizing mutual benefit and local empowerment over paternalism or coercion.

As of June 2025, the Mattei Plan has committed €5.5 billion in public-private initiatives across 15 African states, with sectoral focuses on green energy, agriculture, vocational training, and digital connectivity. The Italian National Institute for International Trade (ICE) reports that 142 Italian companies are now active in Africa under Mattei-affiliated programs, with ENI, Terna, Leonardo, and Snam leading major joint ventures in Algeria, Egypt, Mozambique, and Senegal. Crucially, the plan operates in alignment with the European Union’s Global Gateway strategy and the African Union’s Agenda 2063, allowing for harmonization with multilateral frameworks and avoiding the reputational burdens of unilateralism. Italy’s programming is also embedded within the NDICI budgetary envelope, securing co-financing from EU institutions and amplifying Italy’s leverage within Brussels while reinforcing African perceptions of joint ownership.

In contrast to France’s historical dependence on elite political linkages, Italy’s model hinges on infrastructural co-development and institutional strengthening. One prominent example is the Green Sahel Corridor initiative—a €270 million project co-funded by ENI and the EU, designed to develop solar energy microgrids and agricultural irrigation networks across Niger and southern Algeria. The initiative partners with local cooperatives and ministries rather than centralized elites, reflecting a deliberate departure from the opaque governance patterns that plagued Françafrique. According to the 2024 progress report by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), the Green Sahel Corridor is projected to reduce diesel dependency in the project zones by 47% by 2027, while creating over 15,000 local jobs. In terms of energy diplomacy, Italy has further consolidated its influence through long-term LNG agreements with Algeria and Egypt, ensuring energy resilience for Europe while generating revenue streams for African partners. ENI’s April 2025 contract with Sonatrach for a new floating regasification terminal in Skikda, valued at €1.3 billion, is expected to increase Algerian LNG exports to Italy by 35% within two years.

These engagements have yielded tangible diplomatic capital. African states increasingly view Italy as a reliable, non-intrusive partner focused on deliverables rather than ideology. Italy’s neutrality on contentious issues—such as Western Sahara, Israeli-Palestinian tensions, and African migration governance—has also allowed it to maintain dialogue across ideological divides. Unlike France, which has taken firm positions that alienated actors in Algiers, Bamako, and Tripoli, Italy has positioned itself as a silent broker. This stance has been particularly useful in migration diplomacy. Italy’s migration management strategies, backed by the EU Trust Fund for Africa and the Italian Migration Fund, focus on stabilization of transit zones, investment in local economies, and awareness campaigns to reduce irregular flows. The 2025 mid-year report by the Italian Ministry of the Interior shows a 23% decline in irregular arrivals via the Central Mediterranean Route compared to 2023, attributed in part to strengthened cooperation with Nigerien and Tunisian authorities.

While critics argue that Italy’s approach remains security-heavy, particularly in regions such as Agadez and Zinder, where border control operations are intensive, the inclusion of long-term development metrics within the Mattei Plan marks a strategic shift from containment to transformation. Italian policy documents now emphasize “structural push factors” such as climate vulnerability, youth unemployment, and food insecurity, and programs such as the Agricultural Value Chain Enhancement in Burkina Faso (AVCE-BF), co-managed with FAO, reflect this evolution. According to the World Bank’s 2025 update on Sahelian development partnerships, Italy’s bilateral ODA commitments to the region rose by 42% between 2022 and 2024, making it the third-largest European donor after Germany and the EU institutions.

This Italian ascent is not merely reactive to French decline but strategically coordinated across multiple instruments of national power. The integration of defense, diplomacy, and development (the 3Ds of Italian strategic planning) is operationalized through inter-ministerial task forces, joint civil-military programming, and forward-deployed diplomatic support units. The Italian Joint Operational Headquarters (COI), headquartered in Centocelle, coordinates missions such as MISIN with developmental partners and local ministries. This whole-of-government approach, modeled in part on the U.S. National Security Council’s interagency coordination, has enabled Italy to punch above its weight in complex theaters. A 2024 RAND Corporation analysis on European stabilizing missions in the Sahel noted that “Italy’s integrated footprint offers a template for scalable, sustainable engagement that avoids the overstretch and reputational backlash faced by former colonial actors.”

Notably, Italy’s African doctrine is not merely southern-focused but also connects eastward through its Indo-Mediterranean framework. In January 2025, Italy signed a trilateral memorandum of understanding with Kenya and India on logistics corridor development, linking East African ports with Mediterranean transshipment hubs. This vision complements the Mattei Plan and reflects a shift toward a more holistic Afro-Mediterranean connectivity strategy. With maritime infrastructure projects in Tangiers, Tripoli, and Mombasa receiving technical assistance from Italian engineering firms under the auspices of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), Italy is creating a multidirectional development lattice that strengthens its economic and political positioning across both the Maghreb and the Sahel.

This structural reordering of influence has placed Italy and France on a trajectory of deepening rivalry, with overlapping zones of interest and divergent ideological framing. Where France seeks to regain normative legitimacy through gestures like Palestinian recognition, Italy is building systemic credibility through performance-based cooperation. This divergence is increasingly visible in diplomatic messaging, multilateral forums, and the framing of regional security. France’s 2025 Africa Diplomacy Strategy, released by the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, emphasizes “restoring trust through values,” while Italy’s 2025 Africa Engagement Plan focuses on “delivering stability through infrastructure and human capital.” The strategic competition is no longer about who controls territory, but whose model is seen as legitimate, replicable, and aligned with African aspirations.

In terms of hard power projection, Italy’s operational footprint is expanding with greater interoperability with NATO and the European Defence Fund. The €350 million upgrade of the Italian Forward Logistics Base in Niamey, scheduled for completion in late 2025, will enhance airlift capacity, ISR operations, and medical evacuation infrastructure. Meanwhile, Italian special forces continue to train Nigerien rapid response units under MISIN, while participating in EU capacity-building platforms. By contrast, France’s military posture is now centered on West African coastal states—Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad—where its leverage is increasingly dependent on bilateral military agreements rather than pan-African legitimacy.

The competition extends to language and culture, domains historically dominated by France through the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) and French-language education networks. However, Italian cultural diplomacy is quietly expanding. The Italian Cultural Institutes (IICs) in Addis Ababa, Dakar, and Algiers have expanded programming focused on architecture, digital innovation, and culinary heritage, often in collaboration with UNESCO and local NGOs. While France still holds a dominant position in francophone media and education, Italy’s niche positioning in creative industries and vocational training is gaining traction, particularly among African youth populations seeking employment-linked education. According to UNESCO’s 2024 Education Outlook, Italian-language enrollments in Africa grew by 11% in 2023, driven by scholarships, Erasmus+ partnerships, and digital Italian-language platforms co-developed with African universities.

Ultimately, the collapse of Françafrique has exposed the structural unsustainability of legacy influence models, while opening space for new actors like Italy to assert strategic presence through partnership-oriented approaches. This does not imply the end of French influence, but rather its transformation under pressure—from Italy’s technocratic ascent, from pan-African demands for equality, and from global shifts in geopolitical gravity toward the Global South. Italy’s success will depend on its ability to sustain this trajectory without succumbing to the very temptations—unilateralism, securitization, extractivism—that undermined France’s African project. France’s symbolic gestures, like recognizing Palestine, may offer tactical advantages in narrative repositioning, but unless paired with substantive recalibration of African engagement, they risk appearing as last-gasp attempts to regain influence in a theatre that has moved beyond colonial memory.

Migration as a Geopolitical Weapon: Franco-Italian Competition in North African Transit Corridors and EU Border Governance

Migration has emerged not merely as a humanitarian or economic issue in Euro-African relations but as a central lever of geopolitical power, particularly within the increasingly adversarial dynamics between France and Italy. Nowhere is this more visible than in the contested management of North African transit corridors, where overlapping interests, divergent policy paradigms, and strategic rivalry between Rome and Paris have transformed the movement of people into a battlefield of influence, coercion, and narrative warfare. Italy, under immense domestic pressure to reduce irregular arrivals via the Central Mediterranean Route, has adopted a proactive, structured engagement with origin and transit countries, prioritizing bilateral agreements and developmental incentives. France, by contrast, has relied more heavily on post-colonial diplomatic linkages, securitization narratives, and EU-level consensus-building mechanisms. This divergence has hardened over time into competing migration doctrines, each tied to broader strategies of African engagement, and each instrumentalized to bolster or challenge influence in key zones such as Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria.

Tunisia represents a frontline case study in this competition. In July 2023, the European Union, under Italian leadership and with strong support from European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, signed a €105 million migration compact with the Tunisian government, later expanded to €255 million in early 2024. Italy was instrumental in structuring the package, which included funding for border management, repatriation logistics, and community-based development projects in key coastal governorates such as Sfax and Medenine. According to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 2024 Tunisia Report, Italian technocrats played a lead role in the delivery of biometric systems, training for Tunisian border guards, and logistical support for maritime interception. This compact, while heavily criticized by NGOs and human rights observers, led to a measurable drop in departures: Frontex’s 2024 Annual Risk Analysis recorded a 38% reduction in detected irregular crossings from Tunisia to Italy compared to 2022 levels.

France, although a signatory to the compact, publicly distanced itself from its implementation architecture, citing concerns over human rights standards and lack of consultation. The French Ministry of the Interior issued a communiqué in October 2023 stating that “long-term stabilization must prioritize democratic governance over short-term containment,” a veiled critique of Italy’s transactional approach. Behind the rhetoric, however, France has continued its own bilateral engagement with Tunisia, particularly in sectors such as policing, judicial cooperation, and counterterrorism. The 2024 Franco-Tunisian Security Cooperation Accord, signed in Paris, included a €92 million package for judicial reforms, detention infrastructure, and digital surveillance systems. French policy has focused on what it terms “root-cause interventions,” including youth employment and education programs, often delivered via the French Development Agency (AFD) and coordinated with Francophone civil society networks.

This bifurcation in approach has generated friction at the EU level, particularly within the Justice and Home Affairs Council (JHA), where Italian and French delegates have clashed over the allocation of external border funds and the future architecture of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. During the June 2025 JHA summit, French representatives criticized what they termed the “nationalization of European external action,” warning against the precedence of bilateral compacts over unified EU mechanisms. Italy, supported by Greece, Malta, and Austria, countered that “flexible, tailored engagement with origin and transit states is indispensable for migration control,” and pushed for the replication of the Tunis compact model in Libya and Mauritania. The deadlock reflects not only divergent threat perceptions but also the instrumental use of migration diplomacy to assert regional leadership and policy primacy.

Libya, the most volatile node in the Central Mediterranean corridor, presents an even sharper arena for Franco-Italian rivalry. Since the 2011 NATO intervention and subsequent state collapse, Libya has become both a strategic vacuum and a stage for foreign influence. Italy has consistently supported the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU), with ENI maintaining operations in western Libya and the Italian Navy providing logistical assistance for the Libyan Coast Guard. France, by contrast, has hedged its support between Tripoli and the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who controls key migration hubs in Kufra, Benghazi, and Tobruk. This dual-track approach has allowed France to maintain leverage across both power centers, but it has also complicated EU consensus and constrained humanitarian coordination. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), over 85% of recorded migrant interceptions in Libyan waters during 2024 occurred under GNU authority, supported largely by Italian equipment and training.

This operational dominance has not gone unnoticed. French analysts, particularly at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), have raised concerns that Italy’s monopoly on western Libyan cooperation grants Rome disproportionate influence over EU return and resettlement programs. A 2024 FRS policy brief noted that “Italy’s vertical integration of security, energy, and migration in Libya risks marginalizing European multilateralism.” In response, France has sought to diversify its migration engagements by investing in upstream deterrence mechanisms in Niger and Chad, focusing on local police training, border surveillance, and legal migration pathways. However, the 2023 coup in Niger and the ensuing suspension of many EU activities have significantly degraded France’s operational capacity. Italy, by contrast, has maintained uninterrupted engagement through MISIN and EUMPM Niger, ensuring continuity in both hard and soft border controls.

The geopolitical weaponization of migration is not confined to origin or transit states; it extends into the architecture of European burden-sharing, where France and Italy find themselves increasingly at odds. France remains committed to the Dublin III framework and the solidarity-based relocation mechanisms envisaged under the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. Italy, facing overwhelming frontline pressure, has demanded a more binding and automatic relocation formula, coupled with expanded returns to third countries. According to the European Asylum Support Office’s (EASO) 2024 Statistical Overview, Italy received over 154,000 asylum applications in 2024—nearly double that of France—despite a smaller resident population and GDP. This asymmetry has fueled domestic political pressure in Rome and incentivized more aggressive bilateral diplomacy with North African states, often outside the formal EU channels.

The divergence also plays out in narrative warfare. France has cultivated a discourse of humanitarian leadership, emphasizing the protection of asylum seekers, international refugee law, and the dangers of pushbacks. French media outlets, supported by policy briefings from organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières and Human Rights Watch, frequently criticize Italy’s maritime operations and detainment protocols. In contrast, Italy has framed its approach as “responsible realism,” highlighting the connection between uncontrolled migration, smuggling networks, and terrorism. Italian think tanks such as ISPI and Centro Studi Internazionali have argued for a doctrine of “stabilizing containment,” wherein development and security serve as mutually reinforcing tools for reducing irregular flows. This narrative finds traction not only in Rome but across Central and Eastern Europe, where migration skepticism remains high.

In Algeria, the competition is more subtle but no less strategic. France retains deep cultural, linguistic, and economic ties, but its influence has waned in the face of popular resentment, energy competition, and the rise of multipolar alternatives. Italy has moved assertively to fill the void, particularly in the energy sector. ENI’s 2022 and 2023 gas deals with Sonatrach, coupled with co-financed infrastructure projects under the Mattei Plan, have positioned Italy as Algeria’s primary energy partner. This partnership has been extended to include border security cooperation and joint efforts to combat trans-Saharan smuggling routes, some of which serve as corridors for migrant movements. The Algerian Interior Ministry’s 2024 Bilateral Report on Migration notes enhanced coordination with Italian law enforcement, particularly in data sharing and return logistics.

France, sensing encroachment, has recalibrated its strategy toward Algeria by leveraging its soft power toolkit. In 2025, Paris launched the Franco-Algerian Youth Initiative, a €60 million program aimed at cultural exchanges, vocational training, and diaspora engagement. French authorities also reopened long-stalled discussions on visa facilitation and consular services, a key concern for the over two million Algerians residing in France. While these efforts have yielded moderate improvements in bilateral optics, they have done little to challenge Italy’s lead in hard security cooperation and economic integration.

The competition over migration extends into the digital realm, where both France and Italy have deployed hybrid influence tools to shape perceptions and control narratives. Italy’s Ministry of the Interior has funded multi-language digital awareness campaigns across West and North Africa, warning of the dangers of irregular migration and promoting legal pathways. These campaigns, often co-delivered with NGOs and local influencers, have been cited by the European Commission as a model for behaviorally informed communication. France has responded with its own initiatives, emphasizing rights-based messaging and diaspora empowerment. However, a 2024 analysis by the European External Action Service’s StratCom division found that Italian campaigns had greater reach and credibility among target demographics, particularly youth in Tunisia and Niger.

The hybridization of migration governance has also introduced elements of coercion and bargaining. Transit countries, aware of their leverage, have begun to play European states against each other. Tunisia’s President Kais Saied, during a February 2025 press conference, openly praised Italian “respect for sovereignty and non-interference,” while accusing unnamed European partners of “arrogance and duplicity.” Libyan officials have similarly oscillated between France and Italy, extracting concessions on aid, equipment, and diplomatic support. In this environment, the risk of instrumentalization—whereby migration is used as a bargaining chip or geopolitical weapon—has increased dramatically. This is not merely theoretical; in April 2025, following a diplomatic spat with the EU over human rights conditionalities, Tunisian authorities briefly suspended joint maritime patrols, leading to a 17% spike in departures within two weeks, according to Frontex data.

The weaponization of migration is further compounded by the presence of third-party actors—Russia, Turkey, and the Gulf states—who exploit migratory instability to undermine EU cohesion and project influence. Russia, through its proxies in Libya and digital information campaigns, has been accused of exacerbating migratory pressures to weaken NATO’s southern flank. Italy, acutely aware of this threat, has increased its coordination with NATO’s Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples, focusing on hybrid threat detection and maritime domain awareness. France, too, has sounded alarms over Russian manipulation, but has preferred to work through the EU’s Foreign Policy Instruments Service and the African Peace Facility. This difference in operational culture—Italy’s preference for direct, security-first engagement versus France’s multilateralist, rights-based framework—continues to shape their respective migration doctrines.

Ultimately, migration has ceased to be a secondary issue in Euro-African geopolitics. It is now a primary theater of influence, coercion, and legitimacy-building. For Italy and France, the stakes go beyond border control; they encompass regional leadership, normative authority, and the capacity to shape Europe’s external action. In this high-stakes environment, every agreement, narrative, and operational asset becomes a vector of power. As the geopolitical context continues to fragment, with rising populism in Europe, worsening climate impacts in Africa, and shifting alignments across the Mediterranean, the migration chessboard will remain a key axis along which Franco-Italian competition is defined, contested, and perhaps ultimately resolved.

Military Entrenchment and Normative Warfare: Franco-Italian Rivalry in Sahel Stabilization and Security Projection

The Sahel has long served as both a crucible and a fulcrum of European security projection, a vast geopolitical buffer stretching across the southern edge of the Sahara that connects the Mediterranean Basin to sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past decade, the region has witnessed a sharp intensification of violent extremism, political instability, and foreign military entrenchment. Against this backdrop, Italy and France have pursued increasingly divergent strategies of stabilization, each structured around different philosophies of engagement, deployment architectures, and institutional alignments. Italy’s approach has emphasized modular, low-visibility military missions embedded within broader civil-military frameworks and coordinated with European instruments. France, by contrast, following the disintegration of Operation Barkhane and the collapse of bilateral military accords across much of the central Sahel, has sought to reconstitute its presence via normative influence, coalition diplomacy, and strategic realignment toward coastal West Africa. This bifurcation—between Italy’s operational consolidation and France’s narrative-based repositioning—has created a new axis of competition, with implications for NATO’s southern strategy, EU defense coherence, and the viability of African-led stabilization efforts.

Italy’s military engagement in the Sahel is centered on the Italian Support Mission in Niger (MISIN), launched in 2018 and formally expanded in scope and funding under the 2023 Strategic Direction Document of the Italian Ministry of Defence. MISIN operates under a bilateral agreement with Niger and is tasked with training local security forces, supporting counter-terrorism operations, and reinforcing border control in coordination with Nigerien and European partners. As of May 2025, MISIN deploys approximately 400 personnel, including Carabinieri trainers, medical teams, intelligence analysts, and logistic units. The Italian Joint Operational Headquarters (COI) oversees MISIN’s integration with European missions such as EUCAP Sahel Niger and the European Union Military Partnership Mission in Niger (EUMPM), ensuring interoperability and coherence. Italy’s presence at the Niamey forward base, expanded with €42 million in 2024 for infrastructure upgrades and strategic lift capabilities, has also become a regional logistical hub supporting EU and UN operations.

This operational footprint is distinct in its emphasis on capacity building rather than direct combat engagement. Italian personnel do not participate in kinetic operations but instead focus on specialized training, particularly in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), intelligence sharing, and special forces tactics. According to the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) 2024 mission brief, Italian trainers have conducted over 230 specialized courses for Nigerien Gendarmerie and Armed Forces since 2022, with a reported pass rate of 89% and positive feedback from national command. The mission’s success is further underscored by its continuity during the turbulent post-coup period in 2023, when many Western missions were suspended or expelled. Italy’s quiet diplomacy and non-intrusive posture allowed MISIN and its partners to remain operational, providing continuity in a rapidly deteriorating security environment.

Italy’s commitment to EUMPM Niger, launched in December 2022 by the Council of the European Union, is also central to its strategy. The mission, conceived as a capacity-building and advisory tool in response to the withdrawal of French troops, has gained new prominence amid the vacuum left by Barkhane. Italy has provided not only personnel but strategic planning capabilities, with Italian officers serving in mission leadership roles and contributing to the development of Nigerien National Security Sector Reform (SSR) blueprints. The EU’s 2024 EUMPM Niger Evaluation Report, co-authored with the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), highlighted Italy’s leadership as instrumental in maintaining credibility and engagement with Niger’s transitional authorities. The report also noted that Italy’s perceived neutrality—relative to France’s colonial legacy—has allowed it to navigate political sensitivities with greater agility.

France’s repositioning in the Sahel, by contrast, is marked by a shift from kinetic presence to coalition building and normative re-legitimation. Following the termination of Operation Barkhane in 2022 and subsequent expulsions from Mali (2022), Burkina Faso (2023), and Niger (2023), France has sought to rebuild its regional posture through strategic partnerships with West African coastal states and by framing itself as a normative leader on issues of governance, human rights, and democratic resilience. The French Ministry for the Armed Forces’ 2024 Strategic Recalibration White Paper outlines a “concentric ring” model of engagement, prioritizing strategic partnerships with Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and Chad, while supporting regional institutions such as ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel Joint Force. French deployments now emphasize intelligence cooperation, maritime security, and rapid reaction capabilities based out of pre-positioned forces in Dakar and Abidjan.

This transformation from presence to influence is not without its contradictions. While France has reduced its physical footprint, it has ramped up its doctrinal and advisory roles. The 2024 launch of the French-led “Coalition for Democratic Security in West Africa” (CDSWA), announced at the Paris Sahel Summit, exemplifies this normative turn. Comprising France, Germany, Senegal, Ghana, and the EU Commission, the coalition aims to promote governance capacity, judicial reform, and civilian control of armed forces. Its €550 million budget is heavily underwritten by France, with contributions from the European Peace Facility and the African Development Bank. Although still in its infancy, CDSWA is already viewed as a competing model to the more operationally focused Italian-EU mechanisms. A comparative assessment by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in April 2025 noted that “France’s emphasis on narrative and institution-building contrasts sharply with Italy’s emphasis on tactical proficiency and field-level engagement,” reflecting different theories of change in conflict stabilization.

This divergence extends to multilateral forums, where France and Italy have competed for influence over EU and NATO policy directions. Within the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC), France has pushed for the reorientation of CSDP missions toward governance and resilience, while Italy has argued for maintaining focus on kinetic threat mitigation and border security. This difference came to a head during the May 2025 debate over the renewal of EUCAP Sahel Mali, where France proposed expanding the mission’s mandate to include judicial reform and anti-corruption training. Italy countered with a proposal to refocus the mission on intelligence sharing and counter-IED tactics, citing increasing terrorist attacks in the Mopti and Gao regions. The final mandate reflected a compromise, but the debate underscored a widening policy schism.

NATO, while not operationally active in the Sahel, has increasingly viewed the region as strategically relevant to its Southern Flank, particularly in light of hybrid threats, migration dynamics, and Russian proxy activity. Italy, as host of the NATO Strategic Direction South Hub in Naples, has taken a leading role in articulating a comprehensive Sahel strategy within the Alliance. Italian briefings to NATO’s Military Committee have emphasized the need for enhanced ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) integration, interoperability with EU missions, and the establishment of a Mediterranean Sahel Operational Concept (MESOC). France has supported these initiatives but remains wary of NATO overreach, preferring EU-centered frameworks that preserve French leadership. This tension was evident in the 2024 NATO Brussels Ministerial, where France opposed a proposal to conduct NATO-led exercises in Senegal, while Italy argued such drills would build capacity and deter malign influence.

Beyond institutional venues, the Franco-Italian divergence is also visible in their respective relations with African militaries and civil societies. Italy’s military cooperation emphasizes interoperability and local ownership. In Burkina Faso, Italian trainers worked with regional security networks to develop counter-insurgency manuals co-authored by African officers and reviewed by civilian oversight bodies. France, by contrast, has relied on centralized training academies and doctrine exportation, often modeled on French operational manuals. While this approach benefits from linguistic affinity in francophone states, it has struggled to adapt to localized threat environments and political fragmentation.

Civil society engagement further highlights the asymmetry. Italy has partnered with African think tanks, women’s associations, and youth networks to promote civil-military dialogue, often embedding these components within its broader development programs. In Mali, for instance, the Italian-led “Dialogue for Stability” initiative—funded through the NDICI and managed in part by the Italian Development Cooperation Agency—has facilitated over 40 roundtables between security forces and local leaders since 2022. France’s efforts, though broader in scope, have faced greater resistance, particularly in states where perceptions of French influence are associated with regime survival and anti-democratic stabilization.

A new dynamic complicating this rivalry is the entry of non-Western security providers, particularly Russia and Turkey. The presence of Russian paramilitary elements, primarily under the Africa Corps umbrella, has deepened instability in Mali and Burkina Faso while undermining Western training programs. Italy has responded by enhancing its operational security and intelligence coordination with Nigerien and Chadian authorities, focusing on early warning systems and the protection of critical infrastructure. France, whose presence in these countries has collapsed, has pivoted toward counter-disinformation efforts and cyber defense, launching digital literacy campaigns and media partnerships across francophone West Africa. According to a 2025 report by the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, Italy’s security engagements have proven more resilient to Russian disruption due to their decentralized structure and local co-ownership.

Finally, the financial architecture supporting these missions reveals another layer of differentiation. Italy leverages both national defense budgets and EU co-financing under instruments such as the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). France, while also a beneficiary of these funds, increasingly relies on bilateral accords and coalition pools, such as the CDSWA. This divergence in funding strategy has implications for sustainability, as Italy’s model embeds its presence within broader EU fiscal and strategic frameworks, while France’s coalition approach may face constraints if political consensus or donor fatigue materializes.

The strategic rivalry between Italy and France in the Sahel thus transcends troop numbers or base locations. It is a competition between two visions of stabilization: one rooted in technical capacity, modular deployments, and local empowerment; the other in normative leadership, regional alliances, and institutional reconstruction. Both approaches have strengths and vulnerabilities. Italy’s operational reliability and diplomatic subtlety have won trust, but its success depends on sustained resource flows and policy continuity. France’s normative re-legitimation strategy offers broader regional appeal, but its impact is diluted by past missteps and limited physical presence. In a region as fragmented and dynamic as the Sahel, these contrasting doctrines will continue to shape not only the future of European security engagement but also the contours of African sovereignty, legitimacy, and alignment in the post-Françafrique era.

France’s Pivot to the Global South: Macron’s Recognition of Palestine as Strategic Leverage Against Italian Influence in Mediterranean and Multilateral Arenas

France’s recognition of the State of Palestine in 2025 must ultimately be read not only as a symbolic gesture in Middle Eastern diplomacy, nor as a tactical move against Italian influence in Africa alone, but as a broader strategic pivot toward the Global South aimed at repositioning France as a normative leader in a multipolar world. President Emmanuel Macron’s calculated departure from Washington’s position—despite the risks of transatlantic friction—reflects an overarching effort to reconstruct France’s international profile following years of reputational decline in its former African sphere. This pivot serves to recalibrate France’s diplomatic bandwidth by aligning with post-colonial solidarity movements, forging ties with emerging powers, and offering an alternative narrative to perceived Western hypocrisy. At the same time, it implicitly seeks to undermine the legitimacy and influence of competitors—Italy foremost among them—whose rising stature in African and Mediterranean theaters poses a challenge to France’s historical role as Europe’s voice in the Global South.

The timing of France’s recognition is geopolitically deliberate. By formally recognizing Palestinian statehood in mid-2025, Macron positioned France as the first G7 country to break with the U.S. and challenge the diplomatic inertia surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This move earned immediate approbation from a broad swath of Global South capitals. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in a July 2025 communiqué, welcomed France’s decision as “a bold and necessary affirmation of international legality,” while the African Union Chairperson hailed it as “a long-overdue rectification of moral imbalance in international relations.” This resonance was not incidental. In a context where Western powers are frequently accused of selective adherence to international law, France’s action allowed it to reposition itself as an exception—a Western actor willing to align with non-Western demands on issues of justice, sovereignty, and post-colonial redress.

This recalibration dovetails with a broader trend of de-Westernization in global governance institutions. France, acutely aware of its declining structural influence within Africa and its stagnating leverage within the UN Security Council (where permanent membership no longer guarantees deference), has increasingly sought to amplify its normative profile in non-Western coalitions. The recognition of Palestine thus acts as a signal of repositioning—placing France closer to the positions of BRICS members such as Brazil and South Africa, as well as pivotal swing states like Indonesia, Nigeria, and Egypt. According to the July 2025 briefing by the International Crisis Group, France’s shift has “opened new channels of diplomatic coordination with emerging powers, especially in areas of security governance, energy transition, and multilateral reform.”

By contrast, Italy’s positioning remains anchored in Atlanticist continuity and cautious diplomacy, a strategy that, while operationally effective in Africa, leaves it vulnerable to reputational undercutting in broader multilateral forums. Italy has abstained from recognizing Palestinian statehood, emphasizing instead the importance of a negotiated two-state solution within the existing frameworks of the Oslo Accords. While this approach aligns with U.S. and German positions, it limits Italy’s ability to present itself as an independent actor in the Global South. This reputational asymmetry has material consequences. In June 2025, during the Ministerial Dialogue on South-South Cooperation convened in Jakarta, France was invited as a special observer despite not being a member of the G77, while Italy’s application for observer status was postponed pending consensus. The conference communique cited “alignment with the legitimate aspirations of the Global South” as a key criterion—a veiled allusion to Italy’s perceived reticence on Palestine.

This differential reception has also impacted voting patterns in international organizations. At the July 2025 session of the UN General Assembly, where resolutions on development financing and post-pandemic debt restructuring were debated, France co-sponsored motions with African and Latin American states, whereas Italy’s proposals were perceived as EU-centric and technocratic. A comparative analysis of voting alignment published by the Brookings Institution in August 2025 showed that France’s alignment with African states on core votes increased by 18% from 2023 levels, while Italy’s declined by 7%, reflecting a growing perception gap.

At the regional level, particularly within the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), France’s pivot has reshaped intra-European dynamics. The UfM’s 2025 Ministerial Forum in Barcelona became a platform for Macron to articulate a renewed “Pact for Mediterranean Justice,” centered on three pillars: equitable migration management, sustainable development, and recognition of statehood rights. The initiative, though light on operational content, was politically potent. Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco voiced support, while Italy, Spain, and Greece expressed reservations. Italy’s delegation reiterated its preference for a “stability-first” doctrine, emphasizing energy corridors, migration compacts, and private sector investment. French media interpreted Italy’s stance as a veiled endorsement of the status quo—a framing that gained traction in Arab public opinion, particularly through Al Jazeera, France24 Arabic, and pan-Maghreb media outlets.

France’s ability to dominate the narrative around Palestine also allows it to neutralize criticism of its failures in Africa. Where Italy’s strategy is judged primarily by deliverables—mission continuity, infrastructure output, migration reduction—France can pivot the conversation toward ideals, justice, and historical responsibility. This is particularly effective in regions where Western policy is viewed through a post-colonial lens. According to a 2025 survey by Afrobarometer across seven Sahelian and North African countries, France’s recognition of Palestine increased its favorability among youth respondents by an average of 15 percentage points, with the largest jumps in Algeria (+22%), Tunisia (+17%), and Senegal (+13%). Italy’s favorability remained stable but largely flatlined outside technical circles. These perception differentials, though intangible, influence elite and public discourse in ways that affect diplomatic alignment, media framing, and even development contracting.

The competition extends into multilateral financial institutions. France has successfully leveraged its new moral authority to secure leadership roles in emerging forums. In 2025, France was elected to co-chair the OECD’s Task Force on Inclusive Development Partnerships, a position it had not held since 2010. Italy’s bid to lead the OECD Africa Strategy Working Group was defeated by a narrow margin, with abstentions from several African members reportedly linked to Italy’s perceived equivocation on Palestine. Similarly, within the African Development Bank (AfDB), France has deepened engagement through special trust funds on climate adaptation and urban resilience, often co-branded with Global South partners. Italy remains active, particularly through energy and migration-linked portfolios, but struggles to match France’s narrative capital.

At the same time, France is investing in media, education, and epistemic influence as part of its long-term Global South strategy. The French Development Agency has increased funding for academic cooperation with African and Middle Eastern universities, including new scholarships for Palestinian students and joint degree programs in political science and international law. France Médias Monde has expanded its Arabic and Hausa programming, often emphasizing themes of justice, statehood, and inclusive governance. Italy, while active in cultural diplomacy through institutions such as the Istituto Italiano di Cultura and the Dante Alighieri Society, lacks the scale and thematic cohesion of France’s soft power apparatus. The Italian media presence in Africa and the Arab world remains fragmented, with limited penetration outside diaspora or elite circles.

This imbalance is particularly consequential in shaping how African and Arab publics understand European intentions. France’s narrative of moral leadership, whether accurate or opportunistic, allows it to set the terms of discourse. Italy’s achievements—such as stabilizing migration flows, expanding renewable energy access, or supporting vocational training—are tangible but often under-communicated. In conflict zones such as Libya and Mali, French recognition of Palestine has served as a rhetorical tool to position France as a peace-promoting actor, while Italian operational involvement is often framed through the lens of security containment. This narrative skew is not neutral. It affects how local elites engage with European missions, how NGOs choose partners, and how civil society perceives legitimacy.

Even within the European Union, France’s maneuver has created ripple effects. While the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains bound by unanimity, France’s unilateral move has emboldened other member states—such as Ireland, Spain, and Belgium—to consider similar recognitions, shifting the Overton window on Palestine within Europe. Italy, aiming to maintain cohesion with Germany and the United States, now faces the risk of diplomatic isolation on a high-visibility moral issue. This dynamic surfaced during the June 2025 European Council session, where France proposed that the EU adopt a collective recognition of Palestinian statehood “in line with evolving geopolitical imperatives.” Italy and several Central European states opposed the motion, but the debate revealed a new moral coalition forming within the EU—one in which France positions itself as a leader of conscience, while Italy is cast, however inaccurately, as a defender of stasis.

This tension is further exacerbated by the growing assertiveness of BRICS and other South-led platforms, where France’s overtures have found receptive audiences. In September 2025, France was invited to address the BRICS+ Outreach Dialogue in Johannesburg, where Macron delivered a keynote calling for a “multipolar order anchored in justice, dignity, and mutual respect.” The invitation was extended despite France’s non-membership, signaling a revaluation of Paris’s strategic utility within Global South diplomacy. Italy, although engaged with India, Brazil, and South Africa on bilateral terms, has not achieved similar symbolic breakthroughs. Its absence from such forums limits its ability to shape emerging norms around sovereignty, development, and global governance reform.

France’s recognition of Palestine also intersects with energy and infrastructure geopolitics, areas where Italy has traditionally enjoyed strategic advantage. By aligning with the moral consensus on Palestine, France enhances its negotiating position in energy-rich but politically sensitive regions. Algeria, a critical gas supplier for both countries, has responded positively to France’s stance. In July 2025, Sonatrach and TotalEnergies signed a memorandum to explore new LNG investments in eastern Algeria, a move partially attributed to improved diplomatic atmospherics. While ENI remains Algeria’s most entrenched partner, the French pivot introduces competitive pressure. Similarly, in Egypt, where Italy has long operated through ENI’s Zohr field, the Egyptian government praised France’s “clarity and independence” on Palestine, leading to increased French participation in renewable energy tenders.

The convergence of symbolic diplomacy and resource access reflects a broader trend: the coupling of normative positioning with material advantage. In this calculus, France’s recognition of Palestine is not merely a human rights statement but a diplomatic investment with strategic dividends—an effort to reclaim moral high ground, secure preferential partnerships, and undercut competitors through value-based signaling. For Italy, this presents a multidimensional challenge. It must navigate a landscape where operational success in Africa is insufficient to ensure narrative leadership, where abstention on Palestine translates into perceived moral deficiency, and where France is reinventing itself not through presence, but through persuasion.

To remain competitive, Italy will need to recalibrate its own engagement strategy—not necessarily by mirroring France’s symbolic acts, but by articulating a coherent narrative that connects its operational achievements to the aspirations of the Global South. This may involve more vocal support for Palestinian rights within multilateral institutions, increased investment in African knowledge systems, and greater visibility in forums beyond the EU. It will also require strengthening media and cultural outreach to counterbalance France’s epistemic dominance and ensure that Italy’s African partnerships are seen not merely as pragmatic, but as principled and future-oriented.

In the final analysis, France’s recognition of Palestine in 2025 is not an isolated diplomatic event, but a strategic maneuver embedded in a broader realignment of global influence. It seeks to reposition France as a post-colonial ally, a normative leader, and a pivot actor between North and South. In doing so, it challenges Italy’s silent ascent in Africa by reshaping the discursive terrain, recalibrating multilateral alliances, and weaponizing morality as a tool of statecraft. The effectiveness of this strategy will be judged not only by France’s renewed access to African elites or multilateral platforms, but by its ability to sustain a credible commitment to the values it now claims to champion. Italy, for its part, must respond not with emulation but with articulation—translating its strategic discipline and developmental impact into a language of partnership that resonates beyond spreadsheets and border metrics, into the realm of narrative legitimacy and geopolitical imagination.

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