Abstract
The protracted crisis in Libya since the 2011 overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi has evolved into a complex mosaic of internal divisions and external interferences that continue to undermine state sovereignty, institutional unity, and prospects for democratic transition as of November 2025. This strategic assessment examines the interplay of domestic fault lines—tribal, regional, ideological, and ethnic—with the persistent involvement of foreign military and intelligence actors, drawing exclusively on verified reports from the United Nations Security Council, United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and related resolutions to map current armed group configurations, foreign presences, and their implications for regional stability. The core problem addressed is the failure to achieve unified governance amid ongoing violations of the arms embargo established under Security Council resolution 1970 (2011), as modified by subsequent texts, and the absence of national elections despite repeated commitments under the Skhirat Agreement (2015) and ceasefire of 23 October 2020, with political deadlock exacerbated by rival administrations in Tripoli and the east, leading to recurrent clashes, economic distortions, and human rights concerns.
Methodologically, this report triangulates data from primary UN sources, including UNSMIL statements and Secretary-General reports up to October 2025, Security Council resolutions such as 2796 (2025) extending UNSMIL‘s mandate to 31 October 2026 Resolution 2796 (2025), 2769 (2025) updating sanctions and arms embargo exemptions Resolution 2769 (2025), and economic analyses from the IMF‘s 2025 Article IV Consultation Libya: 2025 Article IV Consultation and World Bank‘s Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025. Cross-verification relies on UN Panel of Experts findings where publicly accessible through UNSMIL references, alongside SIPRI embargo monitoring UN Arms embargo on Libya, emphasizing direct institutional outputs without secondary interpretation or speculation on non-verified activities.
Key findings reveal a fragile ceasefire holding since 2020 but undermined by militarization, with UNSMIL documenting ongoing risks of escalation in Tripoli and southern regions as noted in briefings through August 2025 Remarks of SRSG Hanna Tetteh, 21 August 2025. The dual government structure persists, with the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli and eastern authorities backed by the Libyan National Army (LNA), amid stalled electoral laws and municipal polls facing obstructions UNSMIL Political Roadmap. Foreign forces and mercenaries remain, contrary to Security Council demands for withdrawal, contributing to arms embargo violations monitored via authorizations renewed under resolution 2780 (2025) Resolution 2780 (2025). Economically, hydrocarbon dependency drives volatility, with GDP contraction of 2.7% in 2024 projected by the World Bank Libya Economic Outlook December 2024, offset partially by non-oil growth but constrained by fiscal surpluses masking governance gaps per IMF assessments IMF Staff Concluding Statement 2025. Human rights issues, including deaths in custody, persist alongside porous borders facilitating illicit flows.
In conclusion, Libya‘s trajectory toward unified institutions and elections hinges on enforcing embargo compliance, withdrawing external elements, and advancing UNSMIL-facilitated dialogue under the 2025 roadmap, with implications for Mediterranean security, migration routes, and energy markets. Sustained Security Council unity, as demonstrated in unanimous adoption of resolution 2796 (2025), offers leverage to prioritize Libyan-owned reconciliation, potentially mitigating proxy dynamics and fostering institutional reunification essential for long-term stability in a region marked by interconnected conflicts.
Historical-Strategic Context and Fault Lines (2011–November 2025)
The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 following the NATO-backed intervention authorized under Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) initiated a period of profound institutional collapse and fragmentation in Libya, with the subsequent imposition of an arms embargo through resolution 1970 (2011) establishing a framework for international sanctions that remains in force as of November 2025. That embargo, originally open-ended and prohibiting arms supplies to all entities in Libya, was modified over time to allow exemptions for the internationally recognized government, yet persistent violations have sustained militarization across the country, as monitored by the Panel of Experts assisting the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011). The post-2011 transitional phase saw the emergence of competing authorities, culminating in the division after 2014 between western and eastern administrations, exacerbated by the failure to implement unified security structures despite repeated international commitments.
The Libyan Political Agreement signed in Skhirat, Morocco, on 17 December 2015 UN welcomes historic signing of Libyan Political Agreement, endorsed by Security Council resolution 2259 (2015), aimed to establish a Government of National Accord as the sole legitimate authority, yet its partial implementation led to enduring rivalries between Tripoli-based institutions and those in the east supported by the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Regional fault lines deepened, with Tripolitania in the west dominated by militias from Misrata and Tripoli, Cyrenaica in the east under influence of forces aligned with the Libyan National Army, and Fezzan in the south characterized by porous borders and ethnic minority control, including Tuareg and Toubou communities. Tribal affiliations continued to intersect with these divisions, where networks from Warfalla, Magarha, and Qadhadhfa tribes influenced loyalty patterns, while ideological cleavages pitted Islamist-leaning groups against secular or Salafist-Madkhali factions, often proxy-aligned with external actors.
The permanent ceasefire agreement signed on 23 October 2020 in Geneva by the 5+5 Joint Military Commission Agreement for a Complete and Permanent Ceasefire in Libya, facilitated by UNSMIL, mandated the withdrawal of all mercenaries and foreign fighters within 90 days and the return of military units to camps, yet implementation remained incomplete as of November 2025, with UNSMIL reporting ongoing risks of escalation in briefings to the Security Council. Subsequent efforts, including the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum roadmap, envisioned elections in 2021, but delays persisted due to disputes over electoral laws and constitutional frameworks. Failed attempts to hold national elections in December 2021, coupled with the appointment of rival prime ministers in 2022 — the Government of National Unity in Tripoli and the Government of National Stability in the east — entrenched dual governance structures, undermining progress toward reunification.
By 2024, political deadlock intensified, with the House of Representatives and High Council of State unable to agree on electoral legislation, prompting UNSMIL to establish an Advisory Committee in February 2025 comprising 20 experts to propose pathways forward Advisory Committee Report and Recommendations. That committee submitted its final report on 5 May 2025, recommending options for resolving contentious issues, followed by nationwide consultations and a public poll involving 22,584 respondents Results of UNSMIL’s poll on the political process. In response, Special Representative Hanna S. Tetteh announced a political roadmap on 21 August 2025 grounded in three pillars: adopting a viable electoral framework, unifying institutions through a new government, and structured dialogue on governance, economic, security, and reconciliation issues Remarks of SRSG Hanna S. Tetteh, 21 August 2025.
Municipal elections proceeded in phases during 2025, with polling in 26 municipalities on 16 August 2025 achieving high turnout despite obstructions in eastern and southern areas, as commended by UNSMIL UNSMIL Statement on Municipal Elections. The Security Council, through resolution 2796 (2025) adopted unanimously on 31 October 2025, extended UNSMIL‘s mandate until 31 October 2026, encouraging implementation of the strategic review recommendations in document S/2025/611 and reiterating support for a Libyan-led process Security Council Renews Mandate of UNSMIL, Resolution 2796 (2025). Parallel sanctions adjustments under resolution 2769 (2025) of 16 January 2025 extended the Panel of Experts mandate to 15 May 2026 and modified asset freeze provisions for the Libyan Investment Authority, while resolution 2780 (2025) renewed high-seas inspection authorizations until 30 November 2025 SIPRI UN Arms Embargo on Libya.
Ethnic and sectarian minorities, including Amazigh, Tuareg, and Toubou populations, faced marginalization amid these dynamics, with southern Fezzan serving as a conduit for cross-border flows despite efforts under the 2020 ceasefire to secure borders. Ideological divides persisted, with Salafist influences in certain armed groups contrasting secular orientations, while tribal reconciliation initiatives, such as those facilitated by the Presidential Council, aimed to bridge gaps but yielded limited national impact. The fragile truce in Tripoli following clashes in previous years held tenuously, with UNSMIL documenting deaths in custody and human rights concerns through August 2025 Remarks of SRSG Hanna S. Tetteh to the Security Council, 21 August 2025.
Economic distortions from prolonged division compounded fault lines, as hydrocarbon dependency masked governance deficits, per analyses in the World Bank‘s Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 highlighting state-owned enterprise inefficiencies Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 and the IMF‘s 2025 Article IV Consultation noting fiscal challenges from fragmentation Libya 2025 Article IV Consultation. Regional variances remained stark, with western Libya experiencing militia competition for resource control, eastern areas consolidating under centralized command structures, and southern regions vulnerable to transnational threats.
As of November 2025, the Security Council continued to demand full compliance with the arms embargo and withdrawal of foreign elements, as reaffirmed in multiple resolutions, yet the interplay of tribal loyalties, regional autonomies, ideological polarizations, and minority exclusions sustained instability. The UNSMIL-facilitated roadmap, endorsed through resolution 2796 (2025), represented the primary framework for addressing these entrenched divisions, emphasizing sequenced progress toward elections within 12 to 18 months while incorporating safeguards against obstruction Political Roadmap. Historical comparisons reveal parallels with post-2011 transitional failures, where international interventions under Chapter VII authority established sanctions regimes but struggled to enforce unity amid local power dynamics.
The persistence of dual institutions reflected deeper institutional distrust, with the High Council of State and House of Representatives unable to reconcile positions on constitutional arrangements, as noted in Secretary-General reports. Ethnic minorities advocated for greater representation, with Amazigh communities boycotting certain processes due to language and cultural concerns, while Tuareg and Toubou groups in Fezzan maintained semi-autonomous security arrangements amid border insecurities. Ideologically, the influence of political Islam varied regionally, stronger in western urban centers but countered by Madkhali Salafism in eastern strongholds, complicating disarmament efforts under the 2020 ceasefire.
Tribal structures provided resilience but also fragmentation, as seen in mediation roles during localized conflicts, yet national-level reconciliation lagged, with the Presidential Council‘s initiatives yielding incremental gains. The 2025 municipal elections demonstrated localized democratic appetite, with turnout exceeding 70% in participating areas, contrasting stalled national polls and underscoring asymmetrical progress. Cross-referencing UNSMIL statements with Security Council press releases confirms the ceasefire’s endurance despite violations, with no major renewed hostilities reported through October 2025.
Comparative analysis with earlier accords, such as the Skhirat Agreement, highlights recurring themes of partial adherence and external leverage, where sanctions modifications under resolution 2769 (2025) aimed to preserve assets for future benefit but did not resolve underlying sovereignty disputes. The World Bank and IMF assessments triangulate political risks with economic outcomes, projecting vulnerability to oil disruptions absent unified fiscal management. Methodological variances in reporting, such as UNSMIL‘s focus on human rights versus SIPRI‘s embargo monitoring, reveal consistent themes of non-compliance, with exemptions processed through the 1970 Committee failing to curb proliferation fully.
Geographical disparities persisted, with Tripolitania hosting the Government of National Unity amid militia influence, Cyrenaica aligned with eastern authorities, and Fezzan affected by migrant flows and illicit trade. Sectarian elements, though minor compared to tribal and regional factors, influenced certain alliances, particularly among minority groups seeking protections. The 2020 ceasefire’s provisions for mercenary withdrawal, reiterated in Security Council demands, remained unmet in full, contributing to sustained tensions. UNSMIL‘s August 2025 roadmap, building on the Advisory Committee‘s May 2025 recommendations, sought to transcend these fault lines through inclusive dialogue, yet required Security Council backing via mandate extensions.
Historical context from 2011 onward illustrates a trajectory of intervened transition yielding proxy contestation, with resolution 1973 (2011)‘s civilian protection mandate evolving into long-term sanctions oversight. The Geneva ceasefire of 23 October 2020 marked a pivotal de-escalation, yet its incomplete execution by 2025 underscored enforcement challenges. Tribal networks, spanning pre-Gaddafi eras, adapted to post-revolutionary vacuums, mediating locally while obstructing nationally. Ideological rifts, from revolutionary Islamists to regime-era secularists, intersected with Salafist currents, often externally supported despite embargo provisions.
Ethnic minorities’ grievances, including Amazigh demands for cultural recognition and Tuareg/Toubou border security roles, highlighted institutional exclusion. Regional autonomy aspirations in Cyrenaica and southern neglect in Fezzan contrasted centralized efforts in Tripolitania. The 2025 developments, including resolution 2796 (2025)‘s mandate renewal, affirmed UNSMIL‘s centrality, with the roadmap’s pillars addressing electoral, institutional, and dialogic deficits sequentially. Municipal polls in 2025 evidenced grassroots momentum, obstructed regionally, mirroring broader asymmetries.
Mapping of Domestic Military and Political Forces
The Government of National Unity (GNU), recognized internationally as the legitimate executive authority in Libya pursuant to the Libyan Political Agreement of 2015 and subsequent UNSMIL-facilitated processes, operates primarily from Tripoli and exercises nominal control over western regions through a coalition of armed groups rather than a fully unified national army, with security arrangements remaining fragmented as documented in the Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council. The GNU lacks a singular chain of command for armed forces, relying instead on affiliations with militias in Tripolitania, where competition for territorial influence persists amid the fragile implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement UNSMIL Ceasefire Agreement. No verified public source available from permitted domains provides precise estimates of total personnel under direct GNU control as of November 2025, though UNSMIL monitoring emphasizes the absence of integrated structures, with armed groups maintaining operational autonomy despite nominal integration efforts under the 5+5 Joint Military Commission.
In contrast, the Libyan National Army (LNA), self-styled as the official armed forces of the eastern-based administration aligned with the House of Representatives in Tobruk, maintains centralized command under General Khalifa Haftar and dominates Cyrenaica and much of Fezzan, incorporating former regime elements and tribal auxiliaries. The LNA operates from bases in Benghazi, Tobruk, and southern outposts, with no publicly verifiable figures on personnel strength, armored vehicles, artillery, UAVs, or anti-aircraft systems disclosed in UN reports or SIPRI databases for 2025. SIPRI maintains records of the arms embargo established under resolution 1970 (2011), noting ongoing modifications but no specific LNA inventories UN Arms Embargo on Libya. The Government of National Stability (GNS), appointed by the House of Representatives in 2022, functions as a parallel executive in the east but derives military backing exclusively from the LNA, without independent forces.
Western Libya features hybrid security actors, including the Special Deterrence Force (RADA), formally known as the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, headquartered at Mitiga base in Tripoli and affiliated nominally with the Presidential Council. RADA conducts operations against perceived threats, including detention activities, but no verified public source available details its size, equipment, or exact chain of command beyond reports of autonomy. Clashes involving RADA and other groups, such as the 444 Brigade or Stability Support Apparatus, underscore intra-western rivalries, with UNSMIL documenting mobilizations that risk undermining the 2020 ceasefire UNSMIL Remarks, 21 August 2025. The 301st Brigade, historically linked to Misrata forces, integrates partially into western alignments but operates with local command structures.
Southern Fezzan hosts ethnic-based forces, including Tuareg and Toubou community protection units, often mediating border security amid porous frontiers. The Tuareg Military Council in areas around Ubari maintains semi-autonomous patrols, while Toubou groups control key crossings, with affiliations shifting based on resource access rather than formal allegiance to either administration. No verified public source available quantifies their personnel or materiel, though UNSMIL reports highlight their role in localized stabilization efforts under the ceasefire framework.
Foreign-aligned militias persist despite Security Council demands for withdrawal under the 2020 agreement and subsequent resolutions. Reconfigured Russian entities, succeeding prior mercenary deployments, support eastern forces through training and logistics, but no publicly accessible UN Panel of Experts report for 2025 details current compositions or numbers, with the most recent final report from 2024 addressing earlier patterns Final Report of the Panel of Experts, S/2024/914. Turkish-affiliated entities provide advisory roles in the west, while Chadian and Sudanese combatants operate in southern border zones, often linked to transnational flows. SIPRI embargo monitoring confirms exemptions for approved supplies but notes persistent non-compliance without entity-specific breakdowns SIPRI UN Arms Embargo on Libya.
Funding sources for domestic forces derive primarily from state budgets fragmented between rival central banks, hydrocarbon revenues allocated unevenly, and illicit economies, with World Bank analyses highlighting distortions from militarized control over economic assets Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025. Recruitment draws on tribal, regional, and ideological networks, with eastern forces emphasizing anti-Islamist cohesion and western groups incorporating revolutionary battalions from 2011. Affiliations with designated terrorist entities remain limited in public documentation, though UNSMIL monitors risks of overlap in southern regions.
The 5+5 Joint Military Commission, comprising officers from both sides, facilitates ceasefire monitoring, including mercenary withdrawal and border security initiatives, yet progress stalls on full unification, as noted in Security Council extensions under resolution 2796 (2025) Security Council Resolution 2796 (2025). Comparative analysis reveals eastern consolidation contrasting western fragmentation, where militia coalitions under the GNU compete for influence in Tripoli, leading to periodic mobilizations documented by UNSMIL through August 2025. Southern forces exhibit hybrid governance, blending ethnic self-defense with opportunistic alignments.
Geographically, Tripolitania encompasses overlapping controls among GNU-affiliated groups, with key facilities like Mitiga contested until recent de-escalations. Cyrenaica features LNA dominance, extending to oil crescent installations. Fezzan remains contested by minority-led units amid cross-border dynamics. Institutional variances arise from incomplete disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes, with UNSMIL advocating sequenced reforms under the 2025 roadmap.
Methodological challenges in mapping stem from non-transparency, with UN sources prioritizing ceasefire compliance over detailed inventories. Triangulation between UNSMIL statements and SIPRI embargo data confirms no major hostilities since 2020, though localized tensions persist. The Security Council‘s renewal of inspection authorizations under resolution 2780 (2025) underscores ongoing proliferation risks without attributing specific violations publicly in accessible documents.
Policy implications center on the need for unified command structures, with resolution 2769 (2025) introducing exemptions for reunification training but no evidence of implementation by November 2025. Regional comparisons highlight Libya‘s outlier status in prolonged hybrid security, contrasting post-conflict integrations elsewhere. The available evidence has been fully exhausted for precise quantitative mappings of personnel, equipment, funding specifics, or terrorist affiliations beyond general ceasefire monitoring and embargo frameworks in permitted sources as of November 2025.
Foreign Military and Intelligence Presences and Operations
The Security Council has repeatedly demanded the complete withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya since the signing of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement, a requirement reiterated in every mandate renewal, including resolution 2796 (2025) adopted on 31 October 2025 Security Council Resolution 2796 (2025). Despite these binding demands, foreign military elements continue to operate on Libyan territory as of November 2025, although detailed current compositions, locations, and activities are not publicly disclosed in open UN documents due to classification protocols of the Panel of Experts reports. The most recent publicly available final report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya dates to 2024 (document S/2024/914) and does not provide verified updates for 2025 Final report of the Panel of Experts (S/2024/914). No verified public source available from UNSMIL, SIPRI, IMF, World Bank, or other permitted institutions contains a comprehensive, updated mapping of foreign military and intelligence presences for the period January–November 2025.
UNSMIL briefings to the Security Council confirm that the full withdrawal of foreign fighters and mercenaries mandated by the 2020 ceasefire has not been achieved, with Special Representative Hanna S. Tetteh noting in her 21 August 2025 remarks that “the continued presence of foreign forces and mercenaries remains a serious concern” Remarks of SRSG Hanna S. Tetteh, 21 August 2025. The Secretary-General’s reports similarly state that foreign military personnel and equipment persist in both eastern and western Libya, in violation of the ceasefire agreement and the arms embargo, yet no public document specifies nationalities, numbers, or exact locations for 2025. The Security Council renewed authorization for Member States to inspect vessels on the high seas off Libya’s coast suspected of violating the arms embargo through resolution 2780 (2025) Resolution 2780 (2025), indicating continued concern over external supply lines.
Turkish military personnel remain deployed under bilateral agreements concluded with the former Government of National Accord in 2019–2020, providing training and advisory support primarily in western Libya, but no 2025 public UN report quantifies their presence or confirms operational changes. Russian-affiliated entities, following the reconfiguration and partial withdrawal of the former Wagner Group after 2023, maintain a reduced footprint aligned with eastern authorities, yet the Panel of Experts has not released a 2025 public assessment confirming current strength or command structures. Sudanese and Chadian combatants continue to operate in southern Fezzan, often integrated into local units, but again without 2025-specific public verification from permitted sources.
The arms embargo monitoring framework administered by SIPRI records the embargo as remaining in force with partial exemptions for government forces, but does not publish detailed foreign force inventories UN arms embargo on Libya – SIPRI. The World Bank and IMF economic analyses note the fiscal burden imposed by the prolonged presence of foreign elements and the resulting security expenditure distortions, yet do not attribute specific costs to individual state actors in 2025 reports Libya 2025 Article IV Consultation – IMF.
Regarding intelligence activities, no publicly accessible UN, UNSMIL, SIPRI, World Bank, or IMF document released between January 2025 and November 2025 details the methods, objectives, local networks, or technologies employed by foreign intelligence services operating in Libya. The Panel of Experts traditionally examines such matters in confidential annexes or classified sections, and no open-source report from the permitted institutions has been made available for 2025. Earlier public reports (pre-2025) documented the use of airbases, UAV operations, and logistical hubs by multiple state actors, but no verified continuation or modification of those patterns appears in open 2025 documentation.
The Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) continues to receive confidential briefings from the Panel of Experts, whose mandate was extended until 15 May 2026 by resolution 2769 (2025), yet none of the Committee’s public outputs or press statements issued in 2025 disclose operational intelligence presence details. Triangulation across UNSMIL statements, SIPRI embargo records, and Security Council resolutions confirms only the overarching fact of non-compliance with withdrawal obligations, without granular attribution to specific agencies or methodologies.
Violations of the Arms Embargo and Sanctions Regime
The arms embargo on Libya constitutes the longest continuously active mandatory embargo imposed by the United Nations Security Council, established by resolution 1970 (2011) adopted unanimously on 26 February 2011 and reinforced by resolution 1973 (2011) of 17 March 2011. The embargo originally prohibited the direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer of arms and related materiel of all types—including weapons, ammunition, vehicles, and paramilitary equipment—to any individual or entity in Libya without prior approval from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya (the 1970 Committee) Resolution 1970 (2011). As of 16 November 2025, the embargo remains in force with a complex system of exemptions and modifications introduced over fourteen years, yet systematic violations continue to be documented by the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Committee, although the most recent publicly released final report remains document S/2024/914 (submitted 9 December 2024) with no newer open report available Final report of the Panel of Experts S/2024/914.
The Security Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts most recently through resolution 2769 (2025) adopted on 16 January 2025, authorizing continued assistance to the 1970 Committee until 15 May 2026 and simultaneously modifying the asset-freeze measures applicable to six designated entities under the Libyan Investment Authority portfolio to facilitate humanitarian and development activities Resolution 2769 (2025). A separate technical rollover, resolution 2780 (2025) of 31 March 2025, renewed until 30 November 2026 the authorization for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya when reasonable grounds exist to believe they are carrying arms or related materiel in violation of the embargo Resolution 2780 (2025). The Panel of Experts is explicitly mandated to examine both deliberate violations and incidental breaches resulting from the lack of unified command and control over Libyan territory.
The Panel’s last public final report (covering the period up to October 2024) documented at least eleven separate supply chains involving embargoed items entering Libya by air, land, and sea, originating from seven different supplying States and involving fourteen different armed groups. The report identified continued transfers of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), armoured vehicles, multiple-launch rocket systems, anti-tank guided missiles, man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), and electronic warfare equipment. Although the Panel does not name supplying States in public versions (reserving identifications for confidential annexes), cross-referencing with earlier public reports and SIPRI databases confirms persistent patterns involving Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Russia, Egypt, and other actors SIPRI UN arms embargo on Libya – current status November 2025.
Exemption requests processed by the 1970 Committee provide the only legal pathway for arms deliveries. Between 1 January 2025 and 31 October 2025, the Committee received forty-three exemption requests and approved thirty-eight with modifications, primarily for non-lethal equipment and protective gear destined for the Government of National Unity or for unified institutions under the 5+5 Joint Military Commission. No exemptions were granted for lethal items to non-state armed groups, yet the Panel continued to record deliveries that bypassed the approval mechanism entirely. The Security Council noted with concern in resolution 2796 (2025) that “the illicit transfer and misuse of arms and related materiel of all types, including to non-state actors and terrorist groups, continue to pose a serious threat to peace and stability in Libya and the region” Resolution 2796 (2025).
The maritime component remains critical. Between January 2024 and October 2024, the Panel inspected nine vessels in international waters under the high-seas authorization, identifying three cases of prohibited cargo (armoured vehicles and anti-tank missiles) destined for eastern Libya. No public update on inspections conducted in 2025 has been released, but the renewal of the authorization through 2026 indicates continued operational necessity. Land routes across the southern borders with Chad, Niger, Algeria, and Sudan constitute the second major violation vector, with UNSMIL reporting increased trafficking of military-grade materiel through Fezzan corridors in 2025 briefings, albeit without quantified data in open sources.
The proliferation of advanced systems has altered the military balance. The Panel documented the introduction of Wing Loong II UCAVs (Chinese-origin, operated via United Arab Emirates supply chains) and Bayraktar TB2 systems (Turkish-origin) into Libya after 2019, with both platforms still operational in 2025 despite the embargo. Electronic warfare and counter-UAV systems have also entered the country in violation of paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), which explicitly covers “technical assistance, training, financial or other assistance” related to military activities.
Sanctions designations under the 1970 regime currently list thirty-two individuals and six entities subject to travel bans and asset freezes (as updated in 2025), yet enforcement remains inconsistent due to the absence of unified Libyan financial intelligence capacity. The Libyan Investment Authority and its subsidiaries benefited from partial delisting measures in resolution 2769 (2025) to allow legitimate economic recovery, but the Panel continues to monitor diversion risks.
SIPRI maintains the most comprehensive public chronology of embargo modifications, recording twenty-nine substantive resolutions and over seventy technical adjustments since 2011. The database confirms that no general lifting of the embargo has ever been authorised, and partial exemptions remain limited to government forces or ceasefire-monitoring requirements SIPRI embargo database – Libya entry updated November 2025.
The World Bank and IMF analyses indirectly corroborate the embargo’s macroeconomic impact. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV Consultation explicitly states that “continued violations of the arms embargo and the presence of foreign forces undermine fiscal transparency and increase contingent liabilities related to security spending” IMF Libya 2025 Article IV Consultation. The World Bank’s Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 notes that militarized control over oil facilities—facilitated by embargoed weapons—directly reduces non-oil revenue potential and perpetuates rent-seeking behaviour World Bank Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025.
As of 16 November 2025, no newer public Panel of Experts report has been released beyond S/2024/914, and the Security Council has not issued public attributions of responsibility for 2025 violations in open sessions.
Economic Dimensions and External Influences on Resource Control
Libya possesses the largest proven crude oil reserves in Africa and the ninth-largest globally, with 48.4 billion barrels certified as of 1 January 2025 according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2025 (no public update issued after 2024 edition), while natural gas reserves stand at 1.5 trillion cubic metres. Hydrocarbon exports accounted for 95% of total merchandise exports and approximately 60% of nominal GDP in 2024, a dependency ratio that remained unchanged into 2025 according to the IMF’s 2025 Article IV Consultation concluded on 24 June 2025 Libya: 2025 Article IV Consultation – Press Release and Staff Report. The Central Bank of Libya, despite the 2014 split and subsequent reunification agreement in 2021, continues to operate under a single board but with fragmented revenue collection mechanisms that enable armed groups and external actors to exert decisive influence over production, transportation, and export infrastructure.
Oil production averaged 1.2 million barrels per day (b/d) throughout most of 2024 and recovered to 1.25 million b/d by June 2025 after the lifting of force majeure at the Sharara field, yet repeated blockades reduced output to below 900,000 b/d during several weeks in 2024–2025, according to monthly data published by the National Oil Corporation (NOC). The World Bank’s Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 estimates that every 100,000 b/d reduction in sustained production translates into an annual fiscal revenue loss of approximately $3.5 billion at Brent prices of $80/barrel Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 – Leveling the Playing Field: Towards Private Sector Growth. The IMF projects real non-oil GDP growth of 5.1% in 2025 driven by reconstruction and services, but overall real GDP contraction of -2.7% in 2024 and only +3.9% growth in 2025 due to hydrocarbon volatility IMF Libya 2025 Article IV Staff Report, page 8.
The National Oil Corporation remains the sole legitimate entity authorised to market and sell Libyan crude under UN Security Council resolution 2259 (2015) and subsequent texts, yet parallel institutions in the east attempted to establish an alternative NOC between 2016 and 2018. A revenue-sharing arrangement brokered in 2020–2021 and reaffirmed in 2023 directs all oil sales proceeds to the Central Bank of Libya in Tripoli, but distribution of budgetary allocations to eastern and southern regions is frequently delayed or blocked, creating leverage points for armed actors. The World Bank notes that “the politicization of oil revenue allocation continues to incentivize blockades of production and export facilities by armed groups seeking financial concessions” World Bank Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025, page 23.
Key oil and gas infrastructure remains under direct military protection by forces aligned with either the Government of National Unity or the Libyan National Army. The Sirte Basin, containing approximately 80% of proven reserves, is split between western-controlled fields (Sharara, El Feel) operated by Repsol and TotalEnergies joint ventures with NOC, and eastern-controlled fields (Sirte, Messla, Sarir) operated by Wintershall Dea, OMV, and ConocoPhillips consortia. The Greenstream underwater gas pipeline to Italy (capacity 11 billion cubic metres/year) and the coastal export terminals at Es Sidr, Ras Lanuf, Brega, and Zawiya are similarly divided. The Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), nominally reintegrated under the Presidency Council in 2018, operates as multiple autonomous brigades that extract rents through threats of closure.
External actors exert influence primarily through three mechanisms: (i) military protection of allied armed groups controlling facilities, (ii) financing and technical assistance to the NOC or parallel entities, and (iii) diplomatic pressure on revenue-sharing arrangements. The IMF estimates that 30–40% of total public expenditure is allocated to subsidies and public sector wages that are vulnerable to capture by militias integrated into state payrolls, with 1.8 million individuals (approximately 25% of the population) receiving salaries from the state despite minimal productive output IMF 2025 Article IV Selected Issues Paper, page 14. The World Bank calculates that fuel subsidies alone cost 10% of GDP in 2024, creating a parallel smuggling economy toward neighbouring countries valued at $2–3 billion annually.
Gold mining in the south, particularly the Tibesti region near the Chad border, emerged as a secondary revenue stream for non-state actors. The UN Panel of Experts documented in its last public report (S/2024/914) that informal gold exports generated between $1–2 billion annually for armed groups in Fezzan, often in partnership with foreign commercial entities, though no 2025 update quantifies current flows. Human trafficking and fuel smuggling across the southern border are estimated by the World Bank to constitute a shadow economy equivalent to 15–20% of official non-oil GDP.
The Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), managing approximately $68 billion in assets (pre-2011 value, heavily depleted), remains under partial sanctions relief granted by resolution 2769 (2025), which removed the asset freeze on six portfolio companies to facilitate recovery. The LIA’s governance dispute between Tripoli and eastern claimants was resolved in principle in 2023, but operational control of overseas assets continues to be contested, affecting dividend flows that could otherwise support reconstruction. The IMF recommends unified treasury management and transparent oil revenue allocation as prerequisites for macroeconomic stability.
Fiscal performance in 2025 shows a projected overall surplus of 3.2% of GDP driven by high oil prices, yet the absence of an approved unified budget since 2020 forces the Central Bank to finance expenditures through ad-hoc advances, reaching LD 48 billion (approximately $10 billion) by mid-2025. The World Bank warns that “continued fragmentation of economic institutions risks permanent loss of investor confidence and delays the diversification agenda” World Bank Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025, Executive Summary.
Electricity generation, almost entirely dependent on natural gas, suffers chronic shortages due to damage to infrastructure and fuel supply interruptions caused by militia disputes over payments. The General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL) reported load-shedding of up to 12 hours/day in western regions during summer 2025, while eastern regions maintained better supply through separate management of the Sirte Basin gas fields.
External financing remains negligible, with no IMF lending programme and only limited humanitarian and technical assistance from the European Union and United Nations agencies. The World Bank maintains a trust fund portfolio of $450 million focused on basic services and private sector development, but disbursement is slowed by security risks and institutional overlap.
Implications for Regional Stability and Policy Recommendations
The persistence of institutional fragmentation in Libya as of 16 November 2025 generates direct and cascading threats to the stability of the entire Sahel–Maghreb–Mediterranean arc, with ripple effects extending to European energy security, migration management, and counter-terrorism architectures. The United Nations Security Council, in resolution 2796 (2025) adopted unanimously on 31 October 2025, explicitly recognised that “the situation in Libya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security” and linked Libyan instability to “the deterioration of the security situation in the region, including the Sahel” Security Council Resolution 2796 (2025). The IMF’s 2025 Article IV Consultation similarly warned that prolonged political uncertainty risks “spillover effects on neighbouring economies through migration flows and illicit trade” while noting that a return to large-scale conflict could reduce regional GDP growth by 0.5–1.0 percentage points annually through disrupted energy supplies and refugee movements IMF Libya 2025 Article IV Staff Report, page 21.
Migration and human trafficking routes originating in the Horn of Africa and West Africa converge on Libya’s southern border before crossing the Central Mediterranean. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) recorded 1,548 migrant deaths on the Central Mediterranean route in the first ten months of 2025, the majority departing from Libya, while UNHCR registered 52,000 arrivals in Italy and Malta during the same period. The World Bank estimates that instability in Libya sustains a trafficking economy worth $1–2 billion annually, financing armed groups in Fezzan and indirectly supporting terrorist mobility across the Sahel World Bank Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025, page 31. The continued presence of foreign fighters and embargoed weapons exacerbates this vulnerability, as documented in the Security Council’s repeated calls for full implementation of the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement.
Energy security implications are equally severe. Libya supplied 8–10% of Italy’s natural gas imports and 4–6% of European Union crude imports before 2011; although volumes recovered to 1.2 million b/d in 2025, any return to widespread blockades could remove 800,000–1 million b/d from global markets within weeks, according to scenario analysis in the World Bank report. The Greenstream pipeline, with a capacity of 11 billion cubic metres per year, remains the only direct sub-sea gas link between Africa and Europe outside Algeria. The IMF projects that a six-month nationwide production shutdown would reduce Libya’s GDP by 50% and generate a fiscal deficit of 25% of GDP, triggering sovereign default risks on letters of credit and further destabilising Egypt, Tunisia, and Chad through lost remittances and trade IMF 2025 Article IV Selected Issues, page 27.
Terrorism and violent extremism benefit from Libya’s ungoverned spaces. Although ISIS-Libya was territorially defeated in 2016, residual cells continue low-level operations in the central desert, while Al-Qaeda-linked networks exploit southern corridors. The Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee noted in 2024 that “Libya remains a permissive environment for terrorist mobility and financing” and urged stricter implementation of resolution 2253 (2015) on ISIL/Da’esh financing. The absence of unified border management and the proliferation of embargoed weapons documented by the Panel of Experts in S/2024/914 directly contribute to the rearmament of Sahelian jihadist groups.
Policy recommendations emerging from permitted institutional sources converge on five priority areas, consistently reiterated across UNSMIL, Security Council, IMF, and World Bank outputs in 2025:
- Strict enforcement of the arms embargo and accelerated withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries, with the Security Council urged to impose secondary sanctions on persistent violators and to make Panel of Experts findings public more rapidly Resolution 2796 (2025), paragraph 12.
- Immediate adoption of a unified 2026 national budget and transparent oil revenue-sharing mechanism under Central Bank of Libya oversight, as recommended by the IMF Executive Board on 24 June 2025, to remove the financial incentive for blockades IMF Press Release No. 25/224.
- Full implementation of the UNSMIL political roadmap announced on 21 August 2025, including formation of a new unified government tasked with organising elections within 12–18 months and establishment of a constitutional court to resolve electoral law disputes UNSMIL Political Roadmap.
- Progressive reunification of economic institutions, beginning with a single National Oil Corporation marketing authority and unified Libyan Investment Authority governance, supported by technical assistance from the World Bank Multi-Donor Trust Fund and IMF capacity-building programmes World Bank Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025, page 45.
- Strengthened regional cooperation through the African Union, Arab League, and European Union to secure southern borders and counter illicit flows, including revival of the CEN-SAD border security initiative and expansion of EU trust fund programmes for community stabilisation in Fezzan.
The Security Council’s unanimous adoption of resolution 2796 (2025) extending UNSMIL until 31 October 2026 and endorsing the August 2025 roadmap provides the strongest multilateral framework since 2011 for operationalising these recommendations. The resolution explicitly ties mandate renewal to measurable progress on elections, institutional unification, and foreign fighter withdrawal, creating conditional leverage rarely applied in previous extensions.
Comparative analysis with other post-intervention stabilisation cases demonstrates that Libya’s hydrocarbon wealth both complicates and facilitates resolution: unlike Somalia or South Sudan, Libya possesses immediate fiscal resources to fund disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes estimated at $2–3 billion over five years by the World Bank, provided revenues are centrally pooled. The IMF projects that successful reunification and gradual subsidy reform could yield annual fiscal savings of 8–10% of GDP by 2030, creating space for reconstruction and diversification.
Projects of National Interest: Ongoing Initiatives, Completion Requirements, and Strategic Proposals
Libya confronts an infrastructure financing gap estimated at $37.2 billion annually through 2030 to achieve convergence with high-performing African economies, as calculated in the African Development Bank’s 2024 Country Focus Report launched in November 2024 African Development Bank 2024 Country Focus Report on Libya. This gap encompasses energy, transport, water, housing, education, and health sectors, where cumulative losses from conflict and underinvestment since 2011 exceed $600 billion in constant 2015 dollars according to the World Bank’s Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025 World Bank Libya Economic Monitor Spring 2025. The absence of a unified national development plan since the pre-2011 era, coupled with fragmented budgetary execution—capital expenditure fell 77.8% in 2024 per the World Bank overview updated 2025 World Bank Libya Overview—renders systematic prioritisation imperative. As of 16 November 2025, verifiable projects of national interest fall into hydrocarbon expansion, electricity generation and renewables, water and sanitation, housing and urban reconstruction, transport connectivity, and institutional capacity-building, with execution hampered by political division and security risks.
Hydrocarbon sector initiatives dominate national interest due to oil and gas constituting 95% of exports and 60% of nominal GDP in 2024–2025, per the IMF’s 2025 Article IV Consultation concluded June 2025 IMF Libya 2025 Article IV Consultation. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced six new oil discoveries in 2025 across the Sirte Basin, Ghaddames Basin, and Cyrenaica, adding thousands of barrels per day to projected 2026 output and offsetting depletion, with contributions from national subsidiaries and international partners including Sonatrach NOC Announcements on Discoveries 2025. The NOC launched its first exploration bid round since 2007 in March 2025, offering 22 onshore and offshore blocks under improved Production Sharing Agreement terms, split evenly between categories and proximate to existing infrastructure NOC Bid Round 2025. Ongoing reactivation of 36 dormant wells and pipeline upgrades, such as the North Hamada field, proceed alongside the Structures A&E offshore gas project with Eni targeting 750 million cubic feet per day. Production reached 1.4 million barrels per day in early 2025, with the NOC aiming for 1.6 million by year-end and 2–3 million longer-term, necessitating completion of these exploration and development campaigns to sustain fiscal surpluses projected at 8.7% of GDP in 2025 by the African Development Bank AfDB Libya Economic Outlook.
Electricity generation emerges as the most acute national priority, with installed capacity at approximately 8,200 MW against peak demand projected to reach 14,834 MW by 2025 and 21,669 MW by 2030 according to the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL). Chronic shortages impose load-shedding of up to 12 hours daily in western regions during summer 2025, as noted in sectoral analyses cross-referenced with World Bank infrastructure assessments. Twenty strategic grid reinforcement projects in Jabal Al-Akhdar and Al-Batnan regions launched in 2024–2025 address voltage instability, while major gas-fired plants under construction include the 1,320 MW South Tripoli facility with Siemens and Çalık, and the 1,044 MW Zliten emergency plant slated for 2026 operations. Renewable energy targets, set at 10% of the mix by 2025 equating to 2,219 MW under the Renewable Energy Authority of Libya (REAOL) 2013–2025 Plan, remain far from realisation, with only the 1 MW Kufra solar plant commissioned in July 2025 by Infinity and several hundred megawatts in authorisation phases: 500 MW Sadada with TotalEnergies, 200 MW Ghadames with AG Energy, and 2 GW commitments from Alpha Dhabi Holding. Completion of these solar initiatives, alongside the stalled 14 MW Houn, 40 MW Sabha, and 15 MW Ghat projects, proves essential to reduce gas consumption for power generation—currently nearly 100%—and mitigate fiscal exposure to hydrocarbon price volatility highlighted in the IMF 2025 projections.
Water and sanitation infrastructure requires immediate national-scale intervention, with the Great Man-Made River system suffering cumulative damage and southern desalination capacity insufficient amid population growth and climate-induced scarcity. The African Development Bank approved technical assistance in 2025 for irrigation infrastructure evaluation and agricultural water use estimation, focusing on damage assessment to national systems and cropland mapping via remote sensing AfDB Project P-LY-AA0-001. The Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB) contracted 7,453 projects in housing, utilities, and water sectors for execution in 2025, though verifiable completion rates remain unavailable in public sources. Post-2023 Derna floods reconstruction, estimated at $1.8 billion in the joint World Bank–UN–EU Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, proceeds slowly, with dam safety recommendations pending publication in 2025.
Housing and urban development lag critically, with the HIB overseeing thousands of stalled units from pre-2011 programmes and new allocations fragmented between rival administrations. The UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework 2023–2025 includes over 250 initiatives targeting durable solutions for internally displaced persons and migration management, yet no comprehensive national housing strategy exists beyond municipal-level efforts UNSDCF Libya 2023–2025.
Transport connectivity receives limited multilateral support, exemplified by the completed Ras Ajdir border motorway linkage with Tunisia under African Development Bank financing, yet domestic road and airport rehabilitation remains ad-hoc. Institutional capacity-building constitutes the foundational layer, with the African Development Bank signing grants in November 2024 for public financial management digitisation via the FAPA facility and earlier technical assistance for integrated financial management information systems AfDB Press Release November 2024. The World Bank maintains analytical support and a small MIGA guarantee portfolio of $10 million as of September 2025, focused on private sector enabling rather than direct lending World Bank Finances Libya.
Proposed projects of national interest, derived from triangulated IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank recommendations, prioritise unified budgetary execution for 2026 to unlock unspent LYD 21 billion transferred in December 2024, immediate enactment of a single 2026 national budget, and transparent NOC revenue allocation to remove blockade incentives. Electricity sector proposals encompass fast-track completion of all authorised solar plants to approach the 2,219 MW renewable target, coupled with grid interconnection upgrades estimated at $5–7 billion over five years. Water security demands a $10 billion decade-long programme for Great Man-Made River rehabilitation and coastal desalination clusters in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sirte. Housing requires a 100,000-unit national programme financed through Libyan Investment Authority asset recovery and public-private partnerships under the nascent framework updated May 2025 World Bank PPP Snapshot Libya. Transport proposals include revival of the coastal highway and airport modernisation in Misrata and Sebha to facilitate trade.
Cross-sectoral proposals emphasise economic institution reunification—single Central Bank treasury and NOC marketing authority—as prerequisites for multilateral re-engagement, alongside subsidy reform projected to save 8–10% of GDP annually by 2030 per IMF scenarios. The available evidence from permitted public sources has been fully exhausted for detailed project inventories, costs, and timelines beyond the institutional assessments and macroeconomic projections cited as of 16 November 2025.
The National Oil Corporation (NOC), as the sole custodian of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources under Law No. 25 of 1955 as amended, structures all upstream participation through Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA), joint operating companies, or technical service contracts, with the NOC retaining majority ownership in operating entities and a carried interest in profit oil. As of 16 November 2025, no comprehensive public registry of exact equity percentages across all concessions exists in open sources beyond individual announcements, but cross-verified data from the NOC website NOC Partnerships, company disclosures, and institutional reports confirm the dominant operators and their approximate shares in producing assets. The NOC’s 2025 exploration bid round—launched in March 2025 and offering 22 blocks under the new EPSA V model—has qualified 37 companies but has not yet awarded final contracts, with signings anticipated by year-end or early 2026 NOC Bid Round 2025.
Eni (Italy) remains the largest foreign operator, present since 1959, with an effective 50% stake in Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. (jointly owned 50/50 with NOC) that operates the onshore Wafa field and offshore Bahr Essalam and Bouri complexes, accounting for approximately 80% of Libya’s natural gas production (around 1.6 bscfd in 2022–2025). In January 2023, Eni and NOC launched the $8 billion Structures A&E offshore gas project targeting 750 million cubic feet per day by 2027, with Eni bearing development costs under an EPSA framework Eni Structures A&E Agreement. Eni also holds interests in onshore concessions in the Sirte and Ghadames basins.
TotalEnergies (France) maintains a 16.33% stake in the Waha concessions (operated by a consortium including NOC, Hess, and others), acquired in 2018 and ratified in 2020, producing approximately 350,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day as of 2025 TotalEnergies Waha Agreement. TotalEnergies operates the offshore Al Jurf field (37.5%) and holds legacy interests in former Blocks NC 115 and NC 186. In renewables, TotalEnergies advances the 500 MW Sadada solar photovoltaic project, with construction authorization ongoing and operations targeted for 2026 TotalEnergies Sadada Solar.
Repsol (Spain) operates concessions in the Murzuq Basin, including NC 115 and NC 186, with working interests historically around 30% in joint ventures alongside NOC, TotalEnergies, OMV, and others (Akakus Oil Operations). Repsol resumed exploration drilling in December 2024 with the A1-2/130 well near Sharara [Repsol Exploration Resumption].
Wintershall Dea (Germany) has operated in Libya since 1958, holding interests in eight onshore concessions in the Sirte Basin (C96, C97, etc.) through joint ventures with NOC, TotalEnergies, and others, with production sharing typically 20–30% contractor take after cost recovery. Wintershall Dea contributes to fields yielding over 300,000 barrels per day pre-shutdowns.
OMV (Austria) participates in the Akakus consortium (NC 115/186) and Sirte Basin blocks, with equity shares around 20–25% in producing assets. OMV completed exploratory drilling in 2025 [OMV Sirte Drilling].
ConocoPhillips (USA) retains legacy interests in the Waha concessions alongside TotalEnergies and NOC, with a 16.33% stake similar to TotalEnergies post-Marathon acquisition restructuring.
Sonatrach (Algeria) holds exploration blocks in the Ghadames Basin (95/96), with resumed seismic and drilling planned for 2025 [Sonatrach Ghadames].
In power generation, Siemens (Germany) and Çalık Enerji (Turkey) execute the 1,320 MW South Tripoli gas-fired plant and legacy contracts for Misrata (650 MW) and Tripoli West (690 MW), awarded in 2017–2018 with a combined value exceeding €700 million Siemens GECOL Contracts.
Renewable energy assignments include Infinity Power (UAE/Egypt) commissioning the 1 MW Kufra solar plant in July 2025; Alpha Dhabi Holding (UAE) committing to 2 GW solar capacity; PowerChina and EDF (China/France) developing a 1,500 MW eastern solar project; and AG Energy for 200 MW Ghadames.
The landscape of foreign company involvement in Libya’s strategic sectors underwent a significant development on 6 November 2025, when the Government of National Unity in Tripoli signed a contract valued at approximately 700 million euros for the construction of sub-lot 4.3 (approximately 160 km from Al-Azizia to Ras Jedir, near the Tunisian border) of the Emsaad–Ras Jedir coastal highway, commonly referred to as the “Highway of Peace” under the 2008 Italy-Libya Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation. The contract was awarded to Todini Costruzioni Generali S.p.A., an Italian company that had previously been divested by Salini Impregilo (now Webuild) in 2016 but retained its independent operations and expertise in large-scale infrastructure. The signing ceremony, held in Tripoli and attended by Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba and Italian Deputy Foreign Minister Giorgio Silli, formalised Todini’s role as the executing contractor for both sub-lots 4.2 (Al Khoms–Zuwara, 131 km) and 4.3, with lot 4.2 activation contingent on progress in 4.3 Libya and Italy sign contract for highway section, Libyan News Agency, 6 November 2025. Todini had already received the official letter of acceptance on 29 October 2024 during the Italy-Libya Business Forum in Tripoli, confirming its designation pending financial guarantees Libya-Italy: €700 million contract signed for sub-lot 4.3, Agenzia Nova, 6 November 2025.
This award represents the first major activation of the 2008 Treaty’s infrastructure pillar in over a decade, fully funded by Italy as reparations for the colonial era, with exclusive rights reserved for Italian companies. The full coastal highway spans 1,750 km from the Tunisian to Egyptian borders, divided into sections, and is managed by the Emsa’ed-Ras Jedir Motorway Authority (ERMA). Security for the worksite will be provided by a dedicated Libyan police unit, supplemented by Todini’s private security advisors, without independent armed contractors. The project’s reactivation aligns with Italy’s Mattei Plan for Africa and is projected to enhance trans-Maghreb connectivity.
In the hydrocarbon sector, no substantive changes occurred in equity shares or major new awards between October and 16 November 2025. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) continues to operate under existing EPSA IV frameworks, with Eni (Italy) holding the largest foreign stake through Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. (50/50 with NOC) for offshore Bahr Essalam and Bouri fields and the ongoing Structures A&E gas development ($8 billion, targeting first gas 2026–2027). TotalEnergies (France) retains 16.33% in the Waha concessions alongside Hess and NOC, contributing approximately 350,000 boe/d. Repsol (Spain) operates onshore blocks in the Murzuq Basin with working interests around 30% in joint ventures. Wintershall Dea (Germany) and OMV (Austria) maintain 20–30% contractor takes in Sirte Basin concessions. ConocoPhillips (USA) holds a parallel 16.33% in Waha. Algerian Sonatrach advances exploration in Ghadames Basin blocks 95/96. The NOC’s 2025 bid round for 22 blocks remains in evaluation, with no final awards announced as of 16 November 2025.
| Domain | Key Verified Fact | Exact Figure / Status | Primary Source & Live Link | Date of Source | Regional / Actor Specificity | Implications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Political Authority | Internationally recognized government | Government of National Unity (GNU) – Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba | UNSMIL Political Roadmap Link | August 2025 | Tripoli & western Libya | Nominal executive authority, no unified military command |
| Political Authority | Parallel eastern administration | House of Representatives (Tobruk) + Government of National Stability (GNS) | Security Council Resolution 2796 (2025) Link | 31 Oct 2025 | Benghazi / Tobruk | Recognized by LNA and eastern tribes |
| Ceasefire & Foreign Forces | Permanent ceasefire signed | 23 October 2020 Geneva agreement (5+5 JMC) | Ceasefire Agreement PDF Link | 23 Oct 2020 | Nationwide | Holding but foreign fighters/mercenaries still present |
| Ceasefire & Foreign Forces | Foreign fighter withdrawal status | Not completed – repeated SC demands | Resolution 2796 (2025) & SRSG Tetteh remarks Link | 21 Aug 2025 | Nationwide | Persistent violation |
| Arms Embargo | Embargo established | Resolution 1970 (2011) – still active | SIPRI Embargo Database Link | Ongoing | Nationwide | Longest active mandatory UN embargo |
| Arms Embargo | Latest Panel of Experts public report | S/2024/914 – 11 supply chains documented | UN Digital Library Link | Dec 2024 | Nationwide | No public 2025 report released |
| Arms Embargo | High-seas inspection authorization | Renewed to 30 Nov 2026 | Resolution 2780 (2025) Link | 31 Mar 2025 | Off Libyan coast | Indicates ongoing maritime violations |
| Arms Embargo | Panel mandate extension | Until 15 May 2026 | Resolution 2769 (2025) Link | 16 Jan 2025 | Nationwide | Asset-freeze modifications for LIA |
| Military Mapping – West | Dominant armed groups | RADA, 444 Brigade, Stability Support Apparatus, 301st Brigade | UNSMIL briefings (no public inventory) | 2025 | Tripoli, Misrata, Zawiya | Hybrid, autonomous, nominally under GNU |
| Military Mapping – East | Dominant armed group | Libyan National Army (LNA) – Gen. Khalifa Haftar | SIPRI & UNSMIL | 2025 | Cyrenaica, most of Fezzan | Centralised command |
| Military Mapping – South | Ethnic-based forces | Tuareg & Toubou units | UNSMIL ceasefire monitoring | 2025 | Fezzan (Ubari, Ghat, Sabha) | Semi-autonomous border security |
| Oil Production | Average daily production 2025 | 1.2–1.4 million b/d | NOC monthly reports & IMF Article IV | 2025 | Nationwide | Recovered from blockades |
| Oil Production | Proven reserves | 48.4 billion barrels | BP Statistical Review (last 2024) | 2024 | Nationwide | Largest in Africa |
| Oil Production | Share of exports / GDP | 95% exports, 60% nominal GDP | IMF 2025 Article IV Link | Jun 2025 | Nationwide | Extreme dependency |
| Major Oil Operators | Eni (Italy) | 50% Mellitah Oil & Gas + $8 bn Structures A&E | NOC & Eni press | 2023–2025 | Offshore & west | Largest foreign gas producer |
| Major Oil Operators | TotalEnergies (France) | 16.33% Waha + 500 MW Sadada solar | NOC & TotalEnergies | 2020–2025 | Onshore & renewables | Key Waha partner |
| Major Oil Operators | Repsol, Wintershall Dea, OMV, ConocoPhillips | 20–30% working interests in various concessions | NOC partnerships page | Ongoing | Sirte, Murzuq | Legacy operators |
| Electricity Crisis | Installed capacity vs demand | 8,200 MW vs 14,834 MW peak | GECOL & World Bank | 2025 | Nationwide | Up to 12-hour daily blackouts |
| Electricity Crisis | Major ongoing power plants | 1,320 MW South Tripoli (Siemens/Çalık), 1,044 MW Zliten | GECOL contracts | 2017–2026 | Tripoli, Zliten | Gas-fired, delayed |
| Renewables | Total authorised solar 2025 | ~4.2 GW (Sadada 500 MW, Alpha Dhabi 2 GW, others) | REAOL & company announcements | 2025 | Various | Only 1 MW Kufra operational |
| Infrastructure – Highway | Executed 2025 contract | Todini Costruzioni Generali – sub-lot 4.3 (160 km) + 4.2 (131 km) – €700 million | AGI & LANA Link | 6 Nov 2025 | Coastal west (Al-Azizia → Ras Jedir) | First major 2008 Treaty activation |
| Infrastructure – Other | Executed major non-highway contracts 2025 | None verified in public sources | World Bank, AfDB, UNSMIL | 2025 | Nationwide | Only MoUs (Benghazi June 2025) |
| Fiscal Situation | Projected 2025 surplus | 8.7% of GDP | African Development Bank | Nov 2024 | Nationwide | Oil-price dependent |
| Fiscal Situation | Capital expenditure drop | -77.8% in 2024 | World Bank Overview | 2025 | Nationwide | No unified budget since 2020 |
| Migration & Trafficking | Central Mediterranean deaths 2025 (Jan–Oct) | 1,548 | IOM | Oct 2025 | Departure from Libya | Libyan coast main route |
| UNSMIL Mandate | Current mandate duration | Until 31 October 2026 | Resolution 2796 (2025) | 31 Oct 2025 | Nationwide | Strongest SC backing since 2011 |
| Political Roadmap | Current UN plan | Elections within 12–18 months, new unified government | SRSG Tetteh 21 Aug 2025 remarks | Aug 2025 | Nationwide | Only viable path forward |
